


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Sudan: Country Report

Updated Country Report on Darfur

January 2020 (COI between 2 December 2018 and 10 December 2019)

Commissioned by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Division of International Protection. UNHCR is not responsible for, nor does it endorse, its content. Any views expressed are solely those of the authors.

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Explanatory Note

This report presents country of origin information (COI) on Darfur between 2nd December 2018 and 10th December 2019 on issues identified by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), to be of relevance in refugee status determination for Sudanese nationals. This report is an update of Asylum Research Centre's (ARC) January 2019 publication [Sudan: Country Report, Country Report on Darfur](#), which in turn was an update of Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation's (ACCORD)'s [Darfur COI Compilation](#) of September 2017.

Only COI that specifically referred to the distinct profile groups as per the Terms of Reference was included.

The COI presented is illustrative, but not exhaustive of the information available in the public domain, nor is it determinative of any individual human rights or asylum claim. All sources are publicly available and a direct hyperlink has been provided.

A list of sources and databases consulted is also provided in this report, to enable users to conduct further research and to conduct source assessments. Research focused on **events** from 2nd December 2018 until 10th December 2019. Annual reports covering the situation in 2018 have been included when they were the most recent available from certain sources. All sources were accessed in December 2019 and January 2020.

The following reports which post-date the cut-off point have been included given that they address issues of relevance from this report:

- ❖ REDRESS and African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [A Way Forward? Anti-torture reforms in Sudan in the post-Bashir era](#), 19 December 2019
- ❖ Radio Dabanga, [Darfur farmers present report on herder attacks](#), 24 December 2019
- ❖ Sudan Tribune, [Sudan, armed groups sign framework agreement for peace in Darfur](#), 28 December 2019
- ❖ Sudan Tribune, [Sudan, armed groups sign framework agreement for peace in Darfur](#), 29 December 2019
- ❖ Sudan Tribune, [Sudan dispatches troops to end tribal violence in West Darfur](#), 30 December 2019
- ❖ Radio Dabanga, [70+ dead or injured in bloody West Darfur tribal violence](#), 31 December 2019
- ❖ Sudan Tribune, [Sudanese government delegations visit Darfur states after tribal clashes](#), 1 January 2020
- ❖ Al Jazeera, [Dozens killed in violence in Sudan's West Darfur state](#), 2 January 2020
- ❖ Radio Dabanga, [Hamdok, Hemeti, visit strife-torn West Darfur](#), 2 January 2020
- ❖ UN News, [Sudan: Intercommunal clashes displace tens of thousands in volatile Darfur region](#), 7 January 2020

This document is intended to be used as a tool to help to identify relevant COI and the COI referred to in this report can be considered by decision makers in assessing asylum applications and appeals. **This report is not a substitute for individualised case-specific research and therefore this document should not be submitted in isolation as evidence to refugee decision-making authorities.** Whilst every attempt has been made to ensure accuracy, the authors accept no responsibility for any errors included in this report.

Note that humanitarian access and the ability to conduct human rights research in Darfur is limited as exemplified by the following illustrative sources:

- ❖ UNOCHA, [2019 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Sudan](#), As of 13 March 2019
[...] Protection risks [...]

In Darfur, UNAMID's downsizing has reduced its monitoring and reporting capacity [...]

❖ ACAPS, [*Crisis in Sight, Humanitarian Access*](#), May 2019

[...] Sudan

Humanitarian access remains restricted, especially in conflict areas. The security situation has become more unpredictable since a new military regime took power in April 2019, posing access risks [...]. In Jebel Marra, Darfur, UNAMID personnel were sporadically denied access to conflict areas due to insecurity. UNAMID's retreat reduces safe access as fighting between government forces and the Sudan Liberation Movement – Abdel Wahid al-Nur (SLM-AW) continues. Humanitarian travel policies were eased in 2016, but administrative procedures still present obstacles. Mines, explosive remnants and poor roads hamper assistance. The economic crisis and countrywide lack of fuel and hard currency hamper aid delivery and access to aid [...]

❖ Amnesty International, [*Sudan: Fresh evidence of government-sponsored crimes in Darfur shows drawdown of peacekeepers premature and reckless*](#), 11 June 2019

[...] Despite severe government restrictions on access to Jebel Marra for journalists, independent human rights monitors, and UNAMID, Amnesty International has been able to confirm recent attacks against the region's civilians, much of which have gone unreported by the mission [...]

❖ Human Rights Watch, [*Sudan: End Network Shutdown Immediately, Internet Vital for Safety, Communications in Crisis*](#), 12 June 2019

Sudan's ongoing internet shutdown is a gross violation of human rights and should be lifted immediately, Human Rights Watch said today. Disruptions to access escalated over the past week and the country is now almost entirely cut off from the internet, after forces violently attacked and dispersed protesters.

The authorities should immediately restore access to the internet. It is vital for emergency communications, including information from health care providers, and to access other basic information in times of crisis [...]

The shutdown has resulted in wide-ranging harm. The outage has prevented activists and residents from reporting critical information about the volatile situation in Sudan, where government forces led by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces – known for their abusive campaigns in Darfur, Southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile – have reportedly continued to commit abuses following the June 3 attack [...]

Before the current shutdowns, Sudan's government had blocked access to social media platforms – including Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and the messaging service WhatsApp – intermittently between December 2018 and April 2019 [...]

❖ ACAPS, [*Sudan, Escalation of violence*](#), 17 June 2019

[...] Access is very limited in Sudan. Many humanitarian workers were evacuated from Khartoum and elsewhere following the escalation of violence at the beginning of June. Humanitarian operations, especially in Darfur, have been suspended until security improves. Road blocks, strikes at ports and administrative burdens challenge the delivery of aid. The Internet has been shut down since 10 June [2019] [...]

❖ ACAPS, [*Crisis in Sight, Humanitarian Access*](#), October 2019

[...] Sudan

Humanitarian access deteriorated during the escalation of protests in June 2019, when security forces raided demonstrations, resulting in significant operational constraints. Humanitarian operations remain restricted in conflict areas [...]. In Jebel Marra, Darfur, the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) personnel were sporadically denied access to conflict areas due to insecurity. Humanitarian travel policies were eased in 2016, but administrative procedures still present obstacles. Mines, explosive remnants and poor roads hamper assistance. [...]

Sources and databases consulted

Not all of the sources listed here have been consulted for each issue addressed in the report. Additional sources to those individually listed were consulted via database searches. This non-exhaustive list is intended to assist in further case-specific research. To find out more about an organisation, view the 'About Us' tab of a source's website.

Databases

[Asylos's Research Notes](#)

[EASO COI Portal](#)

[European Country of Origin Information Network \(ECOI\)](#)

[Relief Web](#)

[UNHCR Refworld](#)

News

[Afril News](#)

[All Africa](#)

[Al Jazeera](#)

[The East African](#)

[Gurtong](#)

[Inter Press Service](#)

[The New Humanitarian](#) [Sudan pages]

[Radio Dabanga](#)

[Radio Miraya](#)

[Radio Tamazuj](#)

[Reuters Africa](#) [Sudan pages]

[Sudan Tribune](#)

Sources

[28 too Many](#) [FGM]

[76 Crimes](#) [LGBT]

[Aidsmap](#)

[Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project \(ACLED\)](#) [Sudan pages]

[Article 19](#) [Freedom of expression and information]

[Aegis Trust](#)

[African Arguments](#) [Sudan pages]

[African Studies Centre Leiden](#)

[Africa Center for Strategic Studies](#)

[African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes \(ACCORD\)](#)

[African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies \(ACJPS\)](#)

[Africa Review](#)

[African Union Peace and Security Council](#)

[Alliance for Child Protection in Humanitarian Action](#)

[Amnesty International](#) [Sudan pages]

[Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit \(ATLEU\)](#)

[Assessment Capacities Project \(ACAPS\)](#) [Sudan pages]

[Association for the Prevention of Torture](#)

[Atlantic Council](#)

[Atlas of Torture](#)

[Avert](#) [HIV/AIDS]

[Brookings Institution](#)
[Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies](#) [Sudan pages]
[Carnegie Endowment for International Peace](#)
[Centre for Security Governance](#)
[Centre for Strategic and International Studies](#)
[Child Rights International Network](#) [Sudan pages]
[Christian Solidarity Worldwide](#)
[The Christian Post](#)
[CHR Michelsen Institute](#) [Sudan pages]
[CIA World Factbook](#) [Sudan pages]
[Combatting Terrorism Center](#)
[Committee to Protect Journalists](#) [Sudan pages]
[Darfur Network for Monitoring and Documentation](#)
[Darfur Women Action Group](#)
[Death Penalty Worldwide \(Cornell Law School\)](#)
[Displacement Tracking Matrix \(DTM\)](#) [Sudan pages]
[Doctors Without Borders](#)
[The Economist Intelligence Unit](#) [Sudan pages]
[EASO's List of sources in its report 'Researching the situation of lesbian, gay, and bisexual persons \(LGBT\) in countries of origin'](#)
[Edge Media Network](#) [LGBT]
[Eldis](#)
[Enough Project](#)
[Equal Rights Trust](#)
[Eric Reeves, Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy](#)
[European Council on Foreign Relations \(ECFR\)](#)
[European Institute of the Mediterranean \(IEMed\)](#)
[Foreign Affairs \(published by Council on Foreign Relations\)](#) [Sudan pages]
[Freedom House – Freedom in the World 2019](#) [Sudan pages]
[Frontline Defenders](#)
[Gay Star News](#)
[Global Aids Program Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation](#)
[Global Centre for the responsibility to protect](#)
[Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack](#) [Sudan pages]
[The Global Forum on MSM and HIV](#)
[Global Fund for Peace](#)
[Global Gayz](#)
[Global Initiative on Psychiatry](#)
[GlobalSecurity.org](#)
[Governance Social Development Humanitarian Conflict \(GSDRC\)](#)
[Hands off Cain](#)
[Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research](#)
[Hudo Centre](#)
[Humanitarian Response](#) [Sudan pages]
[Hudson Institute](#)
[Humanitarian Aid Relief Trust](#) [Sudan pages]
[Humanity & Inclusion](#) [formerly Handicap International]
[Human Rights Watch](#) [Sudan pages]
[Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan/Small Arms Survey](#)
[Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada](#)
[Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa](#)

[Institute for Economics & Peace – Global Peace Index 2018](#)
[Institute for the Study of War](#)
[Institute for War and Peace Reporting](#)
[Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre \(IDMC\)](#) [Sudan pages]
[Inter-African Committees on Traditional Practices](#)
[International Alert](#)
[International Bar Association](#)
[International Centre for Prison Studies](#)
[International Commission of Jurists](#)
[International Committee of the Red Cross \(ICRC\)](#)
[International Crisis Group](#)
[International Disability Alliance](#)
[International Federation for Human Rights](#) [Africa pages]
[International Federation of Journalists](#)
[International Freedom of Expression Exchange](#)
[International Institute for Strategic Studies](#)
[International Labour Organisation \(ILO\)](#) [Sudan pages]
[International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Trans and Intersex Association \(ILGA\)](#)
[International Organization for Migration \(IOM\)](#)
[International Office for Migration Sudan Mission](#)
[International Refugee Rights Initiative](#)
[International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims](#)
[International Rescue Committee](#)
[IPI Global Observatory](#)
[Jamestown Foundation](#)
[Kaleidoscope Trust](#) [LGBT]
[Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor](#)
[Long War Journal](#)
[Medecins Sans Frontieres/Doctors Without Borders](#) [Sudan pages]
[Minority Rights Group International](#)
[Minorities at Risk Project](#)
[National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism \(START\) – Global Terrorism Database \(GTD\)](#)
[Nuba Relief, Rehabilitation and Development Organization](#)
[Nuba Reports](#)
[Oakland Institute](#)
[OECD's Social Institutions & Gender Index](#)
[Open Society Foundations](#)
[Orchid Project](#) [FGM]
[Organization for Refuge, Asylum & Migration \(ORAM\)](#)
[Out Right Action International](#) [LGBT]
[Overseas Development Institute \(ODI\)](#)
[Oxfam](#)
[Peace Women](#)
[Penal Reform International](#)
[Physicians for Human Rights](#)
[Pink News](#) [LGBT]
[Refugees International](#)
[Rift Valley Institute](#)
[Reporters Without Borders](#)
[Right to Education](#)

[Saferworld](#)
[Save the Children](#)
[Sexual Rights Initiative](#) [LGBT]
[Small Arms Survey](#)
[SOGICA Database](#) [LGBT]
[South Kordofan Blue Nile Coordination Unit \(SKBLCU\)](#)
[Sudan Democracy First Group](#)
[Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa](#)
[Sudan Consortium](#)
[Sudan Social Development Organisation](#)
[Stop FGM Now](#)
[Their World](#)
[Transparency International](#)
[UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office](#) [Annual Human Rights Report 2018]
[UNAMID](#) (UN African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur)
[United Nations Children's Fund \(UNICEF\)](#) [Sudan pages]
[United Nations Committee Against Torture](#)
[United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights](#)
[United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women](#)
[United Nations Committee on Enforced Disappearances](#)
[United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child](#)
[United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities](#)
[United Nations Development Programme \(UNDP\)](#)
[United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees \(UNHCR\)](#)
[United Nations Human Rights Council](#)
[United Nations Human Settlements Programme \(UNHABITAT\)](#)
[United Nations Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan](#)
[United Nations News Centre](#)
[United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs \(UNOCHA\)](#)
[United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights \(OHCHR\)](#)
[United Nations Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict](#)
[United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime \(UNODC\)](#)
[United Nations Population Fund \(UNPFPA\)](#)
[United Nations Secretary General](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this context](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to education](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially in women and children](#)
[United Nations Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences](#)
[United Nations Women](#)

[United Nations World Food Programme \(WFP\)](#)
[United States Institute of Peace](#)
[United States Congressional Research Service](#)
[United States Department of State](#) [Annual human rights report; annual religious report; annual child labour report; annual trafficking report; annual terrorism report]
[Unrepresented Nations and People's Organisation](#)
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[Women Under Siege Project](#)
[World Bank](#) [Sudan pages]
[World Health Organisation \(WHO\)](#) [Sudan pages]
[Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict](#)
[World Organisation Against Torture](#)
[World Prison Brief](#)
[Women Living Under Muslim Laws](#)
[Women News Network \(WNN\)](#)
[Women's Refugee Commission](#)
[WorldWatch Monitor](#) [Sudan pages]

List of Acronyms

ACAPS	Assessment Capacity Project
ACCORD	African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
ACJPS	African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies
ACLED	Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
CMR	Clinical Management of rape
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CSO	Civil Society Organisations
DDPD	Doha Document for Peace in Darfur
DTM	Displacement Tracking Matrix
ERCC	Emergency Response Coordination Centre
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FEWS NET	Famine Early Warning Systems Network
FFC	Forces for Freedom and Change
FGM/C	Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting
FIDH	International Federation for Human Rights
GoS	Government of Sudan
HAC	Humanitarian Aid Commission
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
ILGA	International lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IPC	Integrated Phase Classification
LGBTQI	Lesbian, gay, Bisexual, Transexual, Queer, Intersex
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
MI	Military Intelligence
NCP	National Congress Party
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NISS	National Intelligence and Security Service
NTC	National Telecommunications Corporation
PDF	Popular Defense Forces
PHK	Personal Hygiene Kit
PSS	Psychosocial support
RRC	Return and Reconstruction Commission
RSF	Rapid Support Forces
SAF	Sudanese Armed Forces
SCCED	Special Criminal Court on the Events in Darfur
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
SLA	Sudan Liberation Army
SLA-AW	Sudan Liberation Army led by Abdul Wahid al-Nur
SLM	Sudan Liberation Movement
SLM-AW	Sudan Liberation Movement led by Abdul Wahid al-Nur
SLM-MM	Sudan Liberation Movement led by Minni Minnawie
SLM-TC	SLM Transitional Council
SMOH	State Ministry of Health
SPLA-N	Sudan People's Liberation Army-North

SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SRCS	Sudanese Red Crescent Society
SRF	Sudan Revolutionary Forces
TMC	Transitional Military Council
UASC	Unaccompanied and separated children
UNAMID	United Nations African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
WFP	World Food Program
WHO	World Health Organisation

1. Security situation in Darfur since December 2018

The Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research's 2018 Conflict Barometer assessed that the situation in Darfur was at the highest intensity level (5), categorized as 'war':

The war over subnational predominance and resources between various ethnic African armed groups, organized under the alliance Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), on the one hand, and the Arab-affiliated Sudanese government, the Sudanese military, and government-backed ethnic Arab paramilitary groups, on the other hand, continued in its 15th consecutive year on war-level.

The armed groups of SRF mainly come from ethnic African tribes, who constitute the majority of Darfur's population. The SRF has been fighting the government since 2003, accusing it of oppressing the African population in Darfur region and of affiliating with Arab armed groups. The SRF comprised the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and its two main factions which are led by Abdul Wahid al-Nur (SLM-AW) and by Minni Minnawie (SLM-MM), the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), as well as the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), primarily active in the states of Blue Nile and South Kordofan. [...]

The government of the Sudan mainly acted through the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the Sudanese Air Force, as well as paramilitary forces, namely the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and the Border Guards. Fighters of these paramilitary forces were, inter alia, recruited among the Janjaweed, a group of nomadic Arab fighters.[...]

Throughout the year, the conflict parties did not agree on a permanent ceasefire but regularly extended temporary cessations of hostilities. President Omar al-Bashir renewed a 2017 unilateral ceasefire for Darfur, Blue Nile, and South Kordofan three times in 2018, extending it until the end of the year. Similarly, the militant movements JEM, SLM-MM, and SLM-TC [SLM Transitional Council] extended the unilateral cessation of hostilities several times, last time until February 2019.¹

The Global Fund for Peace's 2019 Fragile States Index ranked Sudan 8th of 108 countries and categorised it as 'high alert' with a score of 108 (out of a maximum of 120).²

In an April 2019 article The Jamestown Foundation explained that following the coup, the Transitional Military Council (TMC) was formed under Lieutenant General 'Abd al-Fattah al-Burhan.³ The same source further noted that:

Al-Burhan's appointment as head of the TMC has angered many in Darfur, who accuse him of being "the architect of the genocide" in Darfur and regard his new role as "a play of the Islamists to retain power" (Radio Dabanga, April 15). Burhan is well known in Darfur for his threats to exterminate the Fur people. A leading Darfur rebel, 'Abd al-Wahid al-Nur (Fur), said that the Sudan "we dream of, cannot come through these racists like 'Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan, Awad Ibn Awf, Omar al-Bashir and their ilk" (Sudan Tribune, April 16) [...] there are reports of escalating violence in Darfur, where hundreds of thousands of displaced indigenous Africans see an opportunity to take revenge on regime associates and reclaim land seized by the regime and given to Arab settlers, many from outside Sudan (Al-Jazeera, April 17).⁴

According to an April 2019 paper published by Tufts University, there are diverging views on the drivers of the Darfur conflict:

In the past decade, international perspectives on the drivers of conflict in Darfur have tended to polarize around two widely held views. First, the socio-political view focuses on the social, political,

¹ Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, [2018 Conflict Barometer](#), February 2019, *Sudan (Darfur)* p. 92

² Global Fund for Peace, [Fragile States Index 2019](#), April 2019, *2019 Scores* p. 8

³ The Jamestown Foundation, ['Old Wine in Old Bottles?' A Security Q and A on Post-Coup Sudan](#), 22 April 2019

⁴ The Jamestown Foundation, ['Old Wine in Old Bottles?' A Security Q and A on Post-Coup Sudan](#), 22 April 2019

and economic marginalization of Darfur and the role of the government—their policies and counterinsurgency campaign—and the way they have manipulated Darfur actors, leading to the International Criminal Court (ICC) warrant for the arrest of the President of Sudan.

Second, the environmental security view attributes the Darfur conflict to environmental factors: conflict between tribes over land and natural resources made scarcer by a changing climate.⁵

In April 2019 UN News reported that the UN Security Council was told that “Security across the volatile Darfur region of Sudan has deteriorated since last week’s military takeover in Khartoum [...] some internally-displaced people, or IDPs in Darfur – where military action by the former president against civilians led to war crimes charges against him by the International Criminal Court a decade ago – had ‘engaged in violent acts’ targeting Government locations, and those seen as collaborators with the former regime”.⁶

The May 2019 UN Special Report on the strategic assessment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur reported with regards to the security situation that:

Overall, the impact of the recent political developments on the security situation in Darfur has been moderate, despite a peak in violence in several camps for internally displaced persons and fractures within State security forces in the immediate aftermath of the events of 11 April. In general, the security situation remained relatively stable, with little disruption in the trends observed since 2016. Overall, Darfur has evolved into a post-conflict setting characterized by fragile public institutions, facing challenges owing to criminality, a protracted humanitarian crisis and lack of development. Important conflict drivers related to access to land and resources, climate change and environmental degradation and violations of human rights must be addressed further.⁷

UN News reported in mid-June 2019 that “The joint African Union-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), is suspending the handover of any more camps for displaced civilians to the Sudanese military, against a backdrop of worsening violence and insecurity across the country”.⁸ Andrew Gilmour, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights, told the UN Security Council that:

[...] though violence between militias had decreased, the human rights situation overall had got worse, “with increased reports of killings, abduction, sexual violence and other violations.” The “ripple effect” from the killings and abuse in Khartoum was real, he said, noting that 47 had been killed, with 186 injured in various parts of Darfur in the past three months of national upheaval. In the last two months, 163 civilians had been arrested and detained in relation to protests in Darfur, and the Human Rights Section of UNAMID “has received accounts of intensified harassment of civilians and looting of houses and livestock by Rapid Support Forces”, noted Mr. Gilmour. “We believe that many cases in Darfur remain invisible and under-reported due to lack of access to some parts of the region”, he said, adding that in “an atmosphere of violence and uncertainty, upholding the priorities

⁵ CAFOD - Catholic Agency for Overseas Development, CRS - Catholic Relief Services, UMCOR - United Methodist Committee on Relief, et al. (Author), published by Tufts University - Feinstein International Center, [*Lessons for Taadoud II: Improving Natural Resource Management*](#), April 2019, Part 2. *Livelihoods, conflict, power, and institutions* p. 13

⁶ UN News, [*Violence on the rise in Darfur following Sudan military takeover, but UN-AU peacekeeping mission maintains ‘robust posture’*](#), 17 April 2019

⁷ UN Security Council, [*Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic assessment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*](#), 30 May 2019, para. 5

⁸ UN News, [*UN suspending handover of camps in Darfur, peacekeeping chief tells Security Council*](#), 14 June 2019

of the protection of civilians and of human rights in the mandate of UNAMID, is of paramount significance”.⁹

Also in June 2019, the African Union Peace and Security Council expressed concern “over the drastic change on security and political developments in the Sudan which has contributed to the deterioration of the security situation in Darfur and has the potential to directly impact the achievements that have been witnessed in Darfur”.¹⁰

In a June 2019 report, the U.S. Institute of Peace noted that “In all states, governors have been replaced by military appointees. In many states, the reconfiguration of security actors—the army, the paramilitary National Intelligence and Security Service, and affiliated state security forces, such as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which played a leading role in the violence in Khartoum on Monday—may be the most important long-term change in Sudan in years, in what has long been one of Africa’s most heavily securitized states. Nowhere is this reconfiguration more acute than in Darfur, where an imperfect peace deal, and a near-moribund peace process, stumble on”.¹¹

Similarly, the International Peace Institute reported in June 2019 that “While violence and insecurity in Sudan’s Darfur region have noticeably decreased in recent years, the ongoing peace process has stalled, security gains are tenuous, and the underlying causes of conflict have not been resolved. Meanwhile, the country’s uncertain political transition—the removal of President Omar al-Bashir from power in April 2019, the installment of the extraconstitutional Transitional Military Council (TMC), and the ongoing negotiations over its handover to civilian rule—has had significant political and security implications for the Darfur region”.¹² The same source further described:

One of the main justifications for the drawdown of UNAMID has been the notable improvement in the security situation in Darfur. In general, violence in Darfur has decreased significantly since 2014 and 2015, and the UN has not observed significant reversals of security gains in areas UNAMID has vacated. However, these gains remain fragile and uncertain, as underscored by several participants. Nearly two million people remain displaced in Darfur. Pockets of violence continue to flare up in Jebel Marra, where clashes between the Sudan Armed Forces and the Sudan Liberation Army– Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW) continue. Several opposition parties and armed groups are waiting to see what happens during the political transition. Rising instability in neighboring Chad and Libya raises the risk that violence in the region will become intractable: for example, there is already evidence of collaboration between armed groups in Darfur and Libyan General Khalifa Haftar’s forces in southern Libya.¹³

The UN Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan noted in his July 2019 report that “The series of protests and the responses by the Government and security forces starting in December 2018 also influenced the Darfur peace process”.¹⁴ The same source further noted:

⁹ UN News, [*UN suspending handover of camps in Darfur, peacekeeping chief tells Security Council*](#), 14 June 2019

¹⁰ African Union Peace and Security Council, [*The 856th meeting of the Peace and Security Council on the activities of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur \(UNAMID\) and the situation in Darfur*](#), 13 June 2019

¹¹ U.S. Institute of Peace, [*In Downsizing the UN–AU Mission in Darfur, First Do No Harm*](#), 4 June 2019

¹² International Peace Institute, [*Prioritization and Sequencing of Security Council Mandates: The Case of UNAMID*](#), June 2019

¹³ International Peace Institute, [*Prioritization and Sequencing of Security Council Mandates: The Case of UNAMID*](#), June 2019

¹⁴ UN Human Rights Council, [*Situation of human rights in the Sudan Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan*](#), 26 July 2019, para. 41

Although a prenegotiation agreement had been signed by the Justice and Equality Movement, the Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi and the Government of the Sudan on 6 December [2018], the Darfuri signatory movements suspended their participation in the follow-up negotiations in solidarity with the protesters. Many armed movements from Darfur became constituent members of the Forces for Freedom and Change, welcomed the fall of President al-Bashir supported demands for a civilian-led transitional government, but they had yet to articulate a coherent position on their role in the transition by the end of June. Reports also suggest that on 27 June [2019] in Chad, under the auspices of the President of Chad, Idriss Déby, an understanding on cessation of hostilities was reached between the Deputy Chair of the Transitional Military Council, Lieutenant General Dagalo, and representatives of the Sudan Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement”.¹⁵

In a July 2019 briefing, the U.S. Congressional Research Service assessed that “The uncertainty regarding the political situation in Khartoum has implications for the protracted conflict in Darfur”.¹⁶ It further explained:

Peace remains elusive in the Darfur region, where over 2 million people remain displaced (in addition to those displaced internally, there are over 330,000 Darfuri refugees in Chad). Sporadic skirmishes, intercommunal violence, and attacks on peacekeepers, aid workers, and civilians have persisted, despite a cessation of hostilities declared by the government in mid-2016. That declaration came toward the end of a large-scale offensive against rebels in which the RSF and other security forces were implicated in gross human rights abuses.

The U.N.-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), once one of the world’s largest peacekeeping operations, has been drawing down its forces, despite concerns expressed by human rights advocates that a decision in 2017 to cut troops reflected a “false narrative about Darfur’s war ending.”

Under pressure from Khartoum, the Security Council in 2018 set a tentative exit date for the mission of June 30, 2020, prior to which facilities were to be handed over to Sudanese authorities. The Council declared UNAMID’s exit contingent on the security situation. [...]

Several recent incidents suggest security conditions for U.N. and aid operations are worsening. In May [2019], UNAMID’s West Darfur headquarters were looted on the eve of its scheduled handover, with military and police personnel implicated in the incident. In June [2019], World Vision and World Food Program facilities in South Darfur were looted and vandalized. The United Nations reports that most of the facilities that UNAMID has closed as part of its drawdown to date have been occupied by security forces (the sites were supposed to be handed over to the government to be used for civilian purposes). An internal UNAMID review of 10 closed sites indicates that nine are being used specifically by the RSF. In June [2019], the TMC demanded that remaining bases be handed over directly to the RSF; the AU rejected the order, which the TMC has since reversed.¹⁷

ACCORD compiled the number of conflict incidents by province of Sudan in the first six months of 2019, based on Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)’s data.¹⁸ It advises “to employ extreme caution when using fatality numbers” given that “Most of the data collected by ACLED is gathered based on publicly available, secondary reports. It may therefore underestimate the volume of events. Fatality data particularly is vulnerable to bias and inaccurate reporting, and ACLED states

¹⁵ UN Human Rights Council, [Situation of human rights in the Sudan Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan](#), 26 July 2019, para. 41

¹⁶ Congressional Research Service, [Sudan’s Uncertain Transition](#), 17 July 2019

¹⁷ Congressional Research Service, [Sudan’s Uncertain Transition](#), 17 July 2019

¹⁸ ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin & Asylum Research and Documentation, [Sudan, first half year 2019: Update on incidents according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project \(ACLED\)](#), 19 December 2019

to use the most conservative estimate available”.¹⁹ It provided the following with regards to the five Darfur states:

In Central Darfur, 56 incidents killing 100 people were reported. The following locations were among the affected: Bindisi, Boulay, Daya, Deleig, Dursa, Garsila, Golo, Jadeed, Jebel Marrah, Korare, Manabu, Mukjar, Umm Dukhun, Zalingei.

In East Darfur, 8 incidents killing 2 people were reported. The following locations were among the affected: Arid, Ed Daein, Hejlilj. [...]

In North Darfur, 54 incidents killing 15 people were reported. The following locations were among the affected: Abdel Shakur, Dali, Dobo Umda, El Fasher, Hashaba, Kabkabia, Kadareik, Kassab Camp, Katur, Kebkabiya, Khazan Tungur, Kutum, Masri, Naro, Rogli, Tabit, Tawila, Tunjur, Zamzam. [...]

In South Darfur, 32 incidents killing 23 people were reported. The following locations were among the affected: Faluja, Feina, Gereida, Kalma, Kass, Nyala, Saboon El Fag, Tono, Tullus. [...]

In West Darfur, 31 incidents killing 31 people were reported. The following locations were among the affected: Al Kereinik, Babanosa, Djedid, El Geneina, Foro Burunga, Hijleahjah, Jebel Mun, Kuru Kuru, Nouri, Umm Dukhun, Umtajok.²⁰

In ACLED’s mid-year update ‘Ten conflicts to worry about in 2019’ published in August 2019 it argued that:

Since the agreement between the FFC [Forces for Freedom and Change] and TMC [Transitional Military Council] was reached, violence has intensified in parts of Darfur. Closer focus on the peripheries may be required to ensure that events in Khartoum do not deflect attention from the troubled hinterlands of Sudan, which – despite spikes in violence – have been largely overshadowed by the momentous events in the capital. This continued instability can be expected to only spread – across the country and the region – as 2019 continues.²¹

The Darfur Women Action Group expressed in mid-August 2019 its “outrage at the continued acts of violence that are being perpetrated by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). It is inexcusable that on [...] the day the New Constitution was signed, the RSF continued its attacks against innocent civilians in Jebel Marra in Darfur. The attack has left three dead and two critically wounded”.²²

In an October 2019 publication, the International Crisis Group assessed that “The fall of Bashir presents a rare opportunity to end Sudan’s long-running internal wars”.²³ The source further noted:

The two most powerful rebel leaders – Abdelaziz al-Hilu and Abdul-Wahid al-Nur of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North and the Sudan Liberation Movement, respectively – are unlikely to quickly join the government. Nur, in particular, has already denounced the new government in Khartoum. [...]

Dealing with the splintered Darfuri factions may require a special effort, not least because of the rise of Hemedti, whose RSF now controls most of the region and is loathed by many Darfuris. Most of the active Darfuri rebel groups are now outside the country, primarily in Libya, where they fight on multiple sides of that nation’s conflict. Sudanese authorities should urge these groups to engage

¹⁹ ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin & Asylum Research and Documentation, [Sudan, first halfyear 2019: Update on incidents according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project \(ACLED\)](#), 19 December 2019

²⁰ ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin & Asylum Research and Documentation, [Sudan, first halfyear 2019: Update on incidents according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project \(ACLED\)](#), 19 December 2019

²¹ ALCED, [Mid-Year Update: Ten Conflicts to Worry about in 2019](#), 7 August 2019

²² Darfur Women Action Group, [Continued Violence in Darfur Over the Weekend](#), 19 August 2019

²³ International Crisis Group, [Safeguarding Sudan’s Revolution](#), 21 October 2019, *B. Seizing the Moment to End Sudan’s Internal Wars*

seriously in the talks. The AU and EU should offer technical support for the initiative to help parties formulate a roadmap for sustainable peace.²⁴

In mid-October Jean Pierre Lacroix, UN Peacekeeping chief told the UN Security Council that “Despite major political developments at a national level, which have led to the establishment of a civilian-led government, the security situation in the Darfur region of Sudan remains unstable [...] incidents of criminality in Darfur have increased [...] and there has been an increase in the number of farms destroyed”.²⁵

At the end of October 2019, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 2495, “which extends UNAMID’s mandate until 31 October 2020. It maintains the current troop ceilings of 4,050 military and 2,500 police personnel until 31 March 2020” when the council will review the mandate.²⁶

ACLED, reporting on the first week of December 2019 observed that “armed pastoralists and unknown gunmen engaged in several violent incidents throughout Darfur, marking a considerable increase compared to previous weeks. This is a worrying development, and partially confirms fears that the political re-ordering taking place in Khartoum is driving instability in Sudan’s peripheries”.²⁷

A December 2019 International Federation for Human Rights and African Center for Justice and Peace Studies report stated with regards to the security situation in Darfur:

Security remains a major challenge in Darfur, where armed and political violence continued until recently, at significant levels. While the major armed groups have ceased military operations in the region, previous peace negotiations with the Government of Sudan (GoS) have failed to provide concrete and long-lasting achievements, and it is too early to predict the outcomes of the current South Sudan-sponsored talks in Juba that began in October between the transitional government, the rebel SPLM-North faction and two smaller Sudanese rebel groups.

Armed clashes continue in the Jebel Marra, mainly with elements from the Sudan Liberation Army/ Abdul Wahid al-Nur (SLA/AW), and the region remains home to multiple armed militias. Intercommunal violence continues unabated, causing severe civilian casualties. [...]

In other areas of Darfur, while clashes between armed forces have diminished, violence against civilians remains unabated. Cases of killings, rape and other forms of sexual violence, acts of torture, looting, mainly targeting civilians, continue to be reported throughout the region.²⁸

1.1 Clashes between government forces and armed opposition movements

The January 2019 Letter from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan to the President of the UN Security Council explained the conflict dynamics operating in Jebel Marra:

The main development in conflict dynamics in Darfur during the reporting period has been the resumption of heavy clashes between SLA/AW [Sudan Liberation Movement led by Abdul Wahid al-

²⁴ International Crisis Group, [Safeguarding Sudan’s Revolution](#), 21 October 2019, *B. Seizing the Moment to End Sudan’s Internal Wars*

²⁵ UN News, [Ongoing insecurity in Darfur, despite ‘remarkable developments’ in Sudan: UN peacekeeping chief](#), 17 October 2019

²⁶ UNAMID, [Opening remarks by UNAMID Joint Special Representative, Jeremiah Mamabolo, at a press conference held in Khartoum](#), 20 November 2019

²⁷ ACLED, [Regional Overview: 1-7 December 2019](#), 10 December 2019

²⁸ International Federation for Human Rights, African Center for Justice and Peace Studies, Sudan Human Rights Monitor, [Will There Be Justice for Darfur? Persisting impunity in the face of political change; Fact-finding mission report](#), December 2019, 1. *Civilians in Darfur Continue to Bear the Brunt of Insecurity* p. 19-22

Nur] and the security forces in several areas of south-eastern, western and northern Jebel Marra [...], after a relative lull for close to a year. SLA/AW, which controls mountainous, remote territories that are difficult for Government forces to access, has engaged in repeated hit-and-run attacks and ambushes on convoys and advanced bases of the security forces. The Government, for its part, has launched several military operations to dislodge the group from its remaining strongholds, using a combination of Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), RSF [Rapid Support Forces] and local Arab militias.²⁹

Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research's 2018 Conflict Barometer assessed that:

Throughout the year, fighting took place intermittently between government forces, backed by RSF, and SLM-AW, the only armed opposition group involved in recent fighting. These clashes were largely limited to Jebel Marra, a mountain range spanning over the three states of South, North, and Central Darfur. In some instances, violence spilled to other Darfuri areas.³⁰

A December 2019 International Federation for Human Rights and African Center for Justice and Peace Studies report stated with regards to the security situation in Darfur:

Clashes between Sudanese armed forces and SLA/AW as well as infighting within SLA/AW have also been reported since early 2019. Such clashes continued to primarily affect civilians who are forcibly displaced, often on multiple occasions, in search for shelter, food, medical care and other basic services.³¹

The UN Security Council report on UNAMID covering the period from 4 October 2018 to 3 January 2019 noted that "The security situation in Darfur has remained relatively stable, except for intermittent clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid (SLA/AW) faction in Jebel Marra that resulted in civilian displacement".³² The same source recorded that in Daya village in the south-west of Rockero, Central Darfur a clash between a Sudanese Armed Forces patrol and SLA/AW elements on 16 December [2018] was reported, resulting in the deaths of two Sudanese Armed Forces soldiers.³³

The subsequent UN Security Council report on UNAMID covering the period from 4 January to 3 April 2019 noted that:

The overall security situation in Darfur remained relatively stable, with the exception of Jebel Marra, where intermittent clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW) faction, as well as infighting within the rebel group, continued. While there was an increase in the number of incidents of fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and SLA-AW elements (from 9 episodes noted in my last progress report to 18 during the present period), they were on a smaller scale and involved mostly hit-and-run operations.

The trend is consistent with the encirclement of SLA-AW by the Sudanese Armed Forces in the Jebel Marra area and the increased pressure that it has applied on the insurgency, while an uptick in low-

²⁹ UN Security Council, [*Letter dated 10 January 2019 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 \(2005\) addressed to the President of the Security Council*](#), 10 January 2019, para. 44

³⁰ Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, [*2018 Conflict Barometer*](#), February 2019, *Sudan (Darfur)* p. 92

³¹ International Federation for Human Rights, African Center for Justice and Peace Studies, Sudan Human Rights Monitor, [*Will There Be Justice for Darfur? Persisting impunity in the face of political change; Fact-finding mission report*](#), December 2019, 1. *Civilians in Darfur Continue to Bear the Brunt of Insecurity* p. 22

³² UN Security Council, [*African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General*](#), 14 January 2019, para. 2

³³ UN Security Council, [*African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General*](#), 14 January 2019, para. 5

level attacks by SLA-AW may be an attempt to capitalize on the political and economic uncertainty since the start of the nationwide protest movement in December 2018.³⁴

Reporting on the cessation of hostilities announcements, the same report stated “On 28 January [2019], the President of the Sudan, Omer Hassan al-Bachir, announced an open-ended cessation of hostilities in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile, and the Sudanese Revolutionary Front, composed of SLA-MM, JEM/Gibril, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Transitional Council and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-North, led by Malik Agar, reciprocated by extending their unilateral cessation of hostilities for an additional three months, beginning on 8 February 2019”.³⁵

During the period April to June 2019 the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Sudan of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) reported that in South Darfur it “registered a total of 1,607 individuals (373 households) at the Otash IDP camp in Nyala North locality [...] displacement arising from the conflict between the SLA/ AW and government forces”.³⁶ The same source noted that during the same time period in Central Darfur, in Golo in Central Jebel Marra locality, it had also registered individuals who had been “displaced from surrounding areas due to the ongoing conflict between SLA/AW factions”.³⁷

UNOCHA’s ‘Flash Update’ of 9th June 2019 reported that “In Central Darfur, clashes between SLA-AW splinter factions reportedly continued in different locations around Daya village [...] with casualties from both sides. Also, sporadic clashes between SAF/RSF and SLAAW were reported in Rokero market, Jokosti village and Manabu farming area in Central Jebel Marra (CJM) locality. On 5 June [2019], SLA-AW reportedly attacked and killed two SAF personnel in Jokosti in CJM and took their weapons. There have been reported sexual violence, abductions and torture cases against local populations by the warring factions”.³⁸

Amnesty International reported in June 2019 that it had “disturbing new evidence, including satellite imagery, showing that Sudanese government forces, including the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and allied militias, have continued to commit war crimes and other serious human rights violations in Darfur. In the past year these have included the complete or partial destruction of at least 45 villages, unlawful killings, and sexual violence”.³⁹ Amnesty International expressed concern that:

[...] tens of thousands of civilians currently protected by United Nations (UN)/African Union (AU) peacekeepers (UNAMID) in Jebel Marra, Darfur, must not be placed at the mercy of the RSF, a ruthless Sudanese security force that has committed crimes against humanity and war crimes, the organization warned ahead of a crucial vote on the mission’s future on 27 June [2019]. If the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council authorize UNAMID’s closure, it would effectively give the RSF control over civilian areas. Formed from the former “Janjaweed”

³⁴ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 10 April 2019, para. 2

³⁵ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 10 April 2019, para. 3

³⁶ International Organization for Migration (IOM), [Displacement Tracking Matrix \(DTM\) Sudan, April - June 2019](#), 1 December 2019, *Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), South Darfur*, p. 2

³⁷ International Organization for Migration (IOM), [Displacement Tracking Matrix \(DTM\) Sudan, April - June 2019](#), 1 December 2019, *Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), South Darfur*, p. 2

³⁸ UNOCHA, [Sudan: Civil unrest, Flash Update No. 3](#), 9 June 2019, *Situation Overview*, p. 2

³⁹ Amnesty International, [Sudan: Fresh evidence of government-sponsored crimes in Darfur shows drawdown of peacekeepers premature and reckless](#), 11 June 2019

militia, the RSF are responsible for crimes against humanity in Darfur's Jebel Marra region as well as the ongoing bloody crackdown on protesters in Khartoum since 3 June [2019].⁴⁰

According to the same source "Despite severe government restrictions on access to Jebel Marra for journalists, independent human rights monitors, and UNAMID, Amnesty International has been able to confirm recent attacks against the region's civilians, much of which have gone unreported by the mission. Satellite evidence and testimonies confirm that government forces and associated militias damaged or destroyed at least 45 villages in Jebel Marra between July 2018 and February 2019. Amnesty International has also documented other abuses by security forces, including unlawful killings, sexual violence, systematic looting, and forced displacement".⁴¹

In June 2019 Eric Reeves, Sudan researcher and analyst for over 20 years, reported in June 2019 "A campaign by regular government forces, once again working in concert with Arab militias, has moved westward from North Darfur to the strategic Jebel Marra massif. The assault on the Darfuri rebels there began in earnest in mid-January and has reportedly involved tanks, artillery and aerial bombing — the latter often inaccurate and resulting in heavy civilian casualties, the overwhelming majority of them African farmers and their families. The United Nations estimates that in the first 10 days of the current assault, an additional 34,000 people were displaced, most of them women and children. This is probably an underestimate, but accurate figures are hard to come by, in part because Sudan has long excluded both journalists and relief workers from most of Jebel Marra".⁴²

The Atlantic Council reported that in July 2019 Sudan's Transitional Military Council (TMC) "signed a political power-sharing agreement today with the Declaration of Freedom and Change Forces (DFC), the umbrella group of trade unions, professional associations, students, and opposition political parties that brought down thirty years of autocratic rule".⁴³ The source noted that in its article entitled 'Sudan's power-sharing deal: An exercise in optimism' that:

The agreement commits to, amongst other things:

[...] "Establish a policy and program to achieve comprehensive peace in Darfur, Blue Nile and South Kordofan in consultation with the Armed Movements ... to be completed in no longer than six-months," despite the fact Sudan is awash in failed peace agreements going back twenty years and that the armed movements in question have already rejected today's announced political agreement. [...]

But where the rubber will meet the road and where Sudan's democratic aspirations will ultimately lie is in the Constitutional Charter, still being negotiated, which will lay out not the structure of the transition that today's political deal does, but rather the process, powers, and functions of the institutions and positions outlined today.

Until we can get greater clarity on how the Sovereign Council will function, how it will relate to the Prime Minister and his Council of Ministers, and what the duties, responsibilities and authorities of the Legislative Council will be, today's agreement will remain little more than words on a page.⁴⁴

The UN Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan noted in his July 2019 report that "According to information received by the Independent Expert, active clashes between

⁴⁰ Amnesty International, [Sudan: Fresh evidence of government-sponsored crimes in Darfur shows drawdown of peacekeepers premature and reckless](#), 11 June 2019

⁴¹ Amnesty International, [Sudan: Fresh evidence of government-sponsored crimes in Darfur shows drawdown of peacekeepers premature and reckless](#), 11 June 2019

⁴² Eric Reeves, [The Costs of Ignoring Genocide: The Case of Sudan and Darfur](#), 9 June 2019

⁴³ Atlantic Council, [Sudan's power-sharing deal: An exercise in optimism](#), 17 July 2019

⁴⁴ Atlantic Council, [Sudan's power-sharing deal: An exercise in optimism](#), 17 July 2019

government forces and armed groups were relatively infrequent and were localized in remote mountain areas”.⁴⁵ The same source further assessed that:

The effective protection of vulnerable populations in Darfur requires urgent attention, especially in light of the planned withdrawal of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) by June 2020. Due to security concerns, a substantial part of the population in Darfur require protection, while at least 2 million civilians need humanitarian assistance, with over 25 per cent residing in 60 camps and gathering sites for internally displaced persons. Across Darfur, civilians continued to be subjected to killing, assault, abduction, conflict-related sexual violence and arbitrary arrest and detention. Human rights violations and abuses also persisted in localities with no active military operations, including in areas from which UNAMID withdrew in July 2018. Weak local mechanisms to hold perpetrators of abuses accountable and a generalized state of impunity further eroded the security situation and protection of human rights.⁴⁶

Radio Dabanga documented that in early April 2019⁴⁷, early June 2019⁴⁸ and at the end of July 2019⁴⁹, the Sudan Liberation Movement under the leadership of Abdelwahid El Nur (SLM-AW) claimed that the Rapid Support Forces militia launched an offensive on its positions in Jebel Marra which it repelled. With regards to the latter offensive, “According to a statement issued by Waleed Abakar, the military spokesman of the movement, the RSF troops that carried out the attack moved from Sorong military garrison. The movement claims in the statement that its forces managed to defeat the attack and inflicted ‘grievous loss of life’ among the attackers, and seized military equipment, prompting the militiamen to flee the battlefield”.⁵⁰

According to ACLED, “Violence also persisted in the Darfur region during August [2019]. Most of the attacks were reportedly carried out by armed pastoralists, however, Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary forces carried out at least two attacks on civilians in the region, killing three civilians in Fanga on August 17th. The unabated attacks by RSF forces against civilians raise questions on the transitional government’s willingness and ability to rein in the country’s paramilitary forces”.⁵¹

According to an article by the Inter Press Service (IPS), Jean-Pierre Lacroix, the UN Under-Secretary General for peace operations, told the UN Security Council in August 2019 that “The political shift in Khartoum has not changed the situation in Darfur, where anti-government rebels clash with the Sudanese armed forces and a paramilitary group called the Rapid Support Forces”.⁵²

The UN Special Report covering the period from 1 June to end of September 2019 reported that:

[...] The overall security situation in Darfur remained volatile, but largely unchanged from the previous report (S/2019/445). Partly because of the shift of attention of the authorities to security in Khartoum and gaps in the effective functioning of institutions in Darfur states, incidents of criminality increased, in particular in camps for internally displaced persons, and the number of farm destructions and unlawful occupation of land in various parts of Darfur was higher in comparison with the same period last year [...]

⁴⁵ UN Human Rights Council, *Situation of human rights in the Sudan Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan*, 26 July 2019, para. 77

⁴⁶ UN Human Rights Council, *Situation of human rights in the Sudan Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan*, 26 July 2019, para. 78

⁴⁷ Radio Dabanga, *Darfur rebels: ‘Militia attack repulsed in Jebel Marra’*, 3 April 2019

⁴⁸ Radio Dabanga, *Central Darfur rebels ‘repel RSF offensive’ in Jebel Marra*, 3 June 2019

⁴⁹ Radio Dabanga, *Rebels ‘repel militia attack’ in Darfur’s Jebel Marra*, 24 July 2019

⁵⁰ Radio Dabanga, *Rebels ‘repel militia attack’ in Darfur’s Jebel Marra*, 24 July 2019

⁵¹ ACLED, *Regional Overview: Africa 3 September 2019*, 3 September 2019

⁵² Inter Press Service (IPS), *Sudan Transition an “Opportunity” to End Darfur Crisis*, August 2019

Intermittent armed clashes between the Government forces and the Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW) continued in the Jebel Marra, with the movement targeting the Sudan Armed Forces positions around Golo. SLA-AW abducted local civilians and staff of international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for ransom, robbed commercial trucks and looted property of local medical and humanitarian organizations. Meanwhile, in the Daya area, east of Golo, the infighting between the two SLA-AW factions of commanders Salih Borsa and Mubarak Aldouk continued as a result of the latter's attempt to negotiate a surrender with the authorities.⁵³

In mid-October 2019 UN News reported that "Despite major political developments at a national level, which have led to the establishment of a civilian-led government, the security situation in the Darfur region of Sudan remains unstable, UN peace chief Jean-Pierre Lacroix briefed the Security Council [...] armed clashes between rebel forces of the Sudan Liberation Army and Government troops, have continued in the Jebel Marra district in West Darfur".⁵⁴

On 21st October 2019 Deutsche Welle reported that "Sudan's government has signed a political declaration with rebels, calling it a major step toward ending years of civil war. A nationwide cease-fire was also extended as part of efforts to create a lasting peace".⁵⁵ The same article also stated that "The Khartoum administration also agreed to let aid into war-torn areas including Darfur [...] which were cut off from humanitarian groups during al-Bashir's rule".⁵⁶

At the end of November 2019 Radio Dabanga noted that "Ibrahim Khatir was wounded at Um Dukhun market in Central Darfur by unidentified gunmen. The residents of Um Dukhun have complained about the increase in attacks in the streets and in houses, especially after clashes in the area between the army and local militiamen, as the army is preventing the use of motorcycles and the wearing of the face-covering kadamol. As reported by Radio Dabanga last week, two soldiers of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) were wounded when a firefight erupted with militiamen in Um Dukhun market".⁵⁷

A December 2019 International Federation for Human Rights and African Center for Justice and Peace Studies report stated with regards to the security situation in Darfur:

Clashes between Sudanese armed forces and SLA/AW as well as infighting within SLA/AW have also been reported since early 2019. Such clashes continued to primarily affect civilians who are forcibly displaced, often on multiple occasions, in search for shelter, food, medical care and other basic services.⁵⁸

The Sudan Tribune reported at the end of December 2019 that "Sudanese government and Sudanese Revolutionary Front (Darfur Track) have signed a framework agreement on the issues they will discuss in the direct talks for peace in Darfur. The ongoing discussions for peace in Darfur come after the signing on 11 September [2019] of confidence-building measures including the cessation of

⁵³ UN Security Council, [*Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*](#), 15 October 2019, paras. 8 and 9

⁵⁴ UN News, [*Ongoing insecurity in Darfur, despite 'remarkable developments' in Sudan: UN peacekeeping chief*](#), 17 October 2019

⁵⁵ Deutsche Welle, [*Sudan renews cease-fire pact with rebels, lets in aid*](#), 21 October 2019

⁵⁶ Deutsche Welle, [*Sudan renews cease-fire pact with rebels, lets in aid*](#), 21 October 2019

⁵⁷ Radio Dabanga, [*Three injured in Darfur shootings*](#), 28 November 2019

⁵⁸ International Federation for Human Rights, African Center for Justice and Peace Studies, Sudan Human Rights Monitor, [*Will There Be Justice for Darfur? Persisting impunity in the face of political change; Fact-finding mission report*](#), December 2019, 1. *Civilians in Darfur Continue to Bear the Brunt of Insecurity* p. 22

hostilities and humanitarian access [...] The agreement was inked by the 4 armed groups participating in the talks: Justice and Equality Movement of Gibril Ibrahim, Sudan Liberation Movement led by Minni Minnawi, Sudan Liberation Movement Transitional Council and the Sudan Liberation Forces Alliance”.⁵⁹

1.2 Inter-communal and militia clashes

This section provides an overview of inter-communal violence and clashes between militia or attacks by militia on civilians, although not clashes involving the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) which are addressed in the preceding section. It should be read against the Darfur state-specific COI presented further below in section [2.3 Conflict between tribes and inter-communal violence since December 2018](#) as well as section [2. Ethnic and tribal groups and their connection with the government and allied militia](#).

The Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research’s 2018 Conflict Barometer assessed that inter-communal rivalry was at medium intensity level (3), categorized as a ‘violent crisis’:

The limited war over subnational predominance and scarce resources such as cattle and pastureland between various cattle-herding pastoral tribes de-escalated to a violent crisis. In 2017, the government had started a disarmament campaign, including the establishment of buffer zones in conflict hotspots, the rapid deployment of security forces, and an extended involvement of local administrations. Subsequently, the number of inter-communal clashes decreased significantly. Violence continued to be concentrated in the regions of Darfur and Kordofan, where various armed groups were active throughout the year [→ Sudan (Darfur); Sudan (SPLM/A- North)].⁶⁰

The same source further described that inter-communal rivalry existed in Darfur between “Misseriya vs. Rizeigat vs. Zaghawa vs. Fellata vs. Ma'aliya vs. Salamat et al”.⁶¹

The UN Security Council report on UNAMID covering the period from 4 October 2018 to 3 January 2019 noted that:

No major episodes of intercommunal violence were reported. Incidents of crop destruction, which often spark local-level confrontations, were also on the decline. The reduction in the number of incidents of intercommunal violence corresponds to the overall decrease in counter-insurgency operations and associated militia mobilization, in addition to the concerted efforts of UNAMID, the United Nations country team, national and local authorities and communities to resolve disputes and pursue peaceful coexistence. Nevertheless, the root causes of intercommunal conflict remain unaddressed: this includes land disputes, which also affect internally displaced persons returning to their places of origin occupied by others. The seasonal cattle migration from North to South Darfur during the harvest season also raises potential for a spike in intercommunal violence in some parts of the region.⁶²

⁵⁹ Sudan Tribune, [Sudan, armed groups sign framework agreement for peace in Darfur](#), 28 December 2019

⁶⁰ Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, [2018 Conflict Barometer](#), February 2019, *SUDAN (INTER-COMMUNAL RIVALRY)* p. 93

⁶¹ Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, [2018 Conflict Barometer](#), February 2019, *Overview: Conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa in 2018*, p. 61

⁶² UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 14 January 2019, para. 2

Specifically the report stated that “Although no major intercommunal clashes occurred during the reporting period, there were 2 incidents of violence, resulting in 3 fatalities, compared with 6 incidents and 18 fatalities in the previous reporting period”.⁶³

The subsequent UN Security Council report on UNAMID covering the period from 4 January to 3 April 2019 noted that “Despite a slight increase since the last reporting period, incidents of intercommunal clashes also remained low, while there was continued violence between herders and farmers, involving cattle rustling and farm destruction, mainly in North and West Darfur”.⁶⁴ Specifically the report stated that “Four intercommunal clashes have been recorded, with 14 fatalities, mainly in the West, Central and North Darfur States, an increase from the two incidents and three fatalities reported during the previous period”.⁶⁵

The May 2019 UN Special Report on the strategic assessment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur covering the period from 14 July 2018 to 15 May 2019 reported that:

For the period from July 2018 to January 2019, the mission recorded a total of 10 intercommunal clashes and 30 fatalities, compared with 14 clashes and 136 fatalities in the period between July 2017 and January 2018. However, the conflict drivers, in particular access to land and other natural resources, are not being addressed in a systemic way, affecting internally displaced persons returning to their areas of origin and the relations between pastoralist and farming communities. Several intercommunal conflicts persist. In North Darfur, the dispute between the Northern Rezeigat herders and returnee farmers, mostly Tunjur and Fur, over access to farmlands continued in Kutum, Shangil Tobaya, Tawilla, Kabkabiya and Saraf Umra. In South Darfur, tensions between the Masalit and the Fallata over land tenure and competition for natural resources in Gaida remain unresolved, despite the signing of a peace agreement in July 2018. Similar tensions exist between the Salamat and the Fallata in Buram. In East Darfur, while the land-based conflict between the Southern Rezeigat and the Ma’aliyya in Abu Karinka and Adilla remains unresolved, progress was made with the signing of a Declaration for Peaceful Coexistence on 29 November 2018. In West Darfur, mediation efforts by the native administration and UNAMID have facilitated the resolution of several cases of land disputes between herders and farmers. In Central Darfur, animal theft perpetrated by SLA/AW against the Northern Rezeigat aggravated tensions between the latter and the Fur community, which is perceived to support the rebel group.⁶⁶

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) recorded “nearly 11,000 displacements in Sudan between April and June 2019 as a result of inter-communal fighting and clashes over resources in East and Central Darfur, as well as in White Nile and South Kordofan states”.⁶⁷ It further explained:

To put this in context, IDMC recorded a similar number of displacements in the whole of 2018 as a result of clashes between farmers and pastoralists, and none in 2017. This sharp increase in internal

⁶³ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 14 January 2019, para. 7

⁶⁴ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 10 April 2019, para. 2

⁶⁵ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 10 April 2019, para. 8

⁶⁶ UN Security Council, [Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic assessment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 30 May 2019, paras. 18 and 19

⁶⁷ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), [Sudan’s unrest and the challenge of understanding internal displacement](#), August 2019

displacement could suggest that the tense political and economic situation has worsened relations between communities [...]

While instances of inter-communal and ethnic violence decreased in 2019 following the period of civil unrest, for yet reasons unknown; the displacement that followed was significant, indicating that the conflict – this time linked to access to markets, availability of goods and the increase in prices – was much more severe.

Consequently, we can assume that the economic and political crisis has exacerbated displacement associated with inter-communal and inter-ethnic violence. Owing to limited data, it remains difficult to establish a direct link and to assess why the number of inter-communal and inter-ethnic events decreased but their severity increased.⁶⁸

At a briefing to the UN Security Council in June 2019 Andrew Gilmour, Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights, reported:

The violence and uncertainty that has erupted in Darfur in the past few months is unfortunately likely to continue until the root causes (and what Mr. Lacroix has just called the “conflict drivers”) of the conflict are addressed. The tragic incident in Deleij village in Central Darfur on 9 and 10 June [2019] that resulted in the deaths of at least 17 persons, which was related to inter-community violence, but involving state actors, illustrates that point – as well as the direct link between human rights and security.⁶⁹

The UN Special Report covering the period from 1 June to end of September 2019 reported that:

With the onset of the rainy season, and with it the farming season, increased incidents of land occupation and tensions between farmers and pastoralists have been recorded in various parts of Darfur, with pastoralists adopting a more aggressive posture during the current farming season. In the Nertiti area of Central Darfur, disputes between internally displaced farmers, mostly Fur, and the Nawaiba/Northern Rizeigat pastoralists continued over access to farmlands and the harassment of women. In Shangil Tobaya, North Darfur, similar incidents occurred between Northern Rizeigat pastoralists and internally displaced farmers, mainly Fur and Tunjur, while in Kabkabiyah, North Darfur, there were reports of reoccupation of farmlands by pastoralists at the start of the farming season. Overall, the number of armed attacks by pastoralists against farmers and the related fatalities increased in 2019, North Darfur recorded 73 incidents with six victims, compared with 64 incidents with seven victims in 2018, and Central Darfur reported 71 attacks and 27 fatalities, compared with 70 incidents with 21 fatalities during the entire year in 2018.

Although conflicts over land use between farming and pastoralist communities recur during the farming season (May–October), the security vacuum and gaps in the effective functioning of civilian authority in the Darfur region, since the beginning of the national protests, have contributed to an increase of land-related incidents. During the current farming season, UNAMID has recorded 52 land-related incidents with 33 fatalities, compared with 40 incidents with 13 fatalities during the same period of the previous year. This figure covers part of the 2019 farming season and includes limited information from West, East and South Darfur states, where UNAMID closed its operations.⁷⁰

The same source further noted that “some of the major grievances underlying the Darfur crisis, including intercommunal conflicts, remain fundamentally unaddressed. Moreover, the recent political crisis in the Sudan has contributed to fuel tensions between internally displaced persons

⁶⁸ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), [*Sudan’s unrest and the challenge of understanding internal displacement*](#), August 2019

⁶⁹ UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, [*Briefing \[sic\] to the Security Council on Sudan by Andrew Gilmour, Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights, New York*](#), 14 June 2019

⁷⁰ UN Security Council, [*Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*](#), 15 October 2019, paras. 10 and 11

and nomad communities, partly prompted by the political vacuum and weakened governance and rule of law institutions. Consequently, violent clashes and retaliatory attacks have occurred in farmlands and camps for internally displaced persons, in particular in Central, South and North Darfur states".⁷¹

According to a November 2019 Radio Dabanga article "Tensions over farmland have often caused clashes between farmers in Darfur (mostly 'black Africans') and militant herders (calling themselves Arabs) who want to use the farms as pasture. This happens in particular in the dry season, between November and May".⁷²

In November 2019 the Darfur Network for Monitoring and Documentation stated that it "appeals to the transitional government of Sudan, Mohamed Hamden Dagalo (Hemetti) the commander of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and the RSF and Janjaweed militia in Sudan to cease committing violations against farmers and civilians in the Darfur region, which acts are against principles of human rights and international humanitarian law".⁷³ The same source further noted that "Several sources have said that the western and northern areas of El Fasher state in North Darfur have experienced repeated violations by armed militias against farmers, and civilians face threats of death, rape and violence, especially during the agricultural harvest season".⁷⁴

ACLED, reporting on the first week of December 2019 noted that:

In Sudan, armed pastoralists and unknown gunmen engaged in several violent incidents throughout Darfur, marking a considerable increase compared to previous weeks. This is a worrying development, and partially confirms fears that the political re-ordering taking place in Khartoum is driving instability in Sudan's peripheries.⁷⁵

Radio Dabanga noted that "According to a preliminary report by Darfuri farmers in South and North Darfur, at least 50 farmers were killed and injured by armed herders in November and December[2019]".⁷⁶ The same source further described:

The report says that 20 farmers were shot dead and more than 30 others sustained bullet wounds in attacks by militant herdsman in the eastern parts of the Jebel Marra massive. About 7,000 acres planted with millet, sorghum, sesame, groundnuts, and various vegetables were damaged or destroyed.

"In particular the areas of Umsiyala, Dali, Koto, Karfala, Um Laouta, Kadarik, and Tangara in Tawila and East Jebel Marra localities are prone to fierce herders attacks these days," the report reads.

None of the perpetrators have been arrested. The farmers submitted several complaints to the authorities of South and North Darfur, but "no one paid any attention to our case."⁷⁷

⁷¹ UN Security Council, [*Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*](#), 15 October 2019, para. 17

⁷² Radio Dabanga, [Four Darfur farmers attacked by militant herders](#), 5 November 2019

⁷³ Darfur Network for Monitoring and Documentation, [Human rights violations against farmers and civilians by armed militias in the Darfur region](#), 21 November 2019


⁷⁴ Darfur Network for Monitoring and Documentation, [Human rights violations against farmers and civilians by armed militias in the Darfur region](#), 21 November 2019

⁷⁵ ACLED, [Regional Overview: 1-7 December 2019](#), 10 December 2019

⁷⁶ Radio Dabanga, [Darfur farmers present report on herder attacks](#), 24 December 2019

⁷⁷ Radio Dabanga, [Darfur farmers present report on herder attacks](#), 24 December 2019

The following infographic from ACLED⁷⁸ documents events in the five Darfur states between 2 December 2018 and 10 December 2019 (the reporting period of this report) defined as ‘battles’, ‘violence against civilians’ and ‘explosions/remote violence’:



At the end of December 2019, the Sudan Tribune noted that:

The Sudanese government on Monday night decided to dispatch additional troops to the capital of West Darfur State El-Geneina following the eruption of intercommunal clashes in the region. Eight people were killed and eight others were injured as a result of armed clashes between the Massalit and Arab tribes after the murder of a young man from the Arab tribes near the Crendingue camp for displaced persons in El-Geneina. The fighting also extended to two other areas inhabited by the IDPs triggering the imposition of curfew by the state military governor in a bid to end the violence.⁷⁹

On 1 January 2020, the Sudan Tribune documented that “Over 41 people were killed as a result of tribal fighting between the Arab tribes and Massalit after the murder of a member of the Arab groups in El-Geneina after a scuffle near Crendingue camp for displaced Massalit tribe. Also, the tribal violence comes as Darfur Arab groups, which were used by the former regime to quell the insurgency in the region, say they are targeted after the revolution by the tribes that had backed the rebellion from the Fur, Massalit and Zaghawa”.⁸⁰ By 7 January 2019 UN news reported that “Violence between communities in and around El Geneina, the capital of West Darfur State, had reportedly killed at least 54 people, injured 60 and displaced 40,000, since 28 December”.⁸¹

⁷⁸ ACLED, [Sudan analysis](#), undated [accessed 10 January 2020], ‘events’ filtered for ‘battles’, ‘violence against civilians’ and ‘explosions/remote violence’ in the 5 Darfur states between 2 December 2018 and 10 December 2019

⁷⁹ Sudan Tribune, [Sudan dispatches troops to end tribal violence in West Darfur](#), 30 December 2019

⁸⁰ Sudan Tribune, [Sudanese government delegations visit Darfur states after tribal clashes](#), 1 January 2020

⁸¹ UN News, [Sudan: Intercommunal clashes displace tens of thousands in volatile Darfur region](#), 7 January 2020

1.3 Safe/blocked routes

In October 2019 ACAPs reported that “Humanitarian travel policies were eased in 2016, but administrative procedures still present obstacles. Mines, explosive remnants and poor roads hamper assistance. In August 2019 heavy rains and flooding damaged infrastructure further, hindering the delivery of aid. The economic crisis and countrywide lack of fuel and hard currency hamper delivery and access to aid”.⁸²

Radio Dabanga also reported in October 2019 that “Residents of villages in south-eastern Jebel Marra have warned of massive disruption and possible displacement that may hit them in the coming weeks because of a decision by the authorities to prevent commercial vehicles from entering the area [...] A number of south-eastern Jebel Marra residents emphasised that the region is experiencing a severe fuel, food, and consumer goods crisis. Stocks of fuel and foodstuffs are running out, especially sugar, flour, and medicines. Many grain mills and water engines have stopped working because of the fuel crisis. They warned of massive displacement in the coming weeks if commercial vehicles do not reach the weekly market of Feina where people from more than 50 villages buy their goods”.⁸³

2. Ethnic and tribal groups and their connection with the government and allied militia

2.1 Arab ethnic groups

These sections only present COI published from the consulted sources during the reporting period for this report, 2 December 2018 to 10 December 2019. See the previous edition of this report for COI between 1st September 2017 and 2nd December 2018 and for a historical overview, please consult the first edition of this report published by the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation (ACCORD):

- ❖ ARC, [Darfur Country Report](#), January 2019
- ❖ ACCORD, [Darfur COI Compilation](#), September 2017

Please note that sources which report on clashes between herders and pastoralist and attacks against IDPs or returnees tend not to document the ethnicity/tribe of the groups involved.

This section should be read against [2.3 Conflict between tribes and inter-communal violence since December 2018](#), [6.1 Security situation targeting IDPs](#) and [7.1 Security situation targeting returnees](#). Also see [2.4 Treatment of Arab ethnic groups](#).

2.1.1 Rizeigat

Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research's 2018 Conflict Barometer described that inter-communal rivalry existed in Darfur between “Misseriya vs. Rizeigat vs. Zaghawa vs. Fellata vs. Ma'aliya vs. Salamat et al”.⁸⁴

⁸² ACAPS, [Crisis in Sight, Humanitarian Access](#), October 2019

⁸³ Radio Dabanga, [Ban on commercial vehicle traffic to Darfur's Jebel Marra 'could cause mass displacement'](#), 10 October 2019

⁸⁴ Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, [2018 Conflict Barometer](#), February 2019, *Overview: Conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa in 2018*, p. 61

The May 2019 UN Special Report on the strategic assessment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur reported that:

For the period from July 2018 to January 2019, the mission recorded a total of 10 intercommunal clashes and 30 fatalities, compared with 14 clashes and 136 fatalities in the period between July 2017 and January 2018. However, the conflict drivers, in particular access to land and other natural resources, are not being addressed in a systemic way, affecting internally displaced persons returning to their areas of origin and the relations between pastoralist and farming communities. Several intercommunal conflicts persist. In North Darfur, the dispute between the Northern Rezeigat herders and returnee farmers, mostly Tunjur and Fur, over access to farmlands continued in Kutum, Shangil Tobaya, Tawilla, Kabkabiya and Saraf Umra. [...] In East Darfur, while the land-based conflict between the Southern Rezeigat and the Ma'aliyya in Abu Karinka and Adilla remains unresolved, progress was made with the signing of a Declaration for Peaceful Coexistence on 29 November 2018. In West Darfur, mediation efforts by the native administration and UNAMID have facilitated the resolution of several cases of land disputes between herders and farmers. In Central Darfur, animal theft perpetrated by SLA/AW against the Northern Rezeigat aggravated tensions between the latter and the Fur community, which is perceived to support the rebel group.⁸⁵

The UN Special Report covering the period from 1 June to end of September 2019 reported with regards to inter-communal conflict:

With the onset of the rainy season, and with it the farming season, increased incidents of land occupation and tensions between farmers and pastoralists have been recorded in various parts of Darfur, with pastoralists adopting a more aggressive posture during the current farming season. In the Nertiti area of Central Darfur, disputes between internally displaced farmers, mostly Fur, and the Nawaiba/Northern Rizeigat pastoralists continued over access to farmlands and the harassment of women. In Shangil Tobaya, North Darfur, similar incidents occurred between Northern Rizeigat pastoralists and internally displaced farmers, mainly Fur and Tunjur, while in Kabkabiya, North Darfur, there were reports of reoccupation of farmlands by pastoralists at the start of the farming season. [...]

On 6 June, intercommunal fighting in East Darfur, between the Tama and Rizeigat tribes, resulted in the displacement of some 1,300 people from the Hijilij village east of Ed Daein.⁸⁶

It should be noted that “TMC [Transitional Military Council] deputy Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (known as Hemeti) [...] hails from the Mahariya Rizeigat Arab tribe and commands the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a militia originating from the Darfur region. He has reportedly retained ties to Chadian Arab tribes, who may also be opposed to Déby” [President Idriss Déby of Chad].⁸⁷ The International Crisis Group further explained that “He belongs to the Mahariya sub-group (specifically Awlad Mansour clan) of the Rizeigat tribe which are under the larger Baggara nomadic group that live in Darfur and Kordofan and have extensions into Chad and other Sahel countries. Hemedti’s kin came from Chad in the 1980s, fleeing drought”.⁸⁸

⁸⁵ UN Security Council, [*Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic assessment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*](#), 30 May 2019, paras. 18 and 19

⁸⁶ UN Security Council, [*Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*](#), 15 October 2019, paras. 10 and 12

⁸⁷ Institute for Security Studies, [*Sudan after Bashir: Regional opportunities and challenges*](#), August 2019, *Managing complex relations with Chad* p. 7

⁸⁸ International Crisis Group, [*Safeguarding Sudan's Revolution*](#), 21 October 2019, 2. *Hemedti and the Rapid Support Forces*, p.13, footnote 53

2.1.2 Beni Hussayn

The UN Security Council report on UNAMID covering the period from 4 January to 3 April 2019 noted that “In Central Darfur, an altercation between Beni Halba and Beni Hussein youth on 28 January [2019], resulted in violence in the Korari area, leaving several people injured. The disagreement was resolved peacefully, with Beni Hussein families offering to pay for the transportation and treatment of the injured Beni Halba”.⁸⁹

2.1.3 Ma’aliya

Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research’s 2018 Conflict Barometer described that inter-communal rivalry existed in Darfur between “Misseriya vs. Rizeigat vs. Zaghawa vs. Fellata vs. Ma’aliya vs. Salamat et al”.⁹⁰

The May 2019 UN Special Report on the strategic assessment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur covering the period from 14 July 2018 to 15 May 2019 reported that:

For the period from July 2018 to January 2019, the mission recorded a total of 10 intercommunal clashes and 30 fatalities, compared with 14 clashes and 136 fatalities in the period between July 2017 and January 2018. However, the conflict drivers, in particular access to land and other natural resources, are not being addressed in a systemic way, affecting internally displaced persons returning to their areas of origin and the relations between pastoralist and farming communities. [...]

In East Darfur, while the land-based conflict between the Southern Rezeigat and the Ma’aliyya in Abu Karinka and Adilla remains unresolved, progress was made with the signing of a Declaration for Peaceful Coexistence on 29 November 2018.⁹¹

On 31 December 2019, Radio Dabanga reported that “The outcome of bloody clashes between Maaliya herders and Masalit tribesmen in El Geneina, West Darfur, has reportedly risen to more than 70 dead and wounded, while markets, schools, and government institutions remain closed. The violence has already caused the Juba peace talks of the Darfur track to be suspended”.⁹² The same source further noted that:

The Dar Masalit Sultanate reported that the initial toll of the victims of Kerending camp for the displaced and neighbouring villages amounts to 50 dead, and dozens of wounded.

The Emir of the Maaliya herders, Massar Abdelrahman, announced the death of 11 people and 15 wounded from the Maaliya tribe.

The Masalit Sultanate said in a statement [...], that “a large number of janjaweed militiamen carrying firearms attacked Kerending camp [...]. They are guilty of killing, burning, looting, and intimidation.” [...] The Sultanate of Dar Masalit further explained in its statement that the clashes broke out on Sunday because of a fight between a young Masalit tribesman and an Maaliya herder in El Bursa Market that resulted in the death of the latter.

In response the relatives of the victim attacked the families of the perpetrator and killed two of them, wounded others and torched the market. [...]

⁸⁹ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 10 April 2019, para. 9

⁹⁰ Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, [2018 Conflict Barometer](#), February 2019, *Overview: Conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa in 2018*, p. 61

⁹¹ UN Security Council, [Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic assessment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 30 May 2019, paras. 18 and 19

⁹² Radio Dabanga, [70+ dead or injured in bloody West Darfur tribal violence](#), 31 December 2019

The “janjaweed militiamen” attacked wounded people at El Geneina Teaching Hospital on Sunday evening. They killed one person, wounded a child, and assaulted medical personnel, which led to the closure of the hospital [...].⁹³

2.1.4 Beni Halba

The UN Security Council report on UNAMID covering the period from 4 January to 3 April 2019 noted that “In Central Darfur, an altercation between Beni Halba and Beni Hussein youth on 28 January [2019], resulted in violence in the Korari area, leaving several people injured. The disagreement was resolved peacefully, with Beni Hussein families offering to pay for the transportation and treatment of the injured Beni Halba”.⁹⁴

2.1.5 Misseriya

Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research’s 2018 Conflict Barometer described that inter-communal rivalry existed in Darfur between “Misseriya vs. Rizeigat vs. Zaghawa vs. Fellata vs. Ma’aliya vs. Salamat et al”.⁹⁵

The UN Security Council report on UNAMID covering the period from 4 January to 3 April 2019 noted that “In West Darfur, in the vicinity of Hijleahjah village, east of El Geneina, the killing of a member of Awlad Zaid by a member of Misseriya Jabel triggered clashes between the two groups between 15 and 17 January [2019, reportedly causing fatalities and displacement to nearby villages and to Chad. Sudanese Armed Forces personnel were deployed to the area to calm the situation”.⁹⁶ Furthermore, “In West Darfur, an inter-agency assessment mission conducted between 12 and 14 February [2019] to the sites of the aforementioned clashes between members of Awlad Zaid and Misseriya Jabel in January found the need for emergency shelter and non-food items assistance, mainly for older persons, children and pregnant women”.⁹⁷

2.1.6 Ta’aisha

No information was found amongst the sources consulted in the time frame of this report nor in the previous edition. For historical information please consult:

❖ ACCORD, [Darfur COI Compilation](#), September 2017

⁹³ Radio Dabanga, [70+ dead or injured in bloody West Darfur tribal violence](#), 31 December 2019

⁹⁴ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 10 April 2019, para. 9

⁹⁵ Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, [2018 Conflict Barometer](#), February 2019, *Overview: Conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa in 2018*, p. 61

⁹⁶ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 10 April 2019, para. 8

⁹⁷ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 10 April 2019, para. 18

2.1.7 Salamat

Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research's 2018 Conflict Barometer described that inter-communal rivalry existed in Darfur between "Misseriya vs. Rizeigat vs. Zaghawa vs. Fellata vs. Ma'aliya vs. Salamat et al".⁹⁸

The UN Special Report covering the period from 14 July 2018 to 15 May 2019 reported that in the period from July 2018 to January 2019 "in South Darfur, tensions between the Masalit and the Fallata over land tenure and competition for natural resources in Gaida remain unresolved, despite the signing of a peace agreement in July 2018. Similar tensions exist between the Salamat and the Fallata in Buram".⁹⁹

2.2 Non-Arab ethnic groups

These sections only present COI published from the consulted sources during the reporting period for this report; 2 December 2018 to 10 December 2019. See the previous edition of this report for COI between 1st September 2017 and 2nd December 2018 and for a historical overview, please consult the first edition of this report published by the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation (ACCORD):

- ❖ ARC, [Darfur Country Report](#), January 2019
- ❖ ACCORD, [Darfur COI Compilation](#), September 2017

Please note that sources that report on clashes between herders and pastoralist and attacks against IDPs or returnees tend not to document the ethnicity/tribe of the groups involved.

This section should be read against [2.3 Conflict between tribes and inter-communal violence since December 2018](#), [6.1 Security situation targeting IDPs](#) and [7.1 Security situation targeting returnees](#). Also see [2.4 Treatment of Arab ethnic groups](#).

2.2.1 Berti

No information was found on this group in the reporting period. Please consult the previous editions of this report for historical information:

- ❖ ARC, [Darfur Country Report](#), January 2019
- ❖ ACCORD, [Darfur COI Compilation](#), September 2017

2.2.2 Fur

An April 2019 paper published by Tufts University explains that "The development literature on Darfur frequently distinguishes between sedentary farming and nomadic pastoralism, with the

⁹⁸ Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, [2018 Conflict Barometer](#), February 2019, *Overview: Conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa in 2018*, p. 61

⁹⁹ UN Security Council, [Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic assessment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 30 May 2019, para. 19

emphasis on their systems of production and secondarily their particular ethnic group or tribe. This distinction contrasts with the anthropological and conflict literature that frequently distinguishes between different tribes, giving secondary importance to their association with particular livelihoods or specializations. For example, the Fur and Masalit tribes inhabiting the central transition zone are known as expert farmers, while the Northern Rizaygat are known to be camel nomads”.¹⁰⁰

The January 2019 Letter from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan to the President of the UN Security Council reported with regards to conflict dynamics in Jebel Marra:

On several occasions, such as in northern Rokero locality (north-eastern Jebel Marra), fighting also took place between local armed Arab tribesmen and SLA/AW owing to cattle-rustling raids by SLA/AW. As part of these clashes, Arab tribesmen sometimes attacked villages inhabited by Fur civilians (most SLA/AW fighters are from the Fur community).¹⁰¹

The same source explained with regards to the make-up of government forces and auxiliary militias:

On several occasions during the reporting period, the Government conducted operations in Jebel Marra involving SAF, RSF and groups of local armed Arab tribesmen. [...] In eastern and south-eastern Jebel Marra, most of the auxiliary fighters hail from the Sa'ada tribe, which has had a conflictual relationship with the Fur community in the area since the 1980s. Two main Sa'ada groups of fighters are reportedly involved. One is based in Jabra village and is led by the Azreg brothers (Mohamed, Abdallah and Hassan). The other is based in Gardud village; its leaders include Nouredine Haj Ahmed and his brother Jiddo Haj Ahmed. Members of the Ruwas tribe (based in the Limo area) were also involved in some fighting.¹⁰²

The UN Security Council report on UNAMID covering the period from 4 October 2018 to 3 January 2019 noted that “The Fur community are the main victims of crimes against internally displaced persons and other civilians”.¹⁰³

The subsequent UN Security Council report on UNAMID covering the period from 4 January to 3 April 2019 noted that two factions of the SLA-AW, subgroup led by Salih Borsa and subgroup led by Mubarak Aldouk, “attacked and abducted local Fur civilians suspected of collaborating with the opposing faction, and five civilians were reported killed, as well as five injured and 15 abducted”.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁰ CAFOD - Catholic Agency for Overseas Development, CRS - Catholic Relief Services, UMCOR - United Methodist Committee on Relief, et al. (Author), published by Tufts University - Feinstein International Center, [*Lessons for Taadoud II: Improving Natural Resource Management*](#), April 2019, *Managing environmental variability: the role of livelihood specialization* p. 31

¹⁰¹ UN Security Council, [*Letter dated 10 January 2019 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 \(2005\) addressed to the President of the Security Council*](#), 10 January 2019, para. 14

¹⁰² UN Security Council, [*Letter dated 10 January 2019 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 \(2005\) addressed to the President of the Security Council*](#), 10 January 2019, paras. 55-58

¹⁰³ UN Security Council, [*African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General*](#), 14 January 2019, para. 47

¹⁰⁴ UN Security Council, [*African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General*](#), 10 April 2019, para. 7

In an April 2019 article The Jamestown Foundation explained that following the coup, the Transitional Military Council (TMC) was formed under Lieutenant General 'Abd al-Fattah al-Burhan.¹⁰⁵ The same source further noted that:

Al-Burhan's appointment as head of the TMC has angered many in Darfur, who accuse him of being "the architect of the genocide" in Darfur and regard his new role as "a play of the Islamists to retain power" (Radio Dabanga, April 15). Burhan is well known in Darfur for his threats to exterminate the Fur people. A leading Darfur rebel, 'Abd al-Wahid al-Nur (Fur), said that the Sudan "we dream of, cannot come through these racists like 'Abd al-Fatah al-Burhan, Awad Ibn Awf, Omar al-Bashir and their ilk" (Sudan Tribune, April 16).¹⁰⁶

The May 2019 UN Special Report on the strategic assessment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur reported that:

Several intercommunal conflicts persist. In North Darfur, the dispute between the Northern Rezeigat herders and returnee farmers, mostly Tunjur and Fur, over access to farmlands continued in Kutum, Shangil Tobaya, Tawilla, Kabkabiya and Saraf Umra. [...]

In Central Darfur, animal theft perpetrated by SLA/AW against the Northern Rezeigat aggravated tensions between the latter and the Fur community, which is perceived to support the rebel group.¹⁰⁷

According to the June 2019 Minority Rights International 'Peoples Under Threat 2019' Briefing, Sudan is the 7th highest rank country of people under threat, which include the "Fur, Zaghawa, Massalit and others in Darfur".¹⁰⁸

The UN Special Report covering the period from 1 June to end of September 2019 reported that:

[...] With the onset of the rainy season, and with it the farming season, increased incidents of land occupation and tensions between farmers and pastoralists have been recorded in various parts of Darfur, with pastoralists adopting a more aggressive posture during the current farming season. In the Nertiti area of Central Darfur, disputes between internally displaced farmers, mostly Fur, and the Nawaiba/Northern Rizeigat pastoralists continued over access to farmlands and the harassment of women. In Shangil Tobaya, North Darfur, similar incidents occurred between Northern Rizeigat pastoralists and internally displaced farmers, mainly Fur and Tunjur, while in Kabkabiya, North Darfur, there were reports of reoccupation of farmlands by pastoralists at the start of the farming season [...].¹⁰⁹

The Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Sudan of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) covering the period July to September 2019 reported that in West Darfur in August 2019 registration of IDPs took place "in response to the displacement that arose from conflict between local farmers and pastoralist communities. As indicated in the initial interagency mission report, the

¹⁰⁵ The Jamestown Foundation, ['Old Wine in Old Bottles?' A Security Q and A on Post-Coup Sudan](#), 22 April 2019

¹⁰⁶ The Jamestown Foundation, ['Old Wine in Old Bottles?' A Security Q and A on Post-Coup Sudan](#), 22 April 2019

¹⁰⁷ UN Security Council, [Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic assessment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 30 May 2019, paras. 18 and 19

¹⁰⁸ Minority Rights International, [Peoples Under Threat 2019](#), 3 June 2019, *Peoples most under threat – highest-rated countries 2019*, p. 7

¹⁰⁹ UN Security Council, [Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 15 October 2019, para. 10

2019 restriction imposed by the pastoralist population – preventing IDPs, Fur and Massalit host community tribes from cultivating or harvesting their farmland – fueled tensions which erupted following the fall of President Al-Bashir in April this year. The Arab pastoralist retaliated, resulting in the displacement of many IDPs northwards”.¹¹⁰

A December 2019 report from REDRESS and African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies on ‘Anti-torture reforms in Sudan in the post-Bashir era’ asserted that:

According to accounts provided by refugees and lawyers from South, West and North Darfur interviewed by FIDH and ACJPS, former Janjaweed militiamen still occupy the lands of members of the Fur, Massalit and Zaghawa ethnic groups who have been chased from their homeland over the past 16 years, and persecute those who have remained or return, including by perpetrating sexual violence.¹¹¹

2.2.3 Masalit

The UN Security Council report on UNAMID covering the period from 4 January to 3 April 2019 noted that “In Arafah village, north of El Geneina, clashes broke out between the Awlad Eid and Masalit internally displaced persons on 13 March over a livestock dispute, and three Masalit internally displaced persons and two members of Awlad Eid were killed. The West Darfur State authorities increased the security presence to prevent further escalation and protect the Adramata camp for internally displaced persons”.¹¹²

The UN Special Report covering the period from 14 July 2018 to 15 May 2019 reported that in the period from July 2018 to January 2019 “in South Darfur, tensions between the Masalit and the Fallata over land tenure and competition for natural resources in Gaida remain unresolved, despite the signing of a peace agreement in July 2018”.¹¹³

According to the June 2019 Minority Rights International ‘Peoples Under Threat 2019’ Briefing, Sudan is the 7th highest rank country of people under threat, which include the “Fur, Zaghawa, Massalit and others in Darfur”.¹¹⁴

The Displacement Tracking Matrix Sudan of the International Organization for Migration reported that in West Darfur in August 2019 registration of IDPs took place “in response to the displacement that arose from conflict between local farmers and pastoralist communities. As indicated in the initial interagency mission report, the 2019 restriction imposed by the pastoralist population – preventing IDPs, Fur and Massalit host community tribes from cultivating or harvesting their

¹¹⁰ International Organization for Migration (IOM), [Displacement Tracking Matrix \(DTM\) Sudan, July – September 2019](#), 1 December 2019, *Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), West Darfur*, p. 2

¹¹¹ REDRESS and African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [A Way Forward? Anti-torture reforms in Sudan in the post-Bashir era](#), 19 December 2019, *Executive Summary*, p.5

¹¹² UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 10 April 2019, *para. 8*

¹¹³ UN Security Council, [Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic assessment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 30 May 2019, *para. 19*

¹¹⁴ Minority Rights International, [Peoples Under Threat 2019](#), 3 June 2019, *Peoples most under threat – highest-rated countries 2019 p. 7*

farmland – fueled tensions which erupted following the fall of President Al-Bashir in April this year. The Arab pastoralist retaliated, resulting in the displacement of many IDPs northwards”.¹¹⁵

A December 2019 report from REDRESS and African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies on ‘Anti-torture reforms in Sudan in the post-Bashir era’ asserted that:

According to accounts provided by refugees and lawyers from South, West and North Darfur interviewed by FIDH and ACJPS, former Janjaweed militiamen still occupy the lands of members of the Fur, Massalit and Zaghawa ethnic groups who have been chased from their homeland over the past 16 years, and persecute those who have remained or return, including by perpetrating sexual violence.¹¹⁶

On 31 December 2019, Radio Dabanga reported that “The outcome of bloody clashes between Maaliya herders and Masalit tribesmen in El Geneina, West Darfur, has reportedly risen to more than 70 dead and wounded, while markets, schools, and government institutions remain closed. The violence has already caused the Juba peace talks of the Darfur track to be suspended”.¹¹⁷ The same source further noted that:

The Dar Masalit Sultanate reported that the initial toll of the victims of Kerending camp for the displaced and neighbouring villages amounts to 50 dead, and dozens of wounded.

The Emir of the Maaliya herders, Massar Abdelrahman, announced the death of 11 people and 15 wounded from the Maaliya tribe.

The Masalit Sultanate said in a statement on Tuesday, that “a large number of janjaweed militiamen carrying firearms attacked Kerending camp on Monday. They are guilty of killing, burning, looting, and intimidation.” [...]

The Sultanate of Dar Masalit further explained in its statement that the clashes broke out on Sunday because of a fight between a young Masalit tribesman and an Maaliya herder in El Bursa Market that resulted in the death of the latter.

In response the relatives of the victim attacked the families of the perpetrator and killed two of them, wounded others and torched the market. [...]

The “janjaweed militiamen” attacked wounded people at El Geneina Teaching Hospital on Sunday evening. They killed one person, wounded a child, and assaulted medical personnel, which led to the closure of the hospital until Tuesday.

Today, militant herders attacked the headquarters of the West Darfur police, which is located a few metres away from the governor’s house, where high-level security delegation was staying. [...]

The attackers killed two policemen and wounded another. They stole their weapons and a police vehicle.¹¹⁸

According to a 3 January 2020 article from the same source, “More than 80 people were reportedly killed and at least 190 others injured in the tribal violence that broke out in El Geneina, capital of West Darfur, on Sunday. At least 80,000 people have been affected. 8,111 families fled their homes. The El Geneina Crisis Committee formed after the violent events accuses the West Darfur government of complicity”.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁵ International Organization for Migration (IOM), [Displacement Tracking Matrix \(DTM\) Sudan, July – September 2019](#), 1 December 2019, *Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), West Darfur*, p. 2

¹¹⁶ REDRESS and African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [A Way Forward? Anti-torture reforms in Sudan in the post-Bashir era](#), 19 December 2019, *Executive Summary*, p. 5

¹¹⁷ Radio Dabanga, [70+ dead or injured in bloody West Darfur tribal violence](#), 31 December 2019

¹¹⁸ Radio Dabanga, [70+ dead or injured in bloody West Darfur tribal violence](#), 31 December 2019

¹¹⁹ Radio Dabanga, [West Darfur attacks: Death toll rises to 80+, more than 8,000 families displaced](#), 3 January 2020

2.2.4 Zaghawa/Beri

Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research's 2018 Conflict Barometer described that inter-communal rivalry existed in Darfur between "Misseriya vs. Rizeigat vs. Zaghawa vs. Fellata vs. Ma'aliya vs. Salamat et al".¹²⁰

The January 2019 Letter from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan to the President of the UN Security Council reported with regards to new land occupation in North Darfur:

One example of simmering tensions, involving the internally displaced and refugees, is the situation in the Zuruq area of North Darfur. In the last two years, RSF has created a base there. The objective, according to General Hemmeti, the head of RSF, is to control the borders with Libya and Chad, create an "attractive environment" for settlement and develop the place with assistance from the Gulf States in order to lure people from the cities. In the process, members of Hemmeti's Awlad Mansour clan have also settled in the area. These new settlers are led by Juma Dogolo, Hemmeti's uncle and now self-appointed omda (chief) in the area. This occupation, which reportedly disregards the traditional land rights, has led to protests by the Zaghawa, who see the area as part of their own territory. One part of the newlyoccupied territory (Muzbat) is a historical stronghold of SLA/MM. Many Zaghawa displaced persons, refugees and traditional leaders accuse RSF and the Government of carrying out an ethnic cleansing and bringing in new Arab settlers from abroad (Chad, Niger and Mali). The fears were substantiated by a few articles in the Sudanese media, which claimed that the area historically belonged to the Arabs. All official protests and complaints by Zaghawa leaders have reportedly remained unanswered. UNAMID no longer has a presence in the area, and the Panel could not confirm or refute the claims of RSF and the Zaghawa concerning the situation in the area. Various sources have informed the Panel that the situation in Zuruq might become a source of a renewed conflict.¹²¹

According to the June 2019 Minority Rights International 'Peoples Under Threat 2019' Briefing, Sudan is the 7th highest rank country of people under threat, which include the "Fur, Zaghawa, Massalit and others in Darfur".¹²²

A December 2019 report from REDRESS and African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies on 'Anti-torture reforms in Sudan in the post-Bashir era' asserted that:

According to accounts provided by refugees and lawyers from South, West and North Darfur interviewed by FIDH and ACJPS, former Janjaweed militiamen still occupy the lands of members of the Fur, Massalit and Zaghawa ethnic groups who have been chased from their homeland over the past 16 years, and persecute those who have remained or return, including by perpetrating sexual violence.¹²³

¹²⁰ Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, [2018 Conflict Barometer](#), February 2019, *Overview: Conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa in 2018*, p. 61

¹²¹ UN Security Council, [Letter dated 10 January 2019 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 \(2005\) addressed to the President of the Security Council](#), 10 January 2019, para. 163

¹²² Minority Rights International, [Peoples Under Threat 2019](#), 3 June 2019, *Peoples most under threat – highest-rated countries 2019*, p. 7

¹²³ REDRESS and African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [A Way Forward? Anti-torture reforms in Sudan in the post-Bashir era](#), 19 December 2019, *Executive Summary*, p. 5

2.3 Conflict between tribes and inter-communal violence since December 2018

For an analysis of general security trends across the five states see [1. Security situation in Darfur since December 2018](#) and for an overview of intercommunal conflict see [1.2 Inter-communal and militia clashes](#).

For information specific to particular tribes, see the relevant sections contained within [2.1 Arab ethnic groups](#) and [2.2 Non-Arab ethnic groups](#).

Information in the following subsections is divided by the five federal states of Darfur and presents illustrative examples of intercommunal conflict. Please note that sources which report on clashes between herders and pastoralist and attacks against IDPs or returnees tend not to document the ethnicity/tribe of the groups involved but have been included here given their inter-communal nature.

For a useful map of the administrative regions of these five states, see:

- ❖ United Nations Development Programme et al, [Developing DARFUR: A Recovery & Reconstruction Strategy](#), 7 April 2013, p.77

2.3.1 North Darfur

For information on attacks against IDP and returnee communities in North Darfur, see [6.1.1 North Darfur \(IDPs\)](#) and [7.1.1 North Darfur \(returnees\)](#).

The UN Security Council report on UNAMID covering the period from 4 October 2018 to 3 January 2019 noted that with regards to violence against civilians and human rights violations that “The areas most affected by violence were around Golo, Nertiti and Thur in Central Darfur, Kass in South Darfur, and Sortony in North Darfur, all located in the greater Jebel Marra”.¹²⁴ The same source documented that “In North Darfur, the main protection issues were related to the presence of armed nomads and fears of possible crop destruction by livestock”.¹²⁵

In mid-January 2019 Radio Dabanga reported that “A shooting by herders on farmers in North Darfur caused the death of one of them on Sunday. Two people have been abducted. [...] The incident took place in Sani village, north of Kutum. Herders trespassed with their livestock on the farms at Sani and when the farmers tried to chase the animals off their fields, armed men in three vehicles mounted with machine guns arrived at the scene”.¹²⁶

The same source noted on 4 February 2019 that “Armed herders shot dead two people and wounded three others in a shooting in the area of Ragwa near Tabit in Tawila, North Darfur, [...] Witnesses told Radio Dabanga that herders trespassed on a number of farms with their livestock. After a farmer killed one of the camels, herders in two Land Cruisers shot at the farmers”.¹²⁷

¹²⁴ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 14 January 2019, para. 12

¹²⁵ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 14 January 2019, para. 37

¹²⁶ Radio Dabanga, [Herders kill, abduct farmers in North Darfur](#), 15 January 2019

¹²⁷ Radio Dabanga, [Herders kill farmers in North Darfur](#), 4 February 2019

A subsequent UN Security Council report on UNAMID covering the period from 4 January to 3 April 2019 noted that:

Four intercommunal clashes have been recorded, with 14 fatalities, mainly in the West, Central and North Darfur States, an increase from the two incidents and three fatalities reported during the previous period. [...]

In North Darfur, on 3 February, nomads killed three farmers in Rekhwaa village in retaliation for injuries caused to camels. Native administration leaders, with the support of the Sudanese police, arrested one nomad. On the same day, in Tamel Daheash area, a group of nomads reportedly killed three farmers when the victims tried to prevent livestock from grazing on their farmlands. [...]

In North and South Darfur, the main protection issues continued to involve the presence of armed nomads, the fear of possible crop destruction by livestock and the resulting tensions between herders and nomads.¹²⁸

Towards the end of February 2019 Radio Dabanga documented “Cattle raiders wounded three people in North Darfur’s Tawila locality [...]. The same day, a group of firewood gatherers were attacked in Tawila. According to witnesses speaking to Radio Dabanga, militiamen riding ten camels, two motorcycles and driving a Land Cruiser opened fire in a number of settlements [...]. The settlements are in Martalat, an area 5km west of Khazan Tunjur in Tawila. Mahjoub Adam, Haroun Daoud and Daoud Yahya were wounded. The attackers stole 30 of their camels, 51 sheep and goats and 45 other cattle”.¹²⁹

In early March 2019 Radio Dabanga noted that:

Three separate attacks in Tawila locality in North Darfur [...] have left four people wounded. Two children have been kidnapped.

Witnesses told Radio Dabanga that gunmen on camels, wearing military uniforms, attacked Kadarik village, 5km north of Tabit, and seriously wounded Ismail Hamid and Shamseldin Yagoub.

Another group attacked people who were collecting straw in the area of Dubo El Omda in Tawila and injured both Maryam Yagoub and Kalsoum Yousef.

Also [...], gunmen on camels kidnapped 8-year-old Yousef Zakariya and 9-year-old Mohyildin Saleh from the area of Fallujah while they were taking their cattle to graze, a listener informed Radio Dabanga. They have been taken to an unknown destination.¹³⁰

Radio Dabanga reported on 25 March 2019 that “members of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Sudan’s main government militia attacked the market of Tabit in Tawila locality in North Darfur, robbed property, and detained two policemen. Witnesses from Tabit reported to Radio Dabanga that members of the RSF drove up in six Land Cruisers and raided the market of Tabit on Friday, beat people with whips, and then looted cigarette and telephone shops”.¹³¹

The May 2019 UN Special Report on the strategic assessment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur covering the period from 14 July 2018 to 15 May 2019 reported that:

For the period from July 2018 to January 2019, the mission recorded a total of 10 intercommunal clashes and 30 fatalities, compared with 14 clashes and 136 fatalities in the period between July 2017 and January 2018. However, the conflict drivers, in particular access to land and other natural

¹²⁸ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 10 April 2019, paras. 8, 9 and 26

¹²⁹ Radio Dabanga, [North Darfur: Cattle raid, assault wounds five](#), 19 February 2019

¹³⁰ Radio Dabanga, [North Darfur attacks: Two children abducted, four wounded](#), 8 March 2019

¹³¹ Radio Dabanga, [Man dies in South Darfur militia attack](#), 25 March 2019

resources, are not being addressed in a systemic way, affecting internally displaced persons returning to their areas of origin and the relations between pastoralist and farming communities. Several intercommunal conflicts persist. In North Darfur, the dispute between the Northern Rezeigat herders and returnee farmers, mostly Tunjur and Fur, over access to farmlands continued in Kutum, Shangil Tobaya, Tawilla, Kabkabiya and Saraf Umra.¹³²

At the end of May 2019 Radio Dabanga documented that “Two people were shot dead and two others, including a minor, wounded in attacks by gunmen in Tawila locality in North Darfur [...]. Members of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) government militia reportedly prevented farmers from reaching their farms. A relative of one of the dead men told Radio Dabanga that the incident was carried out by eight gunmen wearing military uniforms and riding camels, on Saturday evening near the village of Tordi, 10 kilometres east of Khazan Tunjur”.¹³³ Furthermore, “A 45-year-old man was shot dead in Tawila locality in North Darfur [...] when he attempted to prevent the theft of his goats”.¹³⁴

Radio Dabanga reported in mid-July 2019 that “Ten people were shot dead and five others were wounded in clashes between farmers in a dispute over agricultural land near Routrout village, 15 km southeast of Um Keddada in North Darfur [...]. Resident Jaafar Daoud reported that an armed conflict erupted among cousins on agricultural land in the area. He added that weapons were used in the clashes and that a joint force of the army, Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and local police managed to completely control the situation in the area”.¹³⁵ Moreover, “A group of gunmen wearing uniforms of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) main government militia, riding on camels and horses, raided Kabra village, eight kilometres west of Khazan Tunjur in Tawila locality in North Darfur [...]. Six villagers were killed and seven wounded. [...] The sources said that the militiamen claimed that the villagers stole a number of their camels. The villagers denied this has happened. The dead are Mohamed Adam (8), Ibrahim Mohamed (9), Yousef Yahya (35), Yousef Saleh (39), Adam Mousa (45), and Khatir Suleiman (66)”.¹³⁶

On the 10 August 2019 Radio Dabanga reported that “Unidentified armed herdsmen abducted two boys from Dubo El Omda in North Darfur’s Tawila locality. [...] Since the start of this year, this station received reports of 33 people abducted in Darfur, many of them occurred in Tawila locality”.¹³⁷

The International Crisis Group reported that “In Clashes between farmers and herders in North Darfur state left three civilians dead 11 Aug”.¹³⁸

On 18 August 2019 Radio Dabanga noted that “A group of farmers sustained varying injuries in an attack by militant herders in Tawila [...]. One of the victims told Radio Dabanga that farmers from Abuzeid, Dubo El Omda, and Falluja were tending their land near Katur in Tawila locality, when they were assaulted. ‘Nine herders riding on camels and four others on motorcycles arrived at our farms. They were wearing uniforms of the [paramilitary] Rapid Support Forces’, he said”.¹³⁹

¹³² UN Security Council, [*Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic assessment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*](#), 30 May 2019, paras. 18 and 19

¹³³ Radio Dabanga, [*RSF livestock raids leave two dead, and three injured in North Darfur*](#), 28 May 2019

¹³⁴ Radio Dabanga, [*North Darfur man killed for his livestock*](#), 26 May 2019

¹³⁵ Radio Dabanga, [*11 dead this week in Darfur violence*](#), 16 July 2019

¹³⁶ Radio Dabanga, [*Six villagers – including children – killed in North Darfur attack*](#), 22 July 2019

¹³⁷ Radio Dabanga, [*Herders abduct two boys in Tawila, North Darfur*](#), 10 August 2019

¹³⁸ International Crisis Group, [*CrisisWatch: Sudan*](#), August 2019

¹³⁹ Radio Dabanga, [*North Darfur farmers wounded in attack by herders*](#), 18 August 2019

At the end of August 2019 Radio Dabanga noted that “A group of at least 67 North Darfur farmers came under heavy fire from unidentified gunmen in the area of Abu Deleik in Kalimendo, North Darfur, [...]. Surprisingly, no injuries were reported”.¹⁴⁰

The UN Special Report covering the period from 1 June to end of September 2019 reported that:

With the onset of the rainy season, and with it the farming season, increased incidents of land occupation and tensions between farmers and pastoralists have been recorded in various parts of Darfur, with pastoralists adopting a more aggressive posture during the current farming season. [...] In Shangil Tobaya, North Darfur, similar incidents occurred between Northern Rizeigat pastoralists and internally displaced farmers, mainly Fur and Tunjur, while in Kabkabiyah, North Darfur, there were reports of reoccupation of farmlands by pastoralists at the start of the farming season. Overall, the number of armed attacks by pastoralists against farmers and the related fatalities increased in 2019, North Darfur recorded 73 incidents with six victims, compared with 64 incidents with seven victims in 2018, and Central Darfur reported 71 attacks and 27 fatalities, compared with 70 incidents with 21 fatalities during the entire year in 2018.¹⁴¹

The same source further noted that “some of the major grievances underlying the Darfur crisis, including intercommunal conflicts, remain fundamentally unaddressed. Moreover, the recent political crisis in the Sudan has contributed to fuel tensions between internally displaced persons and nomad communities, partly prompted by the political vacuum and weakened governance and rule of law institutions. Consequently, violent clashes and retaliatory attacks have occurred in farmlands and camps for internally displaced persons, in particular in Central, South and North Darfur states”.¹⁴²

In a September 2019 edition of UNAMID’s ‘Voices of Darfur’, it was reported that “In responses to reported security tensions in Kutum area, north Darfur, UNAMID on 13 June dispatched an Integrated Assessment Mission (IAM) to the area. [...] The IAM members observed that the main source of the afore-mentioned security tensions was the perennial issue of land disputes, mistrust between nomads and farmers on one hand and farmers and state organs on the other, prevalence of firearms and weak rule of law in the area”.¹⁴³

In mid-October Radio Dabanga reported, “A North Darfur farmer was shot dead by herders [...] after he attempted to drive livestock off his farm [...] . A relative of the deceased farmer told Radio Dabanga that armed herders drove their camels and livestock onto the farm of Ahmed Juma in the area of Abu Gamra in North Darfur. When he attempted to save his crops from the encroaching animals and drive them off, one of the herders shot him dead”.¹⁴⁴

In its Africa regional overview for the week 3-9 November 2019, ACLED reported that “In North and Central Darfur, violence against civilians was also widespread. Six pastoralist attacks on farmers between 1 and 4 November left four dead”.¹⁴⁵ Providing further details on the incidents Radio

¹⁴⁰ Radio Dabanga, [67 North Darfur farmers dodge heavy gunfire](#), 22 August 2019

¹⁴¹ UN Security Council, [Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 15 October 2019, paras. 10 and 11

¹⁴² UN Security Council, [Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 15 October 2019, para. 17

¹⁴³ UNAMID, [Voices of Darfur Vol. 8 No. 1](#), 25 September 2019

¹⁴⁴ Radio Dabanga, [North Darfur farmer killed by trespassing herders](#), 16 October 2019

¹⁴⁵ ACLED, [Regional Overview: 3-9 November 2019](#) 12 November 2019

Dabanga noted that “Four farmers, three of them women, were assaulted by herders in separate incidents in North and Central Darfur [...]. In all cases, they were attacked when they protested the grazing of livestock on their farms. Speaking to Radio Dabanga, a farmer reported that his colleague Yagoub Yahya, sustained a bullet wound in his leg when he was trying to drive cattle from his farm in the area of Dubo El Omda in North Darfur’s Tawila locality”.¹⁴⁶

Radio Dabanga reported on 10 November that “Five boys and a girl were wounded when gunmen riding motorcycles opened fire at a ceremony in Kalkal village in North Darfur”.¹⁴⁷ On the next day the same source documented that:

three women farmers were injured in separate attacks by herdsmen in Tawila in North Darfur. Speaking to Radio Dabanga, a farmer reported that Kaltoum Yousef was attacked by herders when she tried to drive livestock from her farm near Dubo El Omda. “For five consecutive days, herders have been grazing their livestock on farms near Dubo El Omda, Dubo El Madrasa, and Katur,” he complained, and called on the state government and security committees to urgently intervene to solve the problem.

In the area of Tabit, a group of militant herders raided the farms of Maryam Saleh and Kaltoum Shogar with their animals. When the women protested, they were assaulted. The herders then seized the groundnuts and grains harvested from the farms, a caller reported from Tabit.¹⁴⁸

Days later, “groups of herdsmen assaulted farmers in various places in North Darfur. Two farmers were abducted and seven others sustained serious injuries”. [...] Another group of herders attacked a number of farmers in the area of Katur in north-east Jebel Marra. They beat them with sticks and whips. Many farmers were injured, of whom Shadia El Kheir, Darelnaeem Ibrahim, and Kaltoum Yahya seriously”.¹⁴⁹

In November 2019 the Darfur Network for Monitoring and Documentation stated that it “appeals to the transitional government of Sudan, Mohamed Hamden Dagalo (Hemetti) the commander of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and the RSF and Janjaweed militia in Sudan to cease committing violations against farmers and civilians in the Darfur region, which acts are against principles of human rights and international humanitarian law”.¹⁵⁰ The same source further noted that “Several sources have said that the western and northern areas of El Fasher state in North Darfur have experienced repeated violations by armed militias against farmers, and civilians face threats of death, rape and violence, especially during the agricultural harvest season”.¹⁵¹

According to Radio Dabanga, at the end of November 2019, “Two farmers were shot dead by armed herdsmen in two separate incidents in North Darfur [...]. Farmer Abdelbagi Bashshar was shot dead by herdsmen in the area of Tangarara, west of Shangil Tobaya in Tawila locality. [...] farmer Saddam Abdelrasoul was shot dead by armed herders in the area of Turr, west of El Fasher, capital of North Darfur”.¹⁵² The same source reported in early December that “Yahya El Khams, a spokesman for the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) in Kutum, told this station that herders drove their camels and cattle into farms in the area of El Hamra, south-east of Kutum in North Darfur [...] . When the

¹⁴⁶ Radio Dabanga, [Four Darfur farmers attacked by militant herders](#), 5 November 2019

¹⁴⁷ Radio Dabanga, [Eight minors injured in Darfur shootings](#), 10 November 2019

¹⁴⁸ Radio Dabanga, [Herders again attack farmers in North Darfur’s Tawila](#), 11 November 2019

¹⁴⁹ Radio Dabanga, [Armed herders assault farmers across North Darfur](#), 14 November 2019

¹⁵⁰ Darfur Network for Monitoring and Documentation, [Human rights violations against farmers and civilians by armed militias in the Darfur region](#), 21 November 2019

¹⁵¹ Darfur Network for Monitoring and Documentation, [Human rights violations against farmers and civilians by armed militias in the Darfur region](#), 21 November 2019

¹⁵² Radio Dabanga, [Two North Darfur farmers killed by herdsmen](#), 2 December 2019

farmers confronted them, the herders opened fire and wounded several, five of them seriously”.¹⁵³ Furthermore another “attack on farmers by herders in North Darfur left two farmers injured. An army soldier and a herder were wounded in the subsequent pursuit. A relative of one of the victims told Radio Dabanga that the armed herders drove their cattle into farms in the area of Dilinga near Tawila. When the farmers attempted to eject the cattle, the herders opened fire, wounding Haroun Ali and another farmer”.¹⁵⁴

Furthermore, “According to a preliminary report by Darfuri farmers in South and North Darfur, at least 50 farmers were killed and injured by armed herders in November and December [2019]”.¹⁵⁵ The same source further described:

The report says that 20 farmers were shot dead and more than 30 others sustained bullet wounds in attacks by militant herdsman in the eastern parts of the Jebel Marra massive. About 7,000 acres planted with millet, sorghum, sesame, groundnuts, and various vegetables were damaged or destroyed.

“In particular the areas of Umsiyala, Dali, Koto, Karfala, Um Laouta, Kadarik, and Tangara in Tawila and East Jebel Marra localities are prone to fierce herders attacks these days,” the report reads. None of the perpetrators have been arrested. The farmers submitted several complaints to the authorities of South and North Darfur, but “no one paid any attention to our case.”¹⁵⁶

In early December 2019 Radio Dabanga reported that “Four people including a child were killed in crossfire when groups of gunmen clashed at the market of Kass [...]. Witnesses reported to Radio Dabanga that an intense firefight broke out between the gunmen, for reasons that are not yet clear”.¹⁵⁷

In early December 2019 “In Shoba, south of Kabkabiya, more than 20 farmers were injured when they were attacked by a group of militant herdsman. 12 women farmers were seriously wounded and had to be transferred to Kabkabiya Hospital. RSF militiamen also assaulted the head of the Committee for the Protection of the Agricultural Season, Sheikh Hasan Eisa. They beat him at Kabkabiya police station, forced him into a vehicle, and drove him to the RSF headquarters south of Kabkabiya, where he was tortured”.¹⁵⁸

According to ACLED data¹⁵⁹, there were 137 incidents in North Darfur during the timeframe of this report, 2 December 2018 to 10 December 2019.¹⁶⁰

2.3.2 South Darfur

For information on conflict between government forces and armed rebel movements in Jebel Marra, see section [1.1 Clashes between government forces and armed opposition movements](#).

¹⁵³ Radio Dabanga, [Schoolgirl raped as Darfur farm violence continues](#), 4 December 2019

¹⁵⁴ Radio Dabanga, [North Darfur farmers wounded in herder attack](#), 27 November 2019

¹⁵⁵ Radio Dabanga, [Darfur farmers present report on herder attacks](#), 24 December 2019

¹⁵⁶ Radio Dabanga, [Darfur farmers present report on herder attacks](#), 24 December 2019

¹⁵⁷ Radio Dabanga, [Four dead in South Darfur market crossfire](#), 5 December 2019

¹⁵⁸ Radio Dabanga, [Protest in North Darfur against herder, militia attacks](#), 9 December 2019

¹⁵⁹ ACCORD It advises “to employ extreme caution when using fatality numbers” given that “Most of the data collected by ACLED is gathered based on publicly available, secondary reports. It may therefore underestimate the volume of events. Fatality data particularly is vulnerable to bias and inaccurate reporting, and ACLED states to use the most conservative estimate available”.¹⁵⁹

¹⁶⁰ Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), [Data export tool](#), accessed 9 January 2020

For information on attacks against IDP and returnee communities in South Darfur, see [6.1.2 South Darfur \(IDPs\)](#) and [7.1.2 South Darfur \(returnees\)](#).

The UN Security Council report on UNAMID covering the period from 4 October 2018 to 3 January 2019 noted that with regards to violence against civilians and human rights violations that “The areas most affected by violence were around Golo, Nertiti and Thur in Central Darfur, Kass in South Darfur, and Sortony in North Darfur, all located in the greater Jebel Marra”.¹⁶¹

The subsequent UN Security Council report on UNAMID covering the period from 4 January to 3 April 2019 noted that “In North and South Darfur, the main protection issues continued to involve the presence of armed nomads, the fear of possible crop destruction by livestock and the resulting tensions between herders and nomads”.¹⁶²

Radio Dabanga reported in early March 2019 that “Three herders were shot dead and two others were wounded in an attack by members of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) on a nomad settlement near Um Dukhun in South Darfur [...]. Witnesses told Radio Dabanga that a group of soldiers raided the settlement [...] with the intention to steal their property. The herders confronted the soldiers with knives and sticks in defence of their livestock and property. The soldiers to opened fire, killing three herders immediately and wounding two others who were taken to Nyala city for treatment”.¹⁶³

According to Al Jazeera reporting in mid-April 2019:

At the United Nations, Jeremiah Mamabolo, the joint UN-AU envoy in Darfur, said al-Bashir's overthrow has sparked violence in the vast western region of the country, between people displaced during its long conflict and other protesters.

The violence included arson attacks on the premises of al-Bashir's security service and his party's offices, as well as houses of community leaders "perceived to have collaborated with the previous regime", Mamabolo said on Wednesday.

There was also violence in the Kalma camp, housing thousands of people who fled the fighting in Darfur and clashes between youth groups on Saturday led to the reported death of 15 displaced people, he said.¹⁶⁴

Documenting the same incidents, UNAMID reported that it “strongly condemns recent violent confrontations between two rival youth groups in Kalma Camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in South Darfur state, which occurred on 13 April 2019. These confrontations reportedly resulted in the killing of 16 people including a humanitarian field worker, with 17 injured and a significant number of IDPs displaced”.¹⁶⁵

The May 2019 UN Special Report on the strategic assessment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur covering the period from 14 July 2018 to 15 May 2019 reported that:

¹⁶¹ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 14 January 2019, para. 12

¹⁶² UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 10 April 2019, para. 26

¹⁶³ Radio Dabanga, [Sudanese soldiers kill herders in raid](#), 1 March 2019

¹⁶⁴ Al Jazeera, [Omar al-Bashir's brothers arrested as Sudan protests continue](#), 17 April 2019

¹⁶⁵ UNAMID, [UNAMID condemns violent confrontations in Kalma IDP camp in South Darfur](#), 21 April 2019

For the period from July 2018 to January 2019, the mission recorded a total of 10 intercommunal clashes and 30 fatalities, compared with 14 clashes and 136 fatalities in the period between July 2017 and January 2018. However, the conflict drivers, in particular access to land and other natural resources, are not being addressed in a systemic way, affecting internally displaced persons returning to their areas of origin and the relations between pastoralist and farming communities. Several intercommunal conflicts persist. [...] In South Darfur, tensions between the Masalit and the Fallata over land tenure and competition for natural resources in Graidia remain unresolved, despite the signing of a peace agreement in July 2018. Similar tensions exist between the Salamat and the Fallata in Buram.¹⁶⁶

ACCORD compiled the number of conflict incidents by province of Sudan in the first six months of 2019, based on Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)'s data.¹⁶⁷ It advises "to employ extreme caution when using fatality numbers" given that "Most of the data collected by ACLED is gathered based on publicly available, secondary reports. It may therefore underestimate the volume of events. Fatality data particularly is vulnerable to bias and inaccurate reporting, and ACLED states to use the most conservative estimate available".¹⁶⁸ It provided the following 'conflict incidents' with regards to South Darfur:

In South Darfur, 32 incidents killing 23 people were reported. The following locations were among the affected: Faluja, Feina, Gereida, Kalma, Kass, Nyala, Saboon El Fag, Tono, Tullus.¹⁶⁹

Towards the end of July 2019 Radio Dabanga recorded that "At least five basic school pupils have been killed, others injured, and three people abducted by gunmen in South Darfur. One of the relatives of the victims told Radio Dabanga that the gunmen opened fire on a group of civilians on Saturday at Gandatu area north of Kass in South Darfur".¹⁷⁰

In early September 2019 Radio Dabanga reported that "Herdsman opened fire and wounded farmers, three of them seriously, in the area of El Jadeed south of Manawashi in South Darfur. Witnesses told Radio Dabanga that the herdsman allowed their cattle and camels to graze on the farms on Monday. When the farmers tried to drive the animals off, the herdsman opened fire on them, resulting in the injuries. Ahmed Hammad (70), Abdellatif Mohamed (24), and Moez Adam Hammad (13) were seriously wounded".¹⁷¹

Radio Dabanga noted that in mid-September 2019 "A child and two other people have been killed, and seven others – including two policemen – have been wounded, and six people have gone missing in an attack by herders near Gireida, South Darfur [...]. A relative of the victims told Radio Dabanga that the incident occurred when herders began grazing their camels on farms near the village of

¹⁶⁶ UN Security Council, [*Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic assessment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*](#), 30 May 2019, paras. 18 and 19

¹⁶⁷ ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin & Asylum Research and Documentation, [*Sudan, first halfyear 2019: Update on incidents according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project \(ACLED\)*](#), 19 December 2019

¹⁶⁸ ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin & Asylum Research and Documentation, [*Sudan, first halfyear 2019: Update on incidents according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project \(ACLED\)*](#), 19 December 2019

¹⁶⁹ ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin & Asylum Research and Documentation, [*Sudan, first halfyear 2019: Update on incidents according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project \(ACLED\)*](#), 19 December 2019

¹⁷⁰ Radio Dabanga, [*Five children killed in South Darfur armed raid*](#), 24 July 2019

¹⁷¹ Radio Dabanga, [*Herdsman seriously wound South Darfur farmers*](#), 4 September 2019

Eidan, west of Gireida. When the angry farmers then decided to take the camels to the police to report the incident and claim compensation, the herders shot at them”.¹⁷²

The International Crisis Group reporting on a separate incident noted that “In South Darfur state, unidentified militants 18-19 Sept attacked Gereida killing two civilians and one army officer, five assailants also killed”.¹⁷³

ACLED reported on 25 September 2019 that “in South Darfur, after Rapid Support Forces killed an internally displaced student, riots in the Mershing camp resulted in the killing of four demonstrators by the police forces. In Idan village of the same region, the Darfur communal militia attacking the farmers in Idan village caused protesters in Gereida town demand improvements in security”.¹⁷⁴

Radio Dabanga documented that in October 2019, “Four men and two women were shot and wounded in Roro village in Gireida, South Darfur [...]. Speaking to Radio Dabanga, a villager reported that about ten gunmen raided Roro village”.¹⁷⁵ Moreover “Armed robbers pillaged five villages near Gireida in South Darfur. [...] The robbers first attacked Kiwi, east of Gireida, where they stole property and 47 heads of cattle. A large numbers of women and children fled to the nearby village of Kerfa, one of the victims reported to Radio Dabanga. He said that the attacks were carried out by gunmen riding on camels and horses. [...] In a separate incident near Manawashi, a villager was killed and three others were wounded”.¹⁷⁶ Furthermore:

A child and a farmer were severely injured in two separate incidents in South Darfur's East Jebel Marra [...]. Herders trespassed with their livestock the farms in the area of Martal. When the farmers confronted the trespassers, they opened fire into the air. 12-year-old Yousef Haroun was wounded, and the farmers were forced to flee the area. [...]

In the area of Fallujah, also in East Jebel Marra, farmer Ibrahim Ali was severely injured when 11 herders attacked him on his farm and beat him. They also stole his donkey and other possessions. Ali was taken to El Malam for treatment.¹⁷⁷

At the end of November 2019 Radio Dabanga noted that “two farmers were injured after being attacked on their farms by herdsmen In the area of Ras El Fil in South Darfur. Farmers have complained about the friction caused by early grazing by herders”.¹⁷⁸

Furthermore, “According to a preliminary report by Darfuri farmers in South and North Darfur, at least 50 farmers were killed and injured by armed herders in November and December[2019]”.¹⁷⁹ The same source further described:

The report says that 20 farmers were shot dead and more than 30 others sustained bullet wounds in attacks by militant herdsmen in the eastern parts of the Jebel Marra massive. About 7,000 acres planted with millet, sorghum, sesame, groundnuts, and various vegetables were damaged or destroyed.

“In particular the areas of Umsiyala, Dali, Koto, Karfala, Um Laouta, Kadarik, and Tangara in Tawila and East Jebel Marra localities are prone to fierce herders attacks these days,” the report reads.

¹⁷² Radio Dabanga, [Three dead, seven injured in South Darfur herder shooting](#), 19 September 2019

¹⁷³ International Crisis Group, [CrisisWatch: Sudan](#), September 2019

¹⁷⁴ ALCED, [Regional Overview: Africa 25 September 2019](#), 25 September 2019

¹⁷⁵ Radio Dabanga, [Six shot in South Darfur](#), 28 October 2019

¹⁷⁶ Radio Dabanga, [Gunmen pillage five villages in South Darfur](#), 21 October 2019

¹⁷⁷ Radio Dabanga, [Darfur child, farmer injured in Jebel Marra herder violence](#), 20 October 2019

¹⁷⁸ Radio Dabanga, [Three injured in Darfur shootings](#), 28 November 2019

¹⁷⁹ Radio Dabanga, [Darfur farmers present report on herder attacks](#), 24 December 2019

None of the perpetrators have been arrested. The farmers submitted several complaints to the authorities of South and North Darfur, but “no one paid any attention to our case.”¹⁸⁰

According to ACLED data¹⁸¹ there were 93 ‘conflict incidents’ in South Darfur during the timeframe of this report, 2 December 2018 to 10 December 2019.¹⁸²

2.3.3 Central Darfur

The UN Security Council report on UNAMID covering the period from 4 October 2018 to 3 January 2019 noted that with regards to violence against civilians and human rights violations that “The areas most affected by violence were around Golo, Nertiti and Thur in Central Darfur, Kass in South Darfur, and Sortony in North Darfur, all located in the greater Jebel Marra”.¹⁸³ The same source further documented that “In Central Darfur, the teams found sexual gender-based violence, allegedly committed by Government forces, in particular in Nertiti, Thur and Golo, to be major protection concerns”.¹⁸⁴ It also detailed that “Notwithstanding sustained and positive engagement between state authorities and UNAMID, corroborating reports on human rights incidents in Central Darfur continued to be a challenge, owing in part to lack of willingness by law enforcement and judicial authorities to share information with UNAMID”.¹⁸⁵

The subsequent UN Security Council report on UNAMID covering the period from 4 January to 3 April 2019 noted that:

Four intercommunal clashes have been recorded, with 14 fatalities, mainly in the West, Central and North Darfur States, an increase from the two incidents and three fatalities reported during the previous period. [...]

In Central Darfur, an altercation between Beni Halba and Beni Hussein youth on 28 January, resulted in violence in the Korari area, leaving several people injured. The disagreement was resolved peacefully, with Beni Hussein families offering to pay for the transportation and treatment of the injured Beni Halba. [...]

In Central Darfur, protection issues included killings, abductions, sexual and gender-based violence, including conflict-related sexual violence, robbery, assaults and harassment, in particular in the areas of Golo, Nertiti and Zalingei. A total of 16 incidents involving some 100 civilians were recorded¹⁸⁶

The May 2019 UN Special Report on the strategic assessment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur reported that:

¹⁸⁰ Radio Dabanga, [Darfur farmers present report on herder attacks](#), 24 December 2019

¹⁸¹ ACCORD advises “to employ extreme caution when using fatality numbers” given that “Most of the data collected by ACLED is gathered based on publicly available, secondary reports. It may therefore underestimate the volume of events. Fatality data particularly is vulnerable to bias and inaccurate reporting, and ACLED states to use the most conservative estimate available”.

¹⁸² Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), [Data export tool](#), accessed 9 January 2020

¹⁸³ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 14 January 2019, para. 12

¹⁸⁴ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 14 January 2019, para. 37

¹⁸⁵ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 14 January 2019, para. 41

¹⁸⁶ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 10 April 2019, paras. 8, 9 and 27

In Central Darfur, animal theft perpetrated by SLA/AW against the Northern Rezeigat aggravated tensions between the latter and the Fur community, which is perceived to support the rebel group.¹⁸⁷

The UN Special Report reported that “On 9 June, in Central Darfur, about 900 people in Dulayq village, Wadi Salih locality, were displaced and 13 people were killed as a result of inter-tribal conflict”.¹⁸⁸

ACLED reported that “Violent attacks were reported in the Deleig area of Darfur on June 10th [2019], resulting in 17 fatalities and over 100 homes destroyed. While the internet blackout has made it difficult for details to emerge, witnesses and reports indicate that the attack was carried out by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The attack on Deleig has renewed questions on the draw-down of the United Nations – African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). This week, the agency announced its suspension of handing former bases over to the RSF during their withdrawal, a policy which had been mandated by the Transitional Military Council (TMC)”.¹⁸⁹

The UN Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan reported that “Sources reported to the Independent Expert that in June [2019], tensions had escalated in Deleij village in Central Darfur between members of the local community and Arab members of the Rapid Support Forces based in the region. According to reports received, armed men allegedly from Arab tribes, possibly including members of the Rapid Support Forces, launched attacks against civilians in Deleij and surrounding villages on 9 and 10 June, resulting in at least 15 civilians killed and 15 injured. Sources also reported that dozens of homes and shops had been destroyed in Deleij and hundreds of heads of livestock had been reportedly looted”.¹⁹⁰

In mid-June 2019 UNAMID reported that “Following recent reports of fatalities and injuries in Deleij village, Central Darfur, the African Union – United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) on 11 June, dispatched an integrated assessment mission to the area to verify these reports. The mission met with the affected persons and local authorities who confirmed that 17 people had been killed, 15 others injured with more than 100 houses burnt. This occurred during heated clashes between nomads and residents apparently angered by the increase in commodity prices at the local market”.¹⁹¹

ACCORD compiled the number of conflict incidents by province of Sudan in the first six months of 2019, based on Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)’s data.¹⁹² It advises “to employ extreme caution when using fatality numbers” given that “Most of the data collected by ACLED is gathered based on publicly available, secondary reports. It may therefore underestimate the volume of events. Fatality data particularly is vulnerable to bias and inaccurate reporting, and

¹⁸⁷ UN Security Council, [*Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic assessment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*](#), 30 May 2019, para. 18 and 19

¹⁸⁸ UN Security Council, [*Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*](#), 15 October 2019, para. 12

¹⁸⁹ ACLED, [*Regional Overview: Africa 17 June*](#), 18 June 2019

¹⁹⁰ UN Human Rights Council, [*Situation of human rights in the Sudan Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan*](#), 26 July 2019, para. 41

¹⁹¹ UNAMID, [*UNAMID Dispatches assessment mission to Delij, Central Darfur, following communal clashes*](#), 13 June 2019

¹⁹² ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin & Asylum Research and Documentation, [*Sudan, first halfyear 2019: Update on incidents according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project \(ACLED\)*](#), 19 December 2019

ACLED states to use the most conservative estimate available”.¹⁹³ It provided the following ‘conflict incidents’ with regards to Central Darfur:

In Central Darfur, 56 incidents killing 100 people were reported. The following locations were among the affected: Bindisi, Boulay, Daya, Deleig, Dursa, Garsila, Golo, Jadeed, Jebel Marrah, Korare, Manabu, Mukjar, Umm Dukhun, Zalingei.¹⁹⁴

In mid-August 2019 Radio Dabanga recorded that “A girl was shot dead and her mother was seriously wounded in an attack by gunmen near Mukjar in Central Darfur [...]. A relative of the victims told Radio Dabanga that three unidentified gunmen opened fire on farmers working in the area of Kumbo Kesri, 10 kilometre east of Mukjar”.¹⁹⁵

In early September Radio Dabanga reported that “Dozens of residents demonstrated in front of Golo military garrison in Central Darfur on Friday after one person was killed, and four others were wounded in an attack by unknown gunmen in Jebel Marra [...]. One of the wounded told Radio Dabanga that gunmen opened fire in the districts of El Sadaga, El Sad El aali and El Sawra on Thursday night, instantly killing Derej Ahmed and wounding secondary school teacher Adam Abakar, University of Sudan student Mubarak Yagoub, and a fourth person who has not been identified”.¹⁹⁶

The UN Special Report covering the period from 1 June to end of September 2019 reported that:

[...] With the onset of the rainy season, and with it the farming season, increased incidents of land occupation and tensions between farmers and pastoralists have been recorded in various parts of Darfur, with pastoralists adopting a more aggressive posture during the current farming season. In the Nertiti area of Central Darfur, disputes between internally displaced farmers, mostly Fur, and the Nawaiba/Northern Rizeigat pastoralists continued over access to farmlands and the harassment of women.¹⁹⁷

In its Africa regional overview for the week 3-9 November 2019, ACLED reported that “In North and Central Darfur, violence against civilians was also widespread. Six pastoralist attacks on farmers between 1 and 4 November left four dead”.¹⁹⁸ Providing further details on the incidents Radio Dabanga noted that “Four farmers, three of them women, were assaulted by herders in separate incidents in North and Central Darfur [...]. In all cases, they were attacked when they protested the grazing of livestock on their farms. [...] In Central Darfur, Siddiga Abdelrahman, who is pregnant, was seriously injured in the area west of Jebel Marra, when herdsmen drove their livestock into her farm, and beat her with sticks and whips when she protested”.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹³ ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin & Asylum Research and Documentation, [Sudan, first halfyear 2019: Update on incidents according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project \(ACLED\)](#), 19 December 2019

¹⁹⁴ ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin & Asylum Research and Documentation, [Sudan, first halfyear 2019: Update on incidents according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project \(ACLED\)](#), 19 December 2019

¹⁹⁵ Radio Dabanga, [Central Darfur girl killed by gunmen](#), 21 August 2019

¹⁹⁶ Radio Dabanga, [Demo against deadly shooting in Darfur's Jebel Marra](#), 7 September 2019

¹⁹⁷ UN Security Council, [Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 15 October 2019, para. 10

¹⁹⁸ ACLED, [Regional Overview: 3-9 November 2019](#) 12 November 2019

¹⁹⁹ Radio Dabanga, [Four Darfur farmers attacked by militant herders](#), 5 November 2019

On the 10 December 2019 Radio Dabanga reported that “Six farmers have been injured and a young woman was gang-raped after unidentified gunmen invaded farms in the area of Khor Ramla in Nierteti in Central Darfur”.²⁰⁰

According to ACLED data²⁰¹ there were 103 ‘conflict incidents’ in Central Darfur during the timeframe of this report, 2 December 2018 to 10 December 2019.²⁰²

2.3.4 West Darfur

For information on attacks against IDP and returnee communities in West Darfur, see [6.1.4 West Darfur \(IDPs\)](#) and [7.1.4 West Darfur \(returnees\)](#).

The UN Security Council report on UNAMID covering the period from 4 October 2018 to 3 January 2019 noted that with regards to violence against civilians and human rights violations that “In North Darfur, the main protection issues were related to the presence of armed nomads and fears of possible crop destruction by livestock. Similar protection issues were identified in West Darfur which included land disputes that were eventually resolved through local conflict resolution mechanisms”.²⁰³

UNOCHA reported that “On 17 January [2019] inter-communal conflict in the Jebel Moon locality of West Darfur State affected an estimated 3,500 people in the five return villages of Chilchil, Girji Girji, Bir Bateha, Dileibaya and Khomi. In some of the villages homes and recent harvests were burned and livestock was looted. Government forces brought the situation under control by 19 January and some of the perpetrators were reportedly arrested. People had spontaneously returned to these villages from refugee camps in Chad and from villages located along the Sudan-Chad border in 2017 and 2018 following encouragement from authorities to return and the improvement of the security situation with the establishment of police posts”.²⁰⁴

Radio Dabanga reported on 27 January 2019 that “Two people were killed, 47 houses were burned, and 180 head of cattle were stolen in an attack by militiamen on a village in West Darfur”.²⁰⁵

The subsequent UN Security Council report on UNAMID covering the period from 4 January to 3 April 2019 noted that:

Four intercommunal clashes have been recorded, with 14 fatalities, mainly in the West, Central and North Darfur States, an increase from the two incidents and three fatalities reported during the previous period. In West Darfur, in the vicinity of Hijleahjah village, east of El Geneina, the killing of a member of Awlad Zaid by member of Misseriya Jabel triggered clashes between the two groups between 15 and 17 January, reportedly causing fatalities and displacement to nearby villages and to Chad. Sudanese Armed Forces personnel were deployed to the area to calm the situation. In Arafah

²⁰⁰ Radio Dabanga, [Minor raped, six injured in Central Darfur farm invasion](#), 10 December 2019

²⁰¹ ACCORD advises “to employ extreme caution when using fatality numbers” given that “Most of the data collected by ACLED is gathered based on publicly available, secondary reports. It may therefore underestimate the volume of events. Fatality data particularly is vulnerable to bias and inaccurate reporting, and ACLED states to use the most conservative estimate available”.

²⁰² Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), [Data export tool](#), accessed 9 January 2020

²⁰³ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 14 January 2019, para. 37

²⁰⁴ UNOCHA, [Humanitarian Bulletin, Sudan Issue 02](#), 28 January – 24 February 2019

²⁰⁵ Radio Dabanga, [Four dead, homes burned in Darfur militia violence](#), 27 January 2019

village, north of El Geneina, clashes broke out between the Awlad Eid and Masalit internally displaced persons on 13 March over a livestock dispute, and three Masalit internally displaced persons and two members of Awlad Eid were killed. The West Darfur State authorities increased the security presence to prevent further escalation and protect the Adramata camp for internally displaced persons”.²⁰⁶

ACCORD compiled the number of conflict incidents by province of Sudan in the first six months of 2019, based on Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)’s data.²⁰⁷ It advises “to employ extreme caution when using fatality numbers” given that “Most of the data collected by ACLED is gathered based on publicly available, secondary reports. It may therefore underestimate the volume of events. Fatality data particularly is vulnerable to bias and inaccurate reporting, and ACLED states to use the most conservative estimate available”.²⁰⁸ It provided the following ‘conflict incidents’ with regards to the five Darfur states:

In West Darfur, 31 incidents killing 31 people were reported. The following locations were among the affected: Al Kereinik, Babanosa, Djedid, El Geneina, Foro Burunga, Hijleahjah, Jebel Mun, Kuru Kuru, Nouri, Umm Dukhun, Umtajok.²⁰⁹

On 12th June the Darfur Women Action Group reported that “reports came in that the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) had commenced the burning of Delaige, a village located in Western Darfur [...] This attacks on Delaige camp is not an isolated incident. It’s a part of the systemic and orchestrated attacks against the indigenous Darfuris that has been carried out by Sudan government and the leaders of the current Sudan’s Transitional Military Council. The RSF reportedly commenced the slaughter of those residing in Delaige on Sunday evening, killing six. By Monday afternoon, the Janjaweed had enclosed the village of Delaige, blocking escape and confining residents to indoors. At that time, the death toll was reported as 16 individuals”.²¹⁰

UNAMID explained in an August 2019 article that “West Darfur is endowed with arable land for farming and livestock rearing, making the state attractive for seasonal migration of nomadic herders from North Darfur and Chad. These seasonal migrations exacerbate conflict between farmers and nomadic herders as a result of increased demand for pasture and water resources. In order to address this cyclic phenomenon, 20 km of the Arara-Gerjira migratory route will be demarcated and two water points and a veterinary clinic established along the route”.²¹¹

The Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Sudan of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) covering the period July to September 2019 reported that in West Darfur in August 2019 registration of IDPs took place “in response to the displacement that arose from conflict between local farmers and pastoralist communities. As indicated in the initial interagency mission report, the 2019 restriction imposed by the pastoralist population – preventing IDPs, Fur and Massalit host

²⁰⁶ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 10 April 2019, para. 8

²⁰⁷ ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin & Asylum Research and Documentation, [Sudan, first halfyear 2019: Update on incidents according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project \(ACLED\)](#), 19 December 2019

²⁰⁸ ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin & Asylum Research and Documentation, [Sudan, first halfyear 2019: Update on incidents according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project \(ACLED\)](#), 19 December 2019

²⁰⁹ ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin & Asylum Research and Documentation, [Sudan, first halfyear 2019: Update on incidents according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project \(ACLED\)](#), 19 December 2019

²¹⁰ Darfur Women Action Group, [Darfur Village Set Ablaze: 16 years of genocide](#), 12 June 2019

²¹¹ UNAMID, [UNAMID and FAO sign MOU to combat inter-communal violence in Darfur](#), 29 August 2019

community tribes from cultivating or harvesting their farmland – fueled tensions which erupted following the fall of President Al-Bashir in April this year. The Arab pastoralist retaliated, resulting in the displacement of many IDPs northwards”.²¹²

Radio Dabanga documented that on 28 November 2019, “Radio Dabanga reported that herdsmen raided Kendebe village at dawn that morning. Four residents were injured. The attackers torched a number of houses. They then left the area, stealing 50 cows and 300 sheep and goats. In a separate attack, farmer Ahmed Matar was killed by militant herders in the area of Gokar near El Geneina, West Darfur, when he objected to them grazing of their livestock on his farm, an eyewitness reported”.²¹³ Radio Dabanga documented that on the next day “Two women and two schoolchildren were seriously injured [...] when unidentified gunmen attacked the village of Gomwa north of Sirba in West Darfur”.²¹⁴

In early December 2019 Radio Dabanga noted that “militant herders attacked a village in Kereinik locality, west of El Geneina. Farmer Sheikheldin Ibrahim was shot dead, and several others were injured. In a separate incident on Friday, two people were injured in Galala village in the western part of Kereinik during a crossfire between the police and herders”.²¹⁵

On 31 December 2019, Radio Dabanga reported that “The outcome of bloody clashes between Maaliya herders and Masalit tribesmen in El Geneina, West Darfur, has reportedly risen to more than 70 dead and wounded, while markets, schools, and government institutions remain closed. The violence has already caused the Juba peace talks of the Darfur track to be suspended”.²¹⁶ The same source further noted that:

The Dar Masalit Sultanate reported that the initial toll of the victims of Kerending camp for the displaced and neighbouring villages amounts to 50 dead, and dozens of wounded.

The Emir of the Maaliya herders, Massar Abdelrahman, announced the death of 11 people and 15 wounded from the Maaliya tribe.

The Masalit Sultanate said in a statement on Tuesday, that “a large number of janjaweed militiamen carrying firearms attacked Kerending camp on Monday. They are guilty of killing, burning, looting, and intimidation.” [...]

The Sultanate of Dar Masalit further explained in its statement that the clashes broke out on Sunday because of a fight between a young Masalit tribesman and an Maaliya herder in El Bursa Market that resulted in the death of the latter.

In response the relatives of the victim attacked the families of the perpetrator and killed two of them, wounded others and torched the market. [...]

The “janjaweed militiamen” attacked wounded people at El Geneina Teaching Hospital on Sunday evening. They killed one person, wounded a child, and assaulted medical personnel, which led to the closure of the hospital until Tuesday.

Today, militant herders attacked the headquarters of the West Darfur police, which is located a few metres away from the governor’s house, where high-level security delegation was staying. He arrived, with a government delegation, to El Geneina today at 8 am.

The attackers killed two policemen and wounded another. They stole their weapons and a police vehicle.²¹⁷

²¹² International Organization for Migration (IOM), [Displacement Tracking Matrix \(DTM\) Sudan, July – September 2019](#), 1 December 2019, *Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), West Darfur*, p. 2

²¹³ Radio Dabanga, [Schools shut after four injured in West Darfur attack](#), 1 December 2019

²¹⁴ Radio Dabanga, [Schools shut after four injured in West Darfur attack](#), 1 December 2019

²¹⁵ Radio Dabanga, [Protest against increasing violence in Darfur](#), 8 December 2019

²¹⁶ Radio Dabanga, [70+ dead or injured in bloody West Darfur tribal violence](#), 31 December 2019

²¹⁷ Radio Dabanga, [70+ dead or injured in bloody West Darfur tribal violence](#), 31 December 2019

According to ACLED data (see note above), there were 57 ‘conflict incidents’ in West Darfur during the timeframe of this report, 2 December 2018 to 10 December 2019.²¹⁸

According to a 3 January 2020 article from the same source, “More than 80 people were reportedly killed and at least 190 others injured in the tribal violence that broke out in El Geneina, capital of West Darfur, on Sunday. At least 80,000 people have been affected. 8,111 families fled their homes. The El Geneina Crisis Committee formed after the violent events accuses the West Darfur government of complicity”.²¹⁹

2.3.5 East Darfur

For information on attacks against IDP and returnee communities in East Darfur, see [7.1.5 East Darfur \(returnees\)](#).

ACCORD compiled the number of conflict incidents by province of Sudan in the first six months of 2019, based on Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)’s data.²²⁰ It advises “to employ extreme caution when using fatality numbers” given that “Most of the data collected by ACLED is gathered based on publicly available, secondary reports. It may therefore underestimate the volume of events. Fatality data particularly is vulnerable to bias and inaccurate reporting, and ACLED states to use the most conservative estimate available”.²²¹ It provided the following ‘conflict incidents’ with regards to East Darfur:

In East Darfur, 8 incidents killing 2 people were reported. The following locations were among the affected: Arid, Ed Daein, Hejlj.²²²

The May 2019 UN Special Report on the strategic assessment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur covering the period from 14 July 2018 to 15 May 2019 reported that:

In East Darfur, while the land-based conflict between the Southern Rezeigat and the Ma’aliyya in Abu Karinka and Adilla remains unresolved, progress was made with the signing of a Declaration for Peaceful Coexistence on 29 November 2018.²²³

UNOCHA noted that “On 3 June [2019], intertribal fighting reportedly took place in Higlieiga village in East of Ed Daein, East Darfur, over a piece of farm land, which caused five fatalities and more than 15 injuries. Mediation from local elders led to the peaceful relocation of members of one tribe to

²¹⁸ Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), [Data export tool](#), accessed 9 January 2020

²¹⁹ Radio Dabanga, [West Darfur attacks: Death toll rises to 80+, more than 8,000 families displaced](#), 3 January 2020

²²⁰ ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin & Asylum Research and Documentation, [Sudan, first halfyear 2019: Update on incidents according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project \(ACLED\)](#), 19 December 2019

²²¹ ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin & Asylum Research and Documentation, [Sudan, first halfyear 2019: Update on incidents according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project \(ACLED\)](#), 19 December 2019

²²² ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin & Asylum Research and Documentation, [Sudan, first halfyear 2019: Update on incidents according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project \(ACLED\)](#), 19 December 2019

²²³ UN Security Council, [Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic assessment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 30 May 2019, paras. 18 and 19

another village, starting on 5 June”.²²⁴ A UN Special Report reported that “On 6 June [2019], intercommunal fighting in East Darfur, between the Tama and Rizeigat tribes, resulted in the displacement of some 1,300 people from the Hijilij village east of Ed Daein”.²²⁵

According to ACLED data²²⁶ there were 19 ‘conflict incidents’ in East Darfur during the timeframe of this report, 2 December 2018 to 10 December 2019.²²⁷

2.3.6 Village defence committees

No information was found on this topic amongst the sources consult in the reporting period for this report nor in the previous edition. For a historical overview see the first edition of this report:

- ACCORD, [Darfur COI Compilation](#), September 2017, 2.3.6 Village defence committees

2.3.7 Blood feuds and state protection

For information on communal conflicts, see [1.2 Inter-communal and militia clashes](#).

The January 2019 Letter from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan to the President of the UN Security Council reported with regards to the Darfur Internal Dialogue and Consultation:

Within the framework of the Doha Document, the Darfur Internal Dialogue and Consultation mechanism has continued to promote intercommunal peace and reconciliation in Darfur. The work of this body has been facilitated by UNAMID. At a meeting with officials and local administrators taking part in the mechanism, the Panel was informed that peace initiatives at the local level had resulted in a series of inter-tribal agreements, with the mediation of the state and federal authorities. These processes are based on traditional reconciliation methods (judiyya) and include the settlement of such issues as payment of blood money (diya). Major weaknesses of local peace settlements have been connected with the issues of implementation and absence of an established national or regional record of such agreements.²²⁸

According to an April 2019 paper published by Tufts University, reporting with regards to compensation and reconciliation in Darfur:

Customary justice is founded on compensation practices and the recognition of responsibility, which can lead to reconciliation. It can be ordered by the court, recommended by ajaweed or other mediators, or agreed by consensus by the parties (Tubiana et al. 2012).

²²⁴ UNOCHA, [SUDAN: Civil unrest Flash Update No. 3](#), 9 June 2019

²²⁵ UN Security Council, [Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 15 October 2019, para. 12

²²⁶ ACCORD advises “to employ extreme caution when using fatality numbers” given that “Most of the data collected by ACLED is gathered based on publicly available, secondary reports. It may therefore underestimate the volume of events. Fatality data particularly is vulnerable to bias and inaccurate reporting, and ACLED states to use the most conservative estimate available”.

²²⁷ Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), [Data export tool](#), accessed 9 January 2020

²²⁸ UN Security Council, [Letter dated 10 January 2019 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 \(2005\) addressed to the President of the Security Council](#), 10 January 2019, para.

Diya (compensation) varies from region to region and from ethnic group to ethnic group. In Darfur, *diya* is used in cases of unintentional homicide, injuries, and damage to property. It is based on Sharia and local customs.

Payment of *diya* is worked out by dividing the amount of imposed compensation by the number of contributing households. It is reported that 66.5% of the *diya* is paid to the paternal family of the victim, and 33.5% of the *diya* is paid to the victim's maternal relatives. The collection of money may be an arduous task as households' contribution may be as low as 100 SDG (Sudanese pounds).

However, payment of *diya* is seen "as an honorable deed, symbolic of belonging to the group. Few are prepared to endure the shame of not meeting the obligation" (El Tom 2012, 107–108). *Diya* payment illustrates the importance of considering local institutions in terms of resource rights relationships between different groups of producers. This form of collective payment reaffirms values of responsibility and respectability among and between groups, and reinforces social belonging to the community. *Diya* is thus an important governance mechanism that relates to resource usage and the maintenance of socio-economic relationships.²²⁹

In a January 2020 article Radio Dabanga reported that "A delegation led by Sudan's Prime Minister Abdullah Hamdok and the Deputy Chairman of the Sovereign Council, Lieutenant-General Mohamed Hamdan 'Hemeti' arrived in the West Darfur capital of El Geneina yesterday to assess the situation following bloody tribal clashes [...] that have claimed dozens of lives".²³⁰ The source further noted that:

Hemeti pledged to hold those involved in El Geneina events accountable according to the law and affirmed rejection of the principle of settling murder cases by blood money.

In a press statement after a session of talks with the Central Truth Investigation Committee and West Darfur State Security Committee on the events in El Geneina yesterday, Hemeti said that paying blood money as a settlement to the issue of killing is forbidden, and every action will be in accordance with the law.²³¹

2.3.8 Possibility for a Darfuri to move to another village/region and being identified/found by non-state actors from their previous place of residence

Maddy Crowther, Co-Executive Director of Waging Peace, published a report in January 2019 on the risk associated for returned Darfuris and consulted a range of organisations and individuals, amongst others Margie Buchanan-Smith and Susanne Jaspars, both Sudan experts, who "were forthright in their assessment that surveillance, and resulting restrictions on freedom of movement for Darfuris, was a primary driver of migration. They wrote, 'They [Darfuri groups] may come under surveillance, especially if they live in IDP camps in Darfur, are university students and/ or political activists. If and when they come under surveillance, their movements are likely to be restricted by the security services. Some are ordered to report regularly to security. Teenage boys may be asked, and put under pressure to spy on their relatives and community. Many young Darfuri men interviewed for the research inside Sudan cited arrest, surveillance, harassment and intimidation as the primary reason for wanting to leave Sudan. Those who had already left, interviewed in Europe, similarly cited those factors as their primary reason for leaving'".²³²

²²⁹ CAFOD - Catholic Agency for Overseas Development, CRS - Catholic Relief Services, UMCOR - United Methodist Committee on Relief, et al. (Author), published by Tufts University - Feinstein International Center, [Lessons for Taadoud II: Improving Natural Resource Management](#), April 2019, Part 5. *Darfur's juridical systems: a context of legal pluralism*, p. 55

²³⁰ Radio Dabanga, [Hamdok, Hemeti, visit strife-torn West Darfur](#), 2 January 2020

²³¹ Radio Dabanga, [Hamdok, Hemeti, visit strife-torn West Darfur](#), 2 January 2020

²³² Waging Peace (Maddy Crowther), [Risks on return for Darfuris in Sudan](#), January 2019, 6. *Viability of internal relocation to Khartoum, c. Surveillance*, p. 22

2.4 Treatment of Arab ethnic groups

This section provides a very brief overview from the consulted sources in the time frame for this report. For further information on Arab ethnic groups and their treatment, see the particular ethnic groups addressed in the following section of this report: [2.1 Arab ethnic groups](#), as well as section [2.3 Conflict between tribes and inter-communal violence since December 2018](#).

The January 2019 Letter from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan to the President of the UN Security Council explained with regards to violations by the Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid that “Attacks on Arab camel herders by SLA/AW are also frequent. Some commanders such as Saleh Borso and Mohamed Taha are well known for such activities”.²³³

According to Al Jazeera reporting in mid-April 2019:

At the United Nations, Jeremiah Mamabolo, the joint UN-AU envoy in Darfur, said al-Bashir's overthrow has sparked violence in the vast western region of the country, between people displaced during its long conflict and other protesters.

The violence included arson attacks on the premises of al-Bashir's security service and his party's offices, as well as houses of community leaders "perceived to have collaborated with the previous regime", Mamabolo said on Wednesday.

There was also violence in the Kalma camp, housing thousands of people who fled the fighting in Darfur and clashes between youth groups on Saturday led to the reported death of 15 displaced people, he said.²³⁴

On 1 January 2020, the Sudan Tribune documented that “Over 41 people were killed as a result of tribal fighting between the Arab tribes and Massalit after the murder of a member of the Arab groups in El-Geneina after a scuffle near Crendingue camp for displaced Massalit tribe. Also, the tribal violence comes as Darfur Arab groups, which were used by the former regime to quell the insurgency in the region, say they are targeted after the revolution by the tribes that had backed the rebellion from the Fur, Massalit and Zaghawa”.²³⁵

2.5 Treatment of non-Arab ethnic groups

This section provides a very brief overview from the consulted sources in the time frame for this report. For further information on non-Arab ethnic groups and their treatment, see the particular ethnic groups addressed in the following section of this report: [2.2 Non-Arab ethnic groups](#) as well as section [2.3 Conflict between tribes since December 2018](#).

2.5.1 Treatment by state actors

For further information, see [2.2 Non-Arab ethnic groups](#) and [1.1 Clashes between government forces and armed opposition movements](#).

²³³ UN Security Council, [Letter dated 10 January 2019 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 \(2005\) addressed to the President of the Security Council](#), 10 January 2019, para. 76

²³⁴ Al Jazeera, [Omar al-Bashir's brothers arrested as Sudan protests continue](#), 17 April 2019

²³⁵ Sudan Tribune, [Sudanese government delegations visit Darfur states after tribal clashes](#), 1 January 2020

The January 2019 Letter from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan to the President of the UN Security Council explained with regards to the make-up of government forces and auxiliary militias:

On several occasions during the reporting period, the Government conducted operations in Jebel Marra involving SAF, RSF and groups of local armed Arab tribesmen. [...]

In eastern and south-eastern Jebel Marra, most of the auxiliary fighters hail from the Sa'ada tribe, which has had a conflictual relationship with the Fur community in the area since the 1980s. Two main Sa'ada groups of fighters are reportedly involved.

One is based in Jabra village and is led by the Azreg brothers (Mohamed, Abdallah and Hassan). The other is based in Gardud village; its leaders include Nouredine Haj Ahmed and his brother Jiddo Haj Ahmed. Members of the Ruwas tribe (based in the Limo area) were also involved in some fighting.

In western Jebel Marra, many militia members hail from the Nawaiba tribe, which has a strong presence between Thur and Nertiti. One of the most famous Nawaiba militia leaders is Alqura. Some elements from the Jalul clan of the Mahamid tribe, based around Nertiti, also participate in militia activity.

These members of local Arab tribes are mobilized on an ad-hoc basis by the security forces for Government of the Sudan military operations. The connection between these tribal militias and the security forces is mostly based on family and tribal ties. In particular, some RSF members hail from those tribes and mobilize their kinsmen in the tribe when support is needed. For instance, according to local sources, several Sa'ada leaders mentioned above are themselves RSF officers.²³⁶

The same source further noted that "Various Arab militias are operating in Darfur and are reportedly engaged in criminal activities such as kidnapping for ransom, human trafficking, smuggling of weapons and drugs and cattle rustling. Some Arab groups sell arms and ammunition to SLA/AW in Jebel Marra".²³⁷ Furthermore, "In January 2017, RSF was integrated in SAF by a parliamentary act. In order to dilute the 'Darfurian Arab' character of the force, recruitment was expanded to non-Arab communities of Darfur and tribes outside Darfur"²³⁸ and "many displaced persons distrust RSF owing to its perceived closeness to Arab communities and the human rights violations and abuses committed by some of its members".²³⁹

The US Department of State reported in its annual human rights report covering events in 2018 that "Human rights monitors reported that the government's national arms collection campaign was incomplete and directed at certain groups, while exempting some Arab groups. IDPs in Darfur also reported that they could not return to their original lands despite government claims the situation was secure, because their lands were being occupied by Arab nomads, who were not disarmed and could attack returnees".²⁴⁰ The same source further noted that "Discrimination occurred in employment and occupation based on gender, religion, and ethnic, tribal, or party affiliation. Ethnic

²³⁶ UN Security Council, [Letter dated 10 January 2019 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 \(2005\) addressed to the President of the Security Council](#), 10 January 2019, paras. 55-58

²³⁷ UN Security Council, [Letter dated 10 January 2019 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 \(2005\) addressed to the President of the Security Council](#), 10 January 2019, para. 186

²³⁸ UN Security Council, [Letter dated 10 January 2019 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 \(2005\) addressed to the President of the Security Council](#), 10 January 2019, para. 130

²³⁹ UN Security Council, [Letter dated 10 January 2019 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 \(2005\) addressed to the President of the Security Council](#), 10 January 2019, para. 156

²⁴⁰ US Department of State, [2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sudan](#), 13 March 2019, Section 1., g. Abuses in Internal Conflict

minorities often complained that government hiring practices discriminated against them in favor of “riverine” Arabs from northern Sudan.²⁴¹

According to a January 2019 report from Maddy Crowther, co-Director of Waging Peace which was based on input from a variety of interviewees, “Respondents had mixed views on the relative intensity of conflict in Darfur in recent years. Some said it was the same, or even worse, than at the recognised height of the Darfur conflict”.²⁴² She cited an anonymous expert as stating “the situation is still pretty bad. The territory is now largely controlled by the Rapid Support Forces, as our now officially labelled most of the “janjawid” Arab militias. There [sic] behaviours are still particularly abusive over non-Arab civilians. They operate checkpoints on the roads where they asked for taxes from travelers. They have also been extending their occupation of non-Arab customary land, including recently on zones they had been unsuccessfully trying to occupy even before the war in Darfur, such as Malam al-Hosh in northern Darfur”.²⁴³ The same report further noted:

It was argued by respondents that the RSF’s behavior still exhibited predation on certain ethnicities. Some attribute this to deliberately ethnicised Government recruitment practices. Hala Al-Karib, the women’s rights advocate, said, “Militarization of pastoralist tribes still happening. Persecution of non Arabized native tribes educated youth who refuses to affiliate themselves /collaborate with the regime is prevalent .” Mosaab Baba from the Ayin Network added, “Law enforcement has become tribalized as well, with outfits such as Border Guards, RSF, and PDF – with the government mainly recruiting Arab tribes (Rizegat, Maaliya, etc).” He further points out this has a long history, as “a reflection of Khartoum’s policies that stretch back as far as the Mahdiya days.”

One notable exception, noted by Osama Mahmoud from the Darfur Union in the UK, is the recruitment of Darfuris of all backgrounds to fight as Sudanese mercenaries on behalf of Saudi Arabia in Yemen.²⁴⁴

The same source also stated:

NGO B provided an example of what this looks like in practice, “Though the changing conflict dynamics have improved the security situation, Darfur remains hugely troubled by Banditry and other criminal elements organised amongst primarily ethnic lines competing over resources (gold, land etc). Militias empowered and supported by the Government of Sudan continue to act with impunity. Such militias were recruited by the Government of Sudan as they were viewed as a cheap means through which to engage the armed opposition. The militias not only received financial support, weapons, military support and intelligence, they were also permitted to engage in acts that would bolster their own socioeconomic positions in relation to other ethnic groups and in order to address perceived historical grievances. Such acts included: raiding livestock; grazing livestock on farmers’ lands; kidnap; extortion; occupying settled territory and driving out the former inhabitants; looting; and indeed any other act in as much as they did not threaten the Government of Sudan. The above continues on a daily basis, largely again along ethnic lines, through the threat or the use of force. This ensures Darfur remains insecure and fragile. It further serves to reinforce the notion that though conflict has decreased, the effects of conflict continue to afflict Darfuris.”

This continues to ensure that certain ethnicities are perceived as being associated with opposition or rebel forces, and remain liable to be persecuted and attacked for this reason. Sudan expert B said,

²⁴¹ US Department of State, [2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sudan](#), 13 March 2019, *Section 7, d. Discrimination with Respect to Employment and Occupation*

²⁴² Waging Peace (Maddy Crowther), [Risks on return for Darfuris in Sudan](#), January 2019, *Executive Summary p. 9*

²⁴³ Waging Peace (Maddy Crowther), [Risks on return for Darfuris in Sudan](#), January 2019, *Executive Summary p. 9*

²⁴⁴ Waging Peace (Maddy Crowther), [Risks on return for Darfuris in Sudan](#), January 2019, *Executive Summary p. 10*

“Security forces often assume that people from particular ethnic communities are part of the opposition.”

NGO B adds, “There have been numerous examples of retreating Government forces – whether Rapid Support Forces, Border Guards or other less institutionalised militia – targetting settlements presumed to be loyal to the armed opposition by sheer virtue of sharing a common ethnicity. These attacks take the form of livestock raids, destruction of property, sexual violence, looting and so forth. The ferocity of such attacks often correlate with whether the force in question were defeated by the armed opposition with increasing losses resulting in increasing acts of revenge on the civilian population.

“Sexual and gender based violence remains the norm. Testimonies express strong evidence that women from typically “African” groups are targeted by men from typically “Arab” ethnic groups. The attacks furthermore often include ethnic and racial slurs indicating the “African” women are nothing more than slaves or that they are lucky to be raped by an “Arab” man.”.²⁴⁵

According to Eric Reeves, Sudan researcher and analyst for over 20 years, reporting in July 2019, “Although Arab groups have suffered from significant violence at various points over the sixteen years of the Darfur conflict, particularly inter-tribal violence in East Darfur—and continue to suffer from violence in some areas—the genocidal ambitions of the Khartoum regime’s counter-insurgency campaign against Darfuri rebel groups has been directed overwhelmingly at non-Arab/African tribal groups”.²⁴⁶

An August 2019 Open Democracy article cited Maddy Crowther, co-Director of Waging Peace, as stating that “The violence recently seen in Khartoum's streets has long been meted out to those in Darfur, Blue Nile and South Kordofan, accompanied by a racist ideology that treats these individuals as second-class citizens. Although the agreement between the civilian and military delegations is welcome, there is a danger it just becomes power-sharing between Nile elites”.²⁴⁷ The same report described “widespread distrust of Hemedti and his RSF militia”, noting that:

Some Darfuris fear the regular army will keep him away from Khartoum by ‘rewarding’ him with Darfur, where the RSF will continue plundering natural resources, looting livestock and ethnically cleansing the non-Arab population. He is reported to have many local chiefs on his payroll there.²⁴⁸

Eric Reeves noted in September 2019:

There is still little evidence that the dynamic new Prime Minister of Sudan, Abdallah Hamdok, will be able to rein in the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Darfur or halt the predations of armed Arab groups targeting non-Arab/African farmers and internally displaced persons. A role in the new Sovereign Council for RSF commander Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemeti”) seems to ensure that the RSF will remain the primary source of real power in Darfur; indeed, the Constitutional Draft ratified last month gives co-equal status to Hemeti’s RSF and the regular army, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), under the command of Sovereign Council head General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. This in effect legitimizes Hemeti’s forces as a private army, an untenable situation in any truly civilian government. [...]

Many thousands of farms and farmlands have been violently destroyed or seized by Arab militias and marauders; billions of dollars of livestock, crops, and possessions have been destroyed or seized; many thousands of villages have been wholly or partially destroyed, often including vital water

²⁴⁵ Waging Peace (Maddy Crowther), [Risks on return for Darfuris in Sudan](#), January 2019, *Executive Summary* p. 12

²⁴⁶ Eric Reeves, [UNAMID Withdrawal and International Abandonment: Violence in Darfur 2017 – 2019, a statistical analysis](#), 28 June 2019

²⁴⁷ Open Democracy, [In this new Sudan, will the elite protesters stand up for suffering Darfur?](#) 15 August 2019

²⁴⁸ Open Democracy, [In this new Sudan, will the elite protesters stand up for suffering Darfur?](#) 15 August 2019

sources and irrigation systems. Displaced farmers seeking to return to or work their farms are constantly subject to extreme violence, including murder, rape, and kidnapping.²⁴⁹

In an October 2019 report, International Crisis Group noted that:

Abdelaziz al-Hilu, who [...] leads the largest faction of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army-North, characterised the rebels' core grievances to Crisis Group as structural. Al-Hilu said Arabic-speaking elites in Khartoum have long tried to impose a "false Arab identity" on a culturally diverse country. This attitude, he said, impelled minorities to take up arms to protect their position in society. He added that successive regimes have worsened centre-periphery relations with the logic of political Islam, which casts non-Muslims as second-class citizens. Al-Hilu concluded by saying: "The other in Sudan is always oppressed, marginalised and excluded when it comes to access to power and wealth. The other in Sudan is left with only two options, either to accept inferiority status or be exterminated".²⁵⁰

2.5.2 Treatment by non-state actors

For further information on the treatment of non-Arab ethnic groups, see: [2.2 Non-Arab ethnic groups](#) as well as section [2.3 Conflict between tribes since December 2018](#).

According to a January 2019 report from Maddy Crowther, co-Director of Waging Peace, "The conflict, and continued persecution is still highly ethnicised, in Darfur, where a wide body of evidence shows certain tribes are associated with rebel movements. Security actors are emboldened by a power vacuum in the regime precipitated by a retreating peacekeeping force, and routed opposition forces. A return to large-scale conflict is possible".²⁵¹

The UN Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan noted in his July 2019 report that "Internally displaced people in a number of locations in Darfur had reported that Arab nomads had threatened them with violence to prevent them from cultivating their farmlands".²⁵² For further information, see section [6.1 Security situation targeting IDPs](#).

At the end of November 2019 Radio Dabanga reported that "Darfur, and North Darfur in particular, is witnessing frequent attacks on farms by militant herdsmen as well as by militiamen of the Rapid Support Forces, who are recruited from Arab herders' tribes that are known to look down on the non-Arab farmers in the area".²⁵³

²⁴⁹ Eric Reeves, [What Will Be Remembered? History and the Darfur Genocide](#), September 2019

²⁵⁰ International Crisis Group, [Safeguarding Sudan's Revolution](#), 21 October 2019, IV. *The Opposition*, B. *Splintered Rebels*, p. 22

²⁵¹ Waging Peace (Maddy Crowther), [Risks on return for Darfuris in Sudan](#), January 2019, *Executive Summary*

²⁵² UN Human Rights Council, [Situation of human rights in the Sudan Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan](#), 26 July 2019, para. 27

²⁵³ Radio Dabanga, [Herders raid Kendebe in West Darfur](#), 29 November 2019

3. Civil and Political Rights

Given the level of restrictions placed on civil and political rights it is advised to read the below sub-sections 3.1 – 3.2.7 in its entirety as some of the information and specific profiles are inter-related.

3.1 Freedom of expression, association, and assembly

The UN Security Council report on UNAMID covering the period from 4 January to 3 April 2019 noted that:

In response to anti-Government protests, which had started in response to the rising cost of fuel and other commodities but had since expanded to include demands for sweeping political reforms, the President announced a year-long state of emergency on 22 February [2019], dismissing both the federal and state governments [...]

On 25 February [2019], President Bashir issued further decrees banning unauthorized public gatherings, regulating the movement of hard currency and the trading of fuel and other commodities and giving the security forces emergency powers to search buildings, restrain the movement of people, arrest individuals and seize assets in connection with crimes relating to the state of emergency [...].²⁵⁴

3.1.1 Treatment of Darfuris who demonstrate or protest against the government

See also information included in section [3.2.1 Treatment of members of political opposition parties, as well as \(perceived\) supporters of such parties, political activists, students, and lawyers who are perceived to oppose the government.](#)

The UN Security Council report on UNAMID covering the period from 4 October 2018 to 3 January 2019 noted that

On 19 December [2018] [...] protests over the rising price of bread and other food commodities took place in various states throughout the Sudan, including Khartoum, River Nile, Red Sea, North Darfur, White Nile, Northern Kordofan, Al-Gedaref and Port Sudan [...] As protesters also called on President Bashir to step down, the Government declared a state of emergency and ordered the indefinite closure of schools and colleges in the Sudan. Nevertheless, the protests continued, on 31 December, including in Khartoum, where the police reportedly resorted to the use of tear gas and live ammunition to disperse the protesters. In South Darfur, on 23 December [2018], the security forces also used tear gas to confront approximately 300 students demonstrating in Kass. In West Darfur, the state security services have been deployed to guard strategic locations, in particular banks, fuel stations and government offices. In East Darfur, the National Intelligence and Security Services arrested a total of 11 youth activists between 22 and 25 December [2018], subsequently releasing 4 of them [...] The protests continued in the first week of January, including in Khartoum and Omdurman. On 10 January [2019], the Sudanese authorities announced that 22 people had been killed by that date in a series of demonstrations”.²⁵⁵

A news article published by the UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner in January 2019 further reported that “Credible reports of the use of excessive force, including live ammunition, by

²⁵⁴ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 10 April 2019, paras. 14 and 15

²⁵⁵ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 14 January 2019, para. 20

State security forces against protestors across Sudan over the past month are deeply worrying, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet said [...] The demonstrations since 19 December 2018 have taken place in a number of cities across Sudan, including [...] Nyala [South Darfur]. The Government has confirmed that 24 people have died in the course of the protests [across Sudan], but other credible reports suggest the death toll may be nearly twice as high. Many others have been injured [...] Authorities have also confirmed that up to 6 January [2019], at least 816 people were arrested in connection with the demonstrations [throughout Sudan]. Reports indicate that these include journalists, opposition leaders, protestors and representatives of civil society”.²⁵⁶

According to a January 2019 article from the African Centre for Peace and Justice Studies, it had received “information that the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) and police have since December 19 2018, carried out a mass campaign of arrests targeting activist including, doctors, human rights defenders, journalists, professors and political party leaders with arbitrary arrest and prolonged detention, in some cases incommunicado, for their participation or suspected participation in the protests that occurred across Sudan”.²⁵⁷ Reporting with regards to the situation in Darfur the same source noted that:

[...] Mr Mohamed Bagan, an advocate and human rights defender who was arrested on 25 December 2018, for participating in the protest. He is being detained incommunicado, for three months in Eldien, East Darfur under the emergency law. [...] On 9 January 2019, the NISS of Nyala, South Darfur, arrested six human right defenders whilst carrying out peaceful protest in solidarity with detainees in other Sudanese towns in front of Central Court of Nyala. We are concerned about the physical and psychological wellbeing of detainees as we fear they may be subjected to torture or ill treatment given the well the documented use of torture and ill treatment by NISS against detainees. [...] In our recent report, we reported the placement of 17 protestors on six months detention period in Shala Prison in North Darfur under the emergency law. Protesters in Al-Tartar in South Kordfan State and Al-Deain in East Darfur State were detained for three months under the emergency laws in December 2018.²⁵⁸

Reporting also on the protests and subsequent arrests that took place in Darfur in December 2018, the joint report published by the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)/African Center for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS)/Sudan Human Rights Monitor reported that “In the context of the protests which broke out in December 2018, NISS arrested and detained more than 120 Darfuri people in South, West or Eastern Darfur. The actual figure is likely to be higher as many people were detained for short periods and then released”.²⁵⁹

The subsequent UN Security Council report on UNAMID covering the period from 4 January to 3 April 2019 noted that “In Ed Daein, East Darfur, seven young people were arrested on 17 January [2019] and subsequently sentenced to a three-month imprisonment for having organized a peaceful

²⁵⁶ UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, [*Reports of excessive force against Sudan protests deeply worrying – Bachelet*](#), 17 January 2019

²⁵⁷ African Centre for Peace and Justice Studies, [*Sudan: Activists targeted with arbitrary arrest and incommunicado detention whilst the media remains restricted amidst crackdown on December 2018 peaceful protests*](#), 17 January 2019

²⁵⁸ African Centre for Peace and Justice Studies, [*Sudan: Activists targeted with arbitrary arrest and incommunicado detention whilst the media remains restricted amidst crackdown on December 2018 peaceful protests*](#), 17 January 2019

²⁵⁹ International Federation for Human Rights, African Center for Justice and Peace Studies, Sudan Human Rights Monitor, [*Will There Be Justice for Darfur? Persisting impunity in the face of political change; Fact-finding mission report*](#), December 2019, *I. Civilians in Darfur continue to bear the brunt of insecurity*, 3. Politically instigated violence remains pervasive, p. 31

march to protest against fuel shortages. That march, in which approximately 200 young people participated, was dispersed by security forces using tear gas. In El Geneina, West Darfur, four civilians reportedly accused of using social media to mobilize protests were arrested between 18 and 23 January [2019]. In Zalingei, Central Darfur, a male civilian was arrested on 24 January [2019] in connection with the protests, but was released the following day”.²⁶⁰

Further reporting on specific protests, Radio Dabanga reported on 4th January 2019 that “El Fasher Criminal Court has sentenced 20 young people to six months in prison against the backdrop of a demonstration in one of the city districts last week. The court issued the sentence against the protesters who had participated in a rally southeast of El Fasher, El Wihda district, under the currently active emergency measures in the state”.²⁶¹ At the end of January the same source noted that “A court in Ed Daein, East Darfur, sentenced four activists to three months imprisonment [for protesting] under the state’s emergency measures that have been installed against the backdrop of the demonstrations throughout Sudan”.²⁶²

The African Centre for Peace and Justice Studies reported in an April 2019 report on protests in the Darfur region that:

Since the last week of March 2019, the NISS of the Darfur region have launched a campaign of arrest, targeting political and civil activists for actual or suspected participation in the ongoing anti-government protests. [...]

On 24 December 2018, residents in the towns of Elfahir in North Darfur and Eldian in Eastern Darfur jointly participated in peaceful protests organized by SPA. Authorities responded by arresting 73 peaceful protesters, 70 were released after a brief detention whilst 3 were subjected to three months detention in Shala prison under emergency law of 2007 [...].²⁶³

The same source documented the following additional persons detained following peaceful protests:

On 29 March 2019, Mr Ahmed Mohamed Al-Hilo who works for National Social Insurance Fund was arrested from his work place in Nyala, South Darfur following a peaceful protest on 28 March 2019 announced by SPA. [...]

On 2 April 2019, NISS arrested the following people in Zalingi, Central Darfur.

Fakhr Eldien Abakar(m)

Numiri Jumaa(m).²⁶⁴

Amnesty International reported that “The Darfur IDPs’ coordination committee also recorded the death of one woman in Zalingei, the capital city of Central Darfur, on [6 April 2019]. She was shot dead when security officers opened fire on protestors”.²⁶⁵

Reporting on the protests that resulted in violence in Darfur on 11th and 12th April 2019 Radio Dabanga reported “In Darfur, an upsurge in protests yesterday resulted in violence and the death of nine people, including a child, in various towns. People tried to release political detainees from NISS

²⁶⁰ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 10 April 2019, para. 13

²⁶¹ Radio Dabanga, [20 protesting youths imprisoned in North Darfur](#), 4 January 2019

²⁶² Radio Dabanga, [East Darfur court jails activists for protests](#), 22 January 2019

²⁶³ African Centre for Peace and Justice Studies, [Darfur region: NISS targets peaceful protestors with arbitrary arrests and prolonged detention](#), 5 April 2019

²⁶⁴ African Centre for Peace and Justice Studies, [Darfur region: NISS targets peaceful protestors with arbitrary arrests and prolonged detention](#), 5 April 2019

²⁶⁵ Amnesty International, [Sudan: Government mounts lethal offensive against protestors killing nine, blocking food and water supplies](#), 9 April 2019

officers. Seven people were killed and dozens were wounded in a shooting by security officers in Zalingei during their celebration of the fall of President Al Bashir yesterday. 37 people were wounded in the shooting by members of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS)".²⁶⁶ The same article noted that in North Darfur "a resident of El Fasher died in front of the security forces' office after they shot him as people tried to free detainees in the cells [...] People gathered at the office of the NISS in the state capital to demand the release of the political detainees. A clash ensued, causing dozens of wounded including some people who sustained serious injuries and were transferred to El Fasher Teaching Hospital".²⁶⁷ Furthermore "In Nyala, the capital of South Darfur, the NISS offices were the scene of another crowd trying to release the detainees. The security officers used gunfire to disperse a crowd, causing injuries to dozens of people whom were transferred to Nyala Teaching Hospital".²⁶⁸

A week later Radio Dabanga, based on a statement issued by the Sudanese Doctors' Central Committee, reported that "members of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) used live fire against demonstrators in Kutum in North Darfur" wounding 12 people.²⁶⁹

A further article by the African Centre for Peace and Justice Studies noted that:

On 29 April [2019], the acting governor of South Darfur, General Hisham Khalid issued emergency Order No.4. The Order which has been approved by the military council criminalises a number of things including indecent dressing. Violation of the Order amounts to severe penalties including; fines and imprisonment of up to three years. Indecent dressing has always been punished under Article 152 of the Criminal Act of 1991 that prohibits "indecent and immoral acts".

Although the motive for passing this Order is not known, a reliable source has informed ACJPS that its intended to target and intimidate women, especially those participating in the ongoing protests. The passing of this Order raises much concern as it is an extension of the former era of injustice and degradation of women under al Bashir's regime where states used local orders to undermine the rule of law and violate the rights of women.²⁷⁰

Amnesty International noted that on 21 April 2019 "security forces injured protesters in Kutum city, North Darfur".²⁷¹

According to Aly Verjee, advisor to the Africa program at the U.S. Institute of Peace, reporting in early May 2019 "Reportedly, as many, if not more, Darfurians were killed in April protests in towns in Darfur as were protesters killed on the streets of Khartoum".²⁷²

Reporting on one such incident, the African Centre for Peace and Justice Studies noted that "On 4 May, protests in Nyala, South Darfur were dispersed by counter revolutionary forces which resulted in one civilian casualty and injuries".²⁷³ Jehanne Henry, Associate Director, Africa Division, of Human Rights Watch (HRW) stated in relation to the same incident:

²⁶⁶ Radio Dabanga, [Darfur: Nine people killed in clashes with security service](#), 12 April 2019

²⁶⁷ Radio Dabanga, [Darfur: Nine people killed in clashes with security service](#), 12 April 2019

²⁶⁸ Radio Dabanga, [Darfur: Nine people killed in clashes with security service](#), 12 April 2019

²⁶⁹ Radio Dabanga, [Demonstrators injured by live fire in North Darfur](#), 22 April 2019

²⁷⁰ African Centre for Peace and Justice Studies, [Sudan Weekly Update: The Transitional Military Council and opposition agree on a joint council as the African Union extends deadline for a third time](#), 6 May 2019

²⁷¹ Amnesty International, [Sudan: 10 human rights priorities for the transition](#), 10 May 2019

²⁷² U.S. Institute of Peace, [Chad, and Darfur, After Bashir](#), 2 May 2019

²⁷³ African Centre for Peace and Justice Studies, [Civil society letter to the African Union on the attacks against peaceful protestors in Sudan](#), 16 May 2019

On May 4 [2019], residents of the Otash displaced person's camp joined protests in Nyala, the capital of South Darfur. Government forces, which according to witnesses included the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary group responsible for grave crimes in Darfur, Southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile over the past five years, tried to disperse the protesters by beating and shooting live bullets and teargas at them, reportedly killing an 18-year old and injuring others in the process. Days earlier, media reported RSF soldiers used violence to break up protests in Zalingei, Central Darfur [...] As one young man who witnessed protesters being dispersed told us: "The security forces always treat us [in Darfur] differently."²⁷⁴

Radio Dabanga reported in early May 2019 that "Two people were wounded in an attempt by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Sudan's main government militia, and members of the security apparatus to break the sit-in in front of the 21st Infantry unit in Zalingei, capital of Central Darfur [...] The Central Sudanese Doctors' Committee confirmed in a statement on Friday that "young protester" Muhanad Khamis was hit by a RSF Land Cruiser causing him varying injuries in attempts to forcibly end the sit-in in Zalingei. The committee added that a vehicle belonging to the security apparatus pursued and hit lawyer Feisal Abdallah and broke his left arm".²⁷⁵

A day later Radio Dabanga reported that a "17-year-old youth was shot dead" in Nyala when "security forces 'violently dispersed' the sit-in".²⁷⁶

The UN Special Report covering the period from 14 July 2018 to 15 May 2019 reported that:

[...] The recent political developments at the national level led to significant changes in the 30-year-old system of governance in the Sudan, which had a direct impact on Darfur. What started as protests against the Government, in Atbara on 19 December 2018, over the removal of subsidies on essential commodities, soon spread across the country and led to the removal of the President by the Transitional Military Council on 11 April 2019. The interim Constitution of 2005 was suspended, and a three-month state of emergency took effect, followed by the lifting of the daily curfew, the release of political detainees and the declaration of a countrywide ceasefire [...]

Those events initially had repercussions in Darfur, where large crowds in major urban centres gathered to celebrate events in Khartoum. The demonstrators targeted National Intelligence and Security Service facilities, perceived as symbols of the previous Government. In El Fasher, Nyala, Zalingei, El Geneina and Ed Daein, security forces, mainly National Intelligence and Security Service personnel, allegedly fired shots indiscriminately to disperse demonstrators, killing at least 15 civilians and injuring hundreds. At the Kalma camp for internally displaced persons in Nyala, South Darfur, 16 people were killed and 17 others injured, after violent confrontations between rival groups among the population in the camp. Attacks against National Intelligence and Security Service personnel and premises were also reported in Nertiti and Golo, in Central Darfur, Kabkabiya, Kutum and Saraf Umra, in North Darfur, Kass, in South Darfur, and Mournei, in West Darfur. Zalingei, Golo, Nertiti, Kass and Kalma were the locations most affected by the recent surge in violence after the change of regime in Khartoum [...].²⁷⁷

The UN Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan reported in his report covering the period 28 September 2018 to 30 June 2019 that "The events in Khartoum and across the country had a particular effect in Darfur, where the use of force by security forces on protesters reportedly left as many as 47 civilians killed and 186 injured between 11 April and 12 June [2019] On

²⁷⁴ Human Rights Watch, [Sudan's Transition Hasn't Ended Abuses in Darfur](#), 8 May 2019

²⁷⁵ Radio Dabanga, [Two injured as paramilitaries attempt to break-up Central Darfur sit-in](#), 5 May 2019

²⁷⁶ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan uprising: One dead as security force attacks South Darfur protest](#), 6 May 2019

²⁷⁷ UN Security Council, [Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic assessment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 30 May 2019, paras. 9 and 10

a number of occasions, State security services suppressed dissent or acts of solidarity with the protests in Khartoum by carrying out arbitrary arrests and detentions in Darfur. Between 11 April and 12 June [2019], at least 163 civilians were arrested and detained in relation to protests in Darfur, according to reports received [...] In one of the most significant incidents, community members of Deleij village in Central Darfur reported that armed men, who they alleged were affiliated with the Rapid Support Forces, carried out an attack on their village on 9 and 10 June [2019] that resulted in the deaths of at least 15 people and significant destruction of homes, shops and other private property”.²⁷⁸ The same source further found that:

Security forces and protesters also clashed in a series of incidents in Darfur and Southern Kordofan in the weeks following the removal of President al-Bashir. On 21 April [2019] in Kutum, North Darfur, protesters reportedly surrounded the office of the National Intelligence and Security Services and committed acts of destruction of property. They were met with force by security forces, who allegedly fired indiscriminately into the crowds, resulting in the injury of a least seven civilians, including minors [...]

According to information received by the Independent Expert, on 2 May [2019], two people were allegedly killed and five others injured as a result of the use of live ammunition by the Rapid Support Forces to disperse young people protesting against their presence in Masteri town in East Darfur [...]

The Independent Expert received information that security forces in Nyala, South Darfur, had reportedly used excessive force, including live ammunition, on 4 May to disperse some two thousand people engaged in protests to demand improved services at an encampment for internally displaced persons at Otash, within the town’s boundaries. Several protesters reportedly sustained gunshot wounds. Riot police also allegedly raided the local hospital’s emergency section. In total, at least six people were wounded by security forces during the 4 May events in Nyala, according to reports received. The Governor of South Darfur imposed a statewide ban on protests following the incident [...].²⁷⁹

In July 2019 the “Darfur Bar Association condemned the arrest of six people from Katila in South Darfur for organising a protest in front of the locality building. The protestors demanded the removal of the leaders of the former regime in the locality. The six protestors have been taken to the state capital of Nyala” reported Radio Dabanga.²⁸⁰

Three civilians were killed by “militiamen in Mershen, South Darfur State” during a “peaceful demonstration” on 15th September 2019 reported the Darfur Network for Monitoring & Documentation.²⁸¹

The following Infographic from ACLED²⁸² documents how many protests there were in the five Darfur states between 2 December 2018 and 10 December 2019 (the reporting period of this report):


²⁷⁸ UN Human Rights Council, [Situation of human rights in the Sudan Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan](#), 26 July 2019, paras. 18 and 79

²⁷⁹ UN Human Rights Council, [Situation of human rights in the Sudan Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan](#), 26 July 2019, para. 36 and 38

²⁸⁰ Radio Dabanga, [Protesters arrested in South Darfur](#), 22 July 2019

²⁸¹ Darfur Network for Monitoring & Documentation, [Three civilians killed by the militiamen in Mersheng, South Darfur State western Sudan](#), Undated [Last accessed: 8 December 2019]

²⁸² ACLED, [Sudan analysis](#), undated [accessed 13 December 2019], ‘events’ filtered for ‘protests’ in the 5 Darfur states between 2 December 2018 and 10 December 2019



3.1.2 Treatment of critical journalists, citizen-journalists, bloggers, etc.

The February 2019 Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research's 2018 Conflict Barometer reporting on the December 2018 protests noted that "NISS detained several journalists who covered the anti- government protests. Entire print-runs of newspapers with reports on the crackdown of protests were prevented from being distributed or were confiscated without justification".²⁸³

A UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner article of January 2019 reported that "The demonstrations since 19 December 2018 have taken place in a number of cities across Sudan, including [...] Nyala [South Darfur]. [...] Authorities have also confirmed that up to 6 January [2019], at least 816 people were arrested in connection [throughout Sudan] with the demonstrations. Reports indicate that these include journalists, opposition leaders, protestors and representatives of civil society".²⁸⁴

The African Centre for Peace and Justice Studies reported on protests in the Darfur region that "On 11 January 2019, Ms Amani Hasabo, a member of Sudanese congress party was arrested from her home in Elfashir and subjected to a 3 months detention under the emergency law in Elfashir Women Prison (khir Kanaga). She was released following President Bashir's pardon on March 8 2019".²⁸⁵

The World Organisation Against Torture included in its 'List of human rights defenders arrested between December 2018 and February 2019' for "their participation or suspected participation in protests that have broken out in different parts of Sudan, denouncing the rising cost of living and calling for President Omar Al Bashir to step down", Mr. Adam Mahdi, "chief editor of Darfur 24

²⁸³ Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, [2018 Conflict Barometer](#), February 2019, *SUDAN (Opposition)*, p. 94

²⁸⁴ UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, [Reports of excessive force against Sudan protests deeply worrying – Bachelet](#), 17 January 2019

²⁸⁵ African Centre for Peace and Justice Studies, [Darfur region: NISS targets peaceful protestors with arbitrary arrests and prolonged detention](#), 5 April 2019

online newspaper [...] on January 27, 2019 subjected to three-month imprisonment under Emergency law of 2007 in Nyala of South Darfur”.²⁸⁶ According to Radio Dabanga “His family has not been informed of the charges against him, nor has a lawyer been allowed to represent him”.²⁸⁷

3.2 Political opposition parties and activists

3.2.1 Treatment of members of political opposition parties, as well as (perceived) supporters of such parties, political activists, students, and lawyers who are perceived to oppose the government

Members of political opposition parties/(perceived) supporters of such parties/political activists

A January 2019 UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner article reported that “Credible reports of the use of excessive force, including live ammunition, by State security forces against protestors across Sudan over the past month are deeply worrying [...] Authorities have also confirmed that up to 6 January [2019], at least 816 people were arrested in connection with the demonstrations. Reports indicate that these include journalists, opposition leaders, protestors and representatives of civil society”.²⁸⁸

A February 2019 report by the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies noted that the organisation had “received information on the arbitrary arrest and detention of 116 political activists between December 2018 and February 2019 for their participation or suspected involvement in the ongoing anti-government protests” across Sudan?.²⁸⁹ The same source further noted that:

At least three detainees, including 1 female have been subjected to six-month detention under the emergency law in North Kordofan and North Darfur states. Authorities have targeted opposition party leaders and members who are actively involved in the ongoing protest. Many were arrested during protests and raids in private residences and party houses. [...] A reliable source informed ACJPS that former detainees have been able to identify the unknown masked individuals and have linked them to members of the National Popular Security Forces established by the ruling party, which include former Mujahedeen and party members. The unknown masked individuals, reportedly responsible for numerous arrests of peaceful protesters in cities of Al-Fasher in Northern Darfur, Kassala State, Al-Dain in East Darfur and in the outskirts of Khartoum State have worked alone or in collaboration with NISS forces, making several appearances in NISS vehicles amongst NISS members. [...]

List of Political Activists detained incommunicado since December 2018, where information is available, dates and location of arrest and detention have been included. [...]

Amani Hassabo(f), the Chairperson of Sudanese Congress party, she was arrested from Alkfah Neighborhood of El-fashir in North Darfur on 11 January 2019. She has been sentenced to a six - months detention under the emergency law and is being detained incommunicado at El-Fashir prison.²⁹⁰

²⁸⁶ World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT), [Sudan: Serious concerns after the arrest of 30 human rights defenders in violent crackdown against peaceful protests](#), 12 February 2019

²⁸⁷ Radio Dabanga, [Visits to detainees denied, South Darfur journalist remains in prison](#), 12 February 2019

²⁸⁸ UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, [Reports of excessive force against Sudan protests deeply worrying – Bachelet](#), 17 January 2019

²⁸⁹ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudan: 116 political activists detained incommunicado without charge amidst violent crackdown on the anti-government peaceful protests since December 2018](#), 19 February 2019

²⁹⁰ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudan: 116 political activists detained incommunicado without charge amidst violent crackdown on the anti-government peaceful protests since December 2018](#), 19 February 2019

In March 2019 the same source reported on the release of 54 detainees from detention by the National Intelligence and Security Service.²⁹¹ Reportedly, “Detainees were arrested for their actual or suspected participation in the ongoing anti-government protests and spent at least 2 months in the custody of NISS without charge or appearance before a court to determine the legality of their detention”.²⁹² Members of the Sudanese Doctors Committee were also released, including “Mohamed Adam(m), was released on 7 March 2019 from Shala Prison in North Darfur. He was arrested in February from Eltahir in North Darfur”.²⁹³

The African Centre for Peace and Justice Studies reported in an April 2019 report on protests in the Darfur region that “On 1 April 2019, NISS of Khartoum arrested Mr Ibrahim Mohamed Ali Temias, the vice of the general secretary of Uma national party from his house located in Khartoum Bahari”.²⁹⁴

Reporting on the use of enforced disappearances against political opponents generally in Sudan, the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies reported in June 2019 that:

The crime of enforced disappearance is one of the gross human rights violations that has been committed with impunity for decades in Sudan, in a variety of context including; civil war, internal conflicts and quelling political dissents. It is regularly used not only to silence political opponents, journalists and human rights defenders, but also used as a tool to intimidate citizens. Lack of accountability by the government has left thousands of families unaware of the fate of their relatives to date. [...]

In the recent years, there has been increased use of “short-term” disappearances where victims are detained incommunicado for a period of time and, eventually freed. Between 19 December 2018 and 12 April 2019, hundreds of peaceful protesters, students, human rights defenders, political opponents, journalist and doctors were allegedly subjected to torture and inhumane conditions while detained incommunicado for months by the National Intelligence Security Services(NISS) in NISS detention centres, NISS controlled sections of prisons and in unknown locations. Although many were released on 13 April 2019 by the head of the Transitional Military Council(TMC), Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, credible sources have reported that some are still missing even after the TMC stated that all political prisoners were released. Many families have continued the search for family members, relatives and friends previously detained by NISS on social media.²⁹⁵

Radio Dabanga reported early June 2019 that “Three people were killed in an attack on Alliance for Freedom and Change (AFC) protestors in Um Tajok in Kireinik locality in West Darfur”.²⁹⁶ In July 2019 “A group of 16 lawyers affiliated with the Darfur Bar Association (DBA)” demanded that Sudan’s National Human Rights Commission intervene “in the case of 28 people who were detained in Gireida in South Darfur without being charged in June [2019]”.²⁹⁷ According to the same article

²⁹¹ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudan: NISS releases fifty-four detainees as seventeen peaceful protestors join hundreds who remain in detention](#), 19 March 2019

²⁹² African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudan: NISS releases fifty-four detainees as seventeen peaceful protestors join hundreds who remain in detention](#), 19 March 2019

²⁹³ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudan: NISS releases fifty-four detainees as seventeen peaceful protestors join hundreds who remain in detention](#), 19 March 2019

²⁹⁴ African Centre for Peace and Justice Studies, [Darfur region: NISS targets peaceful protestors with arbitrary arrests and prolonged detention](#), 5 April 2019

²⁹⁵ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudan: End enforced disappearances and account for hundreds of political dissidents disappeared since December 2018](#), 19 June 2019

²⁹⁶ Radio Dabanga, [Three protestors killed in West Darfur](#), 3 June 2019

²⁹⁷ Radio Dabanga, [28 protestors still detained in South Darfur – Human Rights Commission asked to intervene](#), 12 July 2019

“Accused of being members of the Alliance for Freedom and Change, the detainees were taken from their homes and offices or at the market, and transferred to prison cells in the army garrison in the South Darfur capital Nyala”.²⁹⁸

In July 2019 Radio Dabanga reported that “five youth members of the opposition FFC [Forces for Freedom and Change] were arrested in Katila in South Darfur. They had participated in a demonstration two days before demanding the resignation of the locality commissioner, branding him “a figure of the former regime”, and criticising his failure to manage the locality”.²⁹⁹

Students

The UN Security Council report on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 4 October 2018 to 3 January 2019 noted that “In South Darfur, on 23 December [2018], the security forces also used tear gas to confront approximately 300 students demonstrating in Kass”.³⁰⁰

In March 2019 Radio Dabanga reported that “Hanafi Ismail, Nureldin Mohamed, and Abdallah Omar, students at the Sheikh Yousef Mustafa Koran Institute at El Jeer district in Nyala, capital of South Darfur, were reportedly detained by men in military uniforms, under the pretext that the students were violating the State of Emergency regulations, the director of the institute, Mohamed Yousef Mustafa, told Radio Dabanga. When they reached Nyala valley, the gunmen attempted to seize the students’ phones, but the three students resisted. When Hanafi Ismail exchanged blows with one of the robbers, another opened fire, killing him instantly. His companions Nureldin Mohamed and Abdallah Omar were wounded”.³⁰¹

In mid-September 2019 an article published by the Sudan Tribune reported that “security forces in Nyala, the capital of South Darfur state, [...] used tear gas to disperse a demonstration by school student[s] against bread and transport shortages. Nyala has been experiencing a severe bread and transport crisis, as students experienced difficulties to reach their schools in addition to the general bread crisis”.³⁰² Darfur 24, a local news website, reportedly cited “medical sources saying that more than 20 protesters that have fainted from the tear gas, were admitted to Nyala Teaching Hospital”.³⁰³

Reporting on the use of enforced disappearances against political opponents generally in Sudan, the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies reported in June 2019 that “In the recent years, there has been increased use of “short-term” disappearances where victims are detained incommunicado for a period of time and, eventually freed. Between 19 December 2018 and 12 April 2019, hundreds of peaceful protesters, students, human rights defenders, political opponents, journalist and doctors were allegedly subjected to torture and inhumane conditions while detained incommunicado for months by the National Intelligence Security Services (NISS) in NISS detention centres, NISS controlled sections of prisons and in unknown locations. Although many were released on 13 April

²⁹⁸ Radio Dabanga, [28 protestors still detained in South Darfur – Human Rights Commission asked to intervene](#), 12 July 2019

²⁹⁹ Radio Dabanga, [Three injured in RSF shooting in Omdurman, opposition members held in South Darfur](#), 18 July 2019

³⁰⁰ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 14 January 2019, para. 20

³⁰¹ Radio Dabanga, [Student dead in South Darfur armed robbery by ‘soldier and fake troops’](#), 17 March 2019

³⁰² Sudan Tribune, [South Darfur police fire tear gas to disperse protesters](#), 23 September 2019

³⁰³ Sudan Tribune, [South Darfur police fire tear gas to disperse protesters](#), 23 September 2019

2019 by the head of the Transitional Military Council (TMC), Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, credible sources have reported that some are still missing even after the TMC stated that all political prisoners were released. Many families have continued the search for family members, relatives and friends previously detained by NISS on social media”.³⁰⁴

The International Crisis Group reported that on 22 September 2019 In Nyala in South Darfur state, “security forces fired live rounds and tear gas to disperse students protesting high prices and bread shortages”.³⁰⁵ According to Radio Dabanga reporting on the same incident “four students were wounded and some passed out due to the tear gas”.³⁰⁶

Lawyers

The Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders and the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies noted that “Mohamed Bagan, a lawyer, was arrested on December 25, 2018 and he is being detained incommunicado, for three months in Eldien, East Darfur under the emergency law”.³⁰⁷

The UN Security Council report on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 4 January to 3 April 2019 noted that “Four lawyers were arrested on 9 and 10 January in Nyala, South Darfur, for attempting to present a written petition to the Governor, but were released on 11 January without charge”.³⁰⁸

3.2.2 Treatment of family members of (perceived) political opponents

The African Centre for Peace and Justice Studies reported in an April 2019 report on protests in the Darfur region that:

On 21 March 2019, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) arrested Mr Abu Bakar Adam Fadul (m), in Jugo Jugo neighborhood located in Elfashir, North Darfur on accusations of filming the RSF military base. Mr. Adam is a brother to Mr. Mohamed Adam Fadul (known by social media users as Hamdi Hakoc), an activist who published information about security agencies engaged in arresting and alleged torture of protesters in Elfashir on 24 December 2018. Mr. Adam is being detained by the RSF incommunicado in an unknown location. Incommunicado detention under jurisdiction of the emergency law without being taken to police station or before the courts of law raises concerns about his physical and psychological safety. [...].³⁰⁹

Reporting on the impunity for the use of enforced disappearances against political opponents generally in Sudan, the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies reported in June 2019 that [emphasis added]:

³⁰⁴ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudan: End enforced disappearances and account for hundreds of political dissidents disappeared since December 2018](#), 19 June 2019

³⁰⁵ International Crisis Group, [CrisisWatch: Sudan](#), September 2019

³⁰⁶ Radio Dabanga, [Police break up protest in Darfur by force](#), 23 September 2019

³⁰⁷ Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders and the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudan: Serious concerns after the arrest of 30 human rights defenders in violent crackdown against peaceful protests](#), 12 February 2019

³⁰⁸ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 10 April 2019, para. 13

³⁰⁹ African Centre for Peace and Justice Studies, [Darfur region: NISS targets peaceful protestors with arbitrary arrests and prolonged detention](#), 5 April 2019

Another factor that has contributed to impunity are laws that provide perpetrators, specifically Security agents with wide-ranging immunities. The 2007 Armed Forces Act, 2008 Police Act, and 2010 National Security Act each grant immunities to state actors. Even in cases where the immunities mentioned above have been lifted, victims face various barriers that make it extremely hard to report cases of enforced disappearances. **For example, reported acts of threats, intimidation and reprisals against victims, family members,** witnesses and human rights defenders working on cases of enforced disappearances has frustrated efforts to obtain justice.³¹⁰

3.2.3 Treatment of individuals (perceived to be) associated with or supportive of armed opposition groups

Radio Dabanga reported in December 2018 that youths of Sortony camp in North Darfur have “demanded the release of 20 detainees from Shala prison in El Fasher or be taken to a fair trial after being held for nearly five months”, following accusations of “being affiliated with the Sudan Liberation Movement under the leadership of Abdelwahid El Nur (SLM-AW)”.³¹¹

For further information on the perceived link between ethnicities and armed opposition groups, see section [2.5 Treatment of non-Arab ethnic groups](#).

3.2.4 Information about other (profiles of) individuals some of whom are perceived to be opposed to the government

Government employees

The African Centre for Peace and Justice Studies reported in an April 2019 report on protests in the Darfur region that:

Mr Taj Eldien Ibrahim Taj Eldien, a finance officer in the office of state minister for finance in Central Darfur. Mohamad Ismail, a government employee working with appeal court of central Darfur Judiciary [...]

On 2 April 2019 at about 03:00 PM, NISS of Zalingi in central Darfur State arrested the following from a market;

Mr Mohamed Ahmed Isa, also known as (Kindi), a civil servant working in the appeal court of central Darfur.³¹²

Young people

Radio Dabanga reported in August 2019 that “Yahya Khamis, activist member of the Forces for Freedom and Change in Kutum told Radio Dabanga that the RSF militiamen seized young men at the market of Kutum ‘apparently without no reason. They beat some of them severely and shaved the heads of others by force,’ Khamis said. According to the activist, ‘The purpose of these actions is to

³¹⁰ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudan: End enforced disappearances and account for hundreds of political dissidents disappeared since December 2018](#), 19 June 2019

³¹¹ Radio Dabanga, [North Darfur displaced detained without charge or trial for five months](#), 16 December 2018

³¹² African Centre for Peace and Justice Studies, [Darfur region: NISS targets peaceful protestors with arbitrary arrests and prolonged detention](#), 5 April 2019

provoke young people in the area, so that they will stage a demonstration. The militiamen can then shoot at them as they like”³¹³.

Personal vendetta

In March 2019 Radio Dabanga reported that “Veterinarians in Central Darfur called a strike [...] in protest against the harassment, beating, and humiliation of a colleague by security agents. The strike was sparked by reports that the head of the Golo Veterinary Unit in Jebel Marra, Ahmed Yousef, was beaten and had his head shaved by agents of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) after he refused to allow the sale of unauthorised meat to one of the butchers in the market”³¹⁴.

3.2.5 Treatment of civil society organisations and civil society activists, including women’s rights activists, humanitarian workers as well as peacekeepers

The UN Security Council report on UNAMID covering the period from 4 October 2018 to 3 January 2019 noted that “United Nations and humanitarian agencies continued to be a target of criminal attacks throughout Darfur, although the frequency of such attacks decreased by 50 per cent during the reporting period. A total of 28 criminal incidents targeting United Nations and humanitarian personnel were reported, compared with 57 in the previous reporting period, including intrusion into United Nations premises, break-ins, shootings, robbery and theft/attempted theft of United Nations property”³¹⁵. In addition, the report noted the “arbitrary detention of UNAMID national staff in Darfur” and within the timeframe for this particular report on Darfur specifically highlighted the case of a “national staff member was detained by the National Intelligence and Security Services in El Geneina, West Darfur, on 22 December, and remained in detention without charge at the time of the present report”³¹⁶.

A January 2019 UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner in article reported that “Credible reports of the use of excessive force, including live ammunition, by State security forces against protestors across Sudan over the past month are deeply worrying, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet said [...] The demonstrations since 19 December 2018 have taken place in a number of cities across Sudan, including [...] Nyala [South Darfur]. The Government has confirmed that 24 people have died in the course of the protests, but other credible reports suggest the death toll may be nearly twice as high. Many others have been injured [...] Authorities have also confirmed that up to 6 January [2019], at least 816 people were arrested in connection with the demonstrations. Reports indicate that these include journalists, opposition leaders, protestors and representatives of civil society”³¹⁷.

The subsequent UN Security Council report on UNAMID covering the period from 4 January to 3 April 2019 noted that “There were 17 incidents targeting United Nations and humanitarian personnel in Darfur during the reporting period, a decrease from the 28 incidents reported during

³¹³ Radio Dabanga, [Young men beaten, shaved by RSF in Kutum, North Darfur](#), 3 August 2019

³¹⁴ Radio Dabanga, [Strike in Central Darfur after veterinarian beaten, humiliated](#), 22 March 2019

³¹⁵ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 14 January 2019, para. 27

³¹⁶ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 14 January 2019, para. 28

³¹⁷ UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, [Reports of excessive force against Sudan protests deeply worrying – Bachelet](#), 17 January 2019

the previous period. Of these, 16 targeted United Nations personnel and 1 targeted humanitarian personnel. The incidents included intrusion into UNAMID premises and cases of break-in, robbery, theft and attempted theft of UNAMID property. On 19 January [2019], unidentified armed men stopped a privately contracted truck hired by an international non-governmental organization in Umharz village, 35 km north-east of Nertiti, in Central Darfur, and robbed the organization's national staff of its personal belongings".³¹⁸

In a February 2019 press release the Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders and the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies expressed "their utmost concerns over the violent crackdown targeting human rights defenders participating in ongoing peaceful protests in Sudan".³¹⁹

The African Centre for Peace and Justice Studies reported in an April 2019 report on protests in the Darfur region that:

Since the last week of March 2019, the NISS of the Darfur region have launched a campaign of arrest, targeting political and civil activists for actual or suspected participation in the ongoing anti-government protests. [...]

Four activists in Eldain town in East Darfur were arrested on 24 December 2018 during a protest in the Market. Mohamed Bagan, one of the detainees was sentenced to 3 months detention under emergency law but was released after a few weeks.

Nyala town in South Darfur witnessed four peaceful protests organized by advocates and human rights defenders from which, approximately 10 lawyers and human rights defenders were briefly detained and released by NISS. However, Mr. Salah Adam Alnoor, an advocate and human rights defender was transferred to Khartoum on 5 January 2019 where he remains in incommunicado detention. Other protests came as peaceful protesters responded to a call from SPA leading to the arrests of 22 activist including, Mr Adam Mahdi, a journalist and human rights defender who was released after a few days while the rest remain in incommunicado detention in the NISS section attached to Nyala Prison in very poor detention facilities.³²⁰

The same source documented the following additional persons detained following peaceful protests:

Mohamed Wadidi, an activist [...]

On 29 March 2019, NISS of Zalingi capital in Central Darfur State arrested the following;

On 29 March 2019, NISS of Elfashir, North Darfur State arrested Mr Mudatheir Bashir Omer, a youth activist from his family's home located in South Althura neighborhood in Elfashir [...].³²¹

UN OCHA's 'Humanitarian Bulletin' reported that in May 2019:

Criminal incidents targeting aid organizations and the African Union – United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) have been reported in Darfur. On 13 May [2019], a group of people broke into the facilities of some national NGOs and an international NGO in Buram town (South Darfur) looting nutrition supplies, medicine; polypropylen pipes and a generator. Local police and military forces assisted the organizations in securing their offices and warehouses and temporarily transferred some of their supplies to the military compound for safekeeping. These organizations are implementing

³¹⁸ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 10 April 2019, para. 22

³¹⁹ Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders and the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudan: Serious concerns after the arrest of 30 human rights defenders in violent crackdown against peaceful protests](#), 12 February 2019

³²⁰ African Centre for Peace and Justice Studies, [Darfur region: NISS targets peaceful protestors with arbitrary arrests and prolonged detention](#), 5 April 2019

³²¹ African Centre for Peace and Justice Studies, [Darfur region: NISS targets peaceful protestors with arbitrary arrests and prolonged detention](#), 5 April 2019

programmes largely targeting South Sudanese refugees. On 12 May [2019], the Zakat Chamber office, a government institution, in Buram town was also looted.³²²

UNAMID reported that on 14th May 2019 “the eve of UNAMID’s scheduled handover of its Sector West Headquarters in El Geneina, an unruly crowd forcefully intruded into the super camp, where they looted UN property and contingent-owned-equipment, vandalized premises and put the lives of UN staff and personnel at grave risk. According to our reports, the crowd of looters included elements in Government of Sudan (GoS) Police and military uniforms. Earlier in the day, the intruders had gathered in front of the main gate, blocked it and later in the evening forced their way into the camp”.³²³

UNOCHA reported that “In South Darfur State, on 3 June, there was a demonstration at Beliel internally displaced camp. Food stocks were looted in the refugee settlement at Beliel IDP camp. A water supply pipeline servicing the refugee settlement that had been cut by host community has been repaired, restoring water supply. Other facilities that were affected included UNHCR-COR registration centre, two women's centres, children's centre and a health clinic”.³²⁴

The European Commission’s *ECHO Daily Flash* reported on 5th June 2019 that “Violent incidents were reported also in Darfur, including in Kalma camp (hosting 128,000 Internally Displaced Persons). Humanitarian assets have been looted and most assistance has been temporarily suspended until safe access can be granted”.³²⁵

UN News reported that “On 19 June [2019], a group of protestors ransacked the World Food Programme’s (WFP) Gairda office, in South Darfur, stealing an unspecified amount of money and vandalizing four vehicles. They also invaded and destroyed offices and properties of the humanitarian organization, World Vision International”.³²⁶

The UN Special Report covering the period from 1 June to end of September 2019 reported that “The operating environment presented challenges for aid workers in areas under the control of SLA-AW, who denied access to Central Jebel Marra, namely to Tarbi, Kero and Jokosti villages. On 3 July [2019], alleged SLA-AW elements abducted four national staff of an international NGO in Karonga (4 km east of Golo temporary operating base) and released them on 4 July [2019]. On the same day, three suspected SLAAW elements looted assorted medicine and medical equipment from a clinic run by an international NGO at Bar Arie, in Golo. On 29 July [2019], two local staff members of an international NGO and one local community leader were also abducted by alleged SLA-AW elements at Tarbi village, in Golo. The staff members were later released”.³²⁷

On 1 December 2019, “in Sirba in West Darfur on Sunday, militant herders opened fire on a vaccination vehicle on its way from Kendede to Bir Dageeg. Immunisation programme employee Eisa Yagoub was hit twice which necessitated his transfer to the capital Khartoum for treatment”.³²⁸

³²² UN OCHA, [Sudan, Humanitarian Bulletin, Issue 4, 25 March – 12 May 2019](#), 12 May 2019, p. 3

³²³ UNAMID, [UNAMID strongly condemns looting of its West Darfur headquarters](#), 15 May 2019

³²⁴ UNOCHA, [Sudan: Civil unrest, Flash Update No. 2](#), 8 June 2019, *Situation Overview*, p. 2

³²⁵ European Commission, [Sudan – Crackdown on civilian demonstrations \(Media\) \(ECHO Daily Flash of 05 June 2019\)](#), 5 June 2019

³²⁶ UN News, [‘Wanton destruction’ in Sudan’s Darfur region, ‘blatant violation’ of international law](#), 24 June 2019

³²⁷ UN Security Council, [Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 15 October 2019, para. 15

³²⁸ Radio Dabanga, [Deadly violence across Darfur](#), 3 December 2019

3.2.6 Attacks on schools and teachers

See also information included in sections [6.3.6 Access to education for IDPs](#) and [7.4.3 Access to education for returnees](#).

The UN report on 'Children and armed conflict, covering the period from January to December 2018, specifically reporting on grave violations against children taking place in Darfur stated that "A total of 17 attacks on schools (14) and hospitals (3) were verified and attributed to Government Security Forces (12), including RSF (7) and SAF (5), followed by unidentified armed elements (5). In addition, the United Nations verified the military use of one school by SAF in West Darfur, which was vacated during the year. A school used for military purposes by SAF in Laiba, East Jebel Marra, reported on previously, remained occupied at the time of writing".³²⁹

The UN Security Council report on UNAMID covering the period from 4 October 2018 to 3 January 2019 noted that "As protesters also called on President Bashir to step down, the Government declared a state of emergency and ordered the indefinite closure of schools and colleges in the Sudan".³³⁰

Reporting generally on the situation in Sudan following the December 2018 protests, UNICEF noted in June 2019 that "We have received information that children are being detained, recruited to join the fighting and sexually abused. Schools, hospitals and health centres have been targeted, looted and destroyed. Health workers have been attacked simply for doing their job. Many parents are too scared to let their children leave the house, fearful of violence, harassment and lawlessness".³³¹

Also reporting generally on the detention of protestors in Sudan, the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies have documented that teachers have been detained, but that they were detained, not due to their profession but "targeted for their participation or suspected involvement in the ongoing protests calling for the resignation of president Omar al-Bashir".³³²

The African Centre for Peace and Justice Studies reported in an April 2019 report on protests in the Darfur region that "On 2 April 2019 at about 03:00 PM, NISS of Zalingi in central Darfur State arrested the following from a market [...] Mr Ismail Ali Wadi, a high school teacher".³³³

A June 2019 UNOCHA report noted that "Following delays due to insecurity, schools throughout the country are opening or are set to open soon. [...] North Darfur schools will reportedly resume study on 30 June [2019]. [...] Schools in all other states opened on 16 June and 23 June, following one to three week delays, reportedly due to safety concerns of children, teachers and school administration".³³⁴ In July 2019 Amnesty International stated:

³²⁹ UN General Assembly, [Children and armed conflict, Report of the Secretary-General](#), 20 June 2019, para. 165

³³⁰ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 14 January 2019, para. 5

³³¹ UNICEF, [Children killed, injured, detained and abused amid escalating violence and unrest in Sudan](#), 11 June 2019

³³² African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [Sudan: 30 women detained in inhumane conditions following involvement in protests](#), 20 February 2019

³³³ African Centre for Peace and Justice Studies, [Darfur region: NISS targets peaceful protestors with arbitrary arrests and prolonged detention](#), 5 April 2019

³³⁴ UNOCHA, [Sudan Flash Update No. 9](#), 26 June 2019

Following a directive from Sudan's ruling military authorities that schools in Sudan must close indefinitely barely a month into a new school term, after security officers reportedly opened fire on 29 July during student protests killing six people, including four students under 18 years of age Amnesty International's Director for East Africa, the Horn and the Great Lakes, Joan Nyanyuki said: "It's astonishing that the authorities in Sudan are attempting to deal with the recurring issue of armed officers using lethal force against protesters in this way. Closing schools and preventing children from receiving an education is misguided and unfair – pupils should not be punished because of the actions of an out-of-control paramilitary unit."³³⁵

In late July 2019 Radio Dabanga reported that "Four students were killed and more than 20 others were wounded when a 120 lb artillery shell exploded in front of a Koran School in Jebel Marra, Central Darfur".³³⁶

On 1 December 2019 Radio Dabangae noted that "Two women and two schoolchildren were seriously injured on Friday when unidentified gunmen attacked the village of Gomwa north of Sirba in West Darfur. [...] The local government announced the indefinite closure of schools for the sake of the safety and security of the students and pupils in the area".³³⁷

In a January 2020 article Radio Dabanga reported that "A delegation led by Sudan's Prime Minister Abdullah Hamdok and the Deputy Chairman of the Sovereign Council, Lieutenant-General Mohamed Hamdan 'Hemeti' arrived in the West Darfur capital of El Geneina yesterday to assess the situation following bloody tribal clashes this week, that have claimed dozens of lives".³³⁸ The source further noted that:

On Wednesday, protest vigils were organised in several camps for the displaced in Darfur states to condemn the events in El Geneina. The residents of Gireida locality in South Darfur, and Zamzam camp in North Darfur, along with Khartoum and Wad Madani, and other cities, carried out demonstrations and protests demanding that those involved in El Geneina crimes be brought to justice.

The demonstrations, protest and rallies also called for the provision of urgent humanitarian assistance to the displaced people who are taking refuge in El Geneina schools after burning their camps and homes.

The markets, schools and governmental institutions in El Geneina have been closed for the fourth consecutive day, in addition to stopping the movement of transportation to and from the city and its localities.³³⁹

3.2.7 Torture in Darfur detention sites

An April 2019 African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies publication on torture in Sudan noted with regards to the profiles of persons affected in Sudan in general:

The prevalence of torture in Sudan is a longstanding concern. Human rights defenders, women, political activists, lawyers, journalists, trade unionists, students and other groups have been systematically targeted.

³³⁵ Amnesty International, [Sudan: Close down trigger-happy paramilitary force not schools](#), 31 July 2018

³³⁶ Radio Dabanga, [Central Darfur: Four dead, 20+ injured as shell pounds Jebel Marra Koran school](#), 29 July 2019

³³⁷ Radio Dabanga, [Schools shut after four injured in West Darfur attack](#), 1 December 2019

³³⁸ Radio Dabanga, [Hamdok, Hemeti, visit strife-torn West Darfur](#), 2 January 2020

³³⁹ Radio Dabanga, [Hamdok, Hemeti, visit strife-torn West Darfur](#), 2 January 2020

The NISS and Sudanese Military Intelligence are the primary institutions responsible for torture and ill-treatment cases in detention. Security agents have been vested with wide-ranging immunities, and have carried out a range of human rights violations with impunity. Sudan's National Security Act 2010 provides a legal foundation giving the NISS extensive powers to arrest, arbitrarily detain, and interrogates perceived political opponents and those with perceived links to rebel groups, in order to silence opposition. Torture is commonly practised by police and prison staff to extract confessions or to extort money. Police in particular are implicated in the enforcement of public order laws, and numerous reports of ill-treatment, torture and sexual violence of female prisoners in police stations exist. Members of the army and paramilitary forces have also been extensively implicated in torture in the course of military campaigns in Southern Sudan, Kordofan, the Blue Nile region and Darfur.³⁴⁰

Radio Dabanga reported on 4th January 2019 that "El Fasher Criminal Court has sentenced 20 young people to six months in prison" following their participation at a "rally southeast of El Fasher, El Wihda district".³⁴¹ Following their conviction, they were transferred to Shala prison, but the prison "refused to accept two of the convicts for their serious health conditions after beatings by the security apparatus".³⁴² The same source further reported that at the rally "joint force arrested more than 60 people, most of whom were young people, and transferred a number of them to the headquarters where a number of them was reportedly beaten and tortured".³⁴³

In a March 2019 article, the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies reported that it expressed "its utmost concern over the physical safety and wellbeing of eight activists detained incommunicado without charge by the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS)".³⁴⁴ The source further noted that:

The activists were arrested between December 2018 and February 2019 for actual or suspected participation in the ongoing peaceful anti-government protests in Sudan. Reliable information indicates that the activists are being detained in inhuman conditions including denial meals. Mr Musab Mukhtar Maridi, a football coach from Nyala, South Darfur was arrested by NISS in Nyala on 13 January 2019 and subjected to three months detention in the NISS section attached to Nyala prison under the emergency law in South Darfur. A reliable source informed ACJPS that prison authorities have refused to give him meals and he is only eating food brought by his family.³⁴⁵

In a March 2019 report, the U.S. Congressional Research Service noted with regards to the government of Sudan's response to the protests that:

Reporting from inside Sudan is restricted, but the BBC has documented footage of so-called "hit squads," paramilitary units reportedly coordinated by the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) to suppress the protests. The BBC reporting suggests that activists are tortured in secret detention facilities; several people have died in detention.³⁴⁶

In April 2019 the head of the Darfur Bar Association, Mohamed Abdallah El Doma stated during a press conference that "between 400 and 800 Darfuri activists and rebel fighters captured during

³⁴⁰ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [*Torture in Sudan: Justice and Prevention, Priorities for change following the end of al-Bashir regime*](#), 25 April 2019

³⁴¹ Radio Dabanga, [*20 protesting youths imprisoned in North Darfur*](#), 4 January 2019

³⁴² Radio Dabanga, [*20 protesting youths imprisoned in North Darfur*](#), 4 January 2019

³⁴³ Radio Dabanga, [*20 protesting youths imprisoned in North Darfur*](#), 4 January 2019

³⁴⁴ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [*Sudan Protests: Deep concern for the safety and wellbeing of eight activist detained incommunicado*](#), 15 March 2019

³⁴⁵ African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [*Sudan Protests: Deep concern for the safety and wellbeing of eight activist detained incommunicado*](#), 15 March 2019

³⁴⁶ Congressional Research Service, [*Sudan: Pressure Mounts on the Government*](#), 1 March 2019

battles are still in prisons. A number of them have died in detention because of torture. Some prisoners were also subjected to amputations". He further noted that "the detainees are those sentenced in political cases and prisoners of war. He stressed that no one was allowed to visit them since they were captured; not their parents, lawyers, or local organisations. He said that the prisoners are living in very difficult health and humanitarian conditions. They are hungry and diseases are spreading among them". Mohamed Abdallah El Doma further assessed that "the killings and arrests of the people of Darfur were racist and reprisal".³⁴⁷

Radio Dabanga reported in April 2019 that security agents arrested six students from Kutum in North Darfur and took them to their office. An activist told Radio Dabanga that the six students were tortured and beaten up before being transferred to the Emergency Court of Kutum and sentenced to six months. He pointed out that so far no one has appealed on behalf of the six sentenced and appealed to lawyers to intervene to appeal the verdict".³⁴⁸

A Darfuri lawyer, Salah Adam, arrested in February 2019 stating during an April 2019 press conference following his release that "he spent five days in under torture in the security cells of Nyala until he collapsed and lost his memory before he was moved to the infamous NISS premises 'near the Shendi bus station' in Khartoum North".³⁴⁹

Radio Dabanga reported in mid-July 2019 that "Mudasir Abelrahman was allegedly tortured to death and two others were wounded, one of them seriously, in Ed Daein, capital of East Darfur [...]. Witnesses told Radio Dabanga that the incident took place during a raid by RSF troops on a house at El Gubba district in Ed Daein on suspicion that the residents of that house had stolen a mobile phone belonging to an officer".³⁵⁰

In August 2019 Radio Dabanga reported that "Agents of the Military Intelligence in North Darfur's Tawila locality held three people [...] and tortured them in order to get information about a missing weapon".³⁵¹

In early November 2019 Radio Dabanga noted that "angry protesters attacked the offices of the West Darfur General Intelligence Service (GIS) in Asonga, after a young man was allegedly tortured by militiamen. The buildings burned to the ground. A listener explained to Radio Dabanga that problems started when elements of the Rapid Support Forces, Sudan's main government militia, abused residents of Asonga, 27 km east of the West Darfur capital El Geneina [...]. "As a result, a dispute broke out. The militiamen then took a young man with them to the offices of the security apparatus, and tortured him," he reported.³⁵²

The same source reported in December 2019 that "In Shoba, south of Kabkabiya, more than 20 farmers were injured when they were attacked by a group of militant herdsmen. 12 women farmers were seriously wounded and had to be transferred to Kabkabiya Hospital. RSF militiamen also assaulted the head of the Committee for the Protection of the Agricultural Season, Sheikh Hasan Eisa. They beat him at Kabkabiya police station, forced him into a vehicle, and drove him to the RSF headquarters south of Kabkabiya, where he was tortured".³⁵³

³⁴⁷ Radio Dabanga, [Lawyers: 'Up to 800 Darfur activists, rebel fighters still detained', 18 April 2019](#)

³⁴⁸ Radio Dabanga, [Detained students released in West Kordofan](#), 11 April 2019

³⁴⁹ Radio Dabanga, [Released Darfur lawyer tells of NISS torture](#), 19 April 2019

³⁵⁰ Radio Dabanga, [11 dead this week in Darfur violence](#), 16 July 2019

³⁵¹ Radio Dabanga, [North Darfur military torture three men for lost weapon](#), 20 August 2019

³⁵² Radio Dabanga, [West Darfur's torch offices of Intelligence Service](#), 1 November 2019

³⁵³ Radio Dabanga, [Protest in North Darfur against herder, militia attacks](#), 9 December 2019

A December 2019 report from REDRESS and African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies on 'Anti-torture reforms in Sudan in the post-Bashir era' asserted that:

Over the last three decades, security forces, militias and police, the agents of the ruling National Congress Party (formerly the National Islamic Front), practised the most brutal and diverse forms of torture, including routine beating of detainees, electric shocks, rape and threats of rape, sleep deprivations and refusal of food and medical assistance. The list of victims of torture in Sudan is extensive and includes students, human rights defenders and political activists, trade unionists, professionals, journalists, minority ethnic groups and women. The system of immunities has ensured that anyone who committed torture remains above the law, and victims have no recourse to pursue justice and obtain reparations for their violations.³⁵⁴

The same source made a series of recommendations to bring Sudan in line with its international obligations, including:

Sudan must sign on and ratify international and regional instruments that regulate the prohibition of torture. The domestic law should be amended to ensure that the definition of torture is in compliance with Article 1 of the International Convention Against Torture and Cruel and Inhuman, Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Currently the punishment for torture is minimal or non-existent. The law should ensure that offences of torture are punishable by appropriate penalties which reflect the grave nature of the crime. To avoid any future instances of torture, the law must provide for basic due process rights of detained individuals. These include access to legal representation from the time of the arrest, ensure that a detained person can contact his or her family or employer without requiring prior authorizations as well requiring a medical examination within 24 hours of detention to avoid instances of torture. Justice cannot be achieved if the immunity laws that have prevented families and victims of torture from seeking justice remain in place.

Finally, any reforms must include effective institutional reforms. The judiciary and entities tasked with monitoring and investigation of human rights violations must be independent from the executive and victims must be able to seek reparations.³⁵⁵

3.3 Freedom of movement

3.3.1 Freedom of movement in Darfur

Maddy Crowther, Co-Executive Director of Waging Peace, published a report in January 2019 on the risk associated for returned Darfuris and consulted a range of organisations and individuals, amongst others Margie Buchanan-Smith and Susanne Jaspars, both Sudan experts, who "were forthright in their assessment that surveillance, and resulting restrictions on freedom of movement for Darfuris, was a primary driver of migration. They wrote, 'They [Darfuri groups] may come under surveillance, especially if they live in IDP camps in Darfur, are university students and/ or political activists. If and when they come under surveillance, their movements are likely to be restricted by the security services. Some are ordered to report regularly to security. Teenage boys may be asked, and put under pressure to spy on their relatives and community. Many young Darfuri men interviewed for the research inside Sudan cited arrest, surveillance, harassment and intimidation as the primary

³⁵⁴ REDRESS and African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [A Way Forward? Anti-torture reforms in Sudan in the post-Bashir era](#), 19 December 2019

³⁵⁵ REDRESS and African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, [A Way Forward? Anti-torture reforms in Sudan in the post-Bashir era](#), 19 December 2019

reason for wanting to leave Sudan. Those who had already left, interviewed in Europe, similarly cited those factors as their primary reason for leaving”³⁵⁶.

The UN Security Council report on UNAMID covering the period from 4 October 2018 to 3 January 2019 noted that “The threat of sexual violence remained significant, restricting women’s freedom of movement to undertake livelihood activities around camps for the displaced and in areas of return, including during flight for those displaced because of the conflict in Jebel Marra”³⁵⁷.

In April 2019 UN News reported that Fatou Bensouda, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), told the UN Security Council that “Attacks against civilian populations in Darfur have continued during the reporting period and appear to be increasing in severity. The approximately 1.64 million internally displaced persons in Darfur remain especially vulnerable and sexual and gender-based violence continues to restrict the freedom of movement of women and girls, in IDP camps and areas of return”³⁵⁸.

In its ‘Flash Update’ of 11th June 2019 UNOCHA reported that “In West Darfur, IDP community leaders reported movement restrictions for Abu Zarr and El Hojaj IDP camps, with a complete ban on movements at night”³⁵⁹.

3.3.2 Humanitarian access in Darfur

See also information included in section [3.2.5 Treatment of civil society organisations and civil society activists, including women’s rights activists, humanitarian workers as well as peacekeepers](#).

The UN Security Council report on UNAMID covering the period from 4 October 2018 to 3 January 2019 noted that “Security improvements had a positive impact on the humanitarian situation overall, although the clashes in the Jebel Marra area resulted in additional displacement and the suspension of humanitarian missions to several villages in north, central and west Jebel Marra”³⁶⁰. The same source further reported that “limited availability of cash in banks and inability to transfer cash affected humanitarian operations in all parts of Darfur and forced humanitarian partners to postpone activities such as the construction and rehabilitation of water points and livelihood programmes”³⁶¹.

With special reference to Jebel Marra, Radio Dabanga reported in February 2019 that the Sudan Liberation Movement led by Abdelwahid El Nur (SLM-AW) “holds several areas in Jebel Marra under its control, which is the main reason why the Sudanese government does not allow access there for humanitarian aid assistance [...] The Sudanese government, after its decision to expel international aid organisations from Jebel Marra and Darfur, has prevented the African Union-United Nations

³⁵⁶ Waging Peace (Maddy Crowther), [Risks on return for Darfuris in Sudan](#), January 2019, 6. *Viability of internal relocation to Khartoum, c. Surveillance*, p. 22

³⁵⁷ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 14 January 2019, para. 48

³⁵⁸ UN News, [Violence on the rise in Darfur following Sudan military takeover, but UN-AU peacekeeping mission maintains ‘robust posture’](#), 17 April 2019

³⁵⁹ UNOCHA, [Sudan, Flash Update No. 5](#), 11 June 2019, *Situation Overview*, p. 1

³⁶⁰ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 14 January 2019, para. 21

³⁶¹ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 14 January 2019, para. 25

Mission in Darfur (Unamid) and humanitarian organisations from reaching the areas under the rebels' control. The SLM-AW said that the authorities have also prevented the entry of traders with goods into the area, 'as part of their use of [shortages of, RD] food and medicines as a weapon against Sudanese citizens'".³⁶²

The subsequent UN Security Council report on UNAMID covering the period from 4 January to 3 April 2019 noted that "In Kalma, South Darfur, tensions have increased among groups allegedly affiliated with SLA-AW and others willing to engage with the Government, resulting in the suspension of some humanitarian activities in the camp for internally displaced persons since January 2019".³⁶³ The same report further reported that "Clashes between factions of SLA-AW in Daya village interrupted humanitarian activities, and access to Jokosti area was also denied owing to insecurity".³⁶⁴ The report also highlighted "UNAMID has continued to experience access denials and restrictions of movement. During the reporting period, a total of six denials and one restriction of movement were recorded, as compared with seven in the previous reporting period".³⁶⁵

The International Peace Institute reported in its April 2019 report that:

While Sudanese staff do not generally require authorization to travel, travel restrictions for international staff remain in place. International staff no longer need travel permits, but they still need to submit "travel notifications," which require getting the same signatures from the same people and can take the same amount of time as the permit process. In some ways, travel has gotten even more difficult. Whereas international staff could previously fly directly from Khartoum to towns in conflict-affected states, the government now routes all flights through state capitals. This requires humanitarian workers not only to take two flights but also to request two travel authorizations—one at the national and one at the state level—a process that can add several days to a trip.³⁶⁶

The UN Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan reported in his report covering the period 28 September 2018 to 30 June 2019 that:

The humanitarian country team highlighted that civil unrest and operations by security forces had negatively affected humanitarian operations during the period under review. Humanitarian organizations had faced increased challenges bringing in supplies – including medicines and medical supplies – through Port Sudan and Khartoum airport, mainly due to lengthy customs clearance procedures and delays in obtaining required permits. There were challenges in moving supplies across state lines. In addition, intermittent violent protests and the looting of humanitarian supplies at internal displacement settlements, particularly in Darfur, had disrupted operations. The economic crisis hampered aid efforts, as insufficient financial liquidity affected humanitarian operations and timely responses, while fuel shortages at field sites and the price of goods and services, including transport, continued to increase.³⁶⁷

³⁶² Radio Dabanga, [SLM-AW: 'Outbreak of disease in Jebel Marra'](#), 22 February 2019

³⁶³ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 10 April 2019, para. 11

³⁶⁴ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 10 April 2019, para. 18

³⁶⁵ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 10 April 2019, para. 21

³⁶⁶ International Peace Institute (IPI), [Stuck in Crisis: The Humanitarian Response to Sudan's Health Emergency](#), April 2019, p. 16

³⁶⁷ UN Human Rights Council, [Situation of human rights in the Sudan Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan](#), 26 July 2019, para. 28

The UN Special Report covering the period from 1 June to end of September 2019 reported that “The operating environment presented challenges for aid workers in areas under the control of SLA-AW, who [were] denied access to Central Jebel Marra, namely to Tarbi, Kero and Jokosti villages”.³⁶⁸

UNICEF noted in an August 2019 report that “The current instability has negatively impacted humanitarian operations. Key interlocutors in line ministries are working at a reduced capacity at national and state levels. Implementing Partners are encountering delays in entry visas, travel permits, and approvals for humanitarian cargo as well as delays in finalizing technical agreements for NGO programs. Challenges remains in moving supplies across state lines. In addition, intermittent violent protests and looting of humanitarian supplies at IDP settlements, particularly in Darfur, have disrupted some of the humanitarian operations”.³⁶⁹

In November 2019 Sudan Tribune reported that “The Governor of North Darfur, Maj Gen Malik al-Tayeb Khojali, ordered [...] to take all necessary measures to facilitate and accelerate the humanitarian access to all areas, including areas under the control of armed groups [...] The governor ordered to speed up procedures for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, especially when it is related to urgent situations. The decision cancelled the movement permit and replaced it with the movement notification document only. Further, it cancelled the seals of the states indicating that only the seal of the federal humanitarian commission is sufficient when the notifications are issued in Khartoum, provided that aid agencies and organizations deposit a copy of the notification with the offices of the State Humanitarian Commission, for information. The governor directed the state’s humanitarian aid coordinator to grant movement notices to employees of foreign humanitarian agencies and organizations operating in the state on the same day”.³⁷⁰

3.3.3 Ability for Darfuris to relocate and integrate into areas outside Darfur

Amongst the sources consulted within the timeframe set for this update, no specific information was located on this issue. However, topics such as the security situation, incidents of arbitrary arrests, detention, and forced recruitment, access to justice, freedom of movement and living conditions for Darfuris living in Khartoum and Omdurman will be addressed in an upcoming report by Asylum Research Centre (ARC), which will be available [here](#) once published. This report will be an update of ARC’s September 2018 report [Sudan: Query Response, The situation in Khartoum and Omdurman – An update](#), which contained COI on events that occurred between 19th August 2015 and 9th July 2018.

The UK fact-finding mission report, based on a mission conducted in August 2018 to Khartoum, includes synopsis in section 3 of the report and the full transcripts of individuals the mission interviewed on the issue of ‘Non-Arab Darfuris in Khartoum’.³⁷¹ For a critique of this fact-finding mission see Waging Peace (Maddy Crowther), [Risks on return for Darfuris in Sudan](#), January 2019, 8. *Comment on UK Home Office’s Fact-Finding Mission report (2018)*.

³⁶⁸ UN Security Council, [Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 15 October 2019, para. 15

³⁶⁹ UNICEF, [Sudan Humanitarian Situation Report Mid-Year 2019](#), August 2019

³⁷⁰ Sudan Tribune, [North Darfur governor order to facilitate humanitarian access](#), 13 November 2019

³⁷¹ See UK Home Office, [Report of a fact-finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan, Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018](#), November 2018

4. Forced recruitment and conscription

4.1 Incidents of forced recruitment by state and non-state actors

The January 2019 Letter from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan to the President of the UN Security Council reported with regards to human rights violations and humanitarian access in Jebel Marra “Abuses against local Fur civilians have been reported as a result of the tensions between al-Zayn and Zunoos’s elements and Gaddura. In particular, local sources accused Zunoos of attacks on villagers living in Gaddura’s area as well as looting of their properties and forced recruitment. [...] Some commanders such as Saleh Borso and Mohamed Taha are well known for such activities”.³⁷²

The same source further noted that Darfuri rebels based in Libya recruit in several constituencies though the information does not make it clear whether recruitment is forced or coerced:

- (a) In their communities in Darfur [...];
- (b) In Darfuri communities living in other regions of the Sudan. In particular, the Panel is aware of recruiting networks in El Gezira;
- (c) In refugee camps in eastern Chad. Many Darfuri refugees are from the Zaghawa tribe, like most members of SLA/MM, GSWF and JEM, and the groups have supporters in the camps;
- (d) Among artisanal miners working in the gold mining areas in the border region between the Sudan, Libya and Chad, many of whom are former Darfur rebels or Zaghawa.³⁷³

Furthermore, “According to several sources, many members of Arab tribes of Darfur work as mercenaries for all the Libyan factions (LNA, BDB, etc). Recruitment has reportedly increased recently. This is partly because in a context where Libyan parties accuse each other of using foreign mercenaries, their Arab ethnicity makes them less noticeable than the mostly black Darfur rebels”.³⁷⁴

An October 2019 International Crisis Group report noted that with regards to the Rapid Support Forces that “The RSF’s ranks were swelled by recruits from many impoverished families who were highly motivated by the financial rewards, which could reach up to \$10,000 each per offensive deployment. Some even paid bribes to go”.³⁷⁵

4.2 Recruitment and use of children by government forces and armed groups

The UN report on ‘Children and armed conflict, covering the period from January to December 2018, reported with regards to grave violations against children taking place in Darfur that “No cases of

³⁷² UN Security Council, [*Letter dated 10 January 2019 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 \(2005\) addressed to the President of the Security Council*](#), 10 January 2019, para. 76

³⁷³ UN Security Council, [*Letter dated 10 January 2019 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 \(2005\) addressed to the President of the Security Council*](#), 10 January 2019, para. 101

³⁷⁴ UN Security Council, [*Letter dated 10 January 2019 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 \(2005\) addressed to the President of the Security Council*](#), 10 January 2019, Annex 6 — *Opportunistic Darfur elements in Libya* p. 62

³⁷⁵ International Crisis Group, [*Safeguarding Sudan’s Revolution*](#), 21 October 2019, 2. *Hemedti and the Rapid Support Forces* p. 14

the recruitment and use of children were verified in 2018, although allegations thereof were received”.³⁷⁶

In December 2018 the New York Times reported “Led by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the Saudis say they are battling to rescue Yemen from a hostile faction backed by Iran. But to do it, the Saudis have used their vast oil wealth to outsource the war, mainly by hiring what Sudanese soldiers say are tens of thousands of desperate survivors of the conflict in Darfur to fight, many of them children”.³⁷⁷ The same source further noted:

Some families are so eager for the money that they bribe militia officers to let their sons go fight. Many are ages 14 to 17. In interviews, five fighters who have returned from Yemen and another about to depart said that children made up at least 20 percent of their units. Two said children were more than 40 percent. [...]

Sudanese jets departed Khartoum or Nyala, Darfur, carrying 2,000 to 3,000 soldiers at a time to Saudi Arabia.

They were delivered to camps inside the kingdom, where some said they saw as many as 8,000 Sudanese gathered.

The Saudis issued them uniforms and weapons, which the Sudanese fighters believed were American made. Then Saudi officers provided two to four weeks of training, mainly in assembling and cleaning their guns. [...]

Finally, they were divided into units of 500 to 750 fighters, they said. Then they traveled over land to Yemen, to battles in the Midi Desert, the Khalid ibn Walid camp in Taiz, or around Aden and Hudaydah.

All said they fought only for money. They were paid in Saudi riyals, the equivalent of about \$480 a month for a 14-year-old novice to about \$530 a month for an experienced Janjaweed officer. They received an additional \$185 to \$285 for any month they saw combat — every month for some.³⁷⁸

The UN Special Report covering the period from 14 July 2018 to 15 May 2019 reported that “Notable progress has been achieved in child protection, leading to the delisting of the government security forces from the list of parties to conflict that recruit or use children in situations of armed conflict, with the commitment by the Government to transform the national action plan pertaining to ending and preventing the recruitment and use of children into a national prevention plan”.³⁷⁹

In its annual report on trafficking covering the period April 2018 to March 2019 the U.S. Department of State noted that:

Sudanese law prohibits the recruitment of children as combatants and provides criminal penalties for perpetrators; however, an international organization reported SAF elements forcibly abducted a minor for the purpose of recruitment in 2018. Media reported complicit officials associated with Sudan’s Rapid Support Force recruited children and provided forged documents for minors to serve as combatants in Yemen. Sudanese military forces denied observers’ access to conflict areas in Darfur making verification of child soldier recruitment more challenging. [...]

During the reporting year, the NCCW and the Ministry for Social Welfare continued efforts to prevent the use of child soldiers within the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and its auxiliaries through the

³⁷⁶ UN General Assembly, [Children and armed conflict, Report of the Secretary-General](#), 20 June 2019, para. 162

³⁷⁷ New York Times, [On the Front Line of the Saudi War in Yemen: Child Soldiers From Darfur](#), 28 December 2018

³⁷⁸ New York Times, [On the Front Line of the Saudi War in Yemen: Child Soldiers From Darfur](#), 28 December 2018

³⁷⁹ UN Security Council, [Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic assessment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 30 May 2019, para. 24

implementation of the National Action Plan to Prevent the Recruitment and Use of Children in Armed Conflict. Unlike previous years, the government did not report identifying or reintegrating any child soldiers in 2018. Officials coordinated with the UN to conduct monitoring and verification visits, although observers reported security officials intermittently denied access to conflict areas in Darfur. In 2018, an international organization reported at least one case of child soldier recruitment and use by security forces in 2018. Media outlets reported government officials recruited children—particularly from Darfur—into combat roles in Yemen. In 2017, the government coordinated with international organizations to conduct monitoring and verification visits in eight conflict states, and officials from the NCCW facilitated the release of 21 child soldiers from non-governmental armed forces in the Darfur region.³⁸⁰

UNICEF reported in an April 2019 report with regards to protection needs in Sudan that “conflict continues in the Jebel Marra area region, coupled with frequent inter – tribal conflict. This increases the risk of recruitment and use of children in armed conflict”.³⁸¹

Reporting generally on the situation in Sudan following the December 2018 protests, UNICEF stated in June 2019 that “We have received information that children are being detained, recruited to join the fighting and sexually abused. [...] Many parents are too scared to let their children leave the house, fearful of violence, harassment and lawlessness”.³⁸² According to the Assessment Capacities Project “In times of increased intercommunal fighting and an increase of armed group activity youth, especially males in rural areas, are at higher risk of recruitment”.³⁸³

UNICEF noted in an August 2019 report that “In South and Central Darfur, 133 Sudan Armed Forces personnel (62 officers, 71 soldiers) in Nyala and Kass were trained on child rights, protection of children affected by conflict and measures to protect children from recruitment for service in armed conflict. The training sessions were organized in collaboration with the 16th Division, State Technical Committee of the government and were coordinated by the State Council on Child Welfare (SCCW). This training is timely as allegations of recruitment of children by Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are widespread in social media”.³⁸⁴

The UN Special Report covering the period from 1 June to end of September 2019 reported that “The majority of the grave violations committed against children during the reporting period occurred in the context of infighting between SLA-AW factions in the Jebel Marra. Within the framework of the Security Council-mandated monitoring and reporting mechanism on grave violations against children in situations of armed conflict, during the period between June and September 2019, UNAMID verified 87 grave violations affecting 84 children (including 35 girls), of which [...] 15 of recruitment and use [...] The perpetrators of grave violations were mostly identified as SLA-AW, members of the Rapid Support Forces, armed nomads and unidentified armed men”.³⁸⁵

UNICEF’s humanitarian situation report covering the third quarter of 2019 noted that:

³⁸⁰ U.S. Department of State, [US Department of State: 2019 Trafficking in Persons Report: Sudan](#), 20 June 2019

³⁸¹ UNICEF, [2019 Humanitarian Response Plan January -December 2019](#), April 2019, Protection, p.30

³⁸² UNICEF, [Children killed, injured, detained and abused amid escalating violence and unrest in Sudan](#), 11 June 2019

³⁸³ Assessment Capacities Project, [SUDAN Escalation of violence](#), 17 June 2019

³⁸⁴ UNICEF, [Sudan Humanitarian Situation Report Mid-Year 2019](#), August 2019

³⁸⁵ UN Security Council, [Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 15 October 2019, para. 18

There has been significant social media attention on the recruitment of children by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) for deployment both in Sudan and Yemen. UNICEF alongside the Resident Coordinator Office and UNAMID designed a workshop in July 2019 to identify and visit all the RSF barracks and training centres to conduct a comprehensive age verification exercise and awareness raising and training for troops to prevent underage recruitment. Troop reviews, interviews and documentation of suspected cases are used to identify and monitor individuals suspected to be underage, while transitional care, family tracing and reunification for children associated with armed forces and armed groups who are identified is used to support those confirmed. UNICEF and partners also conducted a workshop for the Government of Sudan Technical Committee members on the age verification process.

Based on the results of these two workshops a comprehensive 4 day verification visit was conducted to the RSF sector of Naila, South Darfur state. More than 600 RSF new recruits were interviewed and 40 RSF commanders were trained on protection of children from grave violations and the relevant legal frameworks including Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and RSF laws.

Furthermore, 36 senior legal SAF officers also received seven days of TOT training on International Humanitarian Law, protection of children during armed conflict and national and international obligations such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Sudan Child Act 2010.

The engagement with RSF revealed that there are multiple factors at the community level which encourage families and parents to accept their children's involvement with the RSF. UNICEF in collaboration with the NCCW has developed community awareness materials which will be used in the next verification process seven other states (Khartoum, North Darfur, East Darfur, Central Darfur, West Darfur, Blue Nile and West Kordofan).³⁸⁶

A December 2019 International Federation for Human Rights and African Center for Justice and Peace Studies report stated with regards to recruitment into the Rapid Support Forces:

It is alleged that these troops include child soldiers, aged between 14 and 17 years, some of whom have been deployed to Yemen to fight alongside the Saudi-led coalition. Since March 2015, Sudan has been playing a significant role in the conflict in Yemen, mainly by sending as many as 14,000 combatants to the battlefield. Most of these combatants have the same profile: boys – aged between 14 and 17 – originating from poor Darfuri families, in search of economic opportunities. A significant number of them are thought to have grown up in Darfur IDPs camps and have been eager to integrate RSF troops to earn money and get their families out of the camps. West and Central Darfur are amongst Sudan's poorest states, with high poverty rates in rural areas, high unemployment rates and low employment opportunities. In a context where Sudanese authorities have taken no tangible measures to ensure economic development in Darfur, migration to foreign countries or engagement within the RSF have constituted real or perceived economic opportunities for the population.³⁸⁷

5. General humanitarian situation in Darfur, which is likely to also affect IDPs and Returnees

With special reference to Jebel Marra, Radio Dabanga reported in February 2019 that "The Sudan Liberation Movement led by Abdelwahid El Nur (SLM-AW) has reported an increase in the cases of pneumonia, diarrhoea, measles and anaemia, and incidences of miscarriage in several areas of Jebel Marra".³⁸⁸

³⁸⁶ UNICEF, [Sudan Humanitarian Situation Report Third Quarter 2019](#), 5 November 2019

³⁸⁷ International Federation for Human Rights, African Center for Justice and Peace Studies, Sudan Human Rights Monitor, [Will There Be Justice for Darfur? Persisting impunity in the face of political change; Fact-finding mission report](#), December 2019, *The Rapid Support Forces (RSF)*, p. 26

³⁸⁸ Radio Dabanga, [SLM-AW: 'Outbreak of disease in Jebel Marra'](#), 22 February 2019

In March 2019 Radio Dabanga reported that “A number of patients and their families in El Geneina, Nyala, Zalingei, and El Fasher hospitals in Darfur have complained of lack of medicines and their high prices. The patients said that all they get in hospitals is prescriptions from doctors, and complain of the lack of medical examination devices, drinking water, and toilets in the hospitals. A number of patients told Radio Dabanga, that four dialysis machines in El Fasher Teaching Hospital are non-operational, in addition to the CT [computer tomography] scanner. They expressed their grief and concern for not being able to afford to go to Khartoum”.³⁸⁹

The Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) stated in August 2019 that “As of late August 2019, OCHA and the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) estimate 245,700 people have been affected by heavy rains and flash floods across 15 states in Sudan [including in Darfur]. Approximately 32,851 homes have been destroyed and another 16,284 were damaged. Heavy rains through August [2019] are expected to worsen flooding in [...] North Darfur [...]”.³⁹⁰

UNICEF reported in its November 2019 *Humanitarian Situation Report* that “An estimated 245,700 people in Sudan experienced above-average heavy rains and flash floods across almost all 18 States over the June to September [2019] rainy season, according to the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), FMOH and other partners. The FMOH confirmed 79 rain attributed deaths, mainly due to collapsed roofs and electrocution. To date, 32,851 homes have been destroyed and 16,284 damaged [...] The most severely affected States are [...] North Darfur, South Darfur [...]”.³⁹¹

Describing the health situation in Darfur Radio Dabanga reported in November 2019 that:

According to Maj Gen Malik Khojali, Acting Governor of North Darfur, the state is suffering from a major shortage of medical and technical personnel. He told reporters [...] that 23 malaria patients and four dengue fever patients died the past week [...] The Sudanese Doctors Central Committee in North Darfur already pointed in early October [2019] to a lack of medicines, medical equipment, and a significant shortage of doctors and nurses, which delays the treatment of patients. They further noted that many people are malnourished due to the continuing economic crisis [...] Between August 25 and September 25 [2019], more than 19,000 cases of malaria were recorded in North Darfur. In the end of October [2019], the Sudanese Doctors Central Committee in North Darfur pointed to a new wave of malaria sweeping across the state, causing serious complications among weak patients, and leaving a number of deaths. During the past couple of months, Sudan has been facing several vector-borne disease outbreaks including dengue fever, Rift Valley fever (RVF), chikungunya, and malaria. The diseases can be linked to the recent floods in the country that have left large pools of stagnant water, which are breeding sites for vectors such as mosquitoes.³⁹²

6. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

Information on the possibility for humanitarian actors to access areas in need in Darfur can be found in sub-section [3.3.2 Humanitarian access in Darfur](#).

For a brief overview of the options available to IDPs in Darfur since the government of Sudan outlined three in January 2016: “1. Integration into host communities; 2. Return to villages of origin;

³⁸⁹ Radio Dabanga, [Medicines in short supply or unaffordable in Darfur](#), 12 March 2019

³⁹⁰ Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), [Flooding risk remains high as heavy rainfall continues during the lean season](#), August 2019, *Key Messages*

³⁹¹ UNICEF, [Sudan: Humanitarian Situation Report, Third Quarter](#), 5 November 2019, *Situation Overview and Humanitarian Needs*, p. 2

³⁹² Radio Dabanga, [‘Unprecedented’ malaria, dengue epidemics in North Darfur](#), 22 November 2019

3. Relocation to another place in the country” see the joint report by: International Federation for Human Rights, African Center for Justice and Peace Studies, Sudan Human Rights Monitor, [*Will There Be Justice for Darfur? Persisting impunity in the face of political change; Fact-finding mission report*](#), December 2019, II. *Returning to Sudan: Hardly an option for refugees*, 2. “We don’t want to go back”, 2.3 *The fate of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)*, p. 56 – 59.
IDP figures for Darfur

The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) reported in a February 2019 report that:

Some 1.6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) are registered as living in camps [in Darfur]. For unregistered IDPs – that is, displaced people living in rural settlements and urban areas – estimates vary considerably, especially as there is no systematic registration of displacement outside of camps. IDPs and their host communities have limited livelihood options and often rely on unsustainable coping strategies, such as unmanaged cutting of trees and shrubs for fuelwood and charcoal production. This places an additional burden on Darfur’s fragile ecosystem and related livelihoods.³⁹³

UN OCHA’s ‘Humanitarian Bulletin’ reported that in February 2019 “In Central Darfur State, over 2,600 people fled their homes in North Jebel Marra locality and took refuge in Kurmul and Thurragey villages (Central Jebel Marra locality) following fighting between two factions of the Sudan Liberation Army – Abdel Wahid (SLAAW)”.³⁹⁴ The same report further noted an “unusual influx of IDPs to South Darfur’s Otash IDP camp as follows:

An unusual increase in the number of IDPs who arrived in South Darfur’s Otash IDP camp from East Jebel Marra locality was reported between January and March of this year. As of 26 May, an estimated 6,000 new IDPs have arrived in the camp during this period bringing the total number of IDPs from East Jebel Marra in the camp to an estimated 10,300. This increase is unusual given there were no reports of recent conflict or violence in the area. According to the IDPs, fighting that had erupted in their home areas in June 2018 forced many of them to flee their homes and take refuge in the mountains where they had no access to services. Their initial displacement disrupted the cultivation season resulting in a poor harvest. Lack of food and hunger has forced them to seek refuge and assistance in Otash IDP camp, their second displacement.³⁹⁵

The subsequent UN Security Council report on UNAMID covering the period from 4 January to 3 April 2019 noted that “According to the International Organization for Migration and the Humanitarian Aid Commission, in South Darfur, approximately 550 people arrived at the Otash camp for internally displaced persons from Feina, Gulbo and Sabun el-Fagur villages on 5 February [2019], owing to reported fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and SLA-AW around Deribat”.³⁹⁶

UNOCHA’s ‘Humanitarian Snapshot’ noted that as of 1st March 2019:

- North Darfur had 446,441 IDPs and 54,028 IDP and refugee returnees
- South Darfur had 537,023 IDPs and 18,243 IDP and refugee returnees
- West Darfur had 183,725 IDPs and 14,705 IDP and refugee returnees
- Central Darfur had 388,371 IDPs and 175,079 IDP and refugee returnees

³⁹³ African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), [*Protecting the environment and women in Darfur through fuel-efficient stoves*](#), 11 February 2019

³⁹⁴ UN OCHA, [*Sudan, Humanitarian Bulletin, Issue 4, 25 March – 12 May 2019*](#), 12 May 2019, p. 2

³⁹⁵ UN OCHA, [*Sudan, Humanitarian Bulletin, Issue 4, 25 March – 12 May 2019*](#), 12 May 2019, p. 3

³⁹⁶ UN Security Council, [*African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General*](#), 10 April 2019, para. 18

- East Darfur had 84,859 IDPs and 53,342 IDP and refugee returnees.³⁹⁷

The UN OCHA Sudan 'Situation Report' noted that "In the first three quarters of 2019, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) registered 14,500 IDPs and 111,500 returnees in six states in Sudan. The highest number of IDP registrations was in South Darfur (5,800 people) and the highest number of returnees registered was in North Darfur (44,500 people)".³⁹⁸

In April 2019 UN News reported that Fatou Bensouda, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), told the UN Security Council that "approximately 1.64 million internally displaced persons [are] in Darfur".³⁹⁹

UNHCR issued maps on refugee and IDP locations in [West Darfur State](#) and [Central Darfur State](#) as of 18 September 2019.⁴⁰⁰

The International Organization for Migration's (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) for Sudan noted in its October 2019 report that "As of baseline round zero, the DTM has identified a total number of 2,086,934 IDPs within 57 localities, pinpointed at 473 locations, across seven states in Sudan [...] The state with the highest number of registered IDPs was South Darfur with 676,438 individuals registered (32% of the total IDP count). Comparatively, East Darfur registered only 60,396 IDPs (3%), the lowest known quantity of hosted IDPs [...] East Darfur had the fewest number of locations and represented less than one per cent of the total location count".⁴⁰¹

6.1 Security situation targeting IDPs

Note that security incidents listed in this section should be seen as illustrative and not exhaustive of the number and type of attacks targeting IDPs. See also the information included in section [2.3 Conflict between tribes and inter-communal violence since December 2018](#).

For human rights violations and criminal incidents directed against IDPs see section [6.2 Human rights violations and criminal incidents directed against IDPs](#), as well as [8.4 Sexual and gender-based violence \(SGBV\)](#).

Information on the possibility for humanitarian actors to access areas in need in Darfur can be found in sub-section [3.3.2 Humanitarian access in Darfur](#).

6.1.1 North Darfur (IDPs)

³⁹⁷ UNOCHA, [Sudan: Humanitarian Snapshot](#), 1 March 2019

³⁹⁸ UN OCHA, [Sudan, Situation Report](#), 5 December 2019, p. 2

³⁹⁹ UN News, [Violence on the rise in Darfur following Sudan military takeover, but UN-AU peacekeeping mission maintains 'robust posture'](#), 17 April 2019

⁴⁰⁰ See UNHCR, [Sudan: Central Darfur State, UNHCR presence and refugee & IDP locations](#), As of 18 September 2019 and UNHCR, [Sudan: West Darfur State, UNHCR presence and refugee & IDP locations](#), As of 18 September 2019

⁴⁰¹ International Organization for Migration (IOM) Sudan, [Displacement Tracking Matrix, DTM Round Zero](#), October 2019, *Internally Displaced Persons baseline Round Zero 2019*, p. 3

In February 2019 Radio Dabanga noted that “Displaced people in Kutum locality in North Darfur have complained about the escalation of attacks by herders who trespass with their livestock into gardens and orchards”.⁴⁰²

Radio Dabanga reported in March 2019 that “Witnesses told Radio Dabanga that a group of herders, driving five cars while other herdsmen rode on camels and horses, stormed the northern part of Kassab camp, in search of items they had lost or they claimed were stolen from them. They beat several people, including a woman, and threatened to burn the camp if their missing belongings were not recovered. Witnesses told Radio Dabanga that the camp's residents appealed to the authorities in Kutum, who deployed military, security and police forces to respond to the attackers”.⁴⁰³

In April 2019 “Gunmen shot dead a displaced man in Tawila locality in North Darfur [...] One of his relatives told Radio Dabanga that a group of unknown gunmen, which he believed to be herders, opened fire on Dago and killed him instantly”.⁴⁰⁴

Radio Dabanga further reported in June 2019 that “Two displaced women from the camps in Kabkabiya in North Darfur have been injured in attacks by paramilitaries on farms, under the pretext of ownership of the land. Displaced people reported that militants carried out a series of attacks on displaced people on farms at Bora and Habor areas in northern Kabkabiya from June 7 to 9, saying that they own the land”.⁴⁰⁵

In July 2019 Radio Dabanga reported that an attack had taken place in “Kassab camp for displaced people north of Kutum in North Darfur. El Hadi Hussein was seriously injured by armed herders on Saturday while he was tending his farm near Kulu village. Witnesses told Dabanga radio that the gunmen beat him with rifle butts. He had to be taken to Kutum Hospital”.⁴⁰⁶

Radio Dabanga documented in August 2019 that “One of the farmers told Radio Dabanga that about 67 people left Zamzam camp for the displaced near the North Darfur capital El Fasher to go to Abu Deleik to cultivate their land” when they came “under heavy fire from unidentified gunmen in the area of Abu Deleik in Kalimendo”.⁴⁰⁷

Radio Dabanga noted in September 2019 that “dozens of displaced farmers from Zamzam camp demonstrated in front of North Darfur state government buildings in the capital of El Fasher [...] to protest against being prevented from cultivating their land” by “militiamen in Kalemindo locality” who “expelled them from the area”.⁴⁰⁸

The Darfur Network for Monitoring and Documentation documented a number of attacks against displaced people in Darfur in October 2019:

On 31 October 2019 at 11:00am, a displaced man and his daughter were killed on their farm by four armed shepherds riding camels and wearing military uniforms. The perpetrators are said to be

⁴⁰² Radio Dabanga, [Attacks on displaced farmers in Kutum](#), 8 February 2019

⁴⁰³ Radio Dabanga, [Displaced people attacked in North Darfur camp](#), 29 March 2019

⁴⁰⁴ Radio Dabanga, [Darfur: Man killed in Tawila, boy dies from burns in Ed Daein](#), 9 April 2019

⁴⁰⁵ Radio Dabanga, [Women injured in North Darfur 'land dispute'](#), 16 June 2019

⁴⁰⁶ Radio Dabanga, [Six villagers – including children – killed in North Darfur attack](#), 22 July 2019

⁴⁰⁷ Radio Dabanga, [67 North Darfur farmers dodge heavy gunfire](#), 22 August 2019

⁴⁰⁸ Radio Dabanga, [North Darfur farmers demand protection from herdsmen](#), 12 September 2019

associated with the RSF in Um Ajajah Kasi Gabal locality, east of Um Jalbak which is 7 km from Tawila locality near to north Darfur El fasher [...]

Other incidents were documented including on 29 October 2019, when Sheikh Ibrahim Abu Bakr Abdul, aged 57, was killed after suffering gunshot wounds in his chest, and his brother Eddy Abu Bakr Abdul Khadar, aged 40, was injured on his farm. The victims were reportedly attacked by the RSF. Shiekh Ibrahim was one of the leaders at the Grand Mosque in Shaddad IDP camp in the Shanqal Tawbay area near El Faster, North Darfur.

On 28 October 2019 at 7:00pm, five women were assaulted near El Fasher in Shanqal Tawbay, North Darfur, 2 km from Shaddad IDP Camp while returning from farming. The attack was carried out by armed militias and pastoralists riding camels. One of the victims, Zahra Abdullah Mohammed, aged 50, was beaten with a weapon and sticks on her back and head and the attackers stole her donkey and all her property.⁴⁰⁹

6.1.2 South Darfur (IDPs)

According to Al Jazeera reporting in mid-April 2019,

At the United Nations, Jeremiah Mamabolo, the joint UN-AU envoy in Darfur, said al-Bashir's overthrow has sparked violence in the vast western region of the country, between people displaced during its long conflict and other protesters.

The violence included arson attacks on the premises of al-Bashir's security service and his party's offices, as well as houses of community leaders "perceived to have collaborated with the previous regime", Mamabolo said on Wednesday.

There was also violence in the Kalma camp, housing thousands of people who fled the fighting in Darfur and clashes between youth groups on Saturday led to the reported death of 15 displaced people, he said.⁴¹⁰

Documenting the same incident, Radio Dabanga reported that "Clashes within Kalma camp for the displaced, near the South Darfur capital Nyala [...] have left 14 people dead, the acting governor of South Darfur, Maj Gen Hashim Khalid, has confirmed. The clashes erupted between two groups of displaced people within the camp".⁴¹¹ UNAMID noted that "These confrontations reportedly resulted in the killing of 16 people including a humanitarian field worker, with 17 injured and a significant number of IDPs displaced".⁴¹²

ACLED noted that in the week of 7 May 2019 that "A demonstration by IDPs in Nyala, South Darfur ended in violence as several protesters were wounded, two by police gunfire".⁴¹³ The same source reported on 25 September 2019 that "in South Darfur, after Rapid Support Forces killed an internally displaced student, riots in the Mershing camp resulted in the killing of four demonstrators by the police forces".⁴¹⁴

Following the shooting of a displaced student in West Dafur "Displaced people in Mershing camp in South Darfur staged mass demonstrations" in September 2019, resulting in the "killing of one protester and the wounding of two others".⁴¹⁵

⁴⁰⁹ Darfur Network for Monitoring and Documentation, [Human rights violations against farmers and civilians by armed militias in the Darfur region](#), Undated [Last accessed: 8 January 2020]

⁴¹⁰ Al Jazeera, [Omar al-Bashir's brothers arrested as Sudan protests continue](#), 17 April 2019

⁴¹¹ Radio Dabanga, [14 dead as South Darfur displaced clash in Kalma camp](#), 17 April 2019

⁴¹² UNAMID, [UNAMID condemns violence confrontations in Kalma IDP camp in South Darfur](#), 21 April 2019

⁴¹³ ACLED, [Regional Overview: Africa 7 May 2019](#), 7 May 2019

⁴¹⁴ ALCED, [Regional Overview: Africa 25 September 2019](#), 25 September 2019

⁴¹⁵ Radio Dabanga, ['Militia' shooting prompts mass demo in South Darfur](#), 17 September 2019

In October 2019 Radio Dabanga reported that “An activist from Gireida told Radio Dabanga that five gunmen intercepted three displaced persons while they were on their way from Gireida to their farms in the area of Nabagai, five kilometres west of Gireida [South Darfur]. Attackers tried to seize their donkey carts, but the three men refused to hand them over. This prompted the gunmen to open fire, killing Rajab on the spot and wounding Idris Adam and El Tayeb Eisa. Eisa had to be transferred to a hospital in Nyala”.⁴¹⁶ Another incident was reported by the same source on 22 October 2019: “A displaced farmer from Abdos camp in Gireida in South Darfur, was severely wounded [...] when unidentified gunmen robbed him of his money and his horse”.⁴¹⁷ A few days later the same source reported that a “gunmen killed one brother and wounded another in an attack near Manawashi” where both brothers were “residents of Shaddad” IDP camp.⁴¹⁸

In November 2019 the Darfur Network for Monitoring and Documentation documented a number of attacks against displaced people in Darfur:

For years, the RSF have harassed the civilians in villages and towns of Gereida in South Darfur, and have committed multiple crimes against the IDPs, including killing, rape, looting, and forced displacement. Armed pastoralists have targeted IDPs by releasing their livestock on the farms to disrupt their agricultural crops. The South Darfur State Government has not respond to civilians’ request to investigate attacks of armed militias.⁴¹⁹

6.1.3 Central Darfur (IDPs)

Amongst the sources consulted within the timeframe set for this update, no specific information was located on this issue. For an historical overview consult the previous two editions:

- ❖ ARC, [Darfur Country Report](#), January 2019
- ❖ ACCORD, [Darfur COI Compilation](#), September 2017

6.1.4 West Darfur (IDPs)

In March 2019 Radio Dabanga reported that “Gunmen attacked six displaced people from Ardamata camp who were collecting straw at Arafa, east of El Geneina Airport. The attackers were blocked in their attempt to rob the displaced people of their donkey carts. The cart owners confronted the gunmen and killed three of them, while wounding two others. The gunmen injured two of the cart owners. A source in the area reported to Radio Dabanga that the cart owners surrendered themselves to the police after the incident. Witnesses said that the gunmen returned in two vehicles, kidnapped three people near the Ardamata camp. They tied two of the abductees down and shot them dead. The third person was tied to one of their vehicles and dragged until he died”.⁴²⁰

The same source stated that in September 2019 “One of the camp elders told Radio Dabanga that two armed men in uniforms of the RSF – the feared and notorious main government militia

⁴¹⁶ Radio Dabanga, [One dead, two injured in South Darfur shooting](#), 4 October 2019

⁴¹⁷ Radio Dabanga, [South Darfur farmer severely injured in armed robbery](#), 22 October 2019

⁴¹⁸ Radio Dabanga, [Horse thieves kill villager in South Darfur](#), 30 October 2019

⁴¹⁹ Darfur Network for Monitoring and Documentation, [Human rights violations against farmers and civilians by armed militias in the Darfur region](#), 21 November 2019

⁴²⁰ Radio Dabanga, [West Darfur killings spark large-scale protest march](#), 15 March 2019

commanded by Lt Gen Mohamed Hamdan ‘Hemeti’, member of Sudan’s Sovereign Council – tried to rob Munir Hamid, a student at the Zalingei University, of his mobile phone [...] When he resisted, one of them shot him dead”.⁴²¹

Al Jazeera reported in January 2020 that “At least 24 people died after an IDP camp was attacked following a dispute between Arab and African ethnic groups [...] Krinding Camp, east of the state capital el-Geneina, was raided [...] following a dispute between Arab and African ethnic groups, said Ashraf Eissa, a spokesman for the joint African Union-United Nations peacekeeping mission in Darfur, UNAMID. ‘The Arab tribesmen came to the IDP camp and started shooting and killing and burning, he told Reuters [...] ‘Then relatives went to the hospital and threatened hospital staff at gunpoint and destroyed the blood bank ... and when a government of Sudan policeman tried to intervene he was shot and killed’”.⁴²² The same news article provided a range of casualty figures from a range of sources:

At least 17 people were wounded in the violence around Geneina, though casualty figures were initial estimates and could rise, Eissa [UNAMID spokesman] said [...]

A senior health official and a spokesman for a local aid group said at least 36 people were killed, including women and children.

The health official told The Associated Press news agency that about 60 others were wounded, and that 49 of them were taken to the capital, Khartoum, for treatment [...]

Adam Regal, a spokesman for a local organisation that helps run IDP camps in the area, said looting and destruction of property by fighters took place in at least three camps in Geneina. He shared footage showing burned properties to the ground, as well as graphic images of burned bodies and wounded people with blood-stained clothes. His group put the toll at 41 dead and more than 100 wounded [...].⁴²³

6.1.5 East Darfur (IDPs)

Amongst the sources consulted within the timeframe set for this update, no specific information was located on this issue. For an historical overview consult the first edition of this report:

❖ ACCORD, [Darfur COI Compilation](#), September 2017

6.2 Human rights violations and criminal incidents directed against IDPs

See also information included in sections [8.4 Sexual and gender-based violence \(SGBV\)](#) and [8.5 State response to sexual and gender-based violence \(SGBV\)](#).

The UN Security Council report on UNAMID covering the period from 4 October 2018 to 3 January 2019 noted that “Internally displaced persons were affected by 48 crime-related incidents, which led to three fatalities [...] In comparison, during the previous reporting period, internally displaced persons and other civilians were affected by 181 and 376 crime-related incidents, respectively, leading to the deaths of 34 internally displaced persons and 91 other civilians. The incidents reported in the past three months included murder (10 cases), armed robbery (14 cases), attempted

⁴²¹ Radio Dabanga, [‘Militia’ shooting prompts mass demo in South Darfur](#), 17 September 2019

⁴²² Al Jazeera, [Dozens killed in violence in Sudan's West Darfur state](#), 2 January 2020

⁴²³ Al Jazeera, [Dozens killed in violence in Sudan's West Darfur state](#), 2 January 2020

robbery (1 case), assault/harassment (35 cases), burglary/breakin [sic] (15 cases), looting (2 cases), abduction (1 case), arson (1 case), shooting (20 cases), attack/ambush (3 cases), threat (2 cases), others (1 case) and livestock theft (6 cases)".⁴²⁴ The same report further noted that the most affected location of violence were areas "around Golo, Nertiti and Thur in Central Darfur, Kass in South Darfur, and Sortony in North Darfur, all located in the greater Jebel Marra. The Fur community are the main victims of crimes against internally displaced persons and other civilians".⁴²⁵

As to the availability of Sudanese police protection, the report stated that "While the Sudanese police assumed responsibility for the security of internally displaced persons camps in Salam, Dereige and Otash in South Darfur, following the closure of UNAMID community policing centres in those camps, security in some camps remained a matter of concern, in particular in Kalma, where violent confrontations continue over return issues, with the involvement of SLA/AW elements".⁴²⁶

With reference to sexual violence the report noted "The threat of sexual violence remained significant, restricting women's freedom of movement to undertake livelihood activities around camps for the displaced and in areas of return, including during flight for those displaced because of the conflict in Jebel Marra. During the reporting period, there were 31 incidents of sexual and gender-based violence. Those incidents included conflict-related sexual violence in the form of rape involving 34 female victims, including 19 minors. Conflict-related sexual violence was committed mostly in Jebel Marra, notably in the context of confrontations between Government forces and SLA/AW".⁴²⁷

The subsequent UN Security Council report on UNAMID covering the period from 4 January to 3 April 2019 noted that "The number of crime-related incidents against internally displaced persons and other vulnerable civilians increased during the reporting period, with 58 incidents resulting in five fatalities, compared with 48 incidents and three fatalities in the previous period".⁴²⁸ The same report further noted that "In camps for internally displaced persons in the Nertiti and Golo areas, Central Darfur, random night shooting and harassment of displaced persons was reported".⁴²⁹ With reference to sexual violence the report stated "Sexual violence, including conflict-related sexual violence, accounted for 15 incidents and 26 victims, including seven minors, a decrease from the 31 incidents reported in the previous period. Of the 59 documented cases, 26 incidents, involving 50 victims, were allegedly perpetrated by Government security forces. Three members of SLA-AW were the alleged perpetrators in two incidents".⁴³⁰ The report further highlighted:

Sexual and gender-based violence, including conflict-related sexual violence, remains a serious concern for women in the greater Jebel Marra area. UNAMID has documented incidents of the rape of four displaced minors, including those of a 15-year-old girl from the Kasab internally displaced

⁴²⁴ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 14 January 2019, para. 11

⁴²⁵ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 14 January 2019, para. 12

⁴²⁶ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 14 January 2019, para. 13

⁴²⁷ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 14 January 2019, para. 15

⁴²⁸ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 10 April 2019, para. 10

⁴²⁹ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 10 April 2019, para. 10

⁴³⁰ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 10 April 2019, para. 12

persons camp by two Sudanese police personnel; of two girls (16 and 17 years of age), residents of the Zamzam internally displaced persons camp, and of a girl (13 years of age), from the Hamadiya internally displaced persons camp, who was raped by two armed men, all in North Darfur. It was also reported that, on 1 February, a 13-year-old girl from the Rongatas internally displaced persons camp, in Zalingei, was gang-raped by four armed nomads at a farm.⁴³¹

Radio Dabanga reported in February 2019 on an attempted rape by militiamen in North Darfur against five displaced women and girls”.⁴³²

Indicative of the level of sexual violence especially but also other violations experienced by IDPs, “statistics presented by nazirs (native administration leaders) of Zamzam camp south of El Fasher [North Darfur] [...] 18 cases of rape, including eight minors, five people killed (three women and two men), dozens of people injured of whom 12 seriously, and the theft of large amounts of money and thousands of livestock”.⁴³³

In April 2019 UN News reported that Fatou Bensouda, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), told the UN Security Council that “Attacks against civilian populations in Darfur have continued during the reporting period and appear to be increasing in severity. The approximately 1.64 million internally displaced persons in Darfur remain especially vulnerable and sexual and gender-based violence continues to restrict the freedom of movement of women and girls, in IDP camps and areas of return”.⁴³⁴

The UN Special Report covering the period from 14 July 2018 to 15 May 2019 reported that:

[...] Internally displaced persons, especially women and children, are the most vulnerable to attacks, mainly perpetrated by government and affiliated forces, including the Rapid Support Forces. There is insufficient action to address violations and abuses, in a context where State authorities are absent in several localities and judicial institutions are weak. As a result, internally displaced persons and local populations have expressed a lack of trust in law enforcement bodies. There has been an upward trend in human rights violations in the Nertiti area, where conflict-related sexual violence and sexual and gender-based violence cases are prevalent, and in the Guldo and Golo areas, where the Rapid Support Forces reportedly burned down dozens of villages in 2018, displacing hundreds of civilians to Kass and Nyala. Human rights violations and abuses also persist in some localities with no active military operations, including in areas from which UNAMID has withdrawn, such as Jebel Moon, West Darfur, where an attack by armed militia in January 2019 resulted in the killing and displacement of civilians [...]

Conflict related sexual violence, with rape constituting 80 per cent of documented cases, occurred in both urban and rural settings, including around camps for internally displaced persons, water points, villages of return and other remote areas. Members of the security forces, including the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces, were identified as perpetrators in over 30 per cent of sexual violence cases. Impunity remains a serious concern.⁴³⁵

The same report further stated that:

⁴³¹ UN Security Council, [*African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General*](#), 10 April 2019, para. 35

⁴³² Radio Dabanga, [*North Darfur: Four women wounded in rape attempt*](#), 11 February 2019

⁴³³ Radio Dabanga, [*North Darfur camp nazirs: Five dead, 18 rapes this year*](#), 17 February 2019

⁴³⁴ UN News, [*Violence on the rise in Darfur following Sudan military takeover, but UN-AU peacekeeping mission maintains 'robust posture'*](#), 17 April 2019

⁴³⁵ UN Security Council, [*Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic assessment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*](#), 30 May 2019, paras. 22 and 23

In some areas of East and West Darfur, internally displaced persons reported cases of physical and verbal harassment by nomads [...]

Overall, community leaders reported that the security situation inside the camps for internally displaced persons remained generally stable, however, cases of human rights violations and abuses and minor incidents of threats, theft and looting were still reported. Police posts are established in most of the camps, but the low number of police officers and logistical challenges remain concerns [...].⁴³⁶

In its 'Flash Update' of 11th June 2019 UNOCHA reported that "In West Darfur, IDP community leaders reported movement restrictions for Abu Zarr and El Hojaj IDP camps, with a complete ban on movements at night".⁴³⁷ In its 'Flash Update' of 20th June 2019 the same source documented that "There are reports of increased denials for displaced people to access their farms by Arab nomads in Kutum. Other localities of concern include Kebkabiya, Tawilla, and Shangal Tobay, that have experienced crop destruction by nomads".⁴³⁸

According to the June 2019 monthly update from the Watch List on Children and Armed Conflict "While underreported, sexual and gender-based violence continues to be a serious concern, especially in the Jebel Mara area [...] The risk of sexual and gender-based violence continues to limit the freedom of movement of women and girls in areas of return and around IDP camps".⁴³⁹

The UN Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan reported in his report covering the period 28 September 2018 to 30 June 2019 that "Internally displaced people in a number of locations in Darfur had reported that Arab nomads had threatened them with violence to prevent them from cultivating their farmlands".⁴⁴⁰ The same report further stated that "During the period under review, the security situation and protection of human rights, especially of internally displaced persons, remained fragile in Darfur".⁴⁴¹

In August 2019 Radio Dabanga reported that "three herders raped two sisters [...] living in the Zamzam camp for displaced near El Fasher" in North Darfur "whilst they were "tending their famili's farm".⁴⁴²

According to Radio Dabanga, in August 2019 "reports that reached Radio Dabanga, at least 24 women and girls were raped in Darfur since the beginning of this year".⁴⁴³ The same source further highlighted one particular incident in north Darfur where "two displaced sisters, aged 14 and 11" were seized by three herdsmen "at gunpoint, raped both, and kept them until the next morning".⁴⁴⁴

⁴³⁶ UN Security Council, [*Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic assessment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*](#), 30 May 2019, paras. 29 and 30

⁴³⁷ UNOCHA, [*Sudan, Flash Update No. 5*](#), 11 June 2019, *Situation Overview*, p. 1

⁴³⁸ UNOCHA, [*Sudan, Flash Update No. 8*](#), 20 June 2019, *Situation Overview*, p. 1

⁴³⁹ Watch List on Children and Armed Conflict, [*Children and Armed Conflict Monthly Update*](#), June 2019

⁴⁴⁰ UN Human Rights Council, [*Situation of human rights in the Sudan Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan*](#), 26 July 2019, para. 27

⁴⁴¹ UN Human Rights Council, [*Situation of human rights in the Sudan Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan*](#), 26 July 2019, para. 77

⁴⁴² Radio Dabanga, [*Two girls gang-raped in North Darfur*](#), 17 August 2019

⁴⁴³ Radio Dabanga, [*School girl gang-raped in South Darfur*](#), 25 August 2019

⁴⁴⁴ Radio Dabanga, [*School girl gang-raped in South Darfur*](#), 25 August 2019

In a September 2019 edition of UNAMID's 'Voices of Darfur', an article stated "One of the silent effects of conflict in Darfur, is the exposure of women, especially women who reside in camps for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) to physical assault, harassment, intimidation and extortion, amongst other issues. These women and young children in their care, initially fled violence in their original villages and sought refuge in the more than 90 IDPs camps in different parts of Darfur. After escaping these attacks in their villages and walking for days, these women are further exposed to various forms of violence including Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) when they find some semblance of life in the IDP Camps".⁴⁴⁵

In an October 2019 Communiqué the African Union Peace and Security Council condemned "the continuing violations of human rights in the Darfur region, including sexual and gender based violence against women and girls, particularly in the camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and, in this respect, underscores the importance of effectively fighting impunity and promoting justice for the victims of the violations".⁴⁴⁶

The Darfur Network for Monitoring & Documentation reported early October 2019 that "two [15-year-old] girls were attacked by four armed Janjaweed militiamen in uniform and others are not uniform who raped two girls [...] in central Darfur (Zalingi) in Nertiti locality, west of Jebel Marra".⁴⁴⁷ In the same month Radio Dabanga stated that "A 13-year-old girl has been raped by two soldiers near Sortony camp for displaced people in Kabkabiya locality in North Darfur" and "Two girls aged 13 and 14 were raped by five herders wearing military uniforms in Central Darfur [...] according to the police report. The rape took place in an open area north of Nierteti, near Shalaya camp for the displaced, where they are living".⁴⁴⁸ In another article by the same source the rape of a 25-year-old displaced woman from Turr camp in West Darfur by a soldier of the Sudanese Armed Forces was reported on.⁴⁴⁹

An opinion piece by Alaa Salah, student activist and member of MANSAM, a coalition of Sudanese women's civil and political groups, published in November 2019 by the Inter Press Service, noted that "violence against women did not end with the end of Al Bashir's reign. As recent as early September [2019], seven women living in the Shangil Tobaya displaced persons camp in Darfur were raped by armed men".⁴⁵⁰

6.3 Access to basic services for IDPs

See also information included in section [5. General humanitarian situation in Darfur, which is likely to also affect IDPs and Returnees](#).

⁴⁴⁵ UNAMID, *Voices of Darfur Vol. 8 No. 1*, 25 September 2019

⁴⁴⁶ African Union Peace and Security Council, *The 889th meeting of the AUPSC on the activities of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and the situation in Darfur*, 24 October 2019

⁴⁴⁷ Darfur Network for Monitoring & Documentation, *Two cases of rape by armed militias in Nertiti locality west of Jebel Marra in Darfur – western Sudan*, Undated [Last accessed: 9 January 2020]

⁴⁴⁸ Radio Dabanga, *Three girls raped in North Darfur and Central Darfur*, 7 October 2019

⁴⁴⁹ Radio Dabanga, *A 25-year-old raped in West Darfur*, 29 October 2019

⁴⁵⁰ Alaa Salah (Inter Press Service), *The Fight for Bread Became a Fight for Freedom*, November 2019

6.3.1 Access to basic services for IDPs (general overview)

UN OCHA's 'Humanitarian Bulletin' reported that in February 2019 "In Central Darfur State, over 2,600 people fled their homes in North Jebel Marra locality and took refuge in Kurmul and Thurragey villages (Central Jebel Marra locality) following fighting between two factions of the Sudan Liberation Army – Abdel Wahid (SLAAW)".⁴⁵¹ The same report further noted with regards to their needs:

The IDPs reported that their property had been looted and some of their homes were burned. Some families took refuge in caves and do not have access to any services, while those who remained behind in the villages need protection, according to the interagency team. Their main needs are food, emergency shelter and household supplies, as well as health, water, sanitation, hygiene, protection and education assistance. The IDPs said they have no intention to return to their home villages as long as the armed groups remain in their home areas. The IDPs who fled to the mountain caves are expected to come to Golo town or Kurmul village soon. In Kurmul village, the IDPs have taken refuge with the host community who are sharing their water and food with the new IDPs.⁴⁵²

UNICEF reported in an April 2019 report with regards to protection needs in Sudan in general that:

Limited socio-economic opportunities and growing economic challenges have negatively impacted the resilience and self-protection capacity of affected communities, especially vulnerable IDPs and returnees. The worsening economic situation and lack of suitable livelihood opportunities for IDP, returnee and host communities, is increasing the risk of child labour in all forms, from begging in markets, to the worst forms such as trafficking, working in gold mines and domestic labour. Protracted displacement, lack of livelihood opportunities, limited capacity of social services facilities and disruption of community support systems have added to the vulnerability of the IDP, returnee and host communities. This has also undermined the capacity of community-based caregivers to cater for their children, including unaccompanied and separated children (UASC) and children with disability, under their care. This is also negatively impacting on the wellbeing of the caregivers themselves.⁴⁵³

The UN Special Report covering the period from 14 July 2018 to 15 May 2019 reported that in Darfur:

[...] The local population and internally displaced persons reported that the reduction of UNAMID patrols did not significantly affect their freedom of movement or access to livelihood services [...] In Korma, North Darfur, community leaders requested that UNAMID hand over its assets to the local community and expressed their grievances over the lack of services, such as schools and hospitals, in the area [...].⁴⁵⁴

Following the recent displacement of people from "Armo, Faredelo, Tergy, Karkura, Aronla and Dongola villages in Daya Area, central Darfur, as a result of armed clashes" between the government of Sudan and armed movements in early June 2019, UNAMID visited the "Gathering Site for IDPs in Sabanga" and "observed the urgent need for food, clean water, sanitation, health services and shelter, especially for the newly arrived IDPs".⁴⁵⁵

⁴⁵¹ UN OCHA, [Sudan, Humanitarian Bulletin, Issue 4, 25 March – 12 May 2019](#), 12 May 2019, p. 2

⁴⁵² UN OCHA, [Sudan, Humanitarian Bulletin, Issue 4, 25 March – 12 May 2019](#), 12 May 2019, p. 2

⁴⁵³ UNICEF, [2019 Humanitarian Response Plan January -December 2019](#), April 2019

⁴⁵⁴ UN Security Council, [Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic assessment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 30 May 2019, para. 29 and 30

⁴⁵⁵ UNAMID, [UNAMID Peacekeepers support IDPs at gathering sites in Central Darfur](#), 23 June 2019

The Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Sudan of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) covering the period July to September 2019 reported that in West Darfur “in addition to the verification of reported IDP figures” who had fled “conflict between local farmers and pastoralist communities”, “IOM identified a severe lack of educational and other basic services available in Krenik”.⁴⁵⁶

In a September 2019 edition of UNAMID’s ‘Voices of Darfur’, it was reported that “In fulfilment of its protection of civilians mandate, UNAMID peacekeepers on 11 June, visited a Gathering Site for Internally Displaced Persons (IDP’s) in Sabanga, located 12 km north-east of the Mission’s Golo Temporary Operating Base, central Darfur, to assess the condition of the newly resettled IDPs at the Site and assess the general security situation in the area. [...] During the visit to the Gathering Site, UNAMID peacekeepers, observed the urgent need for food, clean water, sanitation, health services and shelter, especially for the newly arrived IDPs and communicated these requirements to concerned humanitarian agencies in the area, for immediate action”.⁴⁵⁷

In an article published in the Forced Migration Review in October 2019 Zurab Elzarov, Chief of Joint Operations Centre, UNAMIC, stated that “IDPs in Darfur continue to face difficulties in securing a durable solution to their displacement. Recent developments may offer new hope for some, but complex challenges remain”.⁴⁵⁸ He further noted:

Progress regarding return and other durable solutions across Darfur, however, remains limited, given continuing hostilities and insecurity; the resulting protracted displacement of large numbers of IDPs poses a continuous challenge to satisfying their basic needs and maintaining an adequate standard of living, and puts significant pressure on urban infrastructure.⁴⁵⁹

In November 2019 the Sudan News Agency reported that during a “gathering in occasion of the visit of the Transitional Prime Minister, Dr. Abdullah Hamdouk” to Zamzam IDP Camp, “a number of the displaced persons of the camp have [...] called for the return of international organizations to provide humanitarian assistance to the IDPs, the collective and individual compensations, the provision of basic services to the camp, and the establishment of a training and rehabilitation centers for the displaced”.⁴⁶⁰

At a meeting between a delegation of the UN Sanctions Committee and camp leaders of the Hamidiya IDP camp at Zalingei, Central Darfur, the camp leaders in December 2019:

stressed the deterioration of the security situation in Darfur and the continuing violations of human rights such as unlawful killing, rape, burning and destruction of farms. They also highlighted the proliferation of militiamen and occupation of the land, as well as lack of food and water sanitation in the camps. They also demanded the government to put an end to the plight of the Darfur people who suffer from the unlawful killings, rapes, and displacement, to grant access to humanitarian organisations, and to effectuate the Rule of Law in the marginalised region. The displaced community leaders lamented the shortage of teachers, the accumulation of students, and the lack of classrooms.

⁴⁵⁶ International Organization for Migration (IOM), [*Displacement Tracking Matrix \(DTM\) Sudan, July – September 2019*](#), 1 December 2019, *Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), West Darfur*, p. 2

⁴⁵⁷ UNAMID, [*Voices of Darfur Vol. 8 No. 1*](#), 25 September 2019

⁴⁵⁸ Zurab Elzarov (Forced Migration Review), [*Emerging options for durable solutions in Darfur*](#), October 2019, p. 55

⁴⁵⁹ Zurab Elzarov (Forced Migration Review), [*Emerging options for durable solutions in Darfur*](#), October 2019, p. 55

⁴⁶⁰ Sudan news Agency, [*IDPs of Zamzam Camp Demand Security and Stability*](#), 4 November 2019

They went further and demanded the disbanding and disarming of all militias, the expulsion of new settlers, and compensation for the displaced individually and collectively.⁴⁶¹

6.3.2 Access to housing for IDPs

The UN Security Council report on UNAMID covering the period from 4 October 2018 to 3 January 2019 noted that “On 5 November [2018], the Wali of North Darfur announced the Government’s plan to convert the camps for internally displaced persons in Zamzam (hosting 120,864 persons), Abu Shouk (44,531 persons) and Salam (35,552 persons) into permanent urban settlements for displaced families. According to the plan, each family opting to settle in those areas would receive a 300 m2 plot of land, and the Government and local authorities promised to provide basic services in settlement areas and address land issues. It was indicated that Abu Shouk, Salam and Zamzam camps would be renamed Doha, Al Shatti and Zamzam towns respectively”.⁴⁶²

Radio Dabanga reported in April 2019 that a fire had broken out in an IDP camp in Bindisi destroying “more than 20 houses with all their contents, along with food and agricultural crops. One of the sheikhs of the camp said that the fire left dozens of people affected by the fire in the open without shelter”.⁴⁶³

The UN Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan reported in his report covering the period 28 September 2018 to 30 June 2019 that “Due to security concerns, a substantial part of the population in Darfur require protection, while at least 2 million civilians need humanitarian assistance, with over 25 per cent residing in 60 camps and gathering sites for internally displaced persons”.⁴⁶⁴

In an article published in the Forced Migration Review in October 2019 Zurab Elzarov, Chief of Joint Operations Centre, UNAMIC, stated that “According to the Sudan 2018 Humanitarian Needs Overview, some 1.6 million internally displaced people (IDPs) in Darfur are registered as living in camps. The UN and partners estimate that a further 500,000 displaced people live in host communities and settlements”.⁴⁶⁵

6.3.3 Access to food and water for IDPs

UNOCHA reported in its 2019 Humanitarian Needs Overview, published in mid-March 2019, that “Some 5.7 million people face seasonal food insecurity, mainly in the Darfur states [...] However, estimates by WFP show that more than 58 per cent of the country’s population may not be able to afford the price of the local food basket and is facing continued food access challenges. Information from the Food Security Monitoring System indicates that food insecurity is higher among surveyed IDP and refugee households in South Darfur (87 per cent), East Darfur (75 per cent) and North Darfur (69 per cent), with borderline results for 62 per cent of the population surveyed in West Darfur and

⁴⁶¹ Radio Dabanga, [Central Darfur displaced outline plight to UN delegation](#), 17 November 2019

⁴⁶² UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 14 January 2019, para. 24

⁴⁶³ Radio Dabanga, [Livestock disease, fire in camp for displaced in Central Darfur](#), 2 April 2019

⁴⁶⁴ UN Human Rights Council, [Situation of human rights in the Sudan Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan](#), 26 July 2019, para. 78

⁴⁶⁵ Zurab Elzarov (Forced Migration Review), [Emerging options for durable solutions in Darfur](#), October 2019, p. 55

58 per cent in Central Darfur. Between May 2017 and 2018, there has been an overall increase of food insecurity in Darfur of more than 10 per cent in all states, except for Central Darfur and West Darfur, which have remained relatively stable”.⁴⁶⁶

Whilst the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) stated in September 2019 that “IDPs and poor households in [...] Jebel Marra in Darfur continue to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) food security outcomes during the lean season in September [2019]. Meanwhile, poor households in parts of [...] North Darfur [...] are in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) due to high food prices and low purchasing power”⁴⁶⁷, the November 2019 report noted that “Food security outcomes among IDPs and poor households in [...] Jebel Marra have improved from Emergency (IPC Phase 4) to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) since the end of the lean season. However, many households in Sudan in conflict and non-conflict affected areas continued to face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes due to high staple food prices”⁴⁶⁸. The same source produced a map comparing the ‘Acute Food Insecurity Phase’ across Sudan between November 2019-January 2020 and February-March 2020, which can be accessed [here](#).⁴⁶⁹

6.3.4 Access to healthcare for IDPs

The International Peace Institute reported in its April 2019 report that “Sudan’s healthcare system is unable to cope with the acute level of need, particularly in the conflict-affected areas of Darfur [...] as well as among South Sudanese refugees”.⁴⁷⁰ The same source further specified:

In Darfur, about a quarter of primary healthcare facilities are nonfunctional, though fewer than half of these offer the minimum basic service package [...] Few facilities in Darfur—and none in Central Darfur—provide mental healthcare, and only around a third provide basic essential obstetric care. 35 While sexual and gender-based violence is prevalent in Darfur, many victims receive no medical care, and almost none receive psychosocial care. Across the region, primary healthcare centers face steep personnel shortages, especially in lower-level facilities. Many health facilities in Darfur also suffer from periodic shortages of medicines and vaccines due to their distance from cities, lack of funding, and insecurity.⁴⁷¹

Moreover, with special reference to Jebel Marra region the same source reported:

Within Darfur, access to healthcare is worst in the Jebel Marra region, which covers parts of North, Central, and South Darfur states. Assessment missions beginning in 2017—the first since 2003, in some areas—have exposed a healthcare system that had almost completely collapsed. While some clinics remained operational during the conflict, they had limited capacity, and there were reportedly no facilities providing skilled reproductive care or vaccinations. The parts of Jebel Marra still

⁴⁶⁶ UNOCHA, [2019 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Sudan](#), As of 13 March 2019, *Food Security & Livelihoods, Humanitarian Needs*, p. 22

⁴⁶⁷ Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), [Staple food prices increased sharply during the lean season in Sudan](#), September 2019, *Key Messages*

⁴⁶⁸ Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), [Harvests improve food access, but currency depreciation has continued in November](#), November 2019, *Key Messages*

⁴⁶⁹ Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), [Harvests improve food access, but currency depreciation has continued in November](#), November 2019, *Key Messages*

⁴⁷⁰ International Peace Institute (IPI), [Stuck in Crisis: The Humanitarian Response to Sudan’s Health Emergency](#), April 2019, p. 1

⁴⁷¹ International Peace Institute (IPI), [Stuck in Crisis: The Humanitarian Response to Sudan’s Health Emergency](#), April 2019, p. 7

controlled by the SLA-AW remain cut off from the public healthcare system, though some people are able to cross into areas controlled by the government to access health facilities there.⁴⁷²

The same report contains a figure 'Primary healthcare in Darfur' which depicts the number of facilities that are still functioning in the specific states of Darfur.⁴⁷³

UNICEF noted in an August 2019 report that:

Health and nutrition centres, particularly in Darfur have been affected by the socio-political instability. Ten Out-patient Therapeutic Centres, eight Therapeutic Supplementary Feeding Programmes (TSFP) and 1 Stabilisation Centre in three IDP camps (Boram and Kubum and Nyala) in Central Darfur State and two centers (in Burgu and Rowanda, North Darfur) were attacked during demonstrations and unrest, with all equipment, furniture and supplies looted. In Kubum hospital in South Darfur and the State Ministry of Health (SMOH) warehouse in Zalingei, Central Darfur, a total of 182 cartons of RUTF worth USD \$12,74018 were looted alongside furniture and other equipment. UNICEF, WFP and SMOH are monitoring the issue to understand the causes and to take the necessary precautions with implementing partners. To mitigate, UNICEF is working on strengthening warehousing at the state level and regulating supply deliveries between states, localities and communities.⁴⁷⁴

6.3.5 Access to livelihood opportunities for IDPs

The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) described in a February 2019 report that:

Climate change in Darfur has disrupted people's lives by curtailing the availability of resources, thereby spurring greater competition and conflict. Confronted with the consequences of a brutal war, many people have embraced coping strategies – such as clearing forests to power the kilns for fire bricks – that have accelerated the impact of climate change and indirectly perpetuated a root cause of the conflict. [...]

Environmental concerns have often been at the root of conflict in the region as people, especially farmers and pastoralists, clash over access to natural resources. But the scale of recent degradation has eclipsed previous shortages, severely destabilising a fragile ecosystem that for generations had balanced the needs of diverse livelihoods. The implications include deteriorations in the quality of life – such as access to water or forestry resources – as well as potentially irreversible damage to livelihoods and the likelihood of nearly constant conflict. Reversing this decline is critical to moving Darfur past the current crisis and ensuring its longer-term viability. [...]

The biggest culprit driving deforestation is the enormous demand for construction and firewood. Domestic firewood needs have resulted in highly unsustainable deforestation rates. In the Kalma IDP camp near Nyala, for example, IDPs could once find adequate firewood within 15 kilometres of the camp. Today, they must travel 75 kilometres for the same purpose, or rely on firewood merchants who travel to them.⁴⁷⁵

⁴⁷² International Peace Institute (IPI), [Stuck in Crisis: The Humanitarian Response to Sudan's Health Emergency](#), April 2019, p. 8

⁴⁷³ See International Peace Institute (IPI), [Stuck in Crisis: The Humanitarian Response to Sudan's Health Emergency](#), April 2019, p. 8, Figure 3. Primary healthcare in Darfur

⁴⁷⁴ UNICEF, [Sudan Humanitarian Situation Report Mid-Year 2019](#), August 2019

⁴⁷⁵ African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), [Protecting the environment and women in Darfur through fuel-efficient stoves](#), 11 February 2019

6.3.6 Access to education for IDPs

See also information included in section [3.2.6 Attacks on schools and teachers](#).

Without specifying in how far this also affected IDPs, UNICEF reported in its November 2019 *Humanitarian Situation Report* that “Flooding and heavy rain in August [2019] resulted in extensive damage to education facilities in Central Darfur [...] and West Darfur with 297 basic schools, 293 kindergartens and 269 secondary schools being affected with White Nile and Khartoum states suffering heaviest affects. Classrooms have been either destroyed or partially damaged by the flooding; damaged latrines reduce access to school WASH facilities and pose health risks; fences have collapsed; and teaching and learning materials have been lost [...] Schools were due to restart by mid-August [2019] but due to the floods many States Ministries of Education decided to postpone the start of the term. After a decision by the Prime Minister of Sudan, the majority of schools had opened by 14th of September [2019]”.⁴⁷⁶

7. Returnees

Figures on returnees to Darfur

The UN Security Council report on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 4 October 2018 to 3 January 2019 noted that “Given the relative stability in most parts of Darfur, some people were reportedly returning to their places of origin. A verification mission in October to Tawilah, North Darfur, found 20,000 people who had returned to Tabrat, Martal, Khazan, Tunjour and Dobo al-Omda villages. The returnees identified the need for provision of basic services in the area as a priority”.⁴⁷⁷

UNOCHA reported in its 2019 Humanitarian Needs Overview, published in mid-March 2019, that “the government’s disarmament campaign within Darfur has improved security and this has led to an increase of returnees over the past three years. Spontaneous returns of IDPs and refugees from within Darfur and Chad to stable areas of Darfur has shown an upward trending Central, North, South and West Darfur, in addition to West and South Kordofan. This trend is expected to continue into 2019, and assistance is required for families returning to their areas of origin/resettling elsewhere or integrating in host communities through the provision of non-food items, durable shelter solutions, and integrated early recovery activities”.⁴⁷⁸

The UN OCHA Sudan ‘Situation Report’ noted that “In the first three quarters of 2019, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) registered 14,500 IDPs and 111,500 returnees in six states in Sudan. The highest number of IDP registrations was in South Darfur (5,800 people) and the highest number of returnees registered was in North Darfur (44,500 people)”.⁴⁷⁹

UNOCHA’s ‘Humanitarian Snapshot’ noted that as of 1st March 2019:

⁴⁷⁶ UNICEF, [Sudan: Humanitarian Situation Report, Third Quarter](#), 5 November 2019, *Education*, p. 4

⁴⁷⁷ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 14 January 2019, *para. 23*

⁴⁷⁸ UNOCHA, [2019 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Sudan](#), As of 13 March 2019, *Emergency Shelter/Non-Food Items*, p. 20

⁴⁷⁹ UN OCHA, [Sudan, Situation Report](#), 5 December 2019, p. 2

- North Darfur had 446,441 IDPs and 54,028 IDP and refugee returnees
- South Darfur had 537,023 IDPs and 18,243 IDP and refugee returnees
- West Darfur had 183,725 IDPs and 14,705 IDP and refugee returnees
- Central Darfur had 388,371 IDPs and 175,079 IDP and refugee returnees
- East Darfur had 84,859 IDPs and 53,342 IDP and refugee returnees.⁴⁸⁰

The International Organization for Migration's (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) for Sudan stated in its October 2019 report that "As of October 2019, the DTM has identified a total number of 483,790 returnees from internal displacement within 57 localities, pinpointed at 1,060 locations, across six states in Sudan. Registration was classified according to the date of IOM registration, not the date of individuals' return. The state with the highest number of returnees from internal displacement was Central Darfur, where the total number registered was 167,435 (35% of the total returnee count). West Darfur, in comparison, registered a total number of 7,359 returnees from internal displacement (2%) – the lowest quantity of registrations determined by state. In terms of locations, North Darfur assessed the greatest number of sites – spanning 853 locations (80% of the total locations visited). East Darfur had the fewest locations assessed, representing just two per cent".⁴⁸¹

7.1 Security situation targeting returnees

Note that security incidents listed in this section should be seen as illustrative and not exhaustive of the number and type of attacks targeting returnees.

7.1.1 North Darfur (returnees)

Radio Dabanga reported on 4th December 2018 that "Militiamen torched a mosque which people were building in a village in Kutum locality in North Darfur [...], in disapproval against the return of displaced people", whilst "Other displaced people were prevented by militiamen from returning to Nangido village, north of the Fata Borno camp".⁴⁸²

7.1.2 South Darfur (returnees)

In March 2019 Radio Dabanga reported that "a group of militia attacked three people in the area of Hijeir Tongo near Nyala, capital of South Darfur. One man was shot dead and two others were wounded. A camp sheikh told Radio Dabanga that one of the wounded, from Kalma camp, was transferred to Nyala Teaching Hospital in serious condition, while the other is undergoing treatment inside Kalma camp. The sheikh said the attack took place due to tensions between militia in the area and displaced people who return to their original land for farming purposes".⁴⁸³

⁴⁸⁰ UNOCHA, [Sudan: Humanitarian Snapshot](#), 1 March 2019

⁴⁸¹ International Organization for Migration (IOM) Sudan, [Displacement Tracking Matrix, DTM Round Zero](#), October 2019, *Returnees Baseline Round Zero 2019*, p. 4

⁴⁸² Radio Dabanga, [Militiamen torch mosque, intimidate returnees in North Darfur](#), 4 December 2018

⁴⁸³ Radio Dabanga, [Man dies in South Darfur militia attack](#), 25 March 2019

In October 2019 “Four men and two women were shot and wounded” in Roro village in Gireida, which “accommodates displaced people who voluntarily returned to their area of origin”.⁴⁸⁴

7.1.3 Central Darfur (returnees)

Amongst the sources consulted within the timeframe set for this update, no specific information was located on this issue.

7.1.4 West Darfur (returnees)

The UN Security Council report on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) covering the period from 4 January to 3 April 2019 noted that “In West Darfur, on 17 January [2019], UNAMID documented attacks against returnee villages by armed men, resulting in the displacement of at least 258 families. Six civilians were injured and others remain missing”.⁴⁸⁵

7.1.5 East Darfur (returnees)

Radio Dabanga reported in March 2019 that “unidentified gunmen shot two people dead at Arid village in East Darfur. A source confirmed to Radio Dabanga that the victims had been displaced by conflict a long time ago and resided at En Neem camp in Ed Daein locality. They had returned to their village as part of the voluntary repatriation process for displaced people in Darfur. The source said that the motive for the shooting was to try to expel the returnees from their original villages and farms, in order to exploit their farms that have now been seized by armed groups”.⁴⁸⁶

In April 2019 the same source reported about the arrest of four men by the East Darfur security authorities in El Fadhu village in East Darfur “reportedly for crimes related to obstruction of displaced persons from returning to their villages of origin”.⁴⁸⁷

7.1.6 Un-specified locations in Darfur (returnees)

Maddy Crowther, Co-Executive Director of Waging Peace, consulting a range of organisations and individuals, amongst others “Margie Buchanan-Smith and Susanne Jaspars, Sudan experts, and authors of substantial field research” who said “new displacement continued and those already displaced faced ongoing attacks. There is no reason to believe that this has improved”.⁴⁸⁸ An NGO,

⁴⁸⁴ Radio Dabanga, [Six shot in South Darfur](#), 28 October 2019

⁴⁸⁵ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 10 April 2019, para. 11

⁴⁸⁶ Radio Dabanga, [Two returnees killed over tensions in Darfur](#), 26 March 2019

⁴⁸⁷ Radio Dabanga, [Four arrested by security forces in East Darfur](#), 1 April 2019

⁴⁸⁸ Waging Peace (Maddy Crowther), [Risks on return for Darfuris in Sudan](#), January 2019, 5. Security and humanitarian situation in Darfur, c. Fate of returnees, p. 13

only identified as B, stated that “Most of those that do return either find their homes and lands occupied by the militias that displaced them, or find themselves displaced again shortly after”.⁴⁸⁹

The report published by the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)/African Center for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS)/Sudan Human Rights Monitor in December 2019, which interviewed Sudanese refugees in camps in Chad and lawyers providing assistance to IDPs in Darfur, found that:

Despite government pressure, and according to information collected by FIDH and ACJPS from lawyers providing assistance to IDPs in Darfur, IDPs generally refuse to go back to their homelands or to integrate villages which have been newly created with the support of Gulf countries, as part of the GoS-led voluntary return process. Security and access to basic services are among their main demands.⁴⁹⁰

The same report further noted that “While these testimonies were gathered prior to the protests that broke out throughout Sudan in December 2018, and a transitional government has been formed since then, it is likely that the current security situation in Darfur is insufficiently stable for IDPs to return to their villages and homes”.⁴⁹¹ The same source further highlighted that:

According to accounts provided by refugees and lawyers from South, West and North Darfur interviewed by FIDH and ACJPS, former *Janjaweed* militiamen still occupy the lands of members of the Fur, Massalit and Zaghawa ethnic groups who have been chased from their homeland over the past 16 years, and persecute those who have remained or return, including by perpetrating sexual violence”.⁴⁹²

The same report continued:

In this context, FIDH and ACJPS observed a massive rejection of the voluntary return process implemented by UNHCR since April 2018, in accordance with the tripartite agreement signed in 2017 by UNHCR with the Chadian and Sudanese authorities. While the Sudanese authorities have attempted to demonstrate that the security situation in Darfur has improved, the refugees interviewed during the mission conveyed a completely different perception and set various conditions for their return to Darfur. In particular, they demand that those responsible for the crimes perpetrated against their ethnic groups be brought to justice, that their safety be ensured and that their lands be returned to them.⁴⁹³

⁴⁸⁹ Waging Peace (Maddy Crowther), [Risks on return for Darfuris in Sudan](#), January 2019, 5. *Security and humanitarian situation in Darfur, c. Fate of returnees*, p. 14

⁴⁹⁰ International Federation for Human Rights, African Center for Justice and Peace Studies, Sudan Human Rights Monitor, [Will There Be Justice for Darfur? Persisting impunity in the face of political change; Fact-finding mission report](#), December 2019, II. *Returning to Sudan: Hardly an option for refugees*, p. 41

⁴⁹¹ International Federation for Human Rights, African Center for Justice and Peace Studies, Sudan Human Rights Monitor, [Will There Be Justice for Darfur? Persisting impunity in the face of political change; Fact-finding mission report](#), December 2019, II. *Returning to Sudan: Hardly an option for refugees*, p. 41

⁴⁹² International Federation for Human Rights, African Center for Justice and Peace Studies, Sudan Human Rights Monitor, [Will There Be Justice for Darfur? Persisting impunity in the face of political change; Fact-finding mission report](#), December 2019, *Executive Summary*, p. 5

⁴⁹³ International Federation for Human Rights, African Center for Justice and Peace Studies, Sudan Human Rights Monitor, [Will There Be Justice for Darfur? Persisting impunity in the face of political change; Fact-finding mission report](#), December 2019, *Executive Summary*, p. 5

7.2 Treatment of Darfuri individuals upon arrival to Khartoum Airport and after, including those in possession of Al-Umma Party ID cards

Amongst the sources consulted within the timeframe set for this update, no specific information was located on this issue. For an historical overview consult the previous two editions:

- ❖ ARC, [Darfur Country Report](#), January 2019
- ❖ ACCORD, [Darfur COI Compilation](#), September 2017

7.3 Access to documentation

Amongst the sources consulted within the timeframe set for this update, no specific information was located on this issue. For a historical overview consult the first edition:

- ❖ ACCORD, [Darfur COI Compilation](#), September 2017

7.4 Access to basic services for returnees

See also information included in section [5. General humanitarian situation in Darfur, which is likely to also affect IDPs and Returnees](#).

7.4.1. Access to basic services for returnees (general overview)

The UN OCHA ‘Humanitarian Bulletin’ covering 28 January to 24 February 2019 reported that “From 3 to 6 February 2019, the Recovery, Returns, and Reintegration (RRR) sector carried out voluntary verification missions to five return villages in Katayla locality (Batikha, Haraza, Eraida Al Dwenki, Aradiba Bawat, and Gibaiabish), and one return village in Ed El Fursan locality (Muaqina) to verify voluntariness of returns, number of returnees and to assess needs [...] According to community leaders, people had fled their homes following fighting between two tribes in the area in 2007 and 2013 and returned following reconciliation in 2015, which contributed to stabilization in the area. These returns took place between 2015 and 2018”.⁴⁹⁴ According to the same source the returnees did not raise any “major protection concerns or security incidents” since they returned to their villages but were “concerned about the lack of basic services, such as weather, health, and education”.⁴⁹⁵

UNICEF reported in its May 2019 *Humanitarian Situation Report* that “Humanitarian needs in Sudan in the first quarter of the year persist [...] Returnees also require humanitarian assistance, as many return areas lack basic services and factors including food insecurity, malnutrition, protection risks, inter-communal violence and conflict fuel continued need. Rising food prices have decreased household purchasing power and reduced food access among the most vulnerable”.⁴⁹⁶

⁴⁹⁴ UN OCHA, [Sudan. Humanitarian Bulletin, Issue 02, 28 January – 24 February 2019](#), 24 February 2019, p. 2

⁴⁹⁵ UN OCHA, [Sudan. Humanitarian Bulletin, Issue 02, 28 January – 24 February 2019](#), 24 February 2019, p. 3

⁴⁹⁶ UNICEF, [Sudan: Humanitarian Situation Report, First Quarter](#), 5 May 2019, *Situation Overview and Humanitarian Needs*, p. 2

The Displacement Tracking Matrix Sudan of the International Organization for Migration covering the period July to September 2019 reported that in East Darfur it “verified and registered” returnees to the Asalaya locality and “noted many challenges still facing the returnee communities in Asalaya locality: limited access to food, public defecation as a result of no access to latrines, poor shelter conditions and insufficient crop production due the shortage of rainfall”.⁴⁹⁷

Similarly, the report stated that in North Darfur returnees in Alkuma locality faced “the provision of essential services proved a severe challenge – with the closest water supply to be found in Alkuma town, nine kilometers away. Tensions also rose over the availability and ownership of land. By the time IOM conducted its mission to Abu Gau, the government of North Darfur declared the situation resolved with peaceful coexistence between the two tribes, and the reconstruction of a functioning borehole within the village. Problematically, however, sanitation remains dire, with no existing household latrines, and only one (albeit unfunctional) health clinic in the vicinity”.⁴⁹⁸ In contrast, it noted with regards to returnees in South Darfur, Katayla locality, that “returnees were engaged in livelihood activities (such as farming and market access) and were able to live with relative normality. Many families had returned with their children, cattle, and personal belongings, thus indicating the intention for a sustainable and permanent return”.⁴⁹⁹

In an article published in the Forced Migration Review in October 2019 Zurab Elzarov, Chief of Joint Operations Centre, UNAMIC, stated:

The experience of those who have returned permanently so far, however, calls into question the overall sustainability of returns. Many people have reported facing significant challenges in rebuilding their lives, including a lack of adequate basic services and livelihoods opportunities. Moreover, for some people, disputes over land ownership have been a critical issue; in some returns areas, land has been settled by others since the original displacement took place.⁵⁰⁰

7.4.2. Access to housing for returnees

Amongst the sources consulted within the timeframe set for this update, no specific information was located on this issue. For a historical overview consult the first edition of this report:

❖ ACCORD, [Darfur COI Compilation](#), September 2017

7.4.3. Access to food and water for returnees

Amongst the sources consulted within the timeframe set for this update, no specific information was located on this issue. For a historical overview consult the previous two editions:

⁴⁹⁷ International Organization for Migration (IOM), [Displacement Tracking Matrix \(DTM\) Sudan, July – September 2019](#), 1 December 2019, *Returnees, East Darfur*, p. 2

⁴⁹⁸ International Organization for Migration (IOM), [Displacement Tracking Matrix \(DTM\) Sudan, July – September 2019](#), 1 December 2019, *Returnees, North Darfur*, p. 3

⁴⁹⁹ International Organization for Migration (IOM), [Displacement Tracking Matrix \(DTM\) Sudan, July – September 2019](#), 1 December 2019, *Returnees, South Darfur*, p. 3

⁵⁰⁰ Zurab Elzarov (Forced Migration Review), [Emerging options for durable solutions in Darfur](#), October 2019, p.

- ❖ ARC, [Darfur Country Report](#), January 2019
- ❖ ACCORD, [Darfur COI Compilation](#), September 2017

7.4.4. Access to healthcare for returnees

Amongst the sources consulted within the timeframe set for this update, no specific information was located on this issue. For a historical overview consult the previous two editions:

- ❖ ARC, [Darfur Country Report](#), January 2019
- ❖ ACCORD, [Darfur COI Compilation](#), September 2017

7.4.5. Access to livelihood opportunities for returnees

Maddy Crowther, Co-Executive Director of Waging Peace, published a report in January 2019 on the risk associated for returned Darfuris and consulted a range of organisations and individuals, amongst others an NGO, only identified as B, which stated that “IDPs continue to face a bleak existence in Darfur with little prospect for large-scale returns. Over the last few years donor fatigue has settled into Darfur as a consequence of the protracted nature of the conflict(s). This has left funding shortfalls amongst UN agencies resulting in a cut of rations amongst other things. At the same time IDPs are only able to engage in livelihood activities at often great risk. Bandits and pro-Government forces target IDPs engaging in economic activities such as firewood gathering, farming and so forth, as they view IDP activity as a threat to their new found supremacy and material gains during the conflict(s). Furthermore, the deteriorating economic situation in Sudan is impacting negatively upon IDPs. These three factors combine to create a difficult environment for IDPs – whether in terms of physical or economic security”.⁵⁰¹

Radio Dabanga reported that the tribal chief of a “native administration of East Jebel Marra locality [Daramo]” warned local authorities in August 2019 “not to go ahead with development planning for the Kindinjeir area until the rightful residents have returned” as “planning the area before the return of its residents is a sign that endorses ownership of the lands to the new settlers”.⁵⁰²

Sudan Tribune reported on 8th December 2018 that “the government of Central Darfur State has begun to hand over residential plots to the first batch of refugees returning from Chad. The director of the Higher Council for Peace and Voluntary Return in Central Darfur Aamer Youssef said the government started to hand over residential plots to 352 refugees who arrived at Um Dokhon locality from refugee camps in eastern Chad”.⁵⁰³

7.4.3. Access to education for returnees

See also information included in section [3.2.6 Attacks on schools and teachers](#).

⁵⁰¹ Waging Peace (Maddy Crowther), [Risks on return for Darfuris in Sudan](#), January 2019, 5. *Security and humanitarian situation in Darfur, c. Fate of returnees*, p. 14

⁵⁰² Radio Dabanga, [South Darfur tribal chief: Suspend planning until displaced have returned](#), 5 August 2019

⁵⁰³ Sudan Tribune, [Central Darfur hands over residential plots to returnees](#), 9 December 2018

Amongst the sources consulted within the timeframe set for this update, no specific information was located on this issue. For a historical overview consult the first edition of this report:

- ❖ ACCORD, [Darfur COI Compilation](#), September 2017

7.5 Reintegration

Amongst the sources consulted within the timeframe set for this update, no specific information was located on this issue. For a historical overview consult the previous two editions:

- ❖ ARC, [Darfur Country Report](#), January 2019
- ❖ ACCORD, [Darfur COI Compilation](#), September 2017

8. Women

Public Order Law

At the end of November 2019 Sudan's Sovereign Council and Cabinet decided to "cancel the infamous Public Order Law", which "enforced strict moral codes by prohibiting 'indecent and immoral acts'. Most of the offenses relate to interactions between men and women, dancing, choice of dress, smoking, and other personal behaviour that the authorities deemed improper".⁵⁰⁴ Radio Dabanga reporting on these developments clarified that "The Public Order system disproportionately affected women [...] In 2016, more than 45,000 complaints were issued against women under Sudan's Public Order Act, medical doctor Ihsan Fagiri, Coordinator of the No to Oppression of Women Initiative, told Radio Dabanga in April 2017. 'Students, working women, and especially food and tea vendors have received the lion's share of physical and verbal violence,' she said".⁵⁰⁵

8.1 Female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C)

28 Too Many, an UK registered charity undertaking "research and provide knowledge and tools to those working to end FGM in the countries in Africa"⁵⁰⁶, reported in November 2019 that "There is currently no national law against FGM covering the whole of Sudan. Six states have laws in place that only apply to FGM undertaken within their boundaries: [...] South Darfur [...] These laws are not enforced and there is no publicly available information on any cases of arrests or court proceedings in relation to FGM".⁵⁰⁷ The same source further noted with regards to South Darfur: "The following states have attempted to criminalise FGM [...] South Darfur (FGM prevalence 88.2%) – under Article 11 of the South Darfur State Child Act 2013, all forms of FGM are prohibited".⁵⁰⁸ For a list of ethnicities/tribes continuing to practice FGM see "Table 2: Ethnic composition of states, practice of

⁵⁰⁴ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan dissolves National Congress Party, repeals Public Order Bill](#), 29 November 2019

⁵⁰⁵ Radio Dabanga, [Sudan dissolves National Congress Party, repeals Public Order Bill](#), 29 November 2019

⁵⁰⁶ See 28 Too Many, [About](#), Undated [Last accessed: 17 December 2019]

⁵⁰⁷ 28 Too Many, [Country Profile: FGM in Sudan](#), November 2019, *Executive Summary*, p. 11

⁵⁰⁸ 28 Too Many, [Country Profile: FGM in Sudan](#), November 2019, *Laws Against FGM*, p. 32

FGM by each ethnic group and typical age-range of cutting (data compiled by the Child Protection Section, UNICEF Sudan)” [here](#).⁵⁰⁹

In addition, the source stated with regards to societal level of support against stopping FGM that “The lowest level of support for stopping FGM is in East Darfur (30.6%) and the highest is in Khartoum (71%)”.⁵¹⁰

As to prevalence of FGM according to place of resident the same source reported that “The highest prevalence is in North Kordofan state (97.7%) and North Darfur (97.6%), while in only three of the 18 states is the prevalence below 70% (Blue Nile – 68%, West Darfur – 61.2% and Central Darfur – 45.4%). In the majority of states, the prevalence is above 85%”.⁵¹¹

8.2 Honour killings

Amongst the sources consulted within the timeframe set for this update, no specific information was located on this issue. For a historical overview consult the previous two editions:

- ❖ ARC, [Darfur Country Report](#), January 2019
- ❖ ACCORD, [Darfur COI Compilation](#), September 2017

8.3 Early and forced marriage

An article published by the CHR.Michelsen Institute provided the following overview with regards to Sudan and child marriage:

Each year, 15 million girls are married before the age of 18. Sudan is among the African countries with a high prevalence of child marriage. In Sudan, 10.7% of women aged 15 to 49 are married before the age of 15, and 38% are wed before the age of 18.

While approximately two-thirds of African countries have legislated a minimum age of marriage at or above 18 for both sexes, government actors in Sudan have recently put the issue on their legislative agenda. The Sudanese government’s attempt to set the minimum age of marriage at 18 years has prompted counter-mobilization by religious conservatives saying the practice is sanctioned by Sharia. It has also received criticism from the women’s movement claiming that this proposed reform is insufficient to legally protect girls”.⁵¹²

8.4 Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV)

For information on sexual and gender-based violence against IDP communities, see section [6.2 Human rights violations and criminal incidents directed against IDPs](#).

⁵⁰⁹ See 28 Too Many, [Country Profile: FGM in Sudan](#), November 2019, *Anthropological Background*, p. 37

⁵¹⁰ 28 Too Many, [Country Profile: FGM in Sudan](#), November 2019, *Executive Summary*, p. 13

⁵¹¹ 28 Too Many, [Country Profile: FGM in Sudan](#), November 2019, *Prevalence of FGM According to Place of Residence*, p. 47

⁵¹² CHR. Michelsen Institute, [Religious Counter-Mobilization against Child Marriage Reform in Sudan](#), 2018

Covering the period from January to December 2018 the UN Security Council report on 'Conflict-related sexual violence' reported that "In 2018, the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur documented 122 incidents of sexual violence involving 199 victims: 85 women, 105 girls and 9 boys in Central, South, North and West Darfur States. Rape constituted 80 per cent of reported incidents; 80 per cent of the perpetrators of sexual violence were described as armed and 31 per cent of cases were attributed to members of the security forces. However, cases of sexual violence are likely underreported owing to fear of reprisal and restricted access to conflict areas, to victims and to the sites of incidents".⁵¹³

The UN report on 'Children and armed conflict, covering the period from January to December 2018, specifically reporting on grave violations against children taking place in Darfur stated that "The United Nations verified that 68 girls were subjected to sexual violence, a 55 per cent increase compared with 2017 (44). Cases were attributed to Government Security Forces (39), including RSF (20), SAF (17), the Sudan Police Force (1), the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) (1), followed by unidentified armed elements (29). The majority of cases occurred in the context of clashes in the Jebel Marra area".⁵¹⁴

The UN Security Council report on UNAMID covering the period from 4 October 2018 to 3 January 2019 noted that "The threat of sexual violence remained significant, restricting women's freedom of movement to undertake livelihood activities around camps for the displaced and in areas of return, including during flight for those displaced because of the conflict in Jebel Marra. During the reporting period, there were 31 incidents of sexual and gender-based violence. Those incidents included conflict-related sexual violence in the form of rape involving 34 female victims, including 19 minors. Conflict-related sexual violence was committed mostly in Jebel Marra, notably in the context of confrontations between Government forces and SLA/AW".⁵¹⁵ The same report further reported that "In Central Darfur, the teams [UNAMID integrated field protection teams] found sexual gender-based violence, allegedly committed by Government forces, in particular in Nertiti, Thur and Golo, to be major protection concerns".⁵¹⁶ Moreover, "Victims and witnesses interviewed reported serious human rights concerns involving the Sudanese Armed Forces, Military Intelligence, the National Intelligence and Security Services and RSF, including alleged indiscriminate killings, sexual violence in the form of rape, arbitrary arrests and illegal detention"⁵¹⁷, as well as "reports were recorded of sexual and gender-based violence and robbery and physical assault of women and girls, perpetrated mostly by uniformed personnel around internally displaced persons camps in Golo, Nertiti, Thur, Rockero and other areas".⁵¹⁸

According to the June 2019 monthly update from the Watch List on Children and Armed Conflict "Between January 4 and April 3, UNAMID documented four incidents of rape of girls, in addition to an unverified report of a gang-rape of a 14-year-old girl. The risk of sexual and gender-based

⁵¹³ UN Security Council, [Conflict-related sexual violence, Report of the Secretary-General](#), 29 March 2019, para. 86

⁵¹⁴ UN General Assembly, [Children and armed conflict, Report of the Secretary-General](#), 20 June 2019, para. 164

⁵¹⁵ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 14 January 2019, para. 15

⁵¹⁶ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 14 January 2019, para. 37

⁵¹⁷ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 14 January 2019, para. 41

⁵¹⁸ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 14 January 2019, para. 48

violence continues to limit the freedom of movement of women and girls in areas of return and around IDP camps”.⁵¹⁹

Amnesty International reported in June 2019 that it had “disturbing new evidence, including satellite imagery, showing that Sudanese government forces, including the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and allied militias, have continued to commit war crimes and other serious human rights violations in Darfur. In the past year these have included the complete or partial destruction of at least 45 villages, unlawful killings, and sexual violence [...] Satellite evidence and testimonies confirm that government forces and associated militias [...] between July 2018 and February 2019. Amnesty International has also documented other abuses by security forces, including unlawful killings, sexual violence, systematic looting, and forced displacement”.⁵²⁰

The subsequent UN Security Council report on UNAMID covering the period from 4 January to 3 April 2019 noted that “Sexual violence, including conflict-related sexual violence, accounted for 15 incidents and 26 victims, including seven minors, a decrease from the 31 incidents reported in the previous period. Of the 59 documented cases, 26 incidents, involving 50 victims, were allegedly perpetrated by Government security forces. Three members of SLA-AW were the alleged perpetrators in two incidents”.⁵²¹

In March 2019 Radio Dabanga reported on that “Three young women and girls were repeatedly raped by militiamen in Kutum locality, North Darfur last week. Another was beaten and humiliated. The perpetrators are all still at large”.⁵²²

The UN Special Report covering the period from 14 July 2018 to 15 May 2019 assessed that:

[...] Human rights violations and abuses continue to occur across Darfur, with a significant increase in the number of documented cases, including killings, assault, abduction and conflict-related sexual violence, in the Jebel Marra area during the reporting period. Internally displaced persons, especially women and children, are the most vulnerable to attacks, mainly perpetrated by government and affiliated forces, including the Rapid Support Forces. [...]

There has been an upward trend in human rights violations in the Nertiti area, where conflict-related sexual violence and sexual and gender-based violence cases are prevalent [...]

Conflict-related sexual violence and sexual and gender-based violence continue to be underreported, owing to fear and restricted access to affected areas. Conflict related sexual violence, with rape constituting 80 per cent of documented cases, occurred in both urban and rural settings, including around camps for internally displaced persons, water points, villages of return and other remote areas. Members of the security forces, including the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces, were identified as perpetrators in over 30 per cent of sexual violence cases. Impunity remains a serious concern [...].⁵²³

⁵¹⁹ Watch List on Children and Armed Conflict, [Children and Armed Conflict Monthly Update](#), June 2019

⁵²⁰ Amnesty International, [Sudan: Fresh evidence of government-sponsored crimes in Darfur shows drawdown of peacekeepers premature and reckless](#), 11 June 2019

⁵²¹ UN Security Council, [African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Report of the Secretary-General](#), 10 April 2019, para. 12

⁵²² Radio Dabanga, [Three North Darfur firewood collectors gang-raped](#), 17 March 2019

⁵²³ UN Security Council, [Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic assessment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 30 May 2019, para. 22 and 23

In May 2019 activist Yahya Khamis told Radio Dabanga that “a 14-year-old girl was raped by a herdsman near Kutuk in North Darfur”, who was on her way with other women to collect firewood.⁵²⁴

According to the June 2019 monthly update from the Watch List on Children and Armed Conflict “While underreported, sexual and gender-based violence continues to be a serious concern, especially in the Jebel Marra area”.⁵²⁵

The UN Special Report covering the period from 1 June to end of September 2019 reported that “UNAMID documented 16 incidents of sexual gender-based violence affecting 17 individuals, including 7 minors”.⁵²⁶ The same report further noted “Conflict-related sexual violence, primarily alleged to be perpetrated by armed nomads and other militia groups, continued to be reported in the greater Jebel Marra area, including Golo, Kas, Nertiti, Kabkabiya and other parts of Darfur”.⁵²⁷

In an October 2019 Communique the African Union Peace and Security Council condemned “the continuing violations of human rights in the Darfur region, including sexual and gender based violence against women and girls, particularly in the camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and, in this respect, underscores the importance of effectively fighting impunity and promoting justice for the victims of the violations.”⁵²⁸ Radio Dabanga noted in early October 2019 that reports had reached it that said “that at least 24 women and girls were raped in Darfur since the beginning of this year”.⁵²⁹ Illustrative of such violations, Radio Dabanga reported that “A 14-year-old girl was repeatedly raped by a group of gunmen [...] who accosted her on her way home from school in the area of Koron in Golo locality in Darfur’s Jebel Marra”.⁵³⁰

A joint report published by the International Federation for Human Rights/African Center for Justice and Peace Studies/Sudan Human Rights Monitor in December 2019 noted that:

Sexual violence has been one of the essential components characterising the conflict in Darfur. It has been denounced by many NGOs and documented in the report published in 2005 by the UN Commission of Inquiry. During military raids launched by the Sudanese security forces and their Janjaweed militia allies on villages, women and girls, the principal victims of such violence, were raped, often gang-raped, in public, reduced to sexual slavery, subjected to the humiliation of forced nudity and sexually mutilated. Men were also subjected to sexual violence, including mutilation. Some of these crimes are reflected in the International Criminal Court’s (ICC)’s arrest warrants issued between 2007 and 2010 against former Head of State Omar Al-Bashir, two former ministers, and a Janjaweed militia commander. Yet, more than 10 years later, while the same perpetrators are again

⁵²⁴ Radio Dabanga, [Girl raped by herder in North Darfur](#), 6 May 2019

⁵²⁵ Watch List on Children and Armed Conflict, [Children and Armed Conflict Monthly Update](#), June 2019

⁵²⁶ UN Security Council, [Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 15 October 2019, para. 16

⁵²⁷ UN Security Council, [Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 15 October 2019, para. 19

⁵²⁸ African Union Peace and Security Council, [The 889th meeting of the AUPSC on the activities of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur \(UNAMID\) and the situation in Darfur](#), 24 October 2019

⁵²⁹ Radio Dabanga, [Darfur girl of 14 gang-raped on way home from school](#), 9 October 2019

⁵³⁰ Radio Dabanga, [Darfur girl of 14 gang-raped on way home from school](#), 9 October 2019

using similar military strategies based on the perpetration of sexual violence against enemy groups, impunity for these atrocious crimes persists.⁵³¹

8.5 State response to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV)

Covering the period from January to December 2018 the UN Security Council report on 'Conflict-related sexual violence' reported that "the Armed Forces Act of 2007 criminalizes sexual violence that may occur during military operations; the implementation thereof is critical for the deterrence and prevention of such crimes. The Government has also established some specialized police structures and deployed judges, including to Darfur States, in order to enhance the investigation and prosecution of crimes of sexual violence. Unfortunately, there have been few prosecutions of such crimes".⁵³²

UNICEF noted in an April 2019 report with regards to protection needs in Sudan in general that:

While GBV vastly impacts women, men, boys and girls, the lack of quality response services, especially health and social services for child and adolescent survivors of sexual violence can exacerbate short and long-term harm. IDPs, returnees and host communities continue to face protection related risks in areas of conflict in Darfur's Jebel Marra and in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. While the economic crisis impacts women, boys and girls in different ways, a lack of access to a variety of assets, including but not limited to financial services, legal status, and social safety nets, places women and children in unfavourable and insecure environments that expose them to violence and exploitation. Rape, physical violence, female genital mutilation (FGM), early/forced marriages, denial of economic opportunities, and verbal abuse are some of the common violations against women and girls reported. Gaps in personal hygiene kits (PHKs) further exacerbate risks for women and girls of reproductive health age. Survivors of GBV have inadequate access to services and reporting mechanisms. Specialized lifesaving GBV services, such as the clinical management of rape (CMR), including tailored services for child and adolescent survivors, psychosocial support (PSS) and quality case management services, are unavailable in over 80 per cent of affected localities and where available, quality and access needs to be strengthened.⁵³³

The UN Special Report covering the period from 14 July 2018 to 15 May 2019 reported that:

[...] Human rights violations and abuses continue to occur across Darfur, with a significant increase in the number of documented cases, including killings, assault, abduction and conflict-related sexual violence, in the Jebel Marra area during the reporting period. [...]

There is insufficient action to address violations and abuses, in a context where State authorities are absent in several localities and judicial institutions are weak. As a result, internally displaced persons and local populations have expressed a lack of trust in law enforcement bodies [...]

Members of the security forces, including the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces, were identified as perpetrators in over 30 per cent of sexual violence cases. Impunity remains a serious concern [...].⁵³⁴

⁵³¹ International Federation for Human Rights, African Center for Justice and Peace Studies, Sudan Human Rights Monitor, [Will There Be Justice for Darfur? Persisting impunity in the face of political change; Fact-finding mission report](#), December 2019, Executive Summary, p. 4

⁵³² UN Security Council, [Conflict-related sexual violence, Report of the Secretary-General](#), 29 March 2019, para. 88

⁵³³ UNICEF, [2019 Humanitarian Response Plan January -December 2019](#), April 2019

⁵³⁴ UN Security Council, [Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic assessment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur](#), 30 May 2019, para. 22 and 23

At a briefing to the UN Security Council in June 2019 by Andrew Gilmour, Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights he reported that:

In some areas of Jebel Marra, the sole representatives of Government present are the security forces. But, they are reported as the main perpetrators of violations against the civilian population – i.e. the people they are there to protect. Clearly, this does not lead to increased trust of the population in law enforcement bodies.⁵³⁵

The UN Special Report covering the period from 1 June to end of September 2019 reported that “In three separate incidents, involving the rape of four minors, perpetrators were arrested and are in the process of being prosecuted”.⁵³⁶

In a September 2019 edition of UNAMID’s ‘Voices of Darfur’, an article reported that:

Although a multi-sectoral approach for victims of Sexual and gender based violence has been put in place by UN Agencies and UNAMID in collaboration with the government of Sudan as well as NGO’s this including extended programs relating to medical, legal and psychosocial support, have been put in place the trends and patterns of sexual violence remains unchanged when it comes to attacks during farming, water and firewood collection. Above reasons pointed to a critical need for the establishment of an early warning mechanism to mitigate as well as have a timely response procedures on how to best seek and access physical, legal, health and psychosocial support in the event of violations occurring to IDP women when they venture out for livelihood. [...]

Ms. Hassania Mohammed, the Chairperson of Women Protection Network in Hamidiya Camp for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), in central Darfur, says women are still vulnerable to SGBV exposure, especially when they go for firewood and other livelihood activities but most of them refrain from reporting these incidents due to fear of SGBV stigma. Although WPN members always encourage rape or physical abuse survivors to report these incidents and seek medical treatment, most of them opt for local treatment not only because of stigma but because the medicine is out of their reach, it is very expensive,” stated Ms. Mohammed.⁵³⁷

Hala Al-Karib, regional Director of the Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA), noted in her opinion piece published by Al Jazeera that “The reliance of the state on the militarisation of civilians in the form of militias has legitimised loosely organised armed groups to exert their power through violence with the aim of consolidating the power of the state. This has largely undermined the rule of law in the country, enabled dangerous state-supported militia to control land and resources, and normalised sexual violence, enslavement, rape, and the terrorisation of populations within Sudan, particularly in Darfur, South Kordofan and the Blue Nile as an extension of state power”.⁵³⁸ She further highlighted:

These militias operate inside and outside of the boundaries of the state, thus, they manage to claim state authority without the limitations and expectations of conduct that state-led forces may be held to account for. Their human rights violations, and especially acts of sexual violence against women and girls, are being concealed by the state and ignored by international and regional actors.

⁵³⁵ UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, [*Briefing \[sic\] to the Security Council on Sudan by Andrew Gilmour, Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights, New York*](#), 14 June 2019

⁵³⁶ UN Security Council, [*Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*](#), 15 October 2019, para. 16

⁵³⁷ UNAMID, [*Voices of Darfur Vol. 8 No. 1*](#), 25 September 2019

⁵³⁸ Hala Al-Karib (Al Jazeera), [*Sudan's youth showed us how to counter sexual violence*](#), 5 September 2019

Like elsewhere in the world, in Sudan the international community appears to be taking the lead in the fight against sexual violence, with agencies and NGOs with action plans drafted miles away from Sudan setting direction and pace. These actors maintain a stagnant approach and narrative that is loaded with victimhood, labelling the Sudanese society as being culturally and ideologically crippled, and thereby compromising the capacities of national actors, civil societies, and activists to stand against sexual violence.

Moreover, the international community contributes directly to the exacerbation of sexual violence by ignoring the basic facts of social transformation and, most importantly, turning a blind eye to the contextually-specific root causes of sexual violence, which are the political dynamics that capitalise on violations against civilians as an instrumental means to sustain power.⁵³⁹

Reporting generally on sexual violence being perpetrated against women protestors, a September 2019 CHR. Michelsen Institute article noted that:

Being raped by the military forces will destroy not only for the woman herself, but also her family. It is about breaking down dignity and honor. The Rapid Support Forces and Islamist security forces have repeatedly told female protesters that they will "destroy their reputation". [...]

Sexual violence has long been a taboo topic and a source of shame for survivors who are likely to be regarded as broken, unhonourable, and unfit for marriage. Survivors seldom report such incidents to the police. Partly because the lack of legal protection within the law, but also because of the social stigma. Blame is often put on the women, even by police and judges in court, because she walked alone during the night or wore indecent clothing or somehow tempted her rapist to rape her. There is a very real risk that the survivor of rape will be prosecuted for gross indecency or fornication/adultery, rather than the perpetrator being sent away to jail.

Now survivors of sexual violence during the Ramadan massacre are met with social support and demands for justice. This is nothing less than the start of a social revolution.⁵⁴⁰

A joint report published by the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)/African Center for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS)/Sudan Human Rights Monitor in December 2019 noted that:

Sexual violence has been one of the essential components characterising the conflict in Darfur [...] Some of these crimes are reflected in the International Criminal Court's (ICC)'s arrest warrants issued between 2007 and 2010 against former Head of State Omar Al-Bashir, two former ministers, and a Janjaweed militia commander. Yet, more than 10 years later, while the same perpetrators are again using similar military strategies based on the perpetration of sexual violence against enemy groups, impunity for these atrocious crimes persists. Indeed, there have been no convictions at the national level despite the establishment in 2005 of the Special Criminal Court on the Events in Darfur (SCCED). Such impunity is largely due to a lack of political will on the part of the authorities, which until recently protected the highest-ranking officials responsible for the crimes committed; the lack of independence of the judiciary; and the current legal framework, which includes a system of immunities that ensures that members of the defence and security forces cannot be held accountable. In addition, no decisions have been issued by regional or international courts or bodies to bring justice to the victims of Darfur, since trials before the ICC require the presence of the accused.⁵⁴¹

Special reference to the survivors of sexual and gender-based violence has been made in the above-mentioned report stating that:

⁵³⁹ Hala Al-Karib (Al Jazeera), [Sudan's youth showed us how to counter sexual violence](#), 5 September 2019

⁵⁴⁰ CHR. Michelsen Institute, [Sexual violence does not stop Sudan's women from speaking up](#), 4 September 2019

⁵⁴¹ International Federation for Human Rights, African Center for Justice and Peace Studies, Sudan Human Rights Monitor, [Will There Be Justice for Darfur? Persisting impunity in the face of political change; Fact-finding mission report](#), December 2019, *Executive Summary*, p. 4

Most survivors have been internally displaced (there are an estimated 2.6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Sudan), have taken refuge in neighbouring countries such as Chad (which hosts 300,000 Sudanese refugees), or in Europe. For 16 years, millions of people have thus been waiting for justice to be rendered and for reparations to be issued so that they can finally rebuild their lives. This report presents the testimonies and perspectives of hundreds of women and men who arrived in eastern Chad between 2003 and 2013 as victims of the conflict and refugees in two of the largest camps in the Goz Beida region: Djabal and Goz Amer. Most of the people interviewed by FIDH and ACJPS were subjected to sexual violence, including rape, gang rape, as well as other forms of sexual violence amounting to torture. In the absence of adequate healthcare, they are still suffering the physical and psychological consequences of this violence.⁵⁴²

With regards to returnees, the report found that “According to accounts provided by refugees and lawyers from South, West and North Darfur interviewed by FIDH and ACJPS, former Janjaweed militiamen still occupy the lands of members of the Fur, Massalit and Zaghawa ethnic groups who have been chased from their homeland over the past 16 years, and persecute those who have remained or return, including by perpetrating sexual violence”.⁵⁴³

8.6 Trafficking of women

Amongst the sources consulted within the timeframe set for this update, no specific information was located on this issue. For a historical overview consult the previous two editions:

- ❖ ARC, [Darfur Country Report](#), January 2019
- ❖ ACCORD, [Darfur COI Compilation](#), September 2017

9. Individuals of diverse sexual orientations and/or gender identities

9.1 Legal framework

Article 148 of Sudan’s 1991 Penal Code outlaws same-sex relations in Sudan:

Article 148 of Sudan’s 1991 Penal Code contains the following provisions:

148 Sodomy

- (1) Any man who inserts his penis or its equivalent into a woman’s or a man’s anus or permitted another man to insert his penis or its equivalent in his anus is said to have committed Sodomy.
- (2) (a) Whoever commits Sodomy shall be punished with flogging one hundred lashes and he shall also be liable to five years imprisonment.

⁵⁴² International Federation for Human Rights, African Center for Justice and Peace Studies, Sudan Human Rights Monitor, [Will There Be Justice for Darfur? Persisting impunity in the face of political change; Fact-finding mission report](#), December 2019, *Executive Summary*, p. 5

⁵⁴³ International Federation for Human Rights, African Center for Justice and Peace Studies, Sudan Human Rights Monitor, [Will There Be Justice for Darfur? Persisting impunity in the face of political change; Fact-finding mission report](#), December 2019, *Executive Summary*, p. 5

- (b) If the offender is convicted for the second time he shall be punished with flogging one hundred lashes and imprisonment for a term which may not exceed five years.
- (c) If the offender is convicted for the third time he shall be punished with death or life imprisonment.⁵⁴⁴

Article 151 of the Penal Code contains the following provisions on Indecent Acts:

Whoever commits an act of gross indecency upon the person of another person or any sexual act which does not amount to Zina or Sodomy shall be punished with not more than forty lashes and shall also be liable for imprisonment for a term which may not exceed one year or fine.⁵⁴⁵

The International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA)'s noted in March 2019 that "Six UN Member States impose the death penalty on consensual same-sex sexual acts [...] three in Africa (Nigeria, Sudan and Somalia)".⁵⁴⁶

Article 152 of the Penal Code criminalises the making, portrayal, possession or dissemination of any material contrary to public morals.⁵⁴⁷ ILGA in its annual report covering 2019 stated that "The National Telecommunications Corporation (NTC) blocks websites considered 'offensive to public morality'. Sources indicate that while pornography is the primary target of this censorship, LGBT content and dating sites are also subject to it".⁵⁴⁸

A legislative update to the ILGA state-sponsored homophobia report of 2019 confirmed that there is no legal recognition of same-sex marriage, civil unions, joint adoption or second parent adoption.⁵⁴⁹

An online think piece on LGBTQI visibility within Sudan explained that:

As a conservative Muslim country, Sudan's legal system is based on the Islamic or Sharia law, which criminalises homosexuality. According to Article 148, capital punishment applies should the offense be committed either by a man or woman. For homosexual men, lashes are given for the first offence, with the death penalty following the third offence. As a result, members of the LGBTQ+ community in Sudan live double lives, keeping their gender and sexual identities under wraps to avoid social, religious and legal prosecution.⁵⁵⁰

The US Department of State reported in its annual human rights report covering events in 2018 that "The law does not specifically prohibit homosexuality but criminalizes sodomy, which is punishable by death. Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) persons are not considered a protected class under antidiscrimination laws".⁵⁵¹

⁵⁴⁴ International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA), [State-sponsored homophobia report 2019: Global legislation overview update](#), December 2019, p. 49. The full text of the Sudanese 1991 Penal Code can be found [here](#).

⁵⁴⁵ International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA), [State-sponsored homophobia report 2019: Global legislation overview update](#), December 2019, p. 49

⁵⁴⁶ International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association: Lucas Ramon Mendos, [State-Sponsored Homophobia 2019](#), Geneva; ILGA, March 2019, p.16

⁵⁴⁷ See [1991 Penal Code of Sudan](#)

⁵⁴⁸ International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA), [State-sponsored homophobia report 2019: Global legislation overview update](#), December 2019, p. 57

⁵⁴⁹ International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA), [State-sponsored homophobia report 2019: Global legislation overview update](#), December 2019, p. 171

⁵⁵⁰ 500 Words Magazine, [LGBTQ+ Coming Out of Sudan](#), 31 March 2019

⁵⁵¹ US Department of State, [2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sudan](#), 13 March 2019, Section 6. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons

The report also went on to state that:

Law and regulations prohibit discrimination based on race, sex, gender, disability, tribe, and language, but they are unevenly applied. There is no legal protection from discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity, HIV or other communicable disease status, political opinion, social or national origin, age, or social status.⁵⁵²

Freedom House detailed in its annual report on Sudan covering 2018 that “Same-sex sexual acts are illegal, though this prohibition does not appear to be strongly enforced”.⁵⁵³

ILGA also spoke of the specific legal circumstances for LGBTIQ refugees within Sudan:

Geo-conflicts in Somalia, DR Congo, Sudan and South Sudan have continued to drive out LGBTIQ refugees towards Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The asylum flights pose a legal paradox where countries that criminalize same sex relations continue to abide by their international obligations to protect LGBTIQ refugees and asylum seekers within their borders but at the same time continue to prosecute and persecute their LGBTIQ citizens.⁵⁵⁴

9.2 Treatment of individuals of diverse sexual orientations and/or gender identities

Darfur specific information was not found amongst the sources consulted in the reporting period for this report so this section relies upon the treatment of diverse sexual orientations and/or gender identities across Sudan.

9.2.1 By state actors

Freedom House’s annual report covering 2018 on Sudan indicated that “Official [...] discrimination against LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) individuals is widespread”.⁵⁵⁵

A Sudanese blogger of LGBTIQ sexual orientation gave further information around the official discrimination of LGBTIQ people in Sudan:

The LGBTIQ+ community has never been recognized in Sudan and is still to a great extent denied any form of rights to freedom, peace and justice. Because of your sexual orientation or gender identity, you risk being denied access to health services and education, to lose your job and being subject to hate crimes. This is part of your everyday life as a LGBTIQ+ persons in Sudan. The burden is even harder for LGBTIQ+ persons who are women, of dominant African descent and belonging to a religious minority as these groups have been targeted by the regime we are now protesting against.⁵⁵⁶

A legislative update to the ILGA State-sponsored homophobia report of 2019 stated, in relation to ‘Legal Barriers to the Registration or Operation of Sexual Orientation-Related CSOs [Civil Society

⁵⁵² US Department of State, [2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sudan](#), 13 March 2019, *Section 7. Worker Rights*

⁵⁵³ Freedom House, [Freedom in the World 2019: Sudan](#), 4 February 2019

⁵⁵⁴ International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association: Lucas Ramon Mendos, [State-Sponsored Homophobia 2019](#), Geneva; ILGA, March 2019, p. 89

⁵⁵⁵ Freedom House, [Freedom in the World 2019: Sudan](#), 4 February 2019

⁵⁵⁶ Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI), [Blog from Sudan: The Sudanese revolution: A fight for LGBTIQ + rights?](#), 8 May 2019

Organisations], that “In Sudan, the threat of the death penalty coupled with a rigorous registration process mandated under Section 8(1) of the Voluntary and Humanitarian Work (Organization) Act, 2006 makes it highly unlikely that an SOR CSO would be registered”.⁵⁵⁷

9.2.2 By non-state actors

Freedom House’s annual report covering 2018 on Sudan indicated that “[...] societal discrimination against LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) individuals is widespread”.⁵⁵⁸

The US Department of State reported in their annual human rights report covering events in 2018 that:

Antigay sentiment was pervasive in society. LGBTI organizations increasingly felt pressured to suspend or alter their activities due to threat of harm. Several LGBTI persons felt compelled to leave the country due to fear of persecution, intimidation, or harassment.

There were no reports of official action to investigate or punish those complicit in LGBTI-related discrimination or abuses.⁵⁵⁹

The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs detailed in their November 2019 Sudan Country Report that [unofficial translation]:

Mistreatment of LGBTI people occurs also by relatives.⁸¹⁹ Many homosexuals hide their orientation, also from family and friends, and lead a double life.⁸²⁰ Homosexuals from affluent families enjoy more freedom.⁸²¹ [...] LGBTIs keep in touch via social media including Facebook and gay dating apps.⁸²³

There are a small number of LGBTI interest organizations in Sudan (such as Freedom Sudan, Bedayaa, Rainbow Sudan, Shades of Ebony and Mesahat).⁸²⁴ [...] There are no civil society organizations in Sudan that openly represent the interests of LGBTI people.⁸²⁶

[...] 819 According to a confidential source, an LGBTI person is rejected by his family in the very best scenario. The source said LGBTIs in some cases are forced by their family members to be "treated" by a sheikh. Violence is involved in the "treatment". Confidential source, 26 February 2019.

820 Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2019, Sudan*; US Department of State, *Human right report 2018, March 2019*; Confidential source, 26 February 2019; Confidential source, 6 July 2017.

821 Confidential source, 26 February 2019.

823 The period of demonstrations from December 2018 to May 2019 was seized by all sorts of interest groups to discuss issues of dissatisfaction in society. At the beginning of 2019, attention was again drawn to social media for LGBTI rights. According to various sources, these online discussions again demonstrated that there is a strong aversion to LGBTI people in Sudanese society, including youth activists. Confidential source, 26 February 2019; CMI, *Blog from Sudan: The Sudanese revolution: A fight for LGBTIQ + rights?*, May 8, 2019; 500 words magazine, *LGBTQ + Coming out in Sudan*, 31 March 2019.

824 According to a member of the Sudanese LGBTI community, few interest groups are active. CMI, *Blog from Sudan: The Sudanese revolution: A fight for LGBTIQ + rights?*, May 8, 2019.

825 NGOs providing assistance to LGBTI people do not openly use the term LGBTI in documents about their programs. US Department of State, *Human right report 2018, March 2019*; *Erasing 76 crimes, "400 million LGBT people in jeopardy worldwide"*, March 27, 2018.

826 NGOs providing assistance to LGBTI people do not openly use the term LGBTI in documents about their programs. Outright International, *The Global State of LGBTIQ Organising*, 8 August 2018; Confidential source, 28 February 2019 [...].⁵⁶⁰

⁵⁵⁷ International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA), [State-sponsored homophobia report 2019: Global legislation overview update](#), December 2019, p. 72

⁵⁵⁸ Freedom House, [Freedom in the World 2019: Sudan](#), 4 February 2019

⁵⁵⁹ US Department of State, [2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sudan](#), 13 March 2019, *Section 6. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons*

⁵⁶⁰ Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [Country Report 2019: Sudan](#), October 2019 [unofficial translation provided by a COI researcher]

A May 2019 blog piece from the Norwegian Chr. Michelsen research institute (CMI) commented on societal discrimination of the LGBTIQ community in Sudan: “The Sudanese LGBTIQ+ community still worries about being identified as being LGBTIQ+ in public, including at protests and sit-ins. There is a real danger of being harassed or attacked”.⁵⁶¹

The Sudanese blogger wrote further on the entrenched nature of this anti-LGBTIQ stigma, which also permeates the human rights arena: “Many women’s rights defenders and human rights defenders in Sudan are very conservative when it comes to the LGBTIQ+ community, and homophobic attitudes are widespread even within those groups”.⁵⁶²

According to the same blogger, the LGBTIQ community in Sudan, appears to have found a space online for increasing visibility and discussion:

Part of this conversation and participation is documented on social media platforms. Especially on Twitter many LGBTIQ+ persons and LGBTIQ+ rights groups started sharing their demands during the revolution. Social media became an arena for sharing our struggles and stating that we want to feel safe and part of the Sudanese society, that we want to be respected and that we want to be protected from institutional and social discrimination.

One of few current active advocacy groups, Shades of Ebony, posted statements supporting the revolution and sharing their demands and thoughts on how the LGBTIQ+ community is part of the demands raised by the whole nation. Twitter accounts such as @Sudan_voices which has more than 40 000 followers featured a discussion about the LGBTIQ+ rights as part of the revolution. Individuals like Ahmed Umar, an openly gay Sudanese Artist who lives in Norway, initiated discussions about what it means to be an LGBTIQ+ person in Sudan, and many others took part in discussions on social media about being queer and how they perceived the revolution. The messages were very clear: We are part of this country, society and revolution, and as LGBTIQ+ individuals we want to be included, considered and respected. It is our right to have freedom, to live in peace and to be treated with justice.

There have also been interesting articles written on the topic of visibility and rights, such as “LGBTIQ+ coming out of Sudan” in words magazine <https://500wordsmag.com/social/lgbtq-coming-out-of-sudan/>.⁵⁶³

10. Persons living with HIV/AIDS

Darfur specific information was not found amongst the sources consulted in the reporting period for this report so this section contains information related to Sudan in general.

10.1 Legal framework

Avert, reporting on the punitive attitude and legal barriers towards homosexuality in Sudan negatively affecting the reporting and treatment of those suffering from HIV, specifically stated in October 2019 that:

⁵⁶¹ Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI), [Blog from Sudan: The Sudanese revolution: A fight for LGBTIQ + rights?](#), 8 May 2019

⁵⁶² Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI), [Blog from Sudan: The Sudanese revolution: A fight for LGBTIQ + rights?](#), 8 May 2019

⁵⁶³ Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI), [Blog from Sudan: The Sudanese revolution: A fight for LGBTIQ + rights?](#), 8 May 2019

Throughout many regions in the world, punitive laws and practices deter those most at risk of HIV from seeking the essential services they need. In MENA, eight countries (Qatar, Sudan, UAE, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iran and Somalia), homosexual acts are subject to the death penalty.⁵⁶⁴

The same report also commented on legal restrictions for migrants with HIV:

A number of countries in the MENA region have restrictions on entry, stay or residence for people living with HIV. These laws, and the ways they are implemented, often impinge upon the human rights of people living with HIV.

These restrictions have been adopted by Iran, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria and UAE, some of which are major destinations for migrant workers, particularly from Asia.⁸⁸ They do not just affect people migrating from other parts of the world but also people living with HIV within the region.

[...] 88 UNAIDS (2018) 'Miles to go: global AIDS update 2018', p.234. [...].⁵⁶⁵

10.2 Societal attitudes towards persons living with HIV/AIDS

The US Department of State reported in their annual human rights report covering events in 2018 that "there was societal discrimination against persons with HIV/AIDS."⁵⁶⁶

In October 2019 Avert highlighted issues in Sudan of HIV awareness and testing:

Figures across the other reporting countries remain disappointing - Tunisia and Morocco reported below 70% awareness, Egypt below 60%, and Iran and Sudan around 40% awareness of status.²⁹ In part, this is linked to the fact that the people who could most benefit from HIV testing are often criminalised and face widespread stigma and discrimination.

[...] 29 UNAIDS 'AIDSinfo' (accessed February 2019) [...].⁵⁶⁷

The same report further stated that "People living with HIV experience routine discrimination. More than 60% of women in Algeria and Sudan [...] said they would not buy vegetables from a shopkeeper who is living with HIV".⁵⁶⁸

10.3 Treatment of persons living with HIV/AIDS

UNAIDS reported in its 2018 Sudan country factsheet that in this year the percentage of people of all ages living with HIV in Sudan (59,000) who knew their HIV status was at 27% (16,000).⁵⁶⁹ The 2019 Global AIDS Update by UNAIDS stated that the percentage of people of all ages living with HIV in Sudan who knew their status and who were on treatment in 2018 was 56%.⁵⁷⁰ UNAIDS statistics also

⁵⁶⁴ Avert, [HIV and AIDS in the Middle East & North Africa \(MENA\)](#), 1 October 2019

⁵⁶⁵ Avert, [HIV and AIDS in the Middle East & North Africa \(MENA\)](#), 1 October 2019

⁵⁶⁶ US Department of State, [2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sudan](#), 13 March 2019, *Section 6. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons*

⁵⁶⁷ Avert, [HIV and AIDS in the Middle East & North Africa \(MENA\)](#), 1 October 2019

⁵⁶⁸ Avert, [HIV and AIDS in the Middle East & North Africa \(MENA\)](#), 1 October 2019

⁵⁶⁹ UNAIDS, [Sudan factsheet](#), 2018

⁵⁷⁰ UNAIDS, [Global AIDS Update 2019: Communities at the Centre](#), 10 December 2019, p. 264

indicated that, as of 30 June 2019, 9691 people living with HIV in Sudan were receiving ART (antiretroviral therapy).⁵⁷¹

Avert also warned in October 2019 that “There is an urgent need to expand and improve HIV testing and treatment in Iran and Sudan, where 60% of the region’s AIDS-related deaths took place in 2017”.⁵⁷²

The Global Fund, a key partner and one of the largest donors in Sudan for HIV response, stated in April 2019 that:

For HIV, although the number of people on treatment has doubled in the last year, overall treatment coverage remains at 15% of the estimated people living with HIV. Poor data quality, including forecasting and quantifications, is adversely affecting the grants. There are shortcomings related to the quality of services, including the use of clinical symptoms to diagnose malaria, sub-optimal viral load testing for HIV/AIDS patients, and poor progress towards the TB/MDR target (currently at 30% of target).

[...] In 2016, Sudan adopted UNAIDS fast tracking (90-90-90) and WHO’s test and treat policy in its National Anti-Retroviral Treatment (ART) guidelines. This has resulted in a doubling of the number of people on antiretroviral therapy, reaching 7,630 in 2017. The program has also improved clinical outcomes, reduced HIV transmission rates, and simplified HIV care and treatment. Female sex workers and men who have sex with men are now using Pre-Exposure prophylaxis, an HIV drug, to lower their infection risk.⁵⁷³

Some key statistics reported by the Global Fund also included:

HIV/AIDS: HIV prevalence in the general population is relatively low at less than 1%, but is slightly higher among key populations, who remain stigmatized and in some cases criminalized. Prevalence among Female Sex Workers and Men who have Sex With Men is 1.2% and 1.1% respectively.¹⁰ The country adopted UNAIDS’ ambitious treatment target to help end the epidemic (90-90-90) and WHO’s test and treat policy in 2016. The number of people receiving antiretroviral treatment has doubled in the last two years.⁵⁷⁴

10.4 Access to basic services and employment

See also information included in section [5. General humanitarian situation in Darfur, which is likely to also affect IDPs and Returnees](#).

The US Department of State reported in their annual human rights report covering events in 2018 that “There is no legal protection from discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity, HIV or other communicable disease status, political opinion, social or national origin, age, or social status”.⁵⁷⁵

⁵⁷¹ UNAIDS, [AIDSinfo](#), 2019

⁵⁷² Avert, [HIV and AIDS in the Middle East & North Africa \(MENA\)](#), 1 October 2019

⁵⁷³ The Global Fund, [Audit Report, Global Fund Grants in the Republic of Sudan](#), 29 April 2019, pp. 4-5

⁵⁷⁴ The Global Fund, [Audit Report, Global Fund Grants in the Republic of Sudan](#), 29 April 2019, p. 9

⁵⁷⁵ US Department of State, [2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sudan](#), 13 March 2019, Section 7. Worker Rights