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IOM IRAQ

WEST MOSUL

PERCEPTIONS ON RETURN AND REINTEGRATION AMONG STAYEES, IDPS AND RETURNEES

JUNE 2019



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Although 18 months have passed since the Iraqi government officially declared victory over the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the city of Mosul – and particularly west Mosul, which was the group’s final stronghold in Iraq – is still facing significant challenges that hinder the return and reintegration of internally displaced persons (IDPs), many of whom are now living in or at-risk of protracted displacement.

Entire neighborhoods have not yet been rebuilt, basic services are insufficient in some areas, and poor sanitation is contributing to serious public health problems and the spread of diseases. Furthermore, reports of harassment and violence against civilians by state as well as non-state actors are undermining efforts to build trust in state institutions and authorities. Revenge killings and other acts of retaliation against residents of Mosul and IDPs who are suspected of joining or collaborating with IS have continued since the battle, threatening to trigger new cycles of inter-communal violence. This report, based on interviews and focus groups with a total of 110 Iraqi men and women in west Mosul and the IDP camps Hasan Sham, Haj Ali and Qayyara, provides a rapid assessment of current barriers to return and the challenges and risks that IDPs face if and when they decide to return to west Mosul. We focus in particular on social dynamics between three key populations: (1) “stayers”, west Moslawis who remained in Mosul for the duration of ISIL’s three-year rule, (2) “IDPs,” west Moslawis who left the city at a relatively early stage in ISIL rule and are still displaced in IDP camps, and (3) “returnees”, those who were previously displaced from west Mosul and have since returned to the city. Although the voluntary return of IDPs has been identified as “a critical factor in sustaining a peace process and in revitalizing economic activity”¹ as well as an indicator of successful post-conflict recovery and reintegration efforts,² it is important to recognize and respond to the risk that premature or involuntary return to areas that are unsafe or inhospitable (whether as a result of hostile social dynamics, crime and violence, or inadequate infrastructure and services) may trigger new grievances and conflicts.

We identify several issues that need to be addressed to ensure that the return of those who remain displaced is safe, dignified and sustainable, and does not trigger new cycles of intercommunal conflict: (1) mutual distrust and resentment between different social groups (IDPs, stayers, and returnees) often stemming from suspicion of membership of or collaboration with ISIL and resulting fears of revenge and harassment by other civilians or security forces and (2) insufficient services, education, and job opportunities in west Mosul. These problems are being compounded by west Moslawis’ frustration with the reconstruction process, which is widely perceived as slow, corrupt and uneven. Many interviews and focus group members expressed concerns that aid is being intentionally withheld from west Mosul neighborhoods perceived as sympathetic to ISIL as “punishment” and that east Mosul is receiving more assistance. Although data indicates that the pace and visibility of reconstruction activities are indeed higher in east Mosul, the disparity is due to the fact that west Mosul was retaken several months later and sustained higher levels of damage. Nonetheless, the fact that many residents of west Mosul perceive this disparity as intentional discrimination is important and reveals a need for greater transparency and more effective communication by the Iraqi government, United Nations (UN) agencies, and Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) about the process of reconstruction, as well as humanitarian assistance, social cohesion and reintegration initiatives. We conclude with policy implications and recommendations for programming, both in IDP camps and in Mosul.

¹ Address by United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the Fifty-sixth session of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme (October 6, 2005), <https://www.unhcr.org/excom/announce/43455d812/address-united-nations-secretary-general-kofi-annan-fifty-sixth-session.html>.

² International Organization for Migration, “Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration,” <https://www.iom.int/assisted-voluntary-return-and-reintegration>.



INTRODUCTION

IOM's Iraq mission implements stabilization programming

in areas of displacement and areas of return.

The IOM Community Stabilization Unit commissioned this study to increase understanding of current conflict dynamics and to identify how to rebuild relations between antagonistic communities in IOM community centers in Haj Ali, Qayara and Hasan Sham camps and in west Mosul. This report, based on interviews and focus groups with a total of 110 Iraqi men and women in west Mosul and three nearby IDP camps, provides a rapid assessment of current barriers to return and the challenges and risks that IDPs face if and when they decide to return to west Mosul. We focus in particular on social dynamics between three key populations: (1) “stayers”, meaning west Moslawis who remained in Mosul for the duration of ISIL’s three-year rule, (2) “IDPs,” that is, west Moslawis who left the city at a relatively early stage in ISIL rule and are still displaced in IDP camps, and (3) “returnees”, those who were previously displaced from west Mosul and have since returned to the city.

The voluntary return of IDPs has been identified as “a critical factor in sustaining a peace process and in revitalizing economic activity”³ as well as an indicator of successful post-conflict recovery and reintegration efforts.⁴ Long-term residence in camps may hinder IDPs’ access to essential services, expose them to security risks that sometimes exist in camps, and exacerbate social stigma and isolation. For example, an Amnesty International report found that women and children accused of association with ISIL have

been sexually exploited by other IDPs or camp authorities in eight different IDP camps in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.⁵ However, in many cases, there are also considerable risks associated with IDPs’ return and, in order to ensure that return does not trigger new grievances and conflicts, there is a need to address hostile social dynamics, crime and violence, and inadequate infrastructure and services in their communities of origin. The return and reintegration of thousands of IDPs to areas recaptured from ISIL has generated new tensions within communities that were divided between supporters and opponents of ISIL, as well as those who tried to stay neutral. In Mosul alone, 971,286 displaced persons had returned to their places of origin, while 350,496 were still displaced as of March 2019.⁶ In January 2018, IOM reported that the number of Iraqis returning to their places of origin (3.2 million) had surpassed the number of IDPs (2.6 million) for the first time since the beginning of the conflict with ISIL.⁷ One of the resulting social fault lines is between these “IDPs (IDPs and returnees)” and “stayers”—those who experienced several years of ISIL rule and are now widely (and often erroneously) assumed to have collaborated with and supported the group.

As one resident of Mosul explained, “People assume that everyone who stayed in Mosul [after June 2014] is an ISIL supporter or member of the group, but many of us were victims.”⁸

Many Iraqis experienced extreme human rights abuses at the hands of ISIL and understandably feel betrayed and threatened by Sunni Arabs who collaborated with the group. This is particularly true of ethnic and religious minorities such as Yazidis, who were systematically massacred and enslaved by ISIL on a scale that the UN has determined to be genocide.⁹ Revenge killings of suspected ISIL affiliates or sympathizers have been widespread in Ninewa including Mosul, sometimes perpetrated by individuals who were personally victimized by ISIL. For example, Yazidi militias have been implicated in reprisals against Sunni Arabs believed to have been complicit in the capture and enslavement of Yazidi women.¹⁰

Relatives of ISIL members are another social group that has become a target for retaliation and extra-judicial violence by state and non-state actors or by other civilians. Kinship ties to the group are often considered a sufficient basis for retaliation even if the relatives of ISIL members did not personally commit any crimes. A key principle of tribal law, which is influential in Iraq, particularly in areas where state authority is weak, is the attribution of collective guilt to the family or tribe of the perpetrator of a crime. This principle allows for the relatives of an ISIL member to be held vicariously responsible for crimes that he or she committed individually.¹¹

In Iraq’s Haj Ali IDP camp, widows and mothers of ISIL members interviewed in December 2017 for a United Nations University study said that they hoped to stay in the camp indefinitely because they believed that they and their children would be safer there than in their former homes in Hawija and other areas that were captured by the group, where family members of ISIL members are vulnerable to retaliatory violence. In other areas, displaced relatives of ISIL members are allowed to return to their former homes but only conditional on payment of “blood money” to victims of ISIL.¹² One widow of an ISIL member, whose brother’s house in their village near Hawija was attacked with grenades as a result of his family ties to the group, said, “I am afraid that if I return, my neighbors would kill me in my sleep.”¹³

These fears are well-grounded according to a recent study by Social Inquiry. Many victims of ISIL’s violence have said that they cannot forgive the group’s atrocities and will seek revenge against those who supported it. As one Yazidi explained, “Because of what we have been through, of course we seek revenge. Even myself, if I see a Muslim living among the Yazidis, if I don’t kill him by daylight, I’ll do it by night.”¹⁴ In an attempt to escape the stigma of association with ISIL, a growing number of women who were married to members of the group are seeking divorce.¹⁵

3 Address by United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the Fifty-sixth session of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme (October 6, 2005), <https://www.unhcr.org/excom/announce/43455d812/address-united-nations-secretary-general-kofi-annan-fifty-sixth-session.html>.

4 International Organization for Migration, “Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration,” <https://www.iom.int/assisted-voluntary-return-and-reintegration>.

5 Amnesty International, “The Condemned: Women and Children Isolated, Trapped, and Exploited in Iraq,” (2018), <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/MDE1481962018ENGLISH.PDF>.

6 IOM, “Displacement Tracking Matrix: Mosul,” <http://iraqdtm.iom.int/BaselineDashboard.aspx>.

7 IOM, “Number of Returns Exceeds Number of Displaced Iraqis: UN Migration Agency,” (January 12, 2018), <https://www.iom.int/news/number-returns-exceeds-number-displaced-iraqis-un-migration-agency>.

8 Interview with “Khaled” (38, accountant) in East Mosul (April 14, 2017). Originally quoted in Mara Revkin, “After the Islamic State: Balancing Accountability and Reconciliation in Iraq,” United Nations University (May 2018), <https://i.unu.edu/media/cpr.unu.edu/attachment/2768/2-LoP-Iraq-Case-Study.pdf>.

9 Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria. “They Came To Destroy: ISIS Crimes Against the Yazidis,” (June 16, 2016), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/ColSyria/A_HRC_32_CRP.2_en.pdf.

10 Isabel Cotes, “Iraqi Yazidis take revenge as Islamic State atrocities unearthed,” Reuters, (February 10, 2015), <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-yazidis/iraqi-yazidis-take-revenge-as-islamic-state-atrocities-unearthed-idUSKBN0LE1YQ20150210>.

11 Nabih Bulos, “In Iraq, Punishing Family Ties to Islamic State and Compensating Victims of the Violence,” Los Angeles Times (October 9, 2016), <http://beta.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-iraq-qayyarah-snap-story.html>.

12 Mara Revkin, “After the Islamic State: Balancing Accountability and Reconciliation in Iraq,” United Nations University (May 2018), <https://i.unu.edu/media/cpr.unu.edu/attachment/2768/2-LoP-Iraq-Case-Study.pdf>.

13 Id.

14 Nadia Siddiqui and Roger Guiu, “We Don’t Want Them Back: Balancing the Rights of Displaced, Returning, and Remaining Populations in the Aftermath of ISIS in Northern Ninewa, Iraq,” Social Inquiry (October 2017), <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5bbb4e4c29f2cc31b47ff50f/t/5c5050ba0ebbe874b7c44e69/1548767429810/Policy+Brief+We+Don%27t+Want+Them+Back.pdf>.

15 Linda Givetash, “Divorce on the rise in Iraq as wives cut ties to ISIS militants,” NBC News (July 5, 2018), <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/divorce-rise-iraq-wives-cut-ties-isis-militants-n888541>.

As a result of the social tensions described above, micro-level conflicts between individuals can easily escalate to inter-group conflicts that involve entire families or tribes. This potential for escalation is true not only of conflicts stemming from violence perpetrated by ISIL but also of other types of conflict including disputes over the ownership of property and land. Such disputes are widespread in areas recaptured from ISIL due to the group's systematic destruction of property deeds and other vital documents, the loss of such documents during displacement, and because lack of documentation – of property and persons – was already widespread in Iraq prior to the conflict.¹⁶ Violence against returnees, including revenge killings and property destruction, has already been documented in several areas.¹⁷ To avoid triggering new conflicts, it is important that the return process be well-planned and take place in conjunction with other stabilization measures. Humanitarian and human rights organizations have expressed concern that Iraqi authorities have encouraged thousands of IDPs to return to their communities before it is safe for them to do so, particularly in advance of the May 2018 elections, when former Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi wanted to expedite returns to ensure high voter turnout.¹⁸ The Iraqi government has announced plans to close Hassan Sham Camp in 2019, but many IDPs in the camp have said that physical and economic insecurity remain barriers to return in their areas of origin.¹⁹

We identify two main issues which need to be addressed to ensure that the return of those who remain displaced is safe, dignified, and sustainable, and does not trigger new cycles of intercommunal conflict: (1) mutual distrust and resentment between different social groups (that is, between IDPs, stayers and returnees) often stemming from suspicion of membership in or collaboration with ISIL and resulting fears of revenge and harassment by other civilians or security forces and (2) lack of essential services, education, and job opportunities in west Mosul. These problems are being compounded by west Moslawis' frustration with the reconstruction process, which is widely perceived as slow, corrupt and uneven. Many interviews and focus group members expressed concerns that aid is being intentionally withheld from west Mosul neighborhoods perceived as sympathetic to ISIL as "punishment" and that east Mosul is receiving more assistance. Although data on reconstruction activities indicates that these beliefs are inaccurate, the gap between perceptions and realities on the ground is nonetheless important and suggests a need for greater transparency and more effective communication by the Iraqi government, UN agencies, and NGOs. We conclude that the current dynamics, if not mitigated by a more equitable reconstruction process, increased humanitarian assistance and social cohesion initiatives, could contribute to the resurgence of ISIL in Mosul and other areas of northern Iraq. We conclude with policy implications and recommendations for programming both in IDP camps and in Mosul. Although beyond the scope of this report, these recommendations may also be relevant to the anticipated return of thousands of Iraqis (both combatants and affiliated families) perceived to be affiliated with ISIL in Syria following the recapture of the group's final stronghold, Baghouz, in March 2019.

¹⁶ Mara Revkin, "After the Islamic State: Balancing Accountability and Reconciliation in Iraq," United Nations University (May 2018), <https://i.unu.edu/media/cpr.unu.edu/attachment/2768/2-LoP-Iraq-Case-Study.pdf>.

¹⁷ *Id.*

¹⁸ Ahmed Aboulenein and Giles Elgood, "Iraq returning displaced civilians from camps to unsafe areas," Reuters (January 8, 2018), <https://www.reuters.com/article/mideast-crisis-iraq-refugees/iraq-returning-displaced-civilians-from-camps-to-unsafe-areas-idUSL8N1P03LX>.

¹⁹ Hunar Ahmed, "Fearing camp closures, Mosul IDPs wait in limbo," Rudaw (April 11, 2018), <http://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/031120182>.



METHODOLOGY

This rapid assessment is based on interviews and focus groups discussions with a total of 110 Iraqi men and women between 18-60 years who are either originally from west Mosul or have spent time there during or since ISIL's control of the city.²⁰ An important secondary source has been a survey conducted by one of the authors (Mara Revkin) in March–April 2018.²¹ The scope of this assessment is intentionally limited to west Mosul because this is an area of the city where the return of IDPs is particularly challenging due to the social conflicts noted above as well as high levels of property destruction and the slow pace of reconstruction.

Interviews and focus groups were conducted during the month of February 2019 in west Mosul and in three nearby IDP camps in Ninewa governorate: Haj Ali, Qayarra, and Hassan Sham (Figure 1). We conducted research in all three camps because these are the primary camps to which residents of west Mosul have been displaced, and because there are important differences in the demographics and resources of the camps that may affect the dynamics of return and reintegration.

Figure 1. Map of 3 IDP camp locations²²



²⁰ All but four of the 110 interviewees and focus group participants are originally from West Mosul. These four are originally from the nearby towns and cities of al-Shirqat, Qayarra, Al-Ayadiha, and al-Qasr but spent time in West Mosul either during or after IS's control of the city (Appendix).

²¹ <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/19/world/middleeast/isis-forces-last-iraqi-christians-to-flee-mosul.html>. Mara Revkin, "To Stay or to Leave? Displacement Decisions During Rebel Governance," (2019), Working Paper, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3365503


²² Map created by IOM Iraq.

In west Mosul, all interviews and focus groups were conducted at a Community Center in the neighborhood of Islah al-Zarai (Figure 2). Community Center staff supported the research team to identify residents of west Mosul who were willing to be interviewed or participate in focus groups. The individuals interviewed in the three IDP camps and in west Mosul are originally from 18 of west Mosul's 58 neighborhoods: Islah

al-Zarai, Uraybi, al-Thawra, al-Intisar, Wadi Hajr, al-Jadida, Old City, al-Rifai, Farouq, al-Nahrawan, al-Shifa, 17th July, Bab al-Hadid, Bab al-Baydh, al-Midan, Ras al-Jada, al-Mamoun, and al-Tanak neighborhoods. However, many interviewees and focus group participants lived in several different neighborhoods under ISIL rule and during the subsequent battle as they moved to escape violence or property destruction.

Figure 2. Map of West Mosul

NINEWA GOVERNORATE, IRAQ Mosul City As of October 2017



Date source:
Neighbourhood: OSM, UN Habitat
Road and railway: OSM
City infrastructure: OSM, UN Habitat, IOM
Lake / River: OSM
Satellite imagery: Sentinel-2 from 24/09/2017

Copyright: ESA
Source: Copernicus Open Access Hub
Projection: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 38N
Contact: info@reach-initiative.org
File: IRQ_Map_Mosul_City_06Nov2017

Note: Data, designations and boundaries contained on this map are not warranted to be error-free and do not imply acceptance by the REACH partners, associates or donors mentioned on this map.

Furthermore, interviewees and focus group members have knowledge of west Mosul neighborhoods other than their own neighborhood of origin (as well as knowledge of east Mosul neighborhoods), through communication with or visits to friends and family living in those areas, so they often commented on conditions in multiple neighborhoods. Since the limited scope of this report did not allow for the selection of a random or representative sample of west Mosul residents, we focus on general patterns and trends in west Mosul as a whole. Future research in this area with larger numbers of interviewees or focus groups should attempt to identify variation between different west Mosul neighborhoods in order to tailor and target programming accordingly.

We conducted both focus groups ranging in size from 8 to 12 people and individual interviews. Both methods of qualitative research have advantages. Group discussions may facilitate the recollection of memories as well as the verification of information from multiple different sources,²³ but individual interviews are often necessary when discussing sensitive questions that respondents might be unwilling to answer truthfully in the presence of other community members.²⁴ In focus group settings, we estimated the age of participants rather than asking them directly in order to avoid causing discomfort.²⁵ It was not possible to collect detailed demographic data on every focus group participants due to time

constraints and privacy concerns. For in-depth individual interviews, we collected more detailed demographic information about respondents including age, number of family members, trajectories of displacement, and former as well as current occupations. Information from focus groups is cited as “Statement by a focus group participant in — location” followed by the participant’s displacement status: stayer, leaver (IDP), or returnee. Information from individual in-depth interviews is cited as “Interview with [pseudonym]” followed by the interviewee’s displacement status and more detailed demographic information.²⁶

Throughout the report, interviewees and focus group members are referred to by pseudonyms (indicated by quotation marks). Appendix 1 provides descriptive statistics of the interviews and focus groups. Finally, it is important to note that information obtained through interviews and focus groups reflects the perceptions of participants, which do not always mirror objective realities on the ground. Two factors that may affect the perceptions of west Moslawis and therefore should be taken into consideration by humanitarian practitioners working in this setting are (1) exposure to violence and trauma, which may have distortionary effects on memory and (2) a history of marginalization and longstanding grievances with the Iraqi government and international actors.


A. BACKGROUND

A.1. A BRIEF DEMOGRAPHIC HISTORY OF MOSUL BEFORE ISIL

Mosul is the provincial capital of Ninewa, which shares a border with Syria and is Iraq’s third largest and second most populous governorate. The city is divided by the Tigris River with five bridges connecting the two banks: east and west Mosul. The name “Mosul” is derived from the Arabic root “to come” (*waṣāla* or *وصل*) because of the city’s historical importance as a center of trade.²⁷ Although located at the northern tip of what has been described as the “Sunni Triangle,” an area of northern Iraq that is now predominately Sunni, the demography of Mosul was historically much more diverse, including significant minorities of Arab Shia, Kurds, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Turkmen, Yazidis, Jews, and Shabak, among other religious and ethnic groups.

For example, in the 12th century, an estimated 7,000 Jews were living in Mosul,²⁸ but starting in 1950, Mosul’s Jews, along with the vast majority of Iraqi Jews, left the country when the Iraqi government passed a Denaturalization Act that allowed Jews to emigrate to Israel.²⁹ After the 1968 coup that brought the authoritarian Ba’ath Party to power, the Iraq’s government’s “Arabization” policy resulted in forced displacement of tens of thousands of Kurds and Yazidis from northern Iraq starting in the 1970s.³⁰

Under the rule of former President Saddam Hussein and since his overthrow by the United States of America (USA)-led invasion in 2003, there have been several more waves of out-migration by minority groups – particularly Assyrian Christians and Yazidis – due to threats from armed groups, including ISIL’s predecessor, al-Qaeda in Iraq, lack of job opportunities, and discriminatory land policies that barred minorities from buying or registering property.³¹



23 Richard A. Krueger and Mary Anne Casey, *Focus Groups: A Practical Guide for Applied Research* (Sage: 2014).

24 Michael Kaplowitz, “Statistical Analysis of Sensitive Topics in Group and Individual Interviews,” *Quality and Quantity*, Vol. 34, No. 4 (2000): 419-431.

25 Based on the researchers’ previous experience conducting interviews and surveys with vulnerable populations, including individuals suspected of affiliation with the Islamic State, respondents are often uncomfortable disclosing potentially identifying information—such as names and age—in group settings due to fear that this information might be reported to authorities.

26 The interview data was anonymized to ensure the safety of all respondents as required by IOM’s Data Protection Principles and the Human Subjects Committee of Yale University’s Institutional Review Board (Protocol #1506016040).

27 NGO Coordination Committee for Iraq, “Ninewa: NCCI Governorate Profile,” (December 2010), https://www.ncciraq.org/images/infoygov/NCCI_Ninewa_Governorate_Profile.pdf.

28 Moše Gil, *Jews in Islamic Countries in the Middle Ages* (Brill, 2004), p. 513.

29 Moshe Gat, “The Connection between the Bombings in Baghdad and the Emigration of the Jews from Iraq: 1950-51,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (July 1988), pp. 312-329.

30 Human Rights Watch, “Forced Displacement and Arabization of Northern Iraq,” (2004), <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/iraq0804/4.htm>.

31 UN Habitat, “City Profile of Mosul, Iraq,” (October 2016), http://unhabitatiraq.net/mosulportal/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/UN-Habitat_MosulCityProfile_MEdRes_170409_V6.pdf.

As the demography of Mosul continued to change after 2003, with the proportion of Sunni Arabs steadily increasing due to the exodus of other religious and ethnic groups, the city became a center of unrest and opposition to the Shia-controlled central government, which many Sunnis perceived as corrupt, discriminatory, and ineffective. At the beginning of the Arab Spring in February 2011, protesters in several Iraqi provinces demanded the resignation of governors and local councils, the elimination of corruption, and improvements in basic services.³² The protests in Mosul, some of which took place in the city's Tahrir Square,³³ were described as the “most violent” seen anywhere in the country after security forces intervened on one occasion in February 2011, resulting in five casualties and leaving 20 people injured.³⁴

Additional protests in Mosul in 2012 and 2013 called for amending counter-terrorism legislation that was criticized for targeting Sunnis³⁵ and replacing paramilitary federal police with local police.³⁶ Videos of protests from Mosul during these years show signs bearing slogans including: “No to the government of chaos and blood,”³⁷ “No to sectarianism,”³⁸ “The solution [to corruption] is for you [the government] to resign,”³⁹ “We demand the withdrawal of the Iraqi Federal Police from the city,”⁴⁰ and “Stop insulting human rights.”⁴¹

During these years, ISIL's precursor, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), was becoming an increasingly powerful force in Mosul. By 2009, al-Qaeda operatives were regularly collecting protection taxes from business owners in the city and were accused of assassinating Christians. The Ninewa provincial government formed a special committee to combat AQI's activities, but the group continued to grow stronger as it evolved into what is now known as ISIL.⁴² AQI's activity was concentrated in west Mosul, where on average, the population has historically been poorer, less educated, and more religiously conservative than that of east Mosul.⁴³

32 “عشرات الضحايا باحتجاجات بالعراق” (“Tens of Victims in Protests in Iraq”) Al Jazeera (February 25, 2011), <http://www.aljazeera.net/home/print/f6451603-4dff-4ca1-9c10-122741d17432/c29861ce-d444-4ff6-9e1a-9a70c0f1e88e>.

33 Special Correspondent, “Inside Mosul: Why Iraqis are celebrating Islamic Extremists’ Takeover of Their City,” Niqash (June 12, 2014), <http://www.niqash.org/en/articles/security/3458/why-iraqis-are-celebrating-islamic-extremists%E2%80%99takeover-of-their-city.htm>.

34 “عشرات الضحايا باحتجاجات بالعراق” (“Tens of Victims in Protests in Iraq”) Al Jazeera (February 25, 2011), <http://www.aljazeera.net/home/print/f6451603-4dff-4ca1-9c10-122741d17432/c29861ce-d444-4ff6-9e1a-9a70c0f1e88e>.

35 Azzaman, “سنتقاتل على بوابات بغداد” (“Sheikh al-Dalim: We Will Fight to the Gates of Baghdad”) (December 27, 2012), <https://www.azzaman.com/?p=21341>.

36 Al Arabiya, “برلمان العراق يجتمع الأحد.. وعلاوي يطالب باستقالة المالكي” (“Parliament Convenes on Sunday ... And Allawi Demands the Resignation of al-Maliki”) (January 5, 2013), <http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2013/01/04/258613.html>.

37 Herak, “هتافات متظاهرين حي ١٧ تموز جمعة للحكومة الفوضى والدماء - الموصل – نينوى” (“Shouts of Protestors in July 17th Neighborhood: No to the Government of Chaos and Blood – Mosul – Ninewa”) YouTube (June 24, 2013), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tFFKv-RViIM>.

38 @EmanAlhariri1, “#صورة مظاهرة أهل السنة في ميدان التحرير” (“Mosul: Photograph of a demonstration of Sunnis in Tahrir Square”) Tweet (February 3, 2013), <https://web.archive.org/web/20171119164450/https://twitter.com/EmanAlhariri1/status/298011582116544512>.

39 Id.

40 YouTube, “2013 1 4 العربي حي الموصل حي الموصل” (“Protests in Mosul’s al-Arabi neighborhood”) (January 5, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gZNb_dgf-sA.

41 Samira Ali Mundi, “محلل سياسي: استمرار التظاهرات المناوئة للحكومة يؤشر إلى وجود أطراف تحاول تنفيذ السيناريو السوري في العراق” (“Political analyst: The continuation of anti-government demonstrations indicates the presence of parties trying to implement the Syrian scenario in Iraq”) Iraq Hurr (January 18, 2013), <https://www.iraqhurr.org/a/24877486.html>.

42 Id.

43 Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, “SFA Case Study: Mosul, Iraq,” (January 15, 2007), <https://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/sfacasestudy.pdf>.

A.2. MOSUL DURING AND AFTER ISIL RULE

Some observers have linked the cooperation of Mosul residents with ISIL fighters and perceptions of ISIL as being “liberators”⁴⁴ from a government that they perceived as an “occupying force.”⁴⁵ to the anti-government sentiment prior 2014 and previous presence of extremist groups in Mosul. ISIL overran Mosul over the course of five days – 6–10 June, 2014 – with little resistance from the Iraqi Army.⁴⁶

Videos taken in the early days of ISIL's occupation of Mosul show residents dancing⁴⁷ and parading in celebration.⁴⁸ According to one man interviewed at the time, the demonstrators were “not coming out on behalf of the Islamic State but out of happiness for their salvation from the Iraqi Army.”⁴⁹

Civilians described the first few months of ISIL rule as a kind of “honeymoon”⁵⁰ during which ISIL worked to secure the trust and support of the city's residents by implementing popular policies.

These included the removal of government checkpoints where Sunnis were allegedly interrogated and detained by Iraqi police based on sectarian profiling,⁵¹ the provision of subsidized bread and fuel,⁵² and improvements in the availability of electricity and clean water,⁵³ although the quality of basic services would later deteriorate rapidly after the USA-led coalition began to bombard the city with airstrikes starting in October 2014.⁵⁴ During the first few weeks of ISIL rule, tens of thousands⁵⁵ of those who had fled Mosul along with the retreating Iraqi Army decided to return to their homes after hearing from friends and relatives that the city was “calm”⁵⁶ and life was returning to “normal.”⁵⁷ One taxi driver who, at the time, was driving many returnees back to Mosul said of ISIL, “We see that they have made Mosul better. The water is back. The electricity is back. The prices are lower.”⁵⁸ Another resident of Mosul expressed cautious optimism: “So far, the militants have not harmed any civilians, and they have freed the city from the checkpoints that choke us.”⁵⁹

44 Colin Freeman, “Death Squads, Isis and a New Generation of Fighters: Why Iraq Is Facing Break-up,” Telegraph (June 29, 2014), <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10932851/Death-squads-isis-and-a-new-generation-of-fighters-why-iraq-is-facing-break-up.html>.

45 “Life Under ISIS: Iraqis Return to Mosul, Seeing Militants As Safer Bet,” NBC News (June 16, 2014), <https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/iraq-turmoil/life-under-isis-iraqis-return-mosul-seeing-militants-safer-bet-n131856>.

46 Ned Parker, Isabel Coles, Raheem Salman, “Special Report: How Mosul fell: An Iraqi general disputes Baghdad's story,” Reuters (October 14, 2014), <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-gharawi-special-report/special-report-how-mosul-fell-an-iraqi-general-disputes-baghdads-story-idUSKCN0I30Z820141014>.

47 YouTube, “٢/٧/٢٠١٤ اهل الموصل يحتفلون بسقوط الموصل والرقص في مساجد العبادة مع تنظيم داعش” (“The people of Mosul celebrate the fall of the city and dance in mosques with Daesh”) (February 2, 2014), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zscEq6sDIPg>.

48 YouTube, “احتفالات الموصل بتحريرها من جيش المالكي” (“Celebrations in Mosul after the city's liberation from al-Maliki's army”) (June 12, 2014), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0xDLz94Kbk8>.

49 Zaid al-Anzi, “حقيقة فرحة أهل الموصل بداعش” (“The Truth of the Happiness of the People of Mosul over Daesh”) Noon Post (June 24, 2017), <https://www.noonpost.org/content/3039>.

50 “شهر عسل مؤقت بين داعش ومواطني نينوى” (“Temporary Honeymoon Between Daesh and the Citizens of Ninewa”) Niqash (Jun. 12, 2014), <http://www.niqash.org/ar/articles/security/3458/>.

51 “Life Under ISIS: Iraqis Return to Mosul, Seeing Militants As Safer Bet,” NBC News (June 16, 2014), <https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/iraq-turmoil/life-under-isis-iraqis-return-mosul-seeing-militants-safer-bet-n131856>.

52 Jessica Schulberg, “How Will the Iraq Crisis Turn Out? Here Are a Few Scenarios,” New Republic (June 19, 2014), <https://newrepublic.com/article/118247/how-will-iraq-isis-crisis-be-resolved-here-are-several-scenarios>.

53 One resident of Mosul described improvements in sanitation and electricity: “The armed men organize even the municipal services. Rubbish is being cleaned off the streets. Electricity is very fine: We now have it more than nine hours per day.” Ruth Sherlock and Carol Malouf, “Despite Decapitations and Deaths, Thousands Return Willingly to City Held by ISIS,” The Telegraph (June 14, 2014), <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10900301/iraq-crisis-despite-decapitations-and-deaths-thousands-return-willingly-to-city-held-by-isis-terrorists.html>. See also Haifa Zangana, “لماذا رحب أهل الموصل بداعش؟” (“Why Did Mosul Welcome ISIS?”) Al-Quds (Jun. 25, 2014), <http://www.alquds.co.uk/?p=184079>.

54 Dan Lamothe, “U.S. airstrike in Mosul underscores military questions ahead in dealing with Iraqi cities,” Washington Post (Oct. 9, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2014/10/09/u-s-airstrike-in-mosul-underscores-military-questions-ahead-in-dealing-with-iraqi-cities/?utm_term=.f731141a29a5.

55 “Iraqi refugees return to ISIS held Mosul,” The Telegraph (June 14, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PQm6ur_0_xY.

56 Haifa Zangana, “لماذا رحب أهل الموصل بداعش؟” (“Why did Mosul welcome ISIS?”) Al-Quds (June 25, 2014), <http://www.alquds.co.uk/?p=184079>.

57 Rebecca Collard, “Life in Mosul Gets Back to Normal, Even with ISIS in Control,” Time (June 19, 2014), <http://time.com/2901388/mosul-isis-iraq-syria/>.

58 Associated Press, “Only days after fall of Mosul, Iraqis return to find lower prices, restored services and more,” (June 15, 2014), <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/06/15/only-days-after-fall-mosul-iraqis-return-to-find-lower-prices-restored-services.html>.

59 Tim Arango, “Iraqis Who Fled Mosul Say They Prefer Militants to Government,” New York Times (June 12, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/13/world/middleeast/iraqis-fled-mosul-for-home-after-militant-group-swarmed-the-city.html?_r=0.

Although ISIL quickly announced its intent to implement a strict and selective interpretation of sharia with a 16-article proclamation that banned alcohol, cigarettes, drugs, polytheistic shrines, and un-Islamic clothing, enforcement was initially lax while the population adjusted to the new rules.⁶⁰ At first, sellers of contraband products such as tobacco were asked “politely” to close their businesses, while owners of clothing stores were asked to cover the hair of their female mannequins.⁶¹ Over time, however, ISIL became increasingly strict and unforgiving in its enforcement of these rules. By March 2015, cigarette sellers who would have been let off with a warning in the early days of ISIL rule were being thrown into prison⁶² or publicly beaten.⁶³

While ISIL was ratcheting up the enforcement of its rules within Mosul, the group also began to limit travel and migration out of its territory with a series of policies that became increasingly restrictive over time. The first travel restriction was introduced on 30 November 2014, when ISIL’s sharia committee in Mosul issued a decree requiring residents to obtain official permission from an ISIL court for travel to other Iraqi provinces. Permission was generally only granted for two reasons: (1) medical necessity and (2) collection of salaries in areas outside ISIL’s control.⁶⁴ On 20 December 2014, ISIL’s central research office issued a fatwa clarifying that travel to the “lands of disbelief” is permissible only “for the purpose of a temporary undertaking out of necessity” and “conditional on the [traveler’s] ability to show disavowal of the disbelievers.”⁶⁵

During the same month, ISIL instituted a “sponsorship” (kafāla) system in Mosul that required travelers to register property (real estate or a car) that would be confiscated if they failed to return.⁶⁶ By January 2015, sources inside of Mosul reported that the “sponsorship” system had restricted travel outside of Ninewa to a maximum period of one month.⁶⁷ By mid-February, ISIL had “canceled” the sponsorship system and implemented a complete travel ban, citing “security measures necessary to protect the people of the city.”⁶⁸ By May 2015, as the one-year anniversary of ISIL’s capture of Mosul approached, not only was a complete travel ban in effect, but the group also tried to compel certain individuals who had already left the city to return. On 18 May, ISIL issued an “ultimatum” ordering doctors, pharmacists, and medical professors (healthcare providers are highly valued by ISIL for their ability to treat injured combatants) who had “abandoned the land of the caliphate” to return to their posts within 30 days, or else all of their “mobile and immobile assets will be confiscated ... and become property of the [Islamic] State.”⁶⁹ Although exit eventually became all but impossible without the help of smugglers,⁷⁰ for the first six months of ISIL rule (June 2014 until 30 November 2014), civilians enjoyed relative freedom of movement into and out of Mosul. As one resident of the city said of this period, “There was freedom to move anywhere, no identity cards, no checkpoints.”⁷¹

60 “داعش” يصدر “وثيقة المدينة” في نينوى (“Daesh Issues Charter of the City”), *Al Arabiya* (June 13, 2014), goo.gl/WQZrmN.

61 “داعش” ما سيحلبه حكم “داعش” (“Mosul Waits for What the Rule of Daesh Will Bring”) *al-Sharq* (June 25, 2014), <https://www.al-sharq.com/news/details/250643>.

62 Ali al-Husseini, “العربي الجديد داخل سجون داعش في العراق” (“Inside the Prisons of Daesh in Iraq”) *The New Arab* (November 24, 2017), <https://www.alaraby.co.uk/Print/9f48bcd0-a029-4e10-b363-6e2b89f51683/85ba2b68-fb43-4206-b85b-aa2bfa5b4d17>.

63 “داعش تستثمر في التدخين بحريمة” (“Daesh Profits from Smoking by Banning It”) *al-Alam* (March 29, 2015), goo.gl/q8JrEw.

64 Ayn al-Iraq News, “داعش يعزل نينوى عن محيطها ويمنع أهلها من الخروج” (“Daesh Isolates Ninewa from its Surroundings and Prohibits its Residents from Leaving”) (November 30, 2014), <http://www.aynaliraqnews.com/index.php?aa=news&id22=25880>.

65 Islamic State, “ما حكم بيع جواز السفر لعوام المسلمين؟” (“What is the Fatwa on Selling Passports to Muslims?”), Committee of Research and Fatwas, No. 48 (December 20, 2014), <http://www.aymennjawad.org/2015/01/archive-of-islamic-state-administrative-documents>.

66 Islamic State, “ضوابط السفر” (“Conditions for Travel”) (Ninewa Province Information Center, <http://www.aymennjawad.org/2015/01/archive-of-islamic-state-administrative-documents>). See also Ben Hubbard, “Islamic State Imposes Strict New Order in Mosul, and Deprivation Is a Result,” *New York Times* (December 13, 2014), <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/14/world/islamic-state-imposes-strict-new-order-in-mosul-and-deprivation-is-a-result.html?mcubz=0&r=0>.

67 Rezan Ahmad, “تنظيم داعش يمنع سكان الموصل من السفر الى خارجها” (“Daesh Prohibits Residents of Mosul from Traveling Outside”) *Bas News* (January 5, 2015), <http://www.basnews.com/index.php/ar/news/108791>.

68 Ahmad Mahmoud, “بالفيديو...بعد الغاء الكفالة...الدولة الإسلامية لسكان الموصل: ممنوع السفر” (“Video: After canceling the sponsorship system, the Islamic State Tells the People of Mosul That Travel is Forbidden”) *Rudaw* (Feb. 14, 2015), <http://www.rudaw.net/arabic/middleeast/iraq/140220154>.

69 Islamic State, “إلى: الأطباء والصيادلة وأساتذة الطب والتمريض الذين غادروا أرض الخلافة / إنذار نهائي” (“To: Doctors, pharmacists, medical and nursing professors who have abandoned the land of the Caliphate; Subject: Ultimatum”), *Diwan of Health* (May 18, 2015), <http://www.aymennjawad.org/2015/01/archive-of-islamic-state-administrative-documents>.

70 IRIN, “The cost of freedom from Islamic State,” (October 29, 2015), <http://www.irinnews.org/report/102169/cost-freedom-islamic-state>.

71 Scott Atran, Hoshang Waziri, and Richard Davis. “ISIS After the Caliphate,” *New York Review of Books* (October 19, 2017), <http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2017/10/19/isis-after-the-caliphate/>.

The battle to recapture Mosul from ISIL began in October 2016 and lasted until July 2017. The operations, conducted by Iraqi security forces with the support of the USA and other members of an international coalition, resulted in another wave of large-scale migration and displacement outside of the city. Since Mosul is divided by the Tigris River, the battle to retake the city from ISIL unfolded in two stages. East Mosul was liberated first by Iraq’s elite Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS) who were instructed to fight their way into ISIL-controlled neighborhoods with minimal air support. Although this strategy was commended for limiting collateral damage, the CTS suffered massive casualties and injuries that depleted its fighting force by up to 75 percent.⁷² With the CTS largely incapacitated by the east Mosul operation, the Iraqi Army was forced to rely heavily on Federal Police to retake west Mosul. The Federal Police, viewed as less

professional and disciplined than their CTS counterparts, engaged in indiscriminate tactics not seen in the east Mosul operation including the use of unguided munitions (mortar and howitzer projectiles). Heavy CTS casualties also contributed to a change in the coalition’s rules of engagement in December 2016, which enabled Iraqi commanders to call in airstrikes faster and more easily in west Mosul than in east Mosul.⁷³ These changes in personnel and tactics between the operations in east and west Mosul have been blamed for much higher levels of collateral damage in west Mosul. The number of civilian casualties resulting from the battle is estimated to be somewhere between 9,000 and 11,000.⁷⁴ The UN has estimated that approximately 130,000 homes were destroyed during the battle and that the city is still littered with approximately 8 million tons of rubble and garbage, which could take up to 10 years to clean up.⁷⁵



72 Amnesty International, “At Any Cost: The Civilian Catastrophe in West Mosul, Iraq” (2017), <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde14/6610/2017/en>, p. 11.

73 Richard Hall, “Were high civilian casualties in Mosul unavoidable?” *Public Radio International* (July 13, 2017), <https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-07-13/were-high-civilian-casualties-mosul-unavoidable>.

74 Susannah George, “Mosul is a graveyard: Final IS battle kills 9,000 civilians,” *Associated Press* (December 20, 2017), <https://apnews.com/bbea7094fb954838a2fdc11278d65460>.

75 Danish Demining Group, “Hidden bombs and eight million tonnes of rubble keep the people of Mosul from returning home,” (February 19, 2019), <https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/hidden-bombs-and-eight-million-tonnes-rubble-keep-people-mosul-returning-home>.

A.3. CURRENT DEMOGRAPHIC COMPOSITION

Although historically Mosul was an ethnically and religiously diverse city, AQI and, later, ISIL persecution of non-Sunni Muslim groups resulted in massive displacement by Christians, Shia Turkmens, and Shabak. Although ISIL claimed to allow Christians to live peacefully as non-Muslim residents of its territory due to their status as “People of the Book” (أهل الكتاب) – that is, members of the three Abrahamic religions who were historically tolerated by the original caliphates conditional on their payment of a special tax⁷⁶ – thousands of Christians fled Mosul before, during, and after ISIL’s capture of the city.⁷⁷ As a result of these waves of displacement by minority groups, Mosul’s population was estimated to be 99 percent Sunni Muslim in a survey of 1,458 “Moslawis” conducted by one of the authors in March–April 2018.⁷⁸

The current population in and around west Mosul can be roughly divided into three categories based on displacement decisions.

- **“Stayers”** refer to those who remained in Mosul for the duration of ISIL’s three-year rule. In many cases, they stayed in Mosul until the end of the battle to recapture the city. As Iraqi forces gradually recaptured the city neighborhood by neighborhood, from east to west, many “stayers” survived by repeatedly moving away from the shifting front lines to newly liberated neighborhoods or those still under ISIL control.⁷⁹ Some “stayers” fled Mosul to nearby IDP camps or other cities briefly during the battle and returned soon after, while others remain displaced.

- **“IDPs”** are those who left Mosul at a relatively early stage of ISIL’s rule. In the secondary data source survey of 1,458 Moslawis cited above, “IDPs” are defined as people who left Mosul before 10 March 2015, which is the day on which ISIL officials announced over loudspeakers that anyone who left Mosul from then on would be considered an “apostate,” and their property would be confiscated.⁸⁰ Since apostasy is a crime punishable by death under ISIL’s legal system,⁸¹ this announcement was a de facto travel ban. Therefore, exit became increasingly difficult after that date. The survey recorded the complete displacement history of every respondent and although a small number of “IDPs” (41) left Mosul after 10 March 2015, the vast majority of departures were clustered over a three-month period from January to March 2015 (Figure 1).⁸² There are several possible explanations for this uneven distribution. First, many residents of Mosul have described the first several months of ISIL rule as a “honeymoon” period in which the quality of governance improved and they were treated relatively well. It appears that many residents of Mosul felt safe enough to stay during this period.⁸³ Furthermore, the survey data indicates that many residents of Mosul (42) knew very little about ISIL in June 2014 and had unrealistic expectations about how long the group would remain in control of the city. In the past, AQI and ISIL had taken over specific neighborhoods in Iraq, including Mosul, for periods of days or weeks, but Iraqi Security Forces had always managed to reestablish control.

⁷⁶ Mara Revkin, “What Explains Taxation by Resource-Rich Rebels? Evidence from the Islamic State in Syria,” *Journal of Politics* (2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3023317.

⁷⁷ Alissa Rubin, “ISIS Forces Last Iraqi Christians to Flee Mosul,” *New York Times* (July 18, 2014), <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/19/world/middleeast/isis-forces-last-iraqi-christians-to-flee-mosul.html>.

⁷⁸ <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/19/world/middleeast/isis-forces-last-iraqi-christians-to-flee-mosul.html>. Mara Revkin, “To Stay or to Leave? Displacement Decisions During Rebel Governance,” (2019), Working Paper, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3365503.

⁷⁹ For example, “Sondas,” an IDP from Wadi Hajar first moved from West Mosul to East Mosul during the battle, then to Gogjali, a suburb of Mosul, where she and her children stayed with family for two months before eventually moving to the Hassan Shams Camp. Interview with “Sondas” in Hassan Sham Camp (female, 39, IDP from Wadi Hajar, West Mosul) on January 30, 2019.

⁸⁰ Shawkwmakw, داعش اصدر ضوابط جديدة من أجل منع سكان مدينة الموصل من مغادرتها (March 13, 2015), goo.gl/3QEn3W.

⁸¹ *Supra* note 3.


⁸² Mara Revkin, “To Stay or to Leave? Displacement Decisions During Rebel Governance,” (2019), Working Paper, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3365503.

⁸³ Haifa Zangana, “Why Did Mosul Welcome ISIS?” *Al-Quds* (June 25, 2014), <http://www.alquds.co.uk/?p=184079>.

- The vast majority of the 1,458 survey respondents (85%) said that they “knew nothing” about ISIL when the group arrived in Mosul, 35% said that they did not expect ISIL to last for more than “a few weeks,” and 29% thought that ISIL would be gone “in a few months” (Figure 3). These statistics suggest that lack of information or misinformation about ISIL’s intentions and capabilities may have influenced decisions to stay.⁸⁴ Over time, however, as ISIL became increasingly violent and repressive, residents of Mosul probably became increasingly motivated to leave. An additional possible explanation for the spike

of departures after January 2015 is the intensification of airstrikes. Although the USA-led coalition began to target Mosul in October 2014, the frequency and intensity of the airstrikes increased in January 2015.⁸⁵ Third, civilians were aware of the tightening restrictions on travel and migration out of Mosul and many probably anticipated that ISIL would eventually impose a full travel ban, which it did in March 2015. As exit became more difficult and residents of Mosul became increasingly anxious about the possibility of being trapped in the besieged city, departures probably accelerated.

Figure 3. Information and expectations about ISIL in Mosul (secondary source by Mara Revkin, “To Stay or to Leave? Displacement Decisions During Rebel Governance,” (2019))




⁸⁴ Mara Revkin, “To Stay or to Leave? Displacement Decisions During Rebel Governance,” (2019), Working Paper, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3365503.

⁸⁵ Airwars, “February 3rd, 2015: (I023a) Mosul - Kisik area, Nineveh province, Iraq,” (February 3, 2015), <https://airwars.org/civcas-2015/>.

- Finally, “**returnees**” are those who left Mosul sometime before the battle and have since returned. According to data collected by IOM, the number of returnees moving back to Mosul has increased steadily every month since the battle for the city ended in July 2017. Of course, it is impossible for any typology to capture the full spectrum of variation in a population. Each of these three categories

could be further divided into sub-groups: For example, as Figure 4 illustrates, some “IDPs” left much sooner than others, and we might distinguish between “early IDPs” and “late IDPs.” But to simplify the highly complex demographic realities of post ISIL Mosul and identify key patterns and trends, this report refers to the three general categories of: (1) stayers, (2) IDPs, and (3) returnees.

Figure 4: Timeline of departures from Mosul based on a survey of 1,458 Moslawis (secondary source by Mara Revkin, “To Stay or to Leave? Displacement Decisions During Rebel Governance,” 2019)



B. THE CONTEXT OF IDPS

As of May 2019, IOM estimated that 76 percent of IDPs from Mosul had returned to the city (approximately 984,588 individuals had returned to the city while 305,376 remained displaced in other areas of Iraq). Interviews and focus groups with west Moslawis who are displaced in IDP camps (“IDPs”) revealed several overarching patterns, trends and concerns. The experiences of these “IDPs” differ from those of “stayers” in ways that have important implications for programming and assistance. Although some common patterns and themes emerged from the focus groups across the three IDP camps of Haj Ali, Qayyarah, and Hassan Sham (discussed below) there are some important differences in the perceptions and experiences of IDPs between camps. After the following overview of general trends among IDPs (“IDPs”), we describe conditions and dynamics in each of the three camps.

B.1. TRAUMA AND CONFLICT-RELATED GRIEVANCES

Although IDPs are less likely than stayers to have experienced physical injuries during the battle for Mosul, they are just as likely to have had their properties destroyed or confiscated. In some cases, IDPs’ properties were destroyed by ISIL as punishment for their departure from Mosul. As noted in the overview of Mosul’s occupation by ISIL, the group considered “IDPs” to be apostates and therefore deserving of capital punishment. As a result, “IDPs” feared capture and were severely punished if caught, making the displacement experience particularly stressful. One IDP in Qayyarah Airstrip Camp said that “a female ISIL official, ‘Umm Mustafa,’ was informing the group about families attempting to escape

at night so that they could be stopped and killed: She is responsible for the deaths of so many people.”⁸⁶ Another IDP in Haj Ali recalled fleeing “at night because ISIL considered the fleeing families to be infidels”⁸⁷ and another said that he gave his children sleeping pills to sedate them during their escape from Mosul.⁸⁸ Another IDP reported that ISIL used her and her family as “human shields” after catching them in an attempt to flee; they eventually made their way to Haj Ali in Iraq after escaping Mosul via Syria.⁸⁹ Some IDPs, including children, arrived at camps with gunshot wounds as a result of being targeted by ISIL snipers as they were fleeing Mosul.⁹⁰

Many IDPs had their properties destroyed by ISIL as retaliation for their alleged “apostasy.” According to another man interviewed in Haj Ali, “When ISIL found out that I had fled with my family, they put a car bomb in front of my house and destroyed it.”⁹¹ Other “IDPs” claim that they were unjustly arrested and imprisoned by Iraqi security forces after fleeing Mosul on suspicion of association with ISIL. One IDP in Qayyarah Airstrip Camp was arrested at the Aqrah checkpoint south of Mosul “because my name is similar to the name of someone on a ‘wanted list’.”⁹² Different Iraqi security forces maintain their own wanted lists and mechanisms are not in place to ensure systematic communication and cross-checking between agencies. Such mechanisms would help in promoting the accuracy of wanted lists and make it more difficult for innocent people to be accused of supporting or joining ISIL.⁹³



B.2. STIGMATIZATION OF SUSPECTED ISIL AFFILIATES

The stigmatization of ISIL-affiliated IDPs makes them vulnerable to retaliation both in camps and in their communities of origin. Human Rights Watch has documented cases in which IDPs have falsely accused other camp residents of supporting or joining ISIL to settle scores with or retaliate against personal enemies and rivals. Children who have been detained on ISIL-related charges in Erbil reported that “people from their areas or villages had made false allegations of involvement with [ISIL] against them because of conflicts or feuds between individuals or families.”⁹⁴ Such reports are consistent with research on other civil wars – finding that many civilians take advantage of the conflict

dynamics to resurrect and gain the upper hand in pre-war disputes by falsely denouncing longstanding rivals as a means of eliminating them.⁹⁵ Some IDPs reported being denied services in camps as a result of their perceived affiliation with ISIL and were therefore unable to obtain security clearances and important civil documents. Others insisted that they are innocent and are being unfairly stigmatized while actual ISIL members and supporters have gone unpunished: “Now the government is pardoning some known ISIL members, including emirs [high-ranking officials], who are walking freely in the streets of Mosul while we in the camps are accused of being with ISIL.”⁹⁶

⁸⁶ Comment by focus group participant in Qayyarah Camp (female, 20s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 12, 2019.

⁸⁷ Comment by focus group participant in Haj Ali Camp (male, 60s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 14, 2019.

⁸⁸ Comment by focus group participant in Haj Ali Camp (male, 40s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 14, 2019.

⁸⁹ Comment by focus group participant in Haj Ali Camp (female, 30s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 14, 2019.

⁹⁰ Comment by focus group participant in Qayyarah Camp (female, 50s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 12, 2019.

⁹¹ Comment by focus group participant in Haj Ali Camp (male, 50s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 14, 2019.

⁹² Comment by focus group participant in Qayyarah Airstrip Camp (male, 40s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 12, 2019.

⁹³ Mara Revkin, “After the Islamic State: Balancing Accountability and Reconciliation in Iraq,” United Nations University (May 2018), <https://i.unu.edu/media/cpr.unu.edu/attachment/2768/2-LoP-Iraq-Case-Study.pdf>.

⁹⁴ Human Rights Watch, “KRG: Children Allege Torture by Security Forces,” (January 29, 2017), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/01/29/kg-children-allege-torture-security-forces>.

⁹⁵ Stathis Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 77-83.

⁹⁶ Comment by focus group participant in Qayyarah Airstrip Camp (male, 20s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 12, 2019.

B.3. PERCEPTIONS OF IDPS AND VARIATION IN THE TIMING OF DEPARTURE

IDPs attributed various motivations to other “IDPs” who fled Mosul. Many believed that economic conditions were the primary determinant of decisions to stay or leave. According to “Laith,” an IDP in Hassan Sham, “Those who left Mosul [and went to other cities] are the ones who had the financial ability to start a new life.”⁹⁷ Some of the earliest IDPs were members of religious and ethnic minorities persecuted by ISIL including Shia Muslims (whom ISIL considers apostates) “because they feared for their lives”⁹⁸ and “fleeing was their only hope for survival.”⁹⁹

Another large group of early IDPs were employees of the Iraqi government or security forces (and therefore “wanted” by ISIL for the purported crime of apostasy) or their family members. According to “Laila,” an IDP in Hassan Sham, “Many of those who left worked with the army or police and they feared for themselves and their families.”¹⁰⁰ By 2016, the rate of departures from Mosul had decreased significantly because by that point, ISIL had imposed a de facto travel ban, warning that anyone who tried to leave the city would be considered an apostate and therefore subject to the death penalty.

According to an IDP in Qayyarah Airstrip Camp, by that time, “ISIL was killing any person who tried to escape the city.”¹⁰¹ Another IDP who managed to escape to Hassan Sham Camp during this period said, “Leaving was a great risk because if we were caught by ISIL, we would have been executed immediately.”¹⁰²

The intensification of airstrikes and military operations in 2016 and 2017 was also identified as a driver of

departures.¹⁰³ According to “Salima,” an IDP in Hassan Sham, many people left west Mosul for camps when “their houses were destroyed and they could not afford to rent another house.”¹⁰⁴ “Sondas,” an IDP in Hassan Sham, described a “wave” of departures over the course of 2016 and 2017 as civilians tried to escape the increasingly violent battle. She also noted that a later wave of Moslawis left the city after the battle due to the destruction of their homes and their inability to pay the rising costs of living and rent.¹⁰⁵ Another group of “late IDPs” left after Mosul was liberated because “they were afraid of ISIL sleeper cells and the possibility that ISIL could recapture their neighborhoods.”¹⁰⁶

Previous research and reporting suggest that the timing of decisions to leave Mosul affects whether IDPs are suspected of supporting or collaborating with ISIL. When ISIL first began to capture territory in northern Iraq in June 2014, civilians who fled immediately were reportedly accepted without suspicion. However, after a few months, IDPs from Mosul who were perceived as having “stayed, in the eyes of local authorities, too long in areas under ISIL control” were increasingly stigmatized and quarantined in screening sites.¹⁰⁷ As one local official near the camp explained, “Those families lived for two months with ISIL. They didn’t have a problem with them. Even on Youtube and Facebook we saw them welcoming them,” referring to videos that had shown Mosul residents celebrating ISIL’s capture of the city in June 2014.¹⁰⁸

Some interviews and focus group participants perceived differences between waves of IDPs who arrived in their camp at different times. According to Sondas, an IDP in Hassan Sham, “There is tension between IDPs who arrived earlier and those who arrived more recently because those who arrived earlier are more likely to be ISIL families. Those who arrived more recently, after the battle, were usually displaced for economic reasons.” She suggested that relatives of ISIL members were more likely to flee Mosul before the battle because they feared that they would face revenge from civilians or security forces once ISIL lost control of the city. There is also resentment between the two waves because the influx of more recent IDPs “has led to a shortage of aid to the camp,” increasing competition over limited resources.¹⁰⁹ However, other IDPs interviewed for this study said that they did not perceive differences in the complicity of different waves of leavers who arrived in their camps. As one IDP in Haj Ali said, “There is no tension between IDPs who arrived early and those who arrived later.”¹¹⁰

One woman in west Mosul reported that tensions between stayers and IDPs have decreased over time as the IDPs begin to return and these different groups interact and learn more about each other, building empathy: “In the beginning, there were tensions between these different groups. IDPs assumed that stayers were sympathetic to ISIL. But now, tensions are decreasing and IDPs are starting to understand that most stayers were trapped by ISIL or unable to flee due to poverty.”¹¹¹ This finding suggests that dialogue initiatives may help to prevent conflict.



97 Interview with “Laith” in Hassan Sham Camp (male, 31, IDP from al-Zarai) on January 30, 2019.

98 Interview with “Sondas” in Hassan Sham Camp (female, 39, IDP from Wadi Hajar) on January 30, 2019.

99 Comment by focus group participant in Hassan Sham Camp (male, 20s, IDP from West Mosul) on January 23, 2019.

100 Interview with “Laila” in Hassan Sham Camp (female, 31, IDP from Wadi Hajar) on January 30, 2019.

101 Comment by focus group participant in Qayyarah Airstrip Camp (female, 20s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 12, 2019.

102 Comment by focus group participant in Hassan Sham Camp (male, 20s, IDP from West Mosul) on January 23, 2019.

103 Interview with “Salima” in Hassan Sham Camp (female, 48, IDP from Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul) on January 30, 2019.

104 Id.

105 Interview with “Sondas” in Hassan Sham Camp (female, 39, IDP from Wadi Hajar, West Mosul) on January 30, 2019.

106 Interview with “Samer” in Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul (male, 34, late leaver/returnee from Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul) on February 19, 2019.

107 Dominique Soguel, “Aid to Sunni Arabs in Kurdistan comes with a side of suspicion,” *Christian Science Monitor* (August 28, 2014), <https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2014/0828/Aid-to-Sunni-Arabs-in-Kurdistan-comes-with-a-side-of-suspicion>.

108 Id.

109 Interview with “Sondas” in Hassan Sham Camp (female, 39, IDP from Wadi Hajar, West Mosul) on January 30, 2019.

110 Comment by focus group participant in Haj Ali Camp (male, 60s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 14, 2019.

111 Comment by focus group participant in Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul (female, 60s, “stayer” from Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul) on February 18, 2019.

B.4. HOW DO IDPS PERCEIVE STAYERS?

Many IDPs attributed stayers' decisions to remain in Mosul to economic constraints or their loyalty to the city. Another IDP in Haj Ali said, "Regimes in Iraq have repeatedly changed, but we did not leave our homes in Mosul. Why should people leave when ISIL took control?"¹¹² Another said, "Mosul is our city and our birthplace. It is difficult to abandon one's home."¹¹³ Others stayed in order to protect their houses and land from expropriation by ISIL or other civilians. One IDP in Qayarah said, "Many of those who remained in Mosul did so because they were afraid that their properties would be taken if they left."¹¹⁴ An IDP in Hassan Sham Camp noted that "some particularly rich families who owned many houses and large plots of land did not want to leave Mosul because they knew that ISIL was seizing all abandoned properties."¹¹⁵

Several IDPs who stayed in Mosul for months or years under ISIL rule said that they wanted to leave sooner but were unable to because of their poverty. As one IDP in Haj Ali explained, "Those who left are the ones with money. If we had had money, we would have left, too. Our poor economic situation is the reason why we stayed."¹¹⁶ Some believe that "stayers" were deceived and misled by ISIL: "Most people who stayed in Mosul welcomed ISIL because we were told that this was a tribal revolt. We were misguided and did not realize at the time that ISIL would turn out to be worse than the government."¹¹⁷

Others acknowledged that some residents of Mosul stayed because they felt marginalized, politically and economically, by the Shia-controlled government of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and were therefore sympathetic to the alternative political model offered by ISIL, at least initially. As one IDP in Haj Ali explained, "There was sympathy with ISIL in the beginning because the people of Mosul became impoverished during Nouri al-Maliki's rule because of sectarian politics."¹¹⁸ "Salima," an IDP in Hassan Sham, also identified the al-Maliki government's injustice and sectarianism as drivers of local support for ISIL: "The [al-Maliki] government caused the emergence of ISIL through its injustice. The people of Mosul believed that ISIL would save them from the oppression of this sectarian government."¹¹⁹



B.5. WHAT DO IDPS FROM WEST MOSUL THINK OF RETURN?

IDPs expressed mixed views on the prospects of returning to west Mosul. In general, IDPs perceive a choice between either staying in camps or returning to their former neighborhoods in Mosul. Most are unable or unwilling to relocate to a different city or town where they do not have friends or family. "Laith," an IDP in Hassan Sham, said that he eventually wants to return to west Mosul when security conditions and employment opportunities improve: "I cannot imagine living anywhere else. I think of going back every day and talk to my wife about it often ... But returning without a job or house is really difficult. I don't want my family to be homeless and sleeping in the street."¹²⁰ However, IDPs who have ties to ISIL often feel that returning to their communities of origin is not an option because they fear revenge.

When asked about their future plans, IDPs who have had an association with ISIL said that they either planned to remain in camps indefinitely or move to another city where they hope to start new lives. "Laila," the widow of an ISIL member in Hassan Sham, said, "I don't want to return to Mosul. I would prefer to either stay in the camp or go to Erbil. I can't

go back to my neighborhood because it would not be safe for me and for my children."¹²¹ Another IDP in Hassan Sham camp said that he hopes to move to Baghdad, a city where "no one knows me and no one will accuse me of being an ISIL fighter."¹²²

Several IDPs with ties to ISIL were also concerned that former ISIL members had managed to join Sunni tribal militias aligned with the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), in some cases by making deals to save themselves in exchange for information about other ISIL members, and they are afraid of being identified by these people. "Laila" said, "I cannot trust anyone who was with ISIL yesterday and today is with the security forces or the PMF ... I am afraid that they will threaten me if I return to my neighborhood."¹²³ Another IDP in Qayarah expressed a similar concern: "It is impossible to live in neighborhoods where there are former ISIL members who have since joined the Hashd Sha'abi [referring to the Sunni tribal PMF] because not only did they cause harm to the community but they might also falsely accuse us of association with ISIL in order to gain the trust of the Iraqi government."¹²⁴

¹¹² Comment by focus group participant in Haj Ali Camp (male, 50s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 14, 2019.

¹¹³ Interview with "Sondas" in Hassan Sham Camp (female, 39, IDP from Wadi Hajar, West Mosul) on January 30, 2019.

¹¹⁴ Comment by focus group participant in Qayarah Airstrip Camp (male, 40s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 12, 2019.

¹¹⁵ Comment by focus group participant in Hassan Sham Camp (male, 20s, IDP from West Mosul) on January 23, 2019.

¹¹⁶ Comment by focus group participant in Haj Ali Camp (female, 30s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 14, 2019.

¹¹⁷ Interview with "Sondas" in Hassan Sham Camp (female, 39, IDP from Wadi Hajar, West Mosul) on January 30, 2019.

¹¹⁸ Comment by focus group participant in Haj Ali Camp (male, 20s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 14, 2019.

¹¹⁹ Interview with "Salima" in Hassan Sham Camp (female, 48, IDP from Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul) on January 30, 2019.

¹²⁰ Interview with "Laith" in Hassan Sham Camp (male, 31, IDP from Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul) on January 30, 2019.

¹²¹ Interview with "Laila" in Hassan Sham Camp (female, 31, IDP from Wadi Hajar, West Mosul) on January 30, 2019.

¹²² Comment by focus group participant in Hassan Sham Camp (male, 20s, IDP from West Mosul) on January 23, 2019.

¹²³ Interview with "Laila" in Hassan Sham Camp (female, 31, IDP from Wadi Hajar, West Mosul) on January 30, 2019.

¹²⁴ Comment by focus group participant in Qayarah Airstrip Camp (male, 30s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 12, 2019.

C. CONSTRAINTS ON RETURN

C.1. ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS

Some would like to return to west Mosul, but are prevented by economic barriers including the absence of jobs and costs of rebuilding their former homes. “Laith,” an IDP in Hassan Sham, said that although his relatives in the west Mosul neighborhood of a-Zarii are encouraging him to return, “I tell them that I cannot return until there are job opportunities for me.”¹²⁵ According to one IDP in Haj Ali, “The main obstacle is our economic situation ... There are no job opportunities.”¹²⁶ Another IDP in Haj Ali said, “We want to go back to Mosul. If I had a job opportunity, I could rent a house or even a room, but there are no jobs in Mosul.”¹²⁷ The economic barriers to return appear to be particularly steep for single female heads-of-household, particularly those whose male relatives were affiliated with ISIL and are now dead or missing. As one female IDP in Haj Ali explained, “Many of us are widows ... We don’t have money to live and we don’t get any financial support from our government, so the camp is the only place for us.”¹²⁸ In some cases, IDPs have attempted to go back to west Mosul but are forced to return to camps when they cannot find secure housing or jobs. One IDP in Qayyarah Airstrip Camp reported that his camp neighbors tried to return to Mosul “but they came back to the camp after a few months because of the poor economic situation.”¹²⁹

C.2. HOUSES DESTROYED OR UNLAWFULLY OCCUPIED BY OTHER RESIDENTS

Many IDPs are unable to return because their houses have been destroyed, either by ISIL or during the battle, and renting or buying new property is prohibitively expensive. As one IDP in Haj Ali explained, “My home was occupied by ISIL and used as a base, so it was destroyed by [coalition] airstrikes. I can’t rent a house in west Mosul because most of the houses are still destroyed and east Mosul is too expensive.”¹³⁰ Some houses are still standing but are in need of major repairs that IDPs cannot afford. “Salima,” an IDP in Hassan Sham, said, “I want to return to my home [in west Mosul] but the house was damaged and the doors and windows were stolen [presumably to repair other damaged houses] ... It is not safe to live in this house and I cannot afford to repair it or rent another one.”¹³¹

Other IDPs are unable to return because their homes have been unlawfully occupied by other people and they lack the necessary documentation to reclaim their property. In some cases, security forces have been implicated in the unlawful occupation or transfer of properties.¹³² According to one IDP in Haj Ali, “Some people who have good relationships with security forces are now living in houses that formerly belonged to ISIL families,”¹³³ implying that corrupt Iraqi military or civilian officials are redistributing these properties to their personal friends or political supporters. “Sondas,” an IDP in Hassan Sham, reported that her family’s house and land in west Mosul “have been taken by a member of the security forces.”¹³⁴ Another IDP in Qayyarah reported, “We cannot return because we are an ISIL family and my home is occupied by a member of the security forces.”¹³⁵ This pattern of expropriations suggests that security forces may be exploiting the social and legal vulnerability of Moslawis accused of association with ISIL to occupy their properties.

C.3. LOOTING AND CRIME

Some IDPs expressed a preference for staying in their camps because they feel that they are safer there than they would be in West Mosul. According to “Laith,” an IDP in Hassan Sham, “We feel really safe here, thanks to good security in the camp. Many of us want to stay in the camp because it is safe.”¹³⁶

Looting of homes and high levels of crime in west Mosul were also identified as obstacles to safe return. One female IDP in Haj Ali said, “My house was robbed and if I return to Mosul I would want to return to east Mosul but the rent is very expensive there.”¹³⁷ Another reported an incident in which criminals impersonated Iraqi security forces by wearing fake uniforms and robbed workers who were picking up their salaries in west Mosul.¹³⁸

C.4. SLOW RECONSTRUCTION, POOR QUALITY OF SERVICES, AND LACK OF COMPENSATION

Many IDPs expressed frustration with the slow pace of reconstruction in West Mosul, poor quality of essential services, and lack of compensation for victims of violence and property destruction either during ISIL rule or the subsequent battle to recapture Mosul. Some said that the existing compensation process is too complicated and expensive for most people to access. According to one IDP in Haj Ali, “I applied for compensation, but even applying is difficult because you have to pay the fees, and pay to photocopy papers, as well as travel expenses. I spent more than 150,000 Iraqi dinars to meet these requirements. Many IDPs do not even have enough money to travel

back to Mosul.”¹³⁹ Others suggested that despite the presence of a compensation mechanism, the government may be unwilling or unable to make good on promises of compensation: “If we are lucky we may receive compensation after many years, if the government even intends to pay compensation.”¹⁴⁰ Others lack the necessary documents that would enable them to access Iraq’s social welfare system, particularly individuals with family ties to ISIL. Family members of suspected ISIL members have been unable to obtain essential documents including birth, death, marriage and divorce certificates, identity and welfare cards, and passports because obtaining these documents requires a security screening by Iraq’s Interior Ministry, Intelligence, or National Security Service (NSS) officers. Families of suspected ISIL members often fail these background checks. One IDP in Haj Ali reported that she has been unable to access the social welfare system “because I do not have a legal paper to prove that my husband is missing.”¹⁴¹ Others reported that the compensation process is made even more inaccessible by corruption and bribery: “We don’t trust this corrupt government and even for compensation, you need to know someone.”¹⁴² Furthermore, obtaining documentation can be particularly difficult for women because in Iraq, social welfare entitlements are often registered under the names of male heads of household and are difficult to transfer to the name of the wife if her husband is dead or missing.¹⁴³

¹²⁵ Interview with “Laith” in Hassan Sham Camp (male, 31, IDP from Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul) on January 30, 2019.

¹²⁶ Comment by focus group participant in Haj Ali Camp (male, 50s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 14, 2019.

¹²⁷ Comment by focus group participant in Haj Ali Camp (male, 40s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 14, 2019.

¹²⁸ Comment by focus group participant in Haj Ali Camp (female, 30s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 14, 2019.

¹²⁹ Comment by focus group participant in Qayyarah Camp (male, 20s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 12, 2019.

¹³⁰ Comment by focus group participant in Haj Ali Camp Camp (male, 50s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 14, 2019.

¹³¹ Interview with “Salima” in Hassan Sham Camp (female, 48, IDP from Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul) on January 30, 2019.

¹³² Mara Revkin, “After the Islamic State: Balancing Accountability and Reconciliation in Iraq,” United Nations University (May 2018), <https://i.unu.edu/media/cpr.unu.edu/attachment/2768/2-LoP-Iraq-Case-Study.pdf>.

¹³³ Comment by focus group participant in Haj Ali Camp (female, 20s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 14, 2019.

¹³⁴ Interview with “Sondas” in Hassan Sham Camp (female, 39, IDP from Wadi Hajar, West Mosul) on January 30, 2019.

¹³⁵ Comment by focus group participant in Qayyarah Airstrip Camp (female, 50s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 12, 2019.

¹³⁶ Interview with “Laith” in Hassan Sham Camp (male, 31, IDP from Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul) on January 30, 2019.

¹³⁷ Comment by focus group participant in Haj Ali Camp (female, 30s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 14, 2019. Another woman in the same focus group reported that although her house in West Mosul was not damaged during the battle, it was looted during or after. Comment by focus group participant in Haj Ali Camp (female, 40s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 14, 2019.

¹³⁸ Comment by focus group participant in Haj Ali Camp (female, 40s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 14, 2019.

¹³⁹ Comment by focus group participant in Haj Ali Camp (male, 60s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 14, 2019.

¹⁴⁰ Comment by focus group participant in Qayyarah Airstrip Camp (male, 30s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 12, 2019.

¹⁴¹ Comment by focus group participant in Haj Ali Camp (female, 30s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 14, 2019.

¹⁴² Comment by focus group participant in Haj Ali Camp (male, 50s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 14, 2019.

¹⁴³ Human Rights Watch, “Iraq: Families of Alleged ISIS Members Denied IDs,” (February 25, 2018), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/25/iraq-families-alleged-isis-members-denied-ids>.

C.5. FEARS OF REVENGE AGAINST ISIL-AFFILIATED IDPs

Focus group members and interviewees reported that many IDPs are afraid to return to west Mosul because they fear retaliation as a result of their actual or perceived association with ISIL. This is particularly true of children, wives, and mothers of alleged ISIL fighters. Even though in most cases, the ISIL fighters are missing or dead, their living relatives cannot escape the stigma of association with the group. According to one IDP in Haj Ali, “The fear of revenge is a real obstacle preventing ISIL families from returning.”¹⁴⁴ Another said, “In some areas, people kicked ISIL families out of their neighborhood because ISIL hurt them, so it is very difficult for these people [relatives of ISIL members] to return to their homes.”¹⁴⁵ A woman whose family is accused of supporting ISIL said that she does not have any current plans to return to west Mosul, but if and when she does, she will return to live with her remaining family in al-Jadida.¹⁴⁶ Another woman also accused of family ties to ISIL said that she does not feel that returning to west Mosul is currently an option because “we would have to pay compensation [tribal blood money known as “diyah”] to the victims of ISIL, but we do not have any money to pay them.”¹⁴⁷

“Laith” said he had heard of conflicts between families who have returned to west Mosul since the battle and “stayers” in their neighborhoods whom they believe supported or joined ISIL.¹⁴⁸ In Hassan Sham, “Laila,” the widow of an Iraqi ISIL member who claims that he only joined the group for a few months due to lack of any other job opportunities, knew of displaced families that had attempted to return to their former neighborhoods in west Mosul but “they fled back to the camp because they were accused of being ISIL supporters or families.”¹⁴⁹ She also said that she is personally afraid to return to her former neighborhood in west Mosul because “I am afraid of facing revenge.” “Salima,” an IDP whose husband has been detained on suspicion of association with ISIL, said that her relatives in west Mosul have advised her not to return to the city because she and her children will be vulnerable to retaliation by security forces or other civilians.¹⁵⁰ “Sabah,” a widow of an ISIL fighter currently living in Qayyarah Airstrip Camp, said that family members have advised her not to return to her former neighborhood in west Mosul (Farouq) because of the likelihood that she would face “revenge and anger from families of the victims of the Islamic State.” She said that she does not intend to return to Mosul “because it is not safe for ISIL families. If I leave the camp, I will go to my family in Qayyarah.”¹⁵¹

144 Comment by focus group participant in Haj Ali Camp (male, 40s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 14, 2019.

145 Comment by focus group participant in Haj Ali Camp (female, 20s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 14, 2019.

146 Comment by focus group participant in Haj Ali Camp (female, 20s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 14, 2019.

147 Comment by focus group participant in Haj Ali Camp (female, 30s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 14, 2019.

148 Interview with “Laith” in Hassan Sham Camp (male, 31, IDP from Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul) on January 30, 2019.

149 Interview with “Laila” in Hassan Sham Camp (female, 31, IDP from Wadi Hajar, West Mosul) on January 30, 2019.

150 Interview with “Salima” in Hassan Sham Camp (female, 48, IDP from Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul) on January 30, 2019.

151 Interview with “Sabah” in Qayyarah Airstrip Camp (female, 24, IDP from Farouq, West Mosul) on February 13, 2019.



D. OVERVIEW OF CONDITIONS IN 3 IDP CAMPS NEAR MOSUL

After summarizing common themes and trends observed across IDPs in the three different camps where research was conducted (Haj Ali, Hassan Shams, and Qayarra), the following sections describe conditions and dynamics in each of the three camps. As noted in the methodology section, information obtained through interviews and focus groups reflects the perceptions of participants, which do not always mirror objective realities on the ground.

D.1. HAJ ALI CAMP

The Haj Ali Camp, located in Ninewa Province, was established in January 2017. Its current population is approximately 2,613 families (14,012 individuals) of whom 34 percent are from west Mosul.

D.1.1. Services

In general, IDPs reported that the quality and quantity of services being provided in Haj Ali is greater than that in west Mosul, but still insufficient to meet their needs. Education was identified as particularly weak. One IDP complained that “education is very bad. Schools [...] have no curriculum and no suitable place to study.”¹⁵² Another IDP in Haj Ali reported, “I don’t send my children to school because whenever they go, they come back sick due to rainwater in the trailers where they study.”¹⁵³ Another common concern was the high ratio of students to teachers: “There are 1,020 students in first grade in this camp and 50 students for each trailer.”¹⁵⁴ Some identified the poor quality of education in camps as a driver of returns to Mosul: “I sent my children to my family in Mosul to do their study there,” said one IDP in Haj Ali.¹⁵⁵

Many IDPs expressed the need for more and higher quality healthcare services, psychosocial support. Although IOM does operate two psychosocial support centers in Haj Ali Camp, some IDPs seem to be unaware of these resources. According to one IDP in Haj Ali, “Most of us suffer from psychological conditions, but there is no psychotherapy center in the camp.”¹⁵⁶ Although basic medications for conditions including high blood pressure and diabetes are provided in some camps, supplies are sometimes limited or delayed: “Sometimes, there is a one-month delay, which makes it necessary for us to buy medications from outside the camp,” said one IDP in Haj Ali.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵² Comment by focus group participant in Haj Ali Camp (male, 20s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 14, 2019.

¹⁵³ Comment by focus group participant in Haj Ali Camp (male, 40s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 14, 2019.

¹⁵⁴ Comment by focus group participant in Haj Ali Camp (female, 40s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 14, 2019.

¹⁵⁵ Comment by focus group participant in Haj Ali Camp (male, 40s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 14, 2019.

¹⁵⁶ Comment by focus group participant in Haj Ali Camp (male, 40s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 14, 2019.

¹⁵⁷ Comment by focus group participant in Haj Ali Camp (male, 40s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 14, 2019.

D.1.2. Security

Residents of Haj Ali, for the most part, claimed that they feel safe and protected by both camp authorities and their tribes. It appears that tribes, in addition to camp authorities and security forces, are important providers of security in IDP camps, particularly for single female heads-of-household. One woman in Haj Ali explained, “If I were living in a camp without any members of my family or tribe around me, I would feel afraid because the camp is large and there are many different types of people here.”¹⁵⁸

Men in Haj Ali also viewed tribes as important providers of security and protection: “The camp is very safe because the security forces are doing their job well and we are living in the same block with relatives from our tribe.”¹⁵⁹ In this camp, there were no reports of ISIL-related conflicts or reporting. According to one IDP in Haj Ali, “There are no cases of revenge among the displaced due to accusations of

association with ISIL.”¹⁶⁰ In cases of non-ISIL-related disputes, IDPs reported that tribes played an important role in dispute resolution: “In cases of arguments between neighbors, we resolve it through the tribes.”¹⁶¹ However, occasional security incidents of unknown motivation were reported: “Sometimes at night, there are incidents like throwing rocks at tents, but we do not know who is doing these things or why.”¹⁶²

D.1.3. Gender-Based Violence

IDPs reported that women do not experience high levels of sexual harassment or gender-based violence, despite the fact that they are often not accompanied by male relatives and therefore vulnerable. One man reported, “Widowed women are not afraid of being alone and there is no harassment, although their situation is difficult without a husband.”¹⁶³



¹⁵⁸ Comment by focus group participant in Haj Ali Camp (female, 40s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 14, 2019.

¹⁵⁹ Comment by focus group participant in Haj Ali Camp (male, 60s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 14, 2019.

¹⁶⁰ Comment by focus group participant in Haj Ali Camp (male, 40s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 14, 2019.

¹⁶¹ Comment by focus group participant in Haj Ali Camp (male, 50s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 14, 2019.

¹⁶² Comment by focus group participant in Haj Ali Camp (female, 30s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 14, 2019.

¹⁶³ Comment by focus group participant in Haj Ali Camp (male, 40s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 14, 2019.

D.2. HASSAN SHAM CAMP

The Hassan Sham Camp, located in Erbil Province, was established in November 2014.

Its population is approximately 2,204 families (10,414 individuals).

D.2.1. Services

Many IDPs perceived the quality and quantity of services being provided in Hassan Sham to be worse than in Mosul. According to “Laith,” an IDP from Islah al-Zarai, “The services in Mosul are better than the services in the camp.” He cited education as an example: “Education is very bad here. There are between 60 and 70 students in one class and the teachers are all volunteers.”¹⁶⁴ “Laila,” who has family ties to ISIL, shared this view, saying that “services in Mosul are better but the camp is safer for us.”¹⁶⁵ Others had positive experiences with services, however. “Salma,” whose husband has been detained on suspicion of association with ISIL, said that “services here are better than in Mosul,” particularly healthcare. Her daughter is receiving free medication for diabetes.¹⁶⁶ However, other IDPs complained about the inadequacy of healthcare services, noting that doctors are quick to prescribe painkiller pills “but this is a short-term solution that will not solve our health problems.”¹⁶⁷

Some IDPs in Hassan Sham reported being denied services as a result of their perceived affiliation with ISIL and resulting inability to obtain security clearances and important civil documents. “Laila” said that she has been unable to enroll her children in the camp’s school “because we are considered an ‘ISIL family.’ I wanted to go to Mosul to try to get the necessary documents, but I do not have money to go.”¹⁶⁸

D.2.2. Security

Same as in Haj Ali, newly arrived IDPs are initially assigned to blocks and tents randomly, but they often voluntarily relocate to other blocks where members of their extended families and tribes live because they feel safer among members of their own social group.¹⁶⁹ One IDP, “Laila,” revealed that she has been lying about her tribal identity since arriving at the camp, pretending to belong to the Jabour tribe rather than her real tribe (al-Ghesh), because the latter is widely believed to have collaborated with ISIL.¹⁷⁰

Hassan Sham has received a number of former prisoners who were detained on ISIL-related charges in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and subsequently released after being cleared of suspicion, which may affect social dynamics in the camp.¹⁷¹

D.2.3. Gender-Based Violence

According to some interviewees and focus group participants, gender-based violence and sexual harassment are not common problems in Hassan Sham. “Salima” said that neither she nor her daughters have experienced any harassment in the camp and attributed its absence to the presence of security forces and a 10-p.m. curfew.¹⁷² However, others were aware of cases of sexual harassment and exploitation. According to “Sondas,” some women in the camp “have engaged in sexual relations with camp administrators to obtain benefits including better food and new tents. I believe that most of these relationships are not consensual but are coerced through blackmail or threats of force.”¹⁷³

¹⁶⁴ Interview with “Laith” in Hassan Sham Camp (male, 31, IDP from Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul) on January 30, 2019.

¹⁶⁵ Interview with “Laila” in Hassan Sham Camp (female, 31, IDP from Wadi Hajar, West Mosul) on January 30, 2019.

¹⁶⁶ Interview with “Salima” in Hassan Sham Camp (female, 48, IDP from Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul) on January 30, 2019.

¹⁶⁷ Comment by focus group participant in Hassan Sham Camp (male, 20s) on January 23, 2019.

¹⁶⁸ Interview with “Laila” in Hassan Sham Camp (female, 31, IDP from Wadi Hajar, West Mosul) on January 30, 2019.

¹⁶⁹ Interview with “Laith” in Hassan Sham Camp (male, 31, IDP from Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul) on January 30, 2019.

¹⁷⁰ Interview with “Laila” in Hassan Sham Camp (female, 31, IDP from Wadi Hajar, West Mosul) on January 30, 2019.

¹⁷¹ Interview with “Laith” in Hassan Sham Camp (male, 31, IDP from Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul) on January 30, 2019.

¹⁷² Interview with “Salima” in Hassan Sham Camp (female, 48, IDP from Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul) on January 30, 2019.

¹⁷³ Interview with “Sondas” in Hassan Sham Camp (female, 39, IDP from Wadi Hajar, West Mosul) on January 30, 2019.



D.3. QAYYARAH AIRSTRIP CAMP

The Qayyarah Airstrip Camp, located in Niewa Province, was established in November 2015.

Its current population is approximately 13,613 families (52,598 individuals).

D.3.1. Services

Many IDPs perceived the quality and quantity of services being provided in Qayyarah Airstrip Camp to be worse than in Mosul, particularly education and healthcare. One noted that “when it rains, the camp turns into a lake, flooding our tents and school trailers. Most of our belongings have been destroyed by water damage.”¹⁷⁴ Several IDPs complained about the inadequacy of schools in the camps. One said that “there is no curriculum”¹⁷⁵ and another complained that “most teachers are volunteers who are not qualified.”¹⁷⁶ One man said that the quality of education in the camp is so poor that he had sent his children to live with their uncle in Mosul in order to be able to attend school in the city.¹⁷⁷ The camp has three health centers, but women said that their services are limited: “There is only one center where women can give birth and there is not enough equipment.”¹⁷⁸ However, even though “services in Mosul are better than in this camp,” many IDPs feel that they have no choice but to stay in the camp due to “lack of job opportunities in the city.”¹⁷⁹

D.3.2. Security

One IDP was aware of cases in which victims of ISIL living in the camp had engaged in acts of violence and revenge against other camp residents with family ties to the group.¹⁸⁰ Another reported that “ISIL families” in the camp are living in a state of de facto imprisonment “because security forces are not allowing them to leave.”¹⁸¹ Some tents were set on fire during the summer of 2018 in what one IDP described as “acts of revenge toward ISIL families.”¹⁸² Another female IDP confirmed these arson attacks, saying that their “husband and neighbors started to keep watch in shifts. One group would guard the tents from midnight until 3 a.m. and then another group would take over until morning.”¹⁸³

D.3.3. Gender-Based Violence

IDPs in Qayyarah reported that some women in the camp have experienced sexual harassment but are generally safe if they live near members of their family or tribe.¹⁸⁴ However, given the small and non-random sample of individuals interviewed for this study, we should not assume that gender-based violence is absent from Qayyarah.¹⁸⁵

¹⁷⁴ Comment by focus group participant in Qayyarah Airstrip Camp (female, 40s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 12, 2019.

¹⁷⁵ Comment by focus group participant in Qayyarah Airstrip Camp (male, 40s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 12, 2019.

¹⁷⁶ Comment by focus group participant in Qayyarah Airstrip Camp (male, 20s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 12, 2019.

¹⁷⁷ Comment by focus group participant in Qayyarah Airstrip Camp (male, 30s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 12, 2019.

¹⁷⁸ Comment by focus group participant in Qayyarah Airstrip Camp (female, 30s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 12, 2019.

¹⁷⁹ Comment by focus group participant in Qayyarah Airstrip Camp (female, 30s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 12, 2019.

¹⁸⁰ Comment by focus group participant in Qayyarah Airstrip Camp (male, 30s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 12, 2019.

¹⁸¹ Comment by focus group participant in Qayyarah Airstrip Camp (male, 40s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 12, 2019.

¹⁸² Comment by focus group participant in Qayyarah Airstrip Camp (male, 20s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 12, 2019.

¹⁸³ Comment by focus group participant in Qayyarah Airstrip Camp (female, 20s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 12, 2019.

¹⁸⁴ Comment by focus group participant in Qayyarah Airstrip Camp (male, 20s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 12, 2019.

¹⁸⁵ There has been quite some reporting on GBV and sexual harassment in camps, see for instance <https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5ad84a274.pdf>.



E. DYNAMICS IN WEST MOSUL AFFECTING STAYERS AND RETURNEES

Although 18 months have passed since the Iraqi government officially declared victory over ISIL, the city of Mosul, and particularly West Mosul, which was the group's final stronghold in Iraq, is still facing severe challenges.

The number of civilian casualties resulting from the battle is estimated to be somewhere between 9,000 and 11,000.¹⁸⁶ The United Nations has estimated that approximately 130,000 homes were destroyed during the battle and that the city is still littered with approximately 8 million tons of rubble and garbage, which could take up to 10 years to clean up.¹⁸⁷

Entire neighborhoods have not yet been rebuilt. Basic services are insufficient or non-existent in some areas. Poor sanitation is contributing to serious public health problems and the spread of diseases. Reports of harassment and violence against civilians by Iraqi security forces are undermining trust in state institutions and authorities. Revenge killings and other acts of retaliation against residents of Mosul and IDPs who are suspected of joining or collaborating with ISIL have continued since the battle, threatening to trigger new cycles of inter-communal violence.

E.1. MENTAL AND CONFLICT-RELATED GRIEVANCES SPECIFIC TO STAYERS

As noted in the discussion above, stayers are more likely than IDPs and returnees to have experienced physical injuries during the battle for Mosul. The recent experiences of stayers differ from those of IDPs and returnees in other ways

that have important implications for the tailoring of programming and assistance to the needs of these different social groups. Stayers were exposed to ISIL's ideology, institutions, and harshly enforced rules for more than three years and were more vulnerable to indoctrination and recruitment by ISIL than those who left Mosul, particularly young children who continued attending schools taken over by ISIL.¹⁸⁸ Although schools have reopened and the Iraqi government's curriculum has been reinstated, children are having difficulty learning because many parents kept their children out of ISIL schools to protect them from the group's ideology. According to one interviewee in west Mosul, "Many children in Mosul cannot read or write. Furthermore, they have social and behavioral problems with their classmates because many of them have been traumatized by experiencing or witnessing violence."¹⁸⁹

Some adult stayers were also exposed to indoctrination because they had previously worked for the Iraqi government or security forces and were therefore considered apostates.¹⁹⁰ In order to live under ISIL rule, these stayers were required by ISIL to declare "repentance for their apostasy, a process that the group referred to as *"tawba"* (توبة), which required swearing an oath of allegiance, completing a training course on ISIL's ideology¹⁹¹ and paying a fee in exchange for a special certificate of repentance.¹⁹²



Many stayers reported that they desperately wanted to leave Mosul but could not afford to pay smugglers¹⁹³ and were afraid to risk death by trying to escape on their own. As one stayer explained, "Some people sold everything they had in order to hire smugglers to help them escape, but most people were too poor. ISIL killed anyone they caught trying to escape."¹⁹⁴

ISIL also became increasingly violent toward civilians over time, particularly as the group began to lose control over Mosul. According to one man who was in west Mosul

throughout the battle, "When ISIL started to lose territory, they became more desperate and extreme. They started using civilians as human shields to make it more difficult for the coalition to drop airstrikes without killing civilians. With every neighborhood they lost, they became more violent toward civilians."¹⁹⁵ These experiences with extreme violence for a prolonged period of time (more than three years) should be taken into consideration in the design of reintegration and stabilization programming.

¹⁸⁶ Susannah George, "Mosul is a graveyard: Final IS battle kills 9,000 civilians," Associated Press (December 20, 2017), <https://apnews.com/bbea7094fb954838a2fdc11278d65460>.

¹⁸⁷ Danish Demining Group, "Hidden bombs and eight million tonnes of rubble keep the people of Mosul from returning home," (February 19, 2019), <https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/hidden-bombs-and-eight-million-tonnes-rubble-keep-people-mosul-returning-home>.

¹⁸⁸ Mara Revkin, "Chapter 4: 'I am Nothing Without a Weapon': Understanding Child Recruitment and Use by Armed Groups in Syria and Iraq," United Nations University (2018), https://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:6409/Cradled_by_Conflict.pdf.

¹⁸⁹ Interview with "Fadila" in Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul (female, 53, stayer from Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul) on February 18, 2019.

¹⁹⁰ Comment by focus group participant in Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul (male, 20s, "stayer" from Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul) on February 19, 2019.

¹⁹¹ Aymenn al-Tamimi, "Specimen 3A: Training Session for Teachers in Aleppo Province, May 2014," Aymenn al-Taimimi (May 2014), <http://www.aymennjawad.org/2015/01/archive-of-islamic-state-administrative-documents>.

¹⁹² Aymenn al-Tamimi, "Repentance: Financial Income for the Islamic State," Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi (September 28, 2015), <http://www.aymennjawad.org/2015/09/repentance-financial-income-for-the-islamic-state>.

¹⁹³ IRIN, "The cost of freedom from Islamic State," (October 29, 2015), <http://www.irinnews.org/report/102169/cost-freedom-islamic-state>.

¹⁹⁴ Comment by focus group participant in Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul (male, 70s, "stayer" from Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul) on February 19, 2019.

¹⁹⁵ Comment by focus group participant in Haj Ali Camp (female, 30s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 14, 2019.

F. CHALLENGES IN WEST MOSUL FOR STAYERS AND RETURNEES

Interviewees in west Mosul reported numerous economic, security, and public health challenges. Some IDPs interviewed in camps said that they had attempted to go back to west Mosul but were forced to return to camps after they were unable to find safe housing or jobs.

One female IDP in Haj Ali said that after west Mosul was liberated, she and her family attempted to move back to their former neighborhood (al-Jadida) “but the difficulty of the financial situation made us return to the camp again.”¹⁹⁶

F.1. PUBLIC HEALTH RISKS

Returnees in west Mosul are facing several public health risks stemming from poor sanitation. The local civil defense is responsible for the removal of civilian bodies in west Mosul, but the process has been slow as a result of limited resources and the magnitude of the task. Additionally, some members of the civil defense have reportedly refused to remove bodies believed to have been ISIL members or supporters. Therefore, a significant number of bodies are continuing to decompose above ground, spreading diseases.¹⁹⁷ In January 2018, an Iraqi member of parliament from Ninewa estimated that 4,000 bodies still needed to be recovered from the Old City of west Mosul.¹⁹⁸ A significant number of bodies (at least 1,200) have been removed by civilian volunteers using improvised tools.¹⁹⁹ “Fadila,” a stayer from the west Mosul neighborhood of Islah al-Zarai, reported that “the large number of decaying bodies combined with flooding is spreading diseases throughout west Mosul. There are terrible smells in our neighborhood and children who play outside get skin rashes and other illnesses.”²⁰⁰ Although

scabies is widespread in Mosul, humanitarians attribute its spread primarily to poor hygiene and water quality rather than to the presence of decaying corpses, suggesting that some of the Moslawis interviewed for this study are misinformed about the causes of disease.

F.2. HARASSMENT AND REVENGE BY SECURITY FORCES AND OTHER COMMUNITY MEMBERS

Several interviewees and focus group participants, including “stayers” who never left the city and “returnees” who have come back to the city since the battle, identified harassment by Iraqi security forces as a significant threat in west Mosul. “Salima,” an IDP in Hassan Sham, attempted to return to her home in the Islah al-Zarai neighborhood and to search for her missing husband there, but was told to leave by an Iraqi security officer. More than one Iraqi security officer sexually harassed her unmarried daughters including by “asking me to trade one of my daughters in exchange for permission to return to my home. Now I am afraid to return until my daughters get married.”²⁰¹ IDPs in Qayyarah Airstrip Camp who have made brief visits to Mosul to visit friends and family since the battle reported that “we are always harassed by security forces in the city, so we feel that it is better for us to stay here in the camp where we are safe and do not fear for our lives.”²⁰²

Stayers in west Mosul complained that they are being unfairly punished and stigmatized for their perceived collaboration, while “the real ISIL members are paying bribes to escape from prison or trading information to Iraqi security forces in exchange for their freedom.”²⁰³ They also complained that the Iraqi government is unfairly blaming west Moslawis for ISIL’s capture of the city “when they should be holding the military and security forces accountable for allowing 200 fighters to capture the city in just a few days, without any resistance. They blame West Moslawis for cheering on ISIL. But where were the military and security forces? They abandoned us, and now we are being punished for their failure.”²⁰⁴

Stayers and returnees are also afraid of retaliation by tribes based on tribal law principles of collective responsibility that allow relatives of ISIL members to be held vicariously liable for crimes that they did not personally commit. One woman reported, “When tribal authorities decide who is guilty of supporting ISIL, they are supposed to have three witnesses. But often, they do not have proof and many innocent people are being falsely accused by personal enemies who are looking for any opportunity to take revenge for old disputes and disagreements.”²⁰⁵

Many residents of west Mosul reported that there has been a significant increase in sexual harassment of women, both by security forces and by other civilians, since Mosul was recaptured. The head of an IOM Community Policing Forum in west Mosul identified several factors that are contributing to this trend: the sudden end of ISIL’s policy of strict gender segregation combined with renewed access to cell phones and the

internet (which ISIL had banned) and a large number of single women who are vulnerable to exploitation.²⁰⁶ Opportunism is another factor. Since female family members of ISIL affiliates are highly stigmatized, men may feel that they can harass them with impunity. Due to the destruction or loss of large numbers of critical documents during the conflict, many women need new documents including ID cards, marriage licenses, or birth certificates for children. One interviewee reported several cases in which Iraqi government officials and security forces have asked women to pay bribes or offer sexual favors in exchange for such documents.²⁰⁷

F.3. LACK OF SECURE HOUSING

Most stayers lack the resources to pay the costs of rebuilding their own homes, and the reconstruction assistance being provided by NGOs and the Iraqi government is insufficient to meet their needs. As one man expressed in frustration, “We don’t want charity or small cash handouts, we want real justice and reconstruction of houses.”²⁰⁸ Even those who have money to repair or rebuild their homes are sometimes reluctant to do so because of uncertainty about the future and fear that ISIL or another extremist group will recapture the city. As one man explained, “We are not very motivated to rebuild our houses and neighborhoods or start new businesses because the future is so uncertain. We don’t trust the government or security forces. If ISIL comes back, they might abandon Mosul like they did before [in 2014].”²⁰⁹

196 Comment by focus group participant in Haj Ali Camp (female, 30s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 14, 2019.

197 Raya Jalabi, “Battle over bodies rages quietly in Iraq’s Mosul long after Islamic State defeat,” Reuters (February 5, 2018), <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-mosul-bodies-insight/battle-over-bodies-rages-quietly-in-iraqs-mosul-long-after-islamic-state-defeat-idUSKBN1FP129>.

198 The Baghdad Post, “Civil Defense completes recovery of bodies under rubble in Mosul,” (January 12, 2018), <https://www.thebaghdadpost.com/en/Story/22279/Civil-Defense-completes-recovery-of-bodies-under-rubble-in-Mosul>.

199 Vincent Haiges, “Mosul’s body collectors,” Al Jazeera (May 31, 2018), <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/mosul-body-collectors-180530113119652.html>.

200 Interview with “Fadila” in Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul (female, 53, stayer from Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul) on February 18, 2019.

201 Interview with “Salima” in Hassan Sham Camp (female, 48, IDP from Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul) on January 30, 2019.

202 Comment by focus group participant in Hassan Sham Camp (male, 20s, IDP from West Mosul) on January 23, 2019.

203 Comment by focus group participant in Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul (male, 70s, “stayer” from Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul) on February 19, 2019.

204 Comment by focus group participant in Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul (male, 20s, “stayer” from Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul) on February 19, 2019.

205 Comment by focus group participant in Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul (female, 40s, “stayer” from Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul) on February 19, 2019.

206 Interview with “Dalia” in Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul (female, returnee from Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul) on February 27, 2019.

207 Interview with “Sara” in Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul (female, 32, late-leaver/returnee from al-Qasr village southeast of Mosul) on February 27, 2019.

208 Comment by focus group participant in Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul (male, 20s, “stayer” from Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul) on February 19, 2019.

209 Interview with “Kamal” in Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul (male, 54, stayer from Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul) on February 19, 2019.

F.4. ECONOMIC INSECURITY AND LACK OF ESSENTIAL SERVICES

Some returnees previously living in IDP camps came back to Mosul because they expected that living conditions would be better there. However, they have been disappointed to find that economic conditions and services are just as bad and in some cases worse than in IDP camps. One woman returned from Sheikhan camp to west Mosul so that her five children could attend school in the city “because they were not learning anything in the camp. But there are no jobs here and we are completely dependent on charity and handouts from NGOs. On days when we do not receive food assistance, we are hungry.”²¹⁰ Another resident of west Mosul said that “humanitarian assistance is not enough. I am borrowing food from stores and promising to pay for it in the future even though I don’t know when I will be able to repay my debts.”²¹¹

Several stayers said that they may be forced to move to camps in the near future due to their inability to afford the costs of living in west Mosul. “If the current situation does not improve, most of us will move to camps because everything there is free,” said one man.²¹²

F.5. PERCEIVED INEQUALITIES IN RECONSTRUCTION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST MOSUL

Many interviews and focus group members expressed concerns that aid is being intentionally withheld from west Mosul neighborhoods perceived as sympathetic to ISIL as “punishment” and that east Mosul is receiving more assistance despite having suffered less damage during the battle. Although data indicates that the pace and visibility of reconstruction activities are indeed higher in east Mosul than in west Mosul, this disparity is due to the fact that west Mosul was liberated several months later and sustained higher levels of damage. Nonetheless, the fact that many residents of west Mosul perceive this disparity as intentional discrimination reveals an important gap between perceptions and reality, suggesting a need for greater transparency and more effective communication by the Iraqi government and NGOs.

According to UN Habitat, a total of 391 Risk Reduction and Rehabilitation (RRR) projects have been implemented in east Mosul, compared with the 238 in west Mosul (Table 1).²¹³ The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has 613 projects in east Mosul (completed, under implementation and under assessment), worth approximately USD 339 million compared with 358 projects in west Mosul, worth approximately USD 255 million.²¹⁴ A stabilization specialist with UNDP’s Iraq Mission attributes the disparity to several factors. West Mosul was liberated several months later than east Mosul and sustained higher levels of damage, which required more time-consuming and technical assessments before reconstruction could begin. Relatedly, access to west Mosul was initially hindered because of security measures and the presence of unexploded ordnances. As a result, the reconstruction in west Mosul began 5 to 6 months after reconstruction started in east Mosul.

Over time, the quantity of reconstruction projects planned in west Mosul is projected to catch up with and eventually exceed that in east Mosul. For example, the total number of houses targeted for reconstruction is only 782 in east Mosul compared with 9,511 in west Mosul.²¹⁵

West Mosul, which has a long history of al-Qaeda activity dating back to the early 2000s, was widely perceived as ISIL’s center of power in the city. One IDP in Qayyarah overheard an army officer saying that “The entire western side of Mosul deserves to be killed.”²¹⁶

According to focus group participants and interviewees, discrimination against west Mosul by residents of east Mosul and other Iraqis predates the rise of ISIL in 2014. In addition to having a reputation for harboring al-Qaeda and other extremist groups, west Moslawis were also looked down upon by east Moslawis because they were generally poorer and less educated. One stayer in west Mosul said that his brother, despite receiving an entrance exam score in the top 10 percent, which should have guaranteed him acceptance to a Master’s degree program at the University of Mosul, was denied admission. He is convinced that the university rejected him because he was from west Mosul.²¹⁷ This stayer believes that the historical tensions between east and west Mosul have deepened since the city was recaptured from ISIL for two reasons. First, “the media and government have led people to believe that all stayers in west Mosul were ISIL collaborators, even though this is not true; many of us were victims of ISIL and were trapped here even though we wanted to leave. Some of us even risked our lives to help religious minorities like Yazidis and Christians to escape.”²¹⁸

Second, east Mosul is receiving a disproportionate amount of reconstruction resources and assistance “even though the need for reconstruction is much greater in west Mosul.”²¹⁹

Stayers from the west Mosul neighborhood of Islah al-Zarai perceive that they are being punished by the Iraqi government, UN agencies, NGOs, and private companies in several ways. One man said that west Moslawis’ resentment of east Mosul is growing because “compared to this neighborhood [in west Mosul], east Mosul looks like Paris.” Furthermore, “All the job opportunities are in east Mosul because that is where reconstruction is happening and businesses have reopened, but employers prefer to hire east Moslawis for these jobs because they do not trust west Moslawis and suspect us of supporting ISIL.”²²⁰ Another man reported that even when companies do employ residents of west Mosul, “They pay us less than east Moslawis to do the same jobs.”²²¹ Others reported that the Iraqi government is providing more generous and higher quality food rations and other welfare services in east Mosul than in west Mosul. “We receive fewer vouchers for rice and sugar than people in east Mosul and we believe that the government is being intentionally unequal and unfair to punish us.”²²²

210 Comment by focus group participant in Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul (female, 40s, “returnee” from Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul) on February 19, 2019.

211 Interview with “Fadila” in Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul (female, 53, stayer from Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul) on February 18, 2019.

212 Comment by focus group participant in Hassan Sham Camp (male, 50s, IDP from West Mosul) on January 23, 2019.

213 Data courtesy of UN Habitat.

214 Data courtesy of UNDP.

215 Data courtesy of UN Habitat.

216 Comment by focus group participant in Qayyarah Airstrip Camp (male, 40s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 12, 2019.

217 Comment by focus group participant in Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul (male, 20s, “stayer” from Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul) on February 19, 2019.

218 Id.

219 Id.

220 Comment by focus group participant in Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul (male, 70s, “stayer” from Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul) on February 19, 2019.

221 Comment by focus group participant in Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul (male, 20s, “stayer” from Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul) on February 19, 2019.

222 Comment by focus group participant in Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul (male, 50s, “stayer” from Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul) on February 19, 2019.

IDPs interviewed in camps also perceive inequality in the provision of services and pace of reconstruction between east and west Mosul. One female IDP in Haj Ali said, “Services in east Mosul are better than in west Mosul. However, west Mosul is still mostly destroyed, so before talking about services, the government first needs to rebuild this area.”²²³ Another said that the greatest social conflict are not between stayers and returnees but, rather, “between people from east and west Mosul. Those of us from west Mosul feel that east Moslawis are taking advantage of our situation. Our homes suffered more damage so we have greater need for housing. But instead of helping us, east Moslawis are increasing the rents [referring to housing costs in east Mosul].”²²⁴

F.6. CORRUPTION, BRIBERY, AND PATRONAGE

In addition to inequalities between east and west Mosul, stayers and returnees expressed concern that corrupt businesses, politicians, and local strongmen are exploiting the influx of funding for reconstruction and humanitarian assistance to benefit themselves or friends and family members. One resident of west Mosul said that her neighborhood’s “mukhtar” (a community leader) is corrupt and diverting humanitarian assistance away from those who need it, mostly in order to reward his supporters and enrich his own family: “Many mukhtars in Mosul have become very rich because they are the gatekeepers to the community and all security forces and humanitarian groups must negotiate with them for access. This gives the mukhtars power and opportunity to exploit and mismanage assistance that is provided to their neighborhoods.”²²⁵ According to one resident of west Mosul, “Some NGOs are not helping the poorest people. They are only helping rich people and those with connections.”²²⁶ Another women in west Mosul reported that “some security forces are corrupt and let ISIL members or ISIL families return back to Mosul in exchange for money.”²²⁷

223 Comment by focus group participant in Haj Ali Camp (female, 40s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 14, 2019.

224 Comment by focus group participant in Haj Ali Camp (female, 30s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 14, 2019.

225 Interview with “Fadila” in Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul (female, 53, stayer from Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul) on February 18, 2019.

226 Comment by focus group participant in Qayyarah Airstrip Camp (male, 60s, IDP from West Mosul) on February 12, 2019.

227 Comment by focus group participant in Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul (female, 50s, “stayer” from Islah al-Zarai, West Mosul) on February 18, 2019.



CONCLUSIONS

This report, commissioned by the Community Stabilization Unit of the International Organization for Migration Iraq Mission, has provided an overview of current barriers to return and the challenges and risks that IDPs face if and when they decide to return to west Mosul.

This research highlighted two main issues that need to be addressed to ensure that the return of those who remain displaced is safe, dignified and sustainable, and does not trigger new cycles of intercommunal conflict: (1) mutual distrust and resentment between different social groups (IDPs, stayers and returnees) often stemming from suspicion of membership in or collaboration with ISIL and resulting fears of revenge and harassment by other civilians or security forces and (2) insufficient services, education, and job opportunities in west Mosul. IDPs who choose to remain in camps face additional challenges. Long-term residence in camps may hinder their access to essential services, expose them to security risks that are sometimes present in camps and exacerbate social stigma and isolation. These findings provide relevant insights for humanitarian programming in IDP camps and development programming in Mosul, as well as on the positioning of the international community vis-à-vis Iraqi government plans for the rehabilitation of ISIL-affiliated families, including families who may soon return from Al-Hol, Syria.

First, when it comes to programming in the camps and in Mosul, it is important to note that perceptions of corruption in the reconstruction process are widespread among Mosul residents; frustration with corruption has been identified as a driver of conflict. Although data indicates that the pace and visibility of reconstruction activities are indeed higher in east

Mosul, the disparity is due to the fact that west Mosul was retaken several months later and sustained higher levels of damage. Nonetheless, the fact that many residents of west Mosul perceive this disparity as intentional discrimination is important and reveals a need for greater transparency and more effective communication by the Iraqi government, UN agencies and NGOs about the process of reconstruction, as well as humanitarian assistance, social cohesion and reintegration initiatives. Communication on inequalities should also take into account the need to inform communities still residing in IDP camps of plans for reconstruction of their areas of origin and restoration of essential services, in order to alleviate their sense of despair, hopelessness, and frustration.

Second, humanitarian organizations should develop a comprehensive strategy for transitional livelihood programming to support job growth and ultimately address endemic economic inequality. Such a strategy should include cash-for-work programming, support for business start-ups, and other investment strategies for the local economy. Unemployment among men (increasing risks of criminality or recruitment by armed groups) as well as for women (particularly single women, whose lack of economic independence makes them vulnerable to many forms of exploitation, including sexual abuse and human trafficking) is a key concern which requires specific employment programming adapted to the displacement context.

Third, this report identifies the need to develop strategic, context sensitive and principled programming to facilitate the return and reintegration of ISIL families. It should not be assumed that those who stayed behind in ISIL-occupied Mosul and/or came into contact with ISIL through family links carried out acts in support of ISIL or share the group's ideological underpinnings. The government should develop a robust approach to individual screening to determine, on a case-by-case basis, individual needs and vulnerabilities. Based on the initial screening, some individuals may undergo a more in-depth assessment and, potentially, be referred to a resocialization programme. Alongside resocialization programming, there is a need to consider and reach a common understanding of conditions (social, economic, and political) which enabled the rise of extremist groups such as ISIL in Iraq, and to look at remedial short, medium, and long-term actions to address them. Such programming should be gender-sensitive, taking into account how women and men previously associated with ISIL may have had different experiences and therefore different needs. In particular, there is a need for programming to address the large number of female-headed households and/or single women residing in camps whose husbands, sons or fathers are alleged ISIL fighters, most of whom are now either missing or dead. Resocialization programming should also be gender-sensitive because women who were affiliated with ISIL, either voluntarily or involuntarily, often had very different motivations than men who were affiliated, and they may therefore be more responsive to programming designed specifically to resonate with women.

At the same time, those individuals who are not found to be 'at risk' in terms of affiliation, ideology, action orientation and other factors should be supported to return to their areas of origin through measures to address their material needs (shelter, access to basic services, etc.), activities to address their stigmatization, community-service projects and other

supportive actions to promote the trust and buy-in of the population in areas of origin. Even prior to their return, measures may help bridge the lack of empathy between families who remain in IDP camps and families in their communities of origin, raising awareness on the complex and varied reasons why people left or remained behind in ISIL-occupied Mosul; experiences and suffering in displacement; and the needs and grievances of different social groups.

Some actors, including IOM, are already engaged in promising dialogue initiatives on the ground. Noteworthy are IOM's community centers, which provides place to rebuild trust between communities divided by conflict (including stayers and IDPs) and IOM's Community Policing Forums, which facilitate discussions between civilians and Iraqi security forces aimed at peacefully resolving local concerns, including concerns about the return of individuals previously associated with ISIL. Encouraging the participation of well-respected local community leaders in these dialogues will increase the likelihood of local buy-in and long-term sustainability. These dialogue initiatives need to be complemented with training of Iraqi security forces in methods of community-oriented policing and human rights principles, just as IOM is already doing through its Community Policing Program, to encourage fair and consistent treatment of individuals accused of association with ISIL, recognizing that access to justice is an important safeguard against future radicalization. Advising and training of security forces should also emphasize the importance of protecting vulnerable groups against exploitation, particularly sexual and gender-based violence.

Finally, this report concludes with a call for additional research and data collection to better understand the experiences and needs of populations affected by the recent conflict in order to tailor programming accordingly and fill significant gaps in knowledge concerning best practices for peacebuilding and the prevention of conflict recurrence.

APPENDIX 1

Table 1. Summary of Haj Ali Focus Groups

FOCUS GROUP OF MEN			
Date	Number of Participants	Age Range	Neighborhoods of Origin
02.14.2019	12	25-60	al-Rifai (4), al-Midan (2), al-Tanak (3), Arabi (2), Wadi Hajr (1)
FOCUS GROUP OF WOMEN			
Date	Number of Participants	Age Range	Neighborhoods of Origin
02.14.2019	10	23-50	Old City (3), al-Jadida (3), al-Nahrawan (2), Islah al-Zarai (1), al-Mamoun (1)

Table 2. Summary of Haj Ali Individual Interviews

Date	Age	Gender	Pseudonym	Date of Displacement from Mosul	Neighborhoods of Origin
2/14/2019	60	Female	Basma	2017	Islah al-Zarai

Table 3. Summary of Qayarrah Focus Groups

FOCUS GROUP OF MEN			
Date	Number of Participants	Age Range	Neighborhoods of Origin
02.12.2019	12	25-50	Islah al-Zarai (2), Old City (3), al-Tanak (3), al-Mamoun (2), Wadi Hajr (2)
FOCUS GROUP OF WOMEN			
Date	Number of Participants	Age Range	Neighborhoods of Origin
02.12.2019	10	20-50	Islah al-Zarai (2), Old City (3), al-Tanak (3), al-Mamoun (2), Wadi Hajr (2)
FOCUS GROUP OF YOUTH			
Date	Number of Participants	Age Range	Neighborhoods of Origin
02.12.2019	9	18-23	Islah al-Zarai (4), al-Midan (1), al-Tanak (2), Uraybi (1), Wadi Hajr (1)

Table 4. Summary of Qayarrah Individual Interviews

Date	Age	Gender	Pseudonym	Date of Displacement from Mosul	Neighborhoods of Origin
02.13.2019	40	Male	Jabar	February 2017	Uraybi
02.13.2019	24	Female	Sabah	August 2017	Farouq
02.13.2019	29	Female	Wafah	July 2017	Al-Mamoun
02.13.2019	37	Female	Atherah	2017	Al-Mamoun

Table 5. Summary of Hassan Sham Focus Groups

FOCUS GROUP OF MEN			
Date	Number of Participants	Age Range	Neighborhoods of Origin
02.24.2019	8	30-50	Al-Shifa (1), 17th July (1), Bab al-Hadid (1), Bab al-Baydh (1), al-Jadida (1), Farouq (1), Ras al-Jada (1)
FOCUS GROUP OF WOMEN			
Date	Number of Participants	Age Range	Neighborhoods of Origin
01.23.2019	8	25-40	al-Shura town south of Mosul (1), Wadi Hajr (2), Islah al-Zarai (1), Iqtisadiyin (2), al-Tanak (2)
FOCUS GROUP OF YOUTH			
Date	Number of Participants	Age Range	Neighborhoods of Origin
01.23.2019	8	18-23	Al-Shirqat town south of Mosul (1), Old City (2), al-Jadida (1), Islah al-Zarai (2), al-Rifai (2)

Table 6. Summary of Hassan Sham Individual Interviews

Date	Age	Gender	Pseudonym	Date of Displacement from Mosul	Neighborhoods of Origin
01.23.2019	31	Male	Laith	April 2017	Islah al-Zarai
01.30.2019	31	Female	Laila	March 2017	Wadi Hajr
01.30.2019	48	Female	Salima	July 2017	Islah al-Zarai
01.30.2019	39	Female	Sondas	August 2016	Al-Intisar
01.30.2019	40	Male	Homad	May 2017	Islah al-Zarai

Table 7. Summary of West Mosul Focus Groups

FOCUS GROUP OF MEN				
Date	Number of Participants	Age Range	Displacement Status	Neighborhoods of Origin
02.19.2019	8	20-70	7 Stayers, 1 Late Leaver/ Returnee (2017)	Islah al-Zarai (8)
FOCUS GROUP OF WOMEN #1				
Date	Number of Participants	Age Range	Displacement Status	Neighborhoods of Origin
02.18.2019	9	30-70	9 Stayers	Islah al-Zarai (9)
FOCUS GROUP OF WOMEN #2				
Date	Number of Participants	Age Range	Displacement Status	Neighborhoods of Origin
02.27.2019	6	20-70	6 Stayers	Islah al-Zarai (2), al-Thawra (1), Qayarra (1), al-Qasr village (1), al-Ayadi town (1)

Table 8. Summary of West Mosul Individual Interviews²²⁸

Date	Age	Gender	Pseudonym	Date of Displacement from Mosul	Neighborhoods of Origin
02.18.2019	53	Female	Fadila	Stayer	Islah al-Zarai
02.19.2019	34	Male	Samer	Late Leaver (2017) / Returnee	Islah al-Zarai
01.30.2019	54	Male	Kamal	Stayer	Islah al-Zaraiw
02.27.2019	40s	Female	Dalia	Returnee	Islah al-Zarai
02.27.2019	31	Female	Noora	Stayer	Originally from Islah al-Zarai but lived in Qayarra during IS rule (town south of Mosul)
02.27.2019	21	Female	Aisha	Stayer, moved to Islah al-Zarai in 2016	Al-Ayadi (town west of Mosul)
02.27.2019	32	Female	Sara	Late Leaver (2017) / Returnee	Al-Qasr (village southeast of Mosul)

²²⁸ In West Mosul, some focus group participants were selected for individual interviews following the focus groups, whereas in the IDP camps, the individual interviewees were identified and selected independently of the focus groups.

WEST MOSUL

PERCEPTIONS ON RETURN AND REINTEGRATION AMONG STAYEES, IDPS AND RETURNEES

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