

Global IDP
DATABASE

8/2-04

**PROFILE OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT :
SOMALIA**

Compilation of the information available in the Global IDP
Database of the Norwegian Refugee Council

(as of 6 May, 2004)

Also available at <http://www.idpproject.org>

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CONTENTS

CONTENTS	1
PROFILE SUMMARY	6
SOMALIA: DRASTIC INCREASE IN FUNDING NEEDED FOR PROTECTION AND REINTEGRATION OF IDPs	6
CAUSES AND BACKGROUND OF DISPLACEMENT	11
BACKGROUND	11
SIAD BARRE'S COUNTER-INSURGENCY AGAINST THE ISAAK-DOMINATED SOMALI NATIONAL MOVEMENT IN THE 1980S	11
THE FALL OF BARRE REGIME IN 1991 WAS FOLLOWED BY ALL OUT INTER-CLAN WAR	12
MINORITIES IN SOMALIA: A HISTORY OF SEGREGATION AND LAND EXPROPRIATION	13
SELF-PROCLAIMED REPUBLIC OF SOMALILAND IN 1991 STILL NO INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION (2004)	16
TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL GOVERNMENT (TNG) ELECTED IN AUGUST 2000 LACKS RECOGNITION AND HAS LIMITED CONTROL OVER THE COUNTRY (2003)	19
DE FACTO REGIONAL GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED IN PUNTLAND IN 1998 (2003)	21
A FACTION OF THE RAHANWEYN RESISTANCE ARMY (RRA) PROCLAIMS AUTONOMY OVER THE 'STATE OF SOUTHWESTERN SOMALIA' (SWS) IN APRIL 2002	22
NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES ACCUSED OF BEING INVOLVED IN SOMALI CIVIL WAR, VIOLATING ARMS EMBARGO (1996-2004)	24
TWO APPROACHES TO POLITICAL CONSOLIDATION IN SOMALIA (1991-2002)	26
IRIN-CEA CHRONOLOGY OF THE CONFLICT IN SOMALIA (1960-2000)	27
CAUSES OF DISPLACEMENT	29
MASS DISPLACEMENT BEGAN WITH OUTBREAK OF CIVIL WAR IN 1988	29
THOUSANDS FORCED TO FLEE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN AIDEED-CONTROLLED AREAS DURING LATE 1990S	30
CLAN-BASED COMPETITION OVER RESOURCES IS THE MAIN CAUSE OF DISPLACEMENT (2004)	30
INTERMITTENT INTER-FACTIONAL CONFLICTS IN SOUTHERN AND CENTRAL SOMALIA CAUSE DEATH AND DISPLACEMENT (2003)	32
CRUEL COMBINATION OF CONFLICT AND CLIMATIC EXTREMES CAUSE REPEATED DISPLACEMENTS IN SOMALIA	35
PEACE EFFORTS	37
THE SOMALI NATIONAL RECONCILIATION CONFERENCE UNDER THE AUSPICES OF IGAD (OCT 2002-2004)	37
ARTA DJIBOUTI PEACE PROCESS RESULTED IN CREATION OF THE TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL GOVERNMENT (TNG) (AUGUST 2000)	40
OVER TEN YEARS OF PEACE EFFORTS IN SOMALIA ACHIEVED LITTLE SUCCESS (2003)	41

POPULATION PROFILE AND FIGURES	43
GLOBAL FIGURES	43
AN ESTIMATED 375,000 PERSONS REMAIN DISPLACED IN SOMALIA (APR 2004)	43
GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION	46
IDPs IN NORTHWESTERN SOMALIA: SOMALILAND (2004)	46
IDPs IN SOUTHERN AND CENTRAL SOMALIA (2004)	47
IDPs IN NORTHEASTERN SOMALIA: PUNTLAND (2004)	50
DISAGGREGATED DATA	51
RECENT RETURNEES FROM ETHIOPIA WHO ARE UNABLE TO REINTEGRATE MAKE UP PORTION OF THE IDP POPULATION (2002)	51
PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT	54
GENERAL	54
IDPs TEND TO FLEE NORTHWARDS WHERE SOME DEGREE OF PEACE AND STABILITY SUBSIST (2002)	54
PEOPLE TEND TO FLEE FROM URBAN AREAS TO MAIN TOWNS (2003)	54
SOMALI FAMILIES MOVE AND SPLIT UP IN ORDER TO SURVIVE (2003)	56
PHYSICAL SECURITY & FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT	58
PHYSICAL SECURITY	58
IDPs IN SOMALIA ARE DELIBERATE TARGETS OF GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW (2004)	58
IDP CAMPS SET ON FIRE IN NORTHERN SOMALIA (2003)	60
"GATEKEEPERS" OR CAMP LEADERS PLAY A DUAL ROLE AS PROTECTORS AND USURPERS OF ASSISTANCE (2003)	60
THE PROTECTION OF IDPs IN SOMALIA DEPENDS ON LOCATION: LIVING IN CLAN "HOME AREAS" (2003)	61
DIRECT CORRELATION BETWEEN MINORITIES AND DISPLACEMENT IN SOMALIA (2003)	62
UNICEF SURVEY ON IDP'S PERCEPTIONS ABOUT THEIR OWN PROTECTION SITUATION (DEC 2003)	65
INTERNALLY DISPLACED WOMEN AND GIRLS LACK PROTECTION (2003)	66
DISPLACED CHILDREN LACK PROTECTION (2004)	68
FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT	69
IDPs FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT HAMPERED BY MILITIA ROADBLOCKS AND EXTORTION (2003)	69
SUBSISTENCE NEEDS	71
GENERAL	71
SOMALIA RANKS AMONG THE FIVE LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 2003	71
FOOD	71
IDPs ARE THREE TIMES MORE AT RISK OF MALNUTRITION THAN RESIDENT POPULATIONS (2004)	72
IDPs NUTRITIONAL STATUS IN VARIOUS REGIONS (2004)	74
HEALTH	77

78% PEOPLE HAVE NO ACCESS TO HEALTH FACILITIES AND HAVE ALARMING HEALTH STATUS (2002)	77
EXTREMELY POOR HEALTH STATUS OF IDPs IN MOST REGIONS OF SOMALIA (2002)	79
WATER AND SANITATION	81
MOST IDPs HAVE NO ACCESS TO SAFE DRINKING WATER AND SANITATION FACILITIES (2003)	81
SHELTER AND NON-FOOD ITEMS	84
MOST IDPs LIVE IN SHACKS IN SLUMS OR IN PUBLIC BUILDINGS (2003)	84
<u>ACCESS TO EDUCATION</u>	86
GENERAL	86
MINIMAL ACCESS TO EDUCATION FOR THE SOMALI POPULATION (2003)	86
IDPs' ACCESS TO EDUCATION IS DETERMINED BY THEIR ABILITY TO PAY FOR PRIVATE SERVICES (2003)	87
SCHOOL ENROLEMENT STATUS IN HARGEISA: THE LOWEST AMONG IDPs POPULATIONS DUE TO BEGGING AND DISCRIMINATION (JUNE 2002)	88
<u>ISSUES OF SELF-RELIANCE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION</u>	90
SELF-RELIANCE	90
IDPs' SURVIVAL STRATEGIES ERODED BY YEARS OF PROTRACTED CONFLICT AND DROUGHT (2003)	90
SELF-RELIANCE IN THE NORTHWEST: SOMALILAND (2003)	92
SELF-RELIANCE IN THE NORTHEAST: PUNTLAND (2003)	95
LIVESTOCK BAN HAS LED TO MAJOR INCOME DEFICITS FOR PASTORALISTS AND IDPs (2000-2003)	96
IDPs SELF RELIANCE IN SOUTHERN AND CENTRAL SOMALIA COMPLICATED BY DROUGHT AND CONFLICT (2002)	99
ACCESS TO LAND	101
IDP WOMEN CANNOT ACCESS LAND WITHOUT MALE SUPPORT (2002)	101
COPING MECHANISMS	101
TRADITIONAL COPING MECHANISMS ERODED BY PROTRACTED CONFLICT AND DROUGHT (2002)	102
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION	103
THERE WAS NO FUNCTIONING COURT ADHERING TO INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS IN SOMALIA EXCEPT IN SOMALILAND (2003)	103
GENDER DISCRIMINATION BARRIER TO PUBLIC PARTICIPATION (1998-2002)	104
<u>ISSUES OF FAMILY UNITY, IDENTITY AND CULTURE</u>	105
GENERAL	105
LINEAGE IDENTITY IS CENTRAL ORGANIZING FORCE IN SOMALIA (2002)	105
<u>PROPERTY ISSUES</u>	107
GENERAL	107
LAND DISPOSSESSION IS THE MAIN DRIVING FORCE BEHIND CONFLICT IN SOMALIA (2003)	107

MOST IDPS FROM SOUTHERN SOMALIA IN HARGEISA RENT LAND FROM PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS (JUNE 2002)	108
BOSASSO IDPS EVICTED FROM THEIR PLOTS BY ORIGINAL OWNERS (2002)	108
<u>PATTERNS OF RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT</u>	110
GENERAL	110
MANY IDPS MAINLY FROM MINORITY GROUPS HAVE NOT BEEN INTEGRATED INTO THE HOST COMMUNITIES (2003)	110
IDPS FROM THE SOUTH HAVE LITTLE TO RETURN TO OWING TO RECURRENT CONFLICTS AND UNCHECKED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS (2003)	111
MAYOR OF BOSASSO REQUESTED ASSISTANCE TO SETTLE SOME OF THE 28,000 IDPS (2002)	113
<u>HUMANITARIAN ACCESS</u>	114
GENERAL	114
SYMPTOMS OF COMPLEX EMERGENCIES HAMPER HUMANITARIAN WORK IN MOST OF SOUTHERN AND CENTRAL SOMALIA (OCT 2003)	114
WARLORDS AND MILITIAS REGULARLY EXTORT HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (2003)	116
INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE IN MOGADISHU ON A VISITING BASIS ONLY (2003)	117
SERIOUS CHALLENGES FACING THE TNG REGARDING IMPROVEMENT OF SECURITY AND HUMANITARIAN ACCESS (2001)	119
<u>NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES</u>	121
NATIONAL RESPONSE	121
AUTHORITIES IN NORTHERN SOMALIA HAVE DONE LITTLE FOR IDPS (2003)	121
COORDINATION	121
THE SOMALIA AID COORDINATING BODY (SACB) (1994-2004)	121
UN COORDINATION (2004)	124
THE NGO CONSORTIUM (2002)	125
UN JOINT ACTION AND RECOVERY PLAN FOR SOMALIA (JARP) LAUNCHED IN 2002	126
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 2004	127
UN CAP 2004 FOR SOMALIA WILL FOCUS ON MEETING THE NEEDS OF IDPS	127
UNDP PROGRAMME FOR THE REINTEGRATION OF RETURNEES AND IDPS (2003)	129
UNDP PROGRAMME TO STRENGTHEN DISTRICT AND LOCAL HEALTH STRUCTURES IN THE NORTHWEST WHERE IDPS AND RETURNEES CONCENTRATE (2003)	131
UNFPA PROGRAMME FOR EMERGENCY REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH FOR IDPS IN PUNTLAND (2003)	132
UNICEF AND UNIFEM PROGRAMME FOR HIV PREVENTION AND CARE (2003)	133
UNDP PROGRAMME FOR RULE OF LAW AND SECURITY, DEMOBILISATION AND REINTEGRATION INCLUDING PSYCHO-SOCIAL SUPPORT PARTICULARLY TARGETED AT IDPS (2003)	135
ODI STUDY ADVOCATES FOR AN INTEGRATED PROTECTION APPROACH TO ASSISTANCE IN SOMALIA (2003)	135
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE PRE-2004	137
CAP 2003 FOCUSES ON INTEGRATION AND PROTECTION OF IDPS	137

UN HUMANITARIAN COORDINATOR CALLED ON THE SOMALI LEADERS TO PUBLICLY REAFFIRM THEIR COMMITMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE PROTECTION OF IDPS IN AREAS THEY CONTROL (2003)	139
IRIN OUTREACH RADIO PROJECT COVERS IDP AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2003)	140
OCHA IDP UNIT WORKSHOP ON VULNERABLE COMMUNITIES IN SOMALIA (2002)	141
RETURN AND REINTEGRATION OF UPROOTED POPULATIONS IS A KEY PRIORITY OF THE UN SINCE 2002	142
NGO RESPONSE	145
UN, RED CROSS MOVEMENT AND OVER 60 NGOS WORK TOGETHER WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (2003)	145
ACTION CONTRE LA FAIM ONE OF THE ONLY INTERNATIONAL NGOS ASSISTING IDPS IN SOMALIA SINCE 1992 (2003)	146
CARE PROJECTS FOR IDPS IN AREAS OF FOOD SECURITY (2002)	147
ISLAMIC ORGANIZATIONS HAVE PROVIDED ASSISTANCE IN MOGADISHU DISPLACED PERSONS' CAMPS (1999)	147
SELECTED ACTIVITIES OF THE RED CROSS MOVEMENT	148
ICRC: THE MOST ACTIVE ORGANIZATION IN CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN SOMALIA SINCE THE 1990S (2004)	148
DONOR RESPONSE	150
CAP 2003 FOR SOMALIA RECEIVED ONLY HALF OF THE FUNDS PLEDGED (2003)	150
FUNDING TO VARIOUS ORGANISATIONS WORKING WITH IDPS (2004)	151
FIRST EVER MEETING WITH SOMALILAND AUTHORITIES AND INTERNATIONAL DONORS (SEPT 2003)	152
GAPS	153
CRITICAL PROTECTION AND SECTORAL GAPS IDENTIFIED BY THE OCHA INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT UNIT (APRIL 2004)	153
INFORMATION GAPS IN SOMALIA PROVE DELETERIOUS TO HUMANITARIAN PROGRAMMING AND ADVOCACY (2003)	154
LACK OF CLEAR MANDATE AND COORDINATION TO ASSIST IDPS (2002)	155
POLICY AND RECOMMENDATIONS	155
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE OCHA UNIT ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT (APRIL 2004)	155
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE INDEPENDENT EXPERT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOMALIA (2003)	156
UNCU RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IDPS IN SOMALILAND AND PUNTLAND (2002)	157
REFERENCE TO THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT	159
KNOWN REFERENCES TO THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT (APR 2004)	159
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS	160
LIST OF SOURCES USED	161

PROFILE SUMMARY

Somalia: drastic increase in funding needed for protection and reintegration of IDPs

Despite hopes raised by the ceasefire signed in October 2002, Somalis continue to flee a war which has continued for over ten years. Some 375,000 people are internally displaced, about five per cent of the population of a country which has been in a state of collapse longer than any other. Internally displaced people (IDPs) in Somalia are the most vulnerable of the vulnerable as they have lost all their assets and are subject to multiple human rights violations. They lack access to protection from clan affiliation; the de facto authorities throughout Somalia do not protect them and often divert humanitarian assistance. Most displaced are from southern minority groups and continue to suffer political and economic discrimination. In the insalubrious urban slums where they flee, they receive little or no assistance and most survive through casual work and begging. Income is barely sufficient for one meal a day. In Somaliland, the self-proclaimed entity in the north-west, displaced people are at risk of deportation from a new directive. As Somali leaders are negotiating peace in the south, the future of IDPs remains uncertain. Unless international support drastically increases, their chances of reintegration will remain illusory.

Political developments

A military coup in 1969 installed a dictatorial regime, whose divide-and-rule policy succeeded in polarising grievances into clan-based wars and eventually splintered its own support-base. It was finally overthrown in 1991, but since then, various warlords have fought to establish or maintain control over Somalia's key ports, including Mogadishu, and the most fertile lands between the Jubba and the Shabelle rivers. These regions were traditionally inhabited by minorities who constitute one third of the total Somali population, and who today account for most of the displaced (UNCHR, 30 October 2003, para.25). A short-lived US-led military operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) ended in fiasco in 1995.

The Transitional National Government (TNG), established in October 2000 has not been able to assert control over the country, or gain broad-based recognition. For the past four years, clans and factions grouped under the umbrella of the Somalia Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC) have fought against TNG forces and allied militias, resulting in heightened conflict in southern and central Somalia.

After more than a dozen failed peace initiatives, the latest attempt to establish an all-inclusive, recognised national government, the National Reconciliation Conference launched in late 2002, has achieved some progress. Consensus was reached on a formula for parliamentary representation including seats for minority clans and women (UN SC, 12 February 2004). However, several key leaders have not participated in all stages of the process and important issues have remained unresolved. In addition, the interests of regional powers acting as mediators within the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development framework, continued to undermine peace efforts (ICG, 4 May 2004). The third round of talks to resume in May 2004, was to address the contentious issues of power-sharing, including the method of selection of members of parliament and formation of a future interim government.

Although the self-proclaimed Somaliland Republic in the north-west has refused to take part in these negotiations, this internationally unrecognised entity has been the most successful in establishing peace, and moving towards reconstruction. It laid the basis for a multi-party system in 2001 and held peaceful presidential elections in 13 April 2003.

In the north-east, the self-declared autonomous Puntland State of Somalia, established in 1998, managed to end two years of political crisis in May 2003 with a power-sharing agreement. However, since late 2003 there have been tensions between Somaliland and Puntland over the contested status of the Sool and Sanaag regions.

The continued flows of weapons and ammunitions to Somali factions from all neighbouring countries considerably undermine reconciliation efforts (UNSC, 16 December 2003). At the request of the Security Council, the UN Secretary General appointed experts to monitor violations of the arms embargo up to mid-2004; the African Union is also planning to deploy military observers to monitor the October 2002 ceasefire which has been repeatedly violated (UN News, 29 January 2004).

Causes and patterns of displacement

Since the 1970s Somalia has drifted from one emergency to another, running the whole gamut of repression, civil war, invasion, fragmentation, drought and famine. Conflict in Somalia has centred on control over land, water, the livestock trade and aid. It is unusually hard to give meaningful figures for displacement in a country where two thirds of the population led a nomadic or semi-nomadic existence, traditionally moving with their herds to and from grazing and agricultural lands, water sources and trading centres. It is estimated that at the height of fighting in 1992, up to two million people were internally displaced, another 800,000 had fled to neighbouring countries, and up to half a million had died (UNICEF, 10 December 2003, p.11; USCR, 2003). As of April 2004, rough estimates indicated that some 375,000 people were displaced in Somalia (OCHA, 23 April 2004).

Although there have not been large-scale new displacements in Somalia, thousands of people are temporarily displaced by localised conflicts every year. As a result of insecurity, very few IDPs are returning to their areas of origin and most have lived for over a decade in crowded and unsanitary urban slums (UNICEF 30 October 2003). Tracking displaced populations in Somalia is particularly difficult as virtually all Somalis have been displaced by violence at least once in their life. Wars and severe droughts have complicated and hampered their seasonal migrations, and since the 1990s families have increasingly moved to the main towns in search of work and humanitarian assistance.

In the overcrowded slum areas where they settle, IDPs are grouped in planned and unplanned settlements according to clan affiliations. There they mingle with other indigent groups and waves of returning refugees. Some 36,500 IDPs live in relatively stable Somaliland and Puntland, but the biggest concentration of displaced people is found in Mogadishu, where approximately 250,000 people live in about 200 squatter settlements and camps (OCHA, 23 April 2004).

In addition to the conflict, Somalis have been affected by drought and other natural calamities, which have pushed many to move in search of water, food and medical assistance. Warlords have deliberately displaced people, looted and destroyed food stocks, mined watering places, grazing lands and major trading roads, and destroyed medical and administrative infrastructures in order to prevent people from other clans from sustaining a livelihood. The most ravaged regions have been the south and central areas, and the main ports of Mogadishu and Kismayo, where the livestock trade is concentrated. Armed factions waged battles in order to claim clan sovereignty over their supposed "native territories", forcing local populations either to become subservient to the invaders, who levy taxes in exchange for "protection", or to leave.

New displacements

Despite a peace process launched at the end of 2002, intermittent conflicts made the ceasefire meaningless, preventing people from cultivating their lands and forcing thousands of Somalis to flee again. During 2003, fighting mostly affected the towns of Mogadishu and Baidoa and the regions of Galgadud, Bakool, Shabelle and Gedo (UN, 18 November 2003, p.1).

Since October 2003, about 7,000 people have been displaced by inter-clan fighting over the control of grazing lands and water in the Galgadud region (OCHA, 23 April 2004). Most of the displaced belong to the Dir sub-clan and fled to their clan area in search of protection. However the IDPs whose houses and water stores have been destroyed and livestock killed had little to survive on. And host communities had little food and water to share as the region is suffering from prolonged drought (OCHA, 6 April 2004).

In the Bakool region, thousands of people who had been displaced by a power-struggle in the higher ranks of the Rahanwein Resistance Army in October 2003, were able to return home a few months later thanks to successful reconciliation efforts between Rahanwein elders (OCHA, 6 April 2004).

Critical lack of protection

For over a decade, IDPs in Somalia have been among the most vulnerable in the world. International protection standards as set forth in the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement prove difficult to implement in the prevailing context of state collapse. Under these conditions IDPs are often not afforded protection by local or de facto authorities, nor do they have access to due process of law in the absence of a properly functioning legal system.

Most IDPs come from minority groups such as the farming Bantu and Bajuni communities or the Rahanwein clan, which have a low social status in Somalia and have suffered a long history of discrimination, land dispossession and forced displacement. Since security is granted through clan affiliation, displaced people from minority groups have been particularly exposed to serious human rights abuses including physical violence, prostitution, human trafficking and forced recruitment (UN, 18 November 2003, p.14)

The protection of IDPs in the north-west has been further threatened since September 2003, when the Somaliland administration issued a directive under which it would deport all "illegal immigrants" who were not of Somaliland origin (UNSC 12 February 2004, para.35). IDPs who fled conflict in southern and central Somalia and took refuge in more stable Somaliland, are often stigmatised for coming from the region associated with the former dictatorship (Ibrahim, 15 August 2002, p.5). Northern authorities have not treated IDPs as citizens with equal rights, nor have they facilitated their socio-economic and political integration. Today, they live in the most squalid slum and waste areas on the outskirts of the main towns. IDPs have been denied access to basic services, subject to forced relocations and forced labour. They have also suffered harassment and human rights violations when competing with local labour or begging on the streets (OCHA, 23 April 2004; UN, 18 November 2003, p.13). Although expulsions have not taken place yet, IDPs have started to leave Somaliland and the numbers are likely to rise in Puntland (OCHA, 23 April 2004).

There were several reports of fires in IDP camps in northern Somalia. In July 2003, 1,200 IDPs were left homeless after fires broke out in camps in Bosasso. Most of them dispersed and lacked access to food, water and basic services. The authorities in Bosasso commented that host communities had prejudices against IDPs and viewed them as "economic migrants" with bad habits such as drug abuse (UNCHR, 30 October 2003, paras. 50,69). A similar fire incident in a camp in Hargeisa left hundreds, mostly women and children, without shelter in late 2003 (UNCHR, 30 October 2003, para.59).

Particularly vulnerable are women and children who constitute three quarters of the displaced population (UNCU, 30 July 2002). The level of assault reported by IDPs in camps suggested that women and girls were not adequately protected in this environment; nearly one-third of children reported rape as a common problem within their family, a significantly higher proportion than the 12 percent recorded among the general population (UNICEF, 10 December 2003, p.29). Displaced women suffer both gender and ethnic discrimination. They commonly lacked access to land – traditionally requiring the intermediary of a male relative – and access to humanitarian assistance (UNCU, 30 July 2002).

No access to most basic services

IDPs' access to the most basic services was said to be close to non-existent in southern and central parts of Somalia, one of the world's poorest countries (OCHA, 16 April 2004). Intermittent fighting and drought mean that conditions in IDP settlements are more crowded than ever, with associated high levels of disease. Dehydration from diarrhoea is one of the main causes of death, reflecting the fact that close to 80 per cent of the Somali population have no access to safe water and nearly half has no access to sanitation (UN, 18 November 2003, p.12). Moreover, IDPs often have to pay to use latrines, in addition to paying rent (OCHA, 31 October 2003, p.8). When available, water is often sold at prices unaffordable for IDPs, who

have no choice but to drink water from contaminated streams. There are seasonal outbreaks of cholera in the main towns such as Mogadishu.

As concerns the nutritional status of IDPs, overall malnutrition rates were as high as 25 per cent compared to a national rate of 17 per cent (UNICEF, 30 October 2003). Malnutrition peaked at 39 per cent among displaced children in Mogadishu (FSAU, 30 August 2002). As one of the most crisis-prone zones, the southern and central regions of Somalia, despite their relative fertility compared to the rest of the country, are home to the largest food-insecure groups.

Health services and infrastructures were ravaged by war; as a result only one-fifth of the Somali population has access to health care and there are fewer than 15 qualified doctors per million people (MSF, 9 December 2002). Nearly a quarter of Somali children die before they reach the age of five (UN, 18 November 2003, p.12). The maternal mortality rate is one of the highest in the world and the situation among IDPs is considered to be even worse, because they lack access and/or cannot pay for these services. For example, Bossaso has only one mother and child health centre for a population of 120,000 people including about 28,000 IDPs (UN, 18 November 2003, p.153).

IDPs living in the slums of northern Somalia have only a few, informal, work opportunities; in some regions up to 93 per cent of IDPs depend on begging to survive, barely sufficient to provide one meal per day (UNCU, 30 July 2002, pp.15,27). Unlike returnees and local residents, few IDPs benefit from remittances or from kin support. In addition, the prolonged and continued livestock import ban imposed by the Gulf States since 2000, as well as the closure of the Al-Barakaat Bank (main channel for remittances), following accusations of abetting terrorism, seriously reduced income levels and purchasing power. As a result, competition over jobs increased sharply and so did social discrimination against IDPs.

Problems of humanitarian access

Insecurity has been so acute in Somalia, that it has been difficult to plan assistance or deliver it in time. Humanitarian workers have been at great risk, and several killings in Somaliland in late 2003 forced some agencies to pull out (UNSC, 13 October 2003). In Mogadishu and other insecure regions, humanitarian workers have been kidnapped or killed by militias, and the ambush and looting of humanitarian vehicles are common occurrences. As a result, there is no permanent international presence in the country. UN agencies are based in Nairobi and fly in on short missions. ICRC is the only agency which since the 1990s has maintained access to most regions of Somalia, through negotiations with more or less legitimate authorities and warlords, and liaising with the Somali Red Crescent Societies. In the absence of law and order, humanitarian agencies have often resorted to the protection of militias and gunmen.

Humanitarian assistance

In the absence of a recognised government structure in southern and central Somalia, and pending the elaboration of IDP programmes in the north, humanitarian assistance remains almost entirely dependent upon the international community. In response to the difficult operational environment, the UN and NGOs developed in 2002 the Guiding Principles of Operation, whereby local authorities are reminded of their responsibility for protecting and providing basic services to the populations living in areas over which they claim control.

At national level, the Somali Aid Coordination Body was set up in 1993 to coordinate the activities of UN agencies, NGOs and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement. The Somali Red Crescent is the only national humanitarian institution represented across the country, providing health care, disaster preparedness and relief. The NGO Action Contre la Faim has been the most active in assisting IDPs in Mogadishu, and was also one of the few still present in Mogadishu during the 2000 confrontations. Islamic organisations have also assisted IDPs in Mogadishu and set up schools.

The UN Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator is responsible for the international response. While there is no one single agency specifically focusing on IDPs, their needs have been included in wider programmes. The UN's Consolidated Appeal (CAP) 2004 for Somalia continues to focus on meeting IDPs' humanitarian

needs as well as long-term reintegration, working within the framework of the Joint Action and Recovery Plan for Somalia, launched at the end of 2002. The UN IDP Unit, which selected Somalia as one of its priority countries, assists the UN Country Team in its efforts to improve the UN's response to the displacement crisis. In order to strengthen the protection work of the Humanitarian Coordinator, the UN Country Team created a Protection Coordinator position in 2004, for which it is seeking funding (OCHA, 16 April 2004).

It is evident that there remain serious gaps in the international response to internal displacement in Somalia. Many of the projects for integration, protection, human rights, and economic reconstruction could not be implemented due to lack of funding and insecurity in 2003 (UN, 18 November 2003, p.7). As of April 2004, only 11 per cent of the \$110 million appealed for through the CAP for 2004 was funded, and only half of the funds were received for humanitarian activities in 2003. Donor support for Somalia has decreased by 90 per cent over the last decade (UNHCR, 30 January 2004). A drastic increase in donor support is needed for the reintegration of IDPs, recovery and peace-building in Somalia. With 60 per cent urban unemployment, the northern areas have had since 1997 to absorb half a million returning refugees, most of whom have not been able to meet their most basic needs and ended up living along side IDPs in slums (UNHCR, 30 January 2004; UN, 18 November 2003, p.10). Without substantial international support, this situation risks jeopardising the much-valued stability achieved there in the past ten years. Although the people of Somalia are extraordinarily resilient, they have little chance to get out of the cycle of poverty and war with the low level of assistance currently allocated to the country.

CAUSES AND BACKGROUND OF DISPLACEMENT

Background

Siad Barre's counter-insurgency against the Isaak-dominated Somali National Movement in the 1980s

- Siad Barre military dictatorship installed in 1969 used clan divide and rule tactics in order to hold on to power
- In 1981 a group of Isaak exiles formed the Somali National Movement (SNM) an armed movement with the aim to overthrow the Barre regime
- In 1988 the SNM attacked major towns of Hargeysa and Burco, triggering a full scale civil war in the northwest
- Government response to the northern insurgency was fierce: after years of summary executions, rape, confiscation of property and disappearances, aircraft bombings in 1988 forced half a million people to flee to Ethiopia
- Siad Barre was charged of genocide against the Isaak clan in the northwestern Somalia in an attempt to control the livestock trade
- Violent struggles have ensued ever since a loose opposition coalition overthrew the dictatorial Barre regime in 1991
- By 1992 half a million people were killed and an estimated 1.5 people had fled the country

"Siad Barre seized power in 1969 and increasingly employed divisive clan politics to maintain power. Civil war, starvation, banditry, and brutality have wracked Somalia since the struggle to topple Barre began in the late 1980s. When Barre was deposed in January 1991, power was claimed and contested by heavily armed guerrilla movements and militias based on traditional ethnic and clan loyalties. Savage struggles for economic assets by the various factions led to anarchy and famine." (Freedom House 1999, "Overview")

"In the aftermath of the Ogaden War, approximately a quarter of a million refugees had been settled in the northwest by the Somali government, with the assistance of UNHCR. [...] Most were ethnic Somalis from the Ogaden branch of the Darod clan, although some were members of the Oromo and other Ethiopian ethnic groups. For several years, traditional competition between the Isaak and the Ogaden for pasture and water in the southern Haud had been aggravated by the Somali government's provision of arms, ammunition and training to the Ogaden fighters of the Western Somali Liberation Front. Although intended for use against the Ethiopian government, this military assistance was often directed instead against Isaak civilians in the Haud. [...] Government favouritism towards the Ogaden refugees, who enjoyed preferential access to social services (provided by UNHCR and its Somali government counterpart, the National Refugee Commission), business licenses and government posts, further fuelled Isaak grievances.

In 1981, a group of mainly Isaak exiles meeting in London declared the formation of the Somali National Movement (SNM), an armed movement dedicated to the overthrow of the Barre regime. The SNM initially tried to cast itself as an alliance of opposition figures from different clans, but its core membership and constituency was principally Isaak. The SNM established its first bases in Ethiopia in 1982, and by 1983 it had established itself as an effective guerrilla force in the northwest. In response, government pressure on the Isaak population, whom it deemed sympathetic to the SNM, took the form of "extreme and systematic repression". [...] Summary arrests, extrajudicial executions, rape, confiscation of private property and 'disappearances' all became commonplace as the government sought to deprive the SNM of the support of

the Isaaq public. The government also enlisted the support of the non-Isaaq clans of the northwest, attempting – with only partial success – to exploit traditional kinship affiliations.

In 1988, following a meeting in Djibouti between Siyaad Barre and his Ethiopian counterpart, Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, the Ethiopian government instructed the SNM to cease operations in Somalia and withdraw its forces from the border areas. The SNM, fearing the collapse of its long insurgency, instead attacked the major northern towns of Hargeysa and Burco, triggering the onset of full-scale civil war in the northwest. The government response was fierce: artillery and aircraft bombed the major towns into rubble and forced the displacement of roughly half a million refugees across the border into Ethiopia. Isaaq dwellings were systematically destroyed, while their settlements and water points were extensively mined.

The formation in 1989 (with SNM support) of the southern Somali factions, the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) and the United Somali Congress (USC), provided the SNM with allies and helped to relieve some of the pressure on its fighters. In January 1991, as USC advances in and around Mogadishu forced Barre to abandon the capital, the SNM staged its final offensive in the northwest. The remaining government forces disintegrated and fled, and the vestiges of civil administration collapsed." (ICG, 28 July 2003, pp.5,6)

"By 1988 full scale civil war broke out in Northwest, where Siyad Barre's force attacked the city of Hargeysa in a brutal campaign against the Isaaq clan that led to charges of genocide" (IGAD/UNHCR/UNDP, December 2000, p.7).

"May 27,1988 Civil war erupted when the SNM attacked Burao, one of the main towns in the north. On May 31, they attacked Hargeisa the provincial capital of the region and the second city in the country. Devastating the northern region, causing people to flee their homes and possessions into the neighboring countries such as Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya.

In 1991 the Somali State collapsed as the civil war engulfed the capital Mogadishu and the military regime of Mohamed Said Barre was forced from power.

In their 1992 report, Amnesty International described Somalia as a "human rights disaster", at the end of 1992 it was estimated that more than 500,000 people had died in the war and famine in Somalia, this included 300,000 children were children. Subsequently, some 1.5 million Somalis had fled the country, and more have since died.

No single factor can explain the causes of the war. The legacy of colonialism, contradictions between the centralized state and pastoral culture, unequal human development, lack of power and clan sharing, oppression, corruption were among the contributed factors to the armed conflict that has now divided Somalia." (Ibrahim F. 15 August 2002,p.1)

The fall of Barre regime in 1991 was followed by all out inter-clan war

- With no central government authority, clan divisions have led to violence and lawlessness since early 1990s
- Somalia has always been divided along clan – rather than religious or ethnic – lines
- Absence of central government authority has left vacuum where violence and lawlessness prevail
- All government infrastructure has been destroyed
- The "black hole" of Somalia is said to attract criminals and subversives

"Clan loyalties are the basis for most civil organization in the vacuum left by the disappearance of central authority. Harsh Islamic law has returned a semblance of order to some areas, including parts of Mogadishu long plagued by lawlessness. Islamic courts are imposing sentences that include executions and

amputations in accordance with Shari'a law. Right to free expression and association are ignored. Few autonomous civic or political groups can organize or operate safely. Several small newspapers and newsletters are published in Mogadishu, but the few independent journalists are under constant threat. International correspondents visit only at great risk. Radio stations are mainly operated by various factions, although the United Nations now sponsors new 'peace programming'. During the year, several journalists were arrested in Somaliland for criticizing the local government and suggesting that full press freedom does not exist." (Freedom House 1999, "Political rights and civil liberties")

"Virtually all the infrastructure of government - from buildings and communications facilities to furniture and office equipment - has been looted. All government archives and records, libraries, files and museums have been totally destroyed. In most of the country, there are no police, judiciary or civil service. Communications, apart from private satellite and cellular telephones and radio links, are non-existent. Electricity is not available on a public basis, but only to those who can afford generators. There is no postal service.

[...]

In both informal and formal discussions of the Security Council, member States have expressed concern about the increasingly evident effects of the lack of a functioning central government in Somalia. Somalia is being seen as a 'black hole' where the absence of law and order is attracting criminals and subversives. The Prime Minister of Yemen told my Representative that his Government was concerned about refugee flows from Somalia. He expressed fears that Somalia was being used as a transit-point for the trafficking of narcotic drugs and as a haven for terrorists. President Moi of Kenya called on the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to repatriate tens of thousands of Somali refugees living in north-eastern Kenya. He accused the Somalis of abusing Kenyan hospitality by smuggling arms into the country. To worsen the situation, a Somali militia group disarmed a Kenyan platoon on 1 July 1999 and stole its equipment. Most of the stolen goods were returned after the Government of Kenya threatened punitive action against the perpetrators. A batch of fake Somali shillings, with an estimated value of \$4 million, arrived in Somalia on 9 and 10 April 1999, followed by a second batch, worth about \$5 million, on 8 June 1999. As a result, the value of the Somali shilling fell from about 7.5 shillings to the dollar to over 10,000 shillings to the dollar. There are now four different Somali shillings in circulation in Somalia.

As a country without a national government, Somalia remains unique. The functions that states perform, such as the provision of social services, including health and education, the regulation, for example, of the movement of goods and persons, control of the environment, airspace and coasts, and so on, as well as the representation of the Somali people in intergovernmental and international fora, are absent, notwithstanding the fact that administrations in some parts of the country, notably in north-western Somalia ('Somaliland') and north-east Somalia ('Puntland'), have begun to provide some basic services to their people.

Somalia is different from other African societies in crisis, given its fundamentally homogeneous character. There is no major religious divide, ethnic division or dispute over the allocation of wealth derived from natural resources. Rather, Somalia is a polity in crisis. It is divided on clan lines, with each clan fearful of the incursions of others. The violence, where it is not simple banditry, is mainly defensive in nature. The crucial missing ingredient is trust. Without trust, there can be no peace or security in Somalia and no central government can be re-established." (UNSC 16 August 1999, paras. 61- 64)

"Somalia is an example where effective government and the accountability of political power are no longer coterminous with a defined national territory. The growth of regional problems across boundaries creates overlapping communities of fate: the fortunes and prospects of individual communities are increasingly bound together. One of the major relationships has been the weather - drought or flooding has had an enormous impact on the whole region." (UN November 1999, p. 6)

Minorities in Somalia: a history of segregation and land expropriation

- Although minorities represent one third of Somalia's 7 million people their existence has been downplayed
- Bantu, Bravenese, Rerhamar, Bajuni, Eyle, Galgala, Tumul, Yibir and Gaboye minorities have faced prior and after the war discrimination and exclusion
- Minorities like the Bantu have had their lands confiscated
- Minorities like the Galgala, Gaboye and Yibir have been manipulated and armed against Barre's enemy clans as a result suffered retaliations when the regime fell
- Bantu people who live on fertile lands had two of their villages burned down in 2001 and fled to Hiran region
- Previous rival Habargedir and Maerhan clans have allied to control Kismayo
- Conflict between these two allied clans and General Morgan's forces in the Bay region continue
- In Jowhar security improved since 2000 when Mohamed Dheere from Wersengeli clan took control
- In Beletweyne since General Aideed's forces were ousted in 1996 security improved

"Until recently, many people perceived Somalia as a country with a population of 7,000,000 people who share one culture, one language and one religion. This was the impression given during previous regimes in order to sustain the illusion of homogeneity. One of the things that were deliberately downplayed was the existence of minority groups. Although the population of minority groups living in Somalia has not as yet been established, estimates indicate that they constitute one third of the total Somalia population; approximately 2,000,000 people. The minority groups include **Bantu, Bravenese, Rerhamar, Bajuni, Eyle, Galgala, Tumul, Yibir and Gaboye**. These groups continue to live in conditions of great poverty and suffer numerous forms of discrimination and exclusion.

The Socio economic problems faced by minority groups in Somalia existed prior to the armed conflict that continues in parts of Somalia following the overthrow of the dictator Siyad Barre in 1991, and the subsequent collapse of a Somalia national government. These problems have arisen as a result of cultural values that segregate and exclude the minority groups from dominant clan societies. These minority groups are considered inferior, without full rights, hence their low social, economic and political status. As a result of social segregation, economic deprivation and political manipulation minority groups were systematically excluded from mainstream government positions and the few minorities who held positions had no power to speak on behalf of their communities. Furthermore, as a result of their distinct ethnic identity, some minorities, particular the Bantu and Bajuni have suffered systematic confiscation of their lands and properties. In other cases, minority groups have been politically manipulated to oppose certain dominant clans. This resulted in animosity between some minority groups and dominant clans. When the Somalia state collapsed, the minority clans suffered brutal reprisals.

Unlike other clans from dominant groups, minorities lack international support in the form of regular remittances. Recurrent insecurity caused by conflict creates an environment where minority groups are vulnerable and abnormally displaced from their homes. Notably, some minority groups who were abnormally displaced lost their lands, which were reallocated. Insecurity further affects the delivery of services to minority groups post-displacement in areas such as Kismayo, Jilib and Luuq. However, in areas like Hargeisa, Beletweyne, Jowhar and Ballad where security is not a big problem, minority groups \ receive very little assistance from aid agencies. Estimates indicate that about seventy per cent of the minorities who live in IDP camps or returnee settlements have difficulties in accessing adequate food, proper shelter and education.

In a country where there is no national Government that would be responsible for safeguarding and upholding the rights of minority groups, Somalia minorities are truly in a vulnerable position. Careful and thorough attention needs to be focused on the issues faced by vulnerable populations in order to develop

concrete assistance strategies that will have a positive impact on the security and livelihoods of minority groups.

[...]

In 1975, large sections of Bantu agricultural lands in Jilib and Jamame were systematically appropriated by the Siyad Barre regime under the pretext of development projects through the Resources Sharing Policy of *Hawl iyo Hantiwadaag*. This is a Leninist and Marxist ideology that the regime adopted.

[...] Other Bantu lands in the same area were distributed as political rewards to Siyad Barre's supporters from the Marehan and Dhulbahante clans. All these violations resulted in the suffering of Bantu families in the Lower and Middle Juba riverine areas.

[...]

The situation of minority groups deteriorated when the armed conflict broke out in both Somaliland and south Somalia. Some minorities such as the Galgala, Gaboye and Yibir were perceived as enemies because of their working relationship with the Siyad Barre regime. They therefore suffered grievous human rights violations, which included extra judicial killings, appropriation of lands and properties, and forced displacement from their lands to IDP or refugee camps situated along the Somalia Ethiopia border.

The Galgala people in Mogadishu and Gedihir in Jowhar suffered brutal reprisals from the Abgal clan with whom they lived. These reprisals took place at the beginning of the 1991 war. During the last days of his rule, Siyad Barre misused the Galgala community by arming them against the Abgal. Following his defeat, the Abgal killed many Galgala and forced many others to abandon their houses. There are now nearly 5,000 Galgala IDPs in Kismayo and elsewhere. Important to note, as already mentioned, since the Galgala identify themselves with the Majerten sub clan, they have received minimal clan support from the Darod clan in Kismayo.

The Bantu did not participate in clan-based conflicts. Notwithstanding, they still suffered attacks and violations of their rights. In January 2001, heavily armed militia from the Wersengeli (Abgal clan) carried out a well organised attack on the Bantu (Shidle) farmers in Bananey and Barey villages in Jowhar, following a dispute over grazing land for cattle. According to unconfirmed reports from the Bantu farmers, ten Bantus were killed, all houses in the two villages were burnt down and farming equipment including two generators and three water pumps were looted. To date, no compensation has been given to the Bantu by the Abgal [...]. The Bantu (Makane) in Beletweyne suffered mistreatment and violation from the Hawadle, Galjele, Badi Adde and Jijeje clans. Most of them were displaced from Beletweyne town to rural areas in Hiran region.

The Bajuni from Kismayo and Bajuni Islands were attacked by militiamen from Habargedir (Eir) and others during the initial periods of armed conflict. They suffered violations including confiscation of their lands and rape of the women. Most of them abandoned their homes and sought refuge in Kenya camps.

The Gaboye, Tumul and Yibir in Hargeisa and elsewhere in Somaliland suffered both during and after the armed conflict between Siyad Barre's army and the Somali National Movement of the Isak clan. These groups have similar physical characteristics as the Isak and it was difficult for Siyad Barre's army to differentiate between the Isak and other clans. When Siyad Barre was defeated, the Isak meted harsh punishments on the Gaboye, Tumul and Yibir because they were perceived to be Siyad Barre supporters." (UNCU/OCHA, 1 August 2002, p.2-3;4-6)

Some clan alliances have improved security for some minorities:

"The current condition of minority groups has changed as a result of changing social, economic and political environments in the various regions of Somalia. In Kismayo, for instance, previous rivals (Habargedir and Marehan) have now become allies and are now in control of Kismayo's social and political affairs. There is less insecurity between these clan groups, positively affecting the minorities. However, conflicts between these allies and General Morgan's forces that are currently in Bay region are expected. In general, security conditions have improved. Nevertheless, there are unconfirmed reports of rape of Bantu and Galgala women in IDP camps.

In Jowhar, security conditions have improved since 2000 when Mohamed Dheere from the Wersengeli clan took control of Jowhar and other parts of Middle Shabelle region. Nevertheless, the Bantu and other vulnerable groups in the area complain about taxes taken each month from every household. They report that most of the Bantu families are economically vulnerable and therefore unable to pay taxes. Each household is required to pay 15,000 Somali Shillings every month. Failure to remit the taxes on time results in arrest until the right amount is paid.

In Beletweyne, there appears to be power equilibrium between the Hawadle, Galjeel and Jilele. The town is divided into east and west sections. The eastern section is controlled by the Hawadle and the west by Galjeel. There has been no major fighting between the clans since 1996 when General Aideed's force was ousted jointly by the Hawadle, Galjeel and Jilele communities in Beletweyne. In spite of the seemingly placid environment, the Bantu (Makane) are still vulnerable.

In Somaliland, the security conditions are better than those of any other place in the south. There is a functioning administration, which has not received international recognition. Properties confiscated from minority groups during armed conflicts were returned. However, the minority groups report that they suffer discrimination because they do not benefit from social services and activities and remain unemployed." (UNCU/OCHA, 1 August 2002, p.6-7)

Self-proclaimed Republic of Somaliland in 1991 still no international recognition (2004)

- Somaliland proclaims independence in 1991 and Mohammed Ibrahim Egal becomes president
- After five years of sustained peace 97% of Somaliland voters approved a new constitution in May 2001, laying the basis for a multiparty system
- After President Egal passed away, Dahir Riyale Kahin his deputy was sworn in
- Somaliland is suffering economic losses due to livestock ban since 2000
- President Dahir Riyale Kahin from the Unity of Democrats Party (UDUB) was peacefully elected on 14 April 2003 by 80 votes
- Minister of interior of Somaliland expressed concern that the non-recognition of the independence of Somaliland negatively affected respect for human rights and limited assistance flows
- The insistence of the African Union and the Arab League for the territorial integrity of Somalia could lead to conflict according to ICG
- Despite having signed both the 1991 declaration of independence of Somaliland and its reaffirmation in 1993, the Harti leadership of Sool and Sanaag are ambivalent about Somaliland's cessation claims
- The fact that the Harti elite is split between Somaliland, Puntland and Mogadishu, creates disunity in their political aspirations

"The overthrow of Siad Barre in 1991 led to a *de facto* division of Somalia, with the self-proclamation of the northern Republic of Somaliland on 18 May 1991 as one of the results." (Africa South of the Sahara September 1996, pp. 842-45)

"The Republic of Somaliland has exercised *de facto* independence since May 1991. It is headed by President Mohammed Ibrahim Egal and based in Hargeisa, where resistance to the Said Barre dictatorship in the 1980s was most intense. Egal has said that a referendum on independence will not take place until a peace agreement covering the rest of the country has been reached. Somaliland is far more cohesive than the rest of the country, although reports of some human rights abuses persist." (Freedom House 1999, "Political rights")

"In 1991, when the central Government of Somalia collapsed, 'Somaliland' declared itself independent and sought separation from Somalia, citing the massive discrimination its people had suffered during the regime of Siad Barre. Although, the international community and the United Nations, which upholds the territorial integrity of Somalia, have not recognized the separate status of 'Somaliland', the international community has acknowledged with deep appreciation the good level of security and stability that 'Somaliland' has achieved over the years." (CHR 26 January 2000, p. 22)

"Held on 31 May 2001, the Somaliland referendum was characterised by poor preparation, intimidating diaspora propaganda, and an admirable openness at the polling booths. The vote for independence was combined with the vote for a new constitution which brought in sweeping political changes by Somaliland President Muhammad Ibrahim Egal. The first article of the new constitution asserted the independent status of Somaliland, and Article Nine removes the present clan-based system by laying the basis for a new multiparty system." (IRIN-CEA 10 July 2001, Part 1)

"Since 1991, a functional and modest state structure has been established, with a bicameral parliament, judiciary, police force, and municipal structures. The restoration of security has revitalized the economy and facilitated the rehabilitation of the damaged infrastructure and public services. In terms of volume of trade, Berbera port is flourishing, while Hargeisa has the only airport in Somalia that receives regular commercial passenger airlines from the Gulf States and other countries in the region. Revenue raised mainly from import duties has enabled the administration to oversee the formation of a police force, sectoral ministries and municipalities which provide a mechanism for the prioritisation of needs and planning, as well as basic education and health systems. An active local NGO sector, new business initiatives and an active media challenge the stereotypical description of Somalia as aid dependent." (UNDP Somalia 2001, p.52)

"In May 2001, a resounding 97 percent of Somaliland voters approved a new constitution, affirming the self-declared nation's ten-year-old independence from Somalia."

[...]

Somaliland's five years of uninterrupted peace, on of its greatest achievements since declaring independence in 1991, currently presents the international community with a long-awaited opportunity to significantly assist many long-term Somali refugees in repatriating, reintegrating, and rebuilding their homeland." (USCR, December 2001, p.5)

"In the aftermath of the passing away of Mohammed Egal, the President of the Northwest zone of 'Somaliland,' residents of the zone have called for unity, consultative leadership, and consolidation of the nation's gains. The deputy president, Dahir Riyale Kahin, was immediately sworn in as interim President in accordance with the constitution, following an extra-ordinary session held by the three topmost councils in the zone." (UNICEF 12 June 2002)

"In 'Somaliland', the first multiparty presidential elections were held on 14 April without violent incident and the Somaliland Election Commission declared the incumbent, Dahir Riyale Kahin of the Unity of Democrats (UDUB) Party, the winner by 80 votes. It was reported that the main challenger, Ahmad Muhammad Silanyo, of the opposition Kulmiye (Solidarity) Party, claimed that the election had been rigged and rejected the results. The case was taken to the Constitutional Court which, on 11 May, confirmed the incumbent as the winner. Mr. Kahin had assumed the presidency of Somaliland after the death of long-time president Muhammad Ibrahim Egal in May 2002."

[...]

The expert had a meeting with the Minister of the Interior, who expressed the opinion that the non-recognition of the independence of "Somaliland" was having a negative effect on the observance of human rights, as it limited the assistance they received." (UNCHR, 30 November 2003, paras.10, 46)

"The next phase of the democratic transition will be the most critical: until opposition parties are able to contest parliamentary seats, Somaliland will function as a de facto one party state."

[...]

Recognition of Somaliland, although under consideration by a growing number of African and Western governments, is still vigorously resisted by many members of both the African Union (AU) and the Arab League on the grounds that the unity and territorial integrity of member states is sacrosanct. Furthermore, the creation of a new Somali government emerging from the IGAD process that claims jurisdiction over Somaliland threatens to open a new phase in the Somali conflict.

[...]

Granting Somaliland some kind of increased international profile but without formal recognition – for example, observer status at the UN, the African Union and IGAD – could help to prepare the ground for eventual negotiations between two equals, Somaliland and Somalia.

[...]

Recognition [of Somaliland as an independent state] would establish Somaliland as one of the few genuinely democratic states in the region. And, as David Shinn, former U.S. ambassador to Ethiopia has pointed out, Somaliland's recognition might in fact improve the prospects for a more equitable, durable Somali union at some point in the future, since "it does not rule out the possibility that an independent Somaliland accepted by the African Union could propose unification at a later date with a Somalia that finally achieves its own peace and unity". (ICG, 28 July 2003, pp.i,35)

"As the least conflict-prone, this zone receives most returning refugees from Ethiopia and Djibouti, many of whom face difficulties re-establishing sustainable livelihoods. Cooperative local authorities, and a recent smooth transition of political power, have allowed for significant humanitarian and development initiatives. However, 'Somaliland' continues to suffer economic losses as a result of the ongoing livestock ban. The Sool and Sanaag regions are suffering from food insecurity and require assistance leading up to the next *Deyr* rainy season. Additionally, 'ownership' of these regions is a source of dispute between 'Somaliland' and 'Puntland'. (UN, November 2002, p.18)

Sool and eastern Sanaag regions

"Somaliland's eastern border regions, inhabited mainly by the Harti clans (Dhulbahante and Warsengeli), have long been problematic. Despite having signed both the 1991 declaration of independence and its reaffirmation at the 1993 Boorama conference, the Harti leadership remains ambivalent about Somaliland's claim to separate statehood. Like the Gadabursi, key members of the Harti clans were identified with the leadership of the Siyaad Barre regime during the civil war (although a handful chose to align themselves instead with the SNM). Unlike the Gadabursi, however, the Dhulbahante and Warsengeli negotiated separate ceasefires with the SNM without the latter's forces having to enter their areas.

[...]

At present, Harti loyalties are split at least three ways, with members of the clan's political and traditional elite scattered between Somaliland, Puntland and Mogadishu. Some have sampled all three. "The people are divided," an intellectual in Laas Caanood explained to ICG." (ICG, 28 July 2003, pp.28,29)

"The authorities in the self-declared autonomous region of Puntland have accused the Republic of Djibouti of arming the neighbouring self-declared republic of Somaliland to enable the latter to attack and destabilise Puntland." (IRIN, 22 January 2004)

"Elders from clans living in the contested Sool and Sanaag areas are involved in negotiations with Somaliland and Puntland authorities in a bid to avoid armed conflict over the contested Sool region. Despite the heavy presence of armed personnel in and around Las Anod, the Sool regional capital, the situation remains calm with no reported cases of conflict. Reports indicate that the resident population is not in support of conflict between Somaliland and Puntland, and this has generally had a calming effect." (OCHA, 29 February 2004)

Transitional National Government (TNG) elected in August 2000 lacks recognition and has limited control over the country (2003)

- The Transitional National Government (TNG) was established by the international community at the Arta peace talks (August 2000) and was dismissed by most Somali leaders as 'illegal' and 'unrepresentative'
- TNG headed by Abdulkassim Salat Hassan faces opposition by the coalition Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC), Somaliland and Puntland
- Mogadishu is divided by four main warlords and the areas they control are out of reach for the TNG
- The TNG in difficult economic position due to inability to raise taxes, the frequent closure of Mogadishu port and livestock ban
- Western donors have cut funding until signs of 'good governance'
- TNG resorts to private funding to pay its police
- When the mandate of the TNG expired on 13 August 2003, it stated that it would stay in power until elections were held to avoid political vacuum

"The first quarter of 2001 has been characterised by the TNG's continued attempts of the TNG to establish its credibility in Mogadishu. It has met with very limited success. Attempts to impose its authority outside the capital have been unsuccessful. [...] A number of police stations were reopened in Mogadishu, together with the central prison, while security personnel were put through training courses. But the city remained divided with four well armed factions controlling significant areas. " (IFRC 8 May 2001)

"Since its establishment in Mogadishu seven months ago, the new Transitional National Government (TNG) has struggled to assert control over the Somali capital, demobilise thousands of armed militia, and deal with rampant inflation. Initially received with great optimism in Mogadishu, the TNG has faced continued opposition from Mogadishu-based faction leaders; the newly formed southern-based Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Committee (SRRC); the self-declared independent state of Somaliland, northwestern Somalia; and the self-declared autonomous region of Puntland, northeastern Somalia. Opposition leaders have rejected the Djibouti-hosted Somali peace talks in Arta, which led to the election of the TNG in August 2000, and have dismissed the new government as 'illegal' and 'unrepresentative' – despite the fact the it has received international recognition." (IRIN-CEA 14 May 2001)

"A year after the arrival in Mogadishu of Abdulkassim Salat Hassan as head of Somalia's newly-established interim government, the Horn of Africa nation remains as anarchic as ever. [...] Salat's Transitional National Government (TNG) was set up with the approval of the international community following talks hosted by Djibouti last year.

While the new regime enjoys backing from the international community, it has yet to gain more than a toe-hold in Somalia itself, where most warlords and the two regions in the northwest and northeast reject its authority.

In some parts of central and southern Somalia, militias, who often shift alliances, currently back the TNG in exchange for 'logistical support', but without any tangible contribution to peace, experts say.

Warlords, who for a decade failed to agree on anything and whose warfare destroyed the country, have now ganged up, united in opposition to the TNG.

They met in Addis Ababa in March and launched a common front, the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC), bent on TNG's destruction by setting up what they term a more 'representative' government.

The police force, itself drawn from Mogadishu's numerous clan militias, cannot venture into areas controlled by warlords opposed to the TNG, including the southcentral regions of Bay and Bakol, where TNG and SRRC forces fought in July, leaving 200 people dead and hundreds wounded.

Few expatriate aid workers are permanently stationed in Somalia since the kidnapping in March of two UN staff by gunmen, who freed them in Mogadishu after week in captivity.

Even the business community in Mogadishu, believed to be solidly behind the TNG, has yet to give up its arsenal of arms.

[...]

TNG Foreign Minister Ismail Muhumed Hurre Buba is an arch-rival of Somaliland President Mohamed Ibrahim Egal.

TNG Water and Mineral Resources Minister Hassan Abshir Farah resigned as Puntland's interior minister after political disagreements with his leader Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed.

More than 60 of the 245 transitional assembly members either hail from Somaliland or Puntland, who have on several occasions influenced the TNG to call for change in the two former northwest and northeast Somali regions.

Their calls have been compounded by a major power struggle in both Puntland and Somaliland in the past one month, the results of which could alter the political equation of the Horn of Africa nation." (AFP 31 August 2001)

"However, the hope of attracting substantial foreign aid has not materialized as most Western donors have adopted a 'wait and see' approach and made aid conditional on signs of 'effective government'. With Mogadishu port closed, lacking revenue from livestock exports, and unable to raise taxes, the TNG has had to depend on some friendly states and members of the Mogadishu business community to finance the police force, judiciary, demobilisation and rehabilitation." (UNDP Somalia 2001, p.54)

"The President of the Transitional National Government (TNG), Abdikassim Salad Hassan and Prime Minister Hassan Abshir Farah maintain that the reconciliation process with regional administrations and faction leaders is a priority. The President has visited districts including Dusa Merab, El-buur, Brava and Merka in the South. However, opposition to the TNG continues to grow stronger." (UN, May 2002, p.3)

« Mogadishu is characterised by inter-factional conflicts and shifting political alliances. The TNG controls less than a quarter of Mogadishu. Even in the midst of economic devastation, the business community plays a key role in the sustenance of Mogadishu's economy and therefore seeks to avoid further losses. A strong civil society is another key asset. An estimated 150,000 IDPs live in inhumane conditions. Other vulnerable groups include minorities and urban destitute. National aid workers are frequently targeted for kidnapping." (UN, November 2002, pp.18-20)

"The Mogadishu-based Transitional National Government (TNG) – formed in 2000 following the Arta peace process as the hopeful basis for an inclusive national government – has had only limited success so far in establishing its authority beyond Mogadishu. Meanwhile, inter- and intra-clan conflict has continued sporadically in parts of southern and central Somalia, exacerbated to some extent by a polarization of political groupings between those supporting the TNG, and opposition factions loosely aligned under the umbrella of the Somalia Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC). Serious clashes took place in or near Mogadishu, Jowhar, Kismayo, and Bardera." (UN, November 2002, p.3)

"On 13 August [2003] the mandate of the TNG expired. A statement was made, however, that, as stipulated in the Somali Constitution, it would remain in power until free and fair elections were held, in order to avoid a vacuum in governance. Controversy surrounded this statement, which followed the convening of Parliament by TNG President Abdiqassim Salad Hassan which voted no confidence in Prime

Minister Hassan Abshir Farah and Speaker of Parliament Abdallah Derow Isaak, who continued to state that they represented the TNG at the Nairobi peace talks whereas the President had withdrawn from the talks 10 days previously. The officials reportedly claimed that their dismissals were illegitimate under the Transitional Charter and there had not been a quorum in Parliament when the no-confidence vote was held. At the time of writing, the TNG remained in office in Mogadishu." (UNCHR, 30 November 2003, para.12)

For detailed information on the political situation in the country, refer to the November 2000 paper of Ken Menkhaus [External link].

De facto regional government established in Puntland in 1998 (2003)

- Fierce internal power struggle exploded when former President Abdullahi Yusuf rejected the election of his successor President Jama Ali Jama (Nov 2001-end 2002)
- Economic situation of the arid Puntland region is adversely affected by lack of infrastructure and the livestock ban
- The Northeast region was less affected by conflict and several ports enjoyed economic expansion and Garowe was elected regional capital of Puntland in 1998
- Relations with Somaliland are strained over determining border areas notably Sool and Sanag regions
- Two year political crisis ended by power-sharing and peace agreement signed on 17 May 2003
- On the contested status of Sool and Sanag, the Minister of Puntland argued the regions should belong to them according to the regions' ethnic composition rather than colonial demarcation

"In contrast with 'Somaliland', 'Puntland' does not consider itself a separate entity. Rather, it describes itself as a regional government of Somalia. In her report to the previous session of the Commission on Human Rights (E/CN.4/1999/103), the independent expert reported on how 'Puntland' came into being in 1998. The 'Puntland' Constitutional Conference was held in Garowe, between 15 May and 30 July 1998. It was attended by 470 delegates from the Bari, Nugal, Sool and Sanaag regions, as well as hundreds of observers. None of the delegates were women. The conference ended by formulating a new 'social contract' as a basis for the restoration of effective State authority in these regions." (CHR 26 January 2000, p. 28)

"Garowe was selected as the regional capital, a president was elected and line ministries were appointed." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p.3)

"The area described as the North-east of Somalia or 'Puntland' has the largest surface and the longest coastline in the country. It is an arid area with low potential for developing water resources or rain-fed agriculture. The majority of the largely nomadic population depends on the livestock trade and to a much lesser extent on fishing and dealing in frankincense. Relative peace and security have allowed an export-oriented economy to develop and the north-east is increasingly developing as a region of transition and recovery. Although a government was elected in September 1998, only the President, Vice President and nine ministers [had been appointed as of December 1998]. One of the first priorities of this Administration has been to establish proper security forces (police and prisons) and a judiciary system." (UN December 1998, p. 26)

"Formed in 1998, Puntland's administrative structures are still embryonic. Lacking the infrastructure and potential revenue sources of Somaliland the administration's impact on public services and the economy has been more limited. However, Puntland can boast active business and NGO sectors. The population of the region has increased greatly since the war as people originally from there fled the south. This has led to high levels of investment by Somalis in housing and businesses and reflects the public's confidence in the political and security situation.

Although relations with Somaliland are strained over border definitions and Puntland's southern border is intermittently insecure, the region has managed to avoid any major security threats for ten years. In June 2001, the administration's three-year term expired. The failure to agree upon a transfer of power led to a constitutional crisis, which has now threatened the region's security." (UNDP Somalia 2001, p.51)

"For the first time in over six years, the peace that has existed in the zone was broken. This followed a decision by a meeting of elders to cancel the extension of the mandate of President Col. Abdullahi Yusuf's administration that had been given by Parliament, and install an interim President. Militias of groups opposed to Col. Yusuf's regime occupied the airport and seaport, effectively taking control. Col. Yusuf responded through force, and attacked the militias at the airport." (UNICEF 7 September 2001)

"The term of Puntland leader Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed came to an end in June. Under the Puntland Charter he was replaced temporarily by the President of the Supreme Court, Yusuf Haji Nur. Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed refused to acknowledge his replacement, and supporters of both sides clashed in August in Bosaso, where around 40 people were killed. In November Jama Ali Jama was appointed by elders as the next leader, although this decision was again rejected by Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed. Fighting between supporters of both sides broke out in November and December in Garowe, resulting in the deaths of at least 13 people." (AI, January 2002)

"Heavy fighting was reportedly raging near the village of Berta Boqorka, near the town of Qardho some 280 km northeast of Garowe, regional capital of the self-declared autonomous region of Puntland, northeastern Somalia, on Tuesday, according to local media sources.

Forces loyal to the region's former president, Col Abdullahi Yusuf, were reportedly engaged in fierce fighting with forces loyal to Puntland's current president, Jama Ali Jama" (IRIN, 7 May 2002)

"Meanwhile, in the Northeast, former president, Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, rejected the outcome of the elections of 2001 where Jama Ali Jama was elected to lead Puntland. Colonel Yusuf has retreated with his forces from Garowe (political capital) to Galkacyo and has created a separate southwestern state, declaring himself president. Colonel Yusuf has since recaptured Garowe. Mr. Jama retreated to Bosaso (economic capital).." (UN, May 2002, p.3)

"Talks were held in "Puntland" in early May to end the conflict which began in June 2001 when Abdullahi Yusuf, whose presidential term then ended, claimed that the region's parliament had extended his mandate. In July 2001, clan elders rejected his claim and on 14 November they elected Jama Ali Jama president for a three-year term. Abdullahi Yusuf captured Bosaso from Jama Ali Jama in May 2002. A dialogue between the administration of Abdishakur Mire Adan and the opposition, led by General Ade Muse Hirsi, an ally of Jama Ali Jama, was convened in Bosaso following three months of mediation by Sanaag elders. A peace agreement was signed on 17 May 2003, to which all parties have thus far reportedly adhered.

[...]

On the question of the contested areas of Sool and Sanaag, the Minister [of Puntland] insisted that the international community must recognize the areas as belonging to "Puntland" based on ethnicity, and not on colonial demarcation." (UNCHR, 30 November 2003, paras.11, 68)

A faction of the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) proclaims autonomy over the 'State of Southwestern Somalia' (SWS) in April 2002

- The RRA sets up an autonomous administration over Bay and Bakool regions of south and central Somalia since 1999
- In March 2002 former colonel of Barre's secret police Mr. Hasan Muhammad Nur Shatigadud was elected president of the 'State of Southwestern Somalia' with Baidoa as capital

- This move makes the RRA an established opposition party and might prove deleterious for the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC)
- Central and southern once Somalia breadbaskets, are the most affected by conflict, drought and lack of humanitarian access
- Conflicts were violent during 2002 in Bardera, Gedo, and Baidoa formerly stable
- Power clashes between senior ranks of the RRA over control of Bay and Bakool displaced thousands (2003)

"Since 1999, the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) has begun to establish an administration in the two southern regions of Bay and Bakool that have been chronically insecure for most of the past decade." (UNDP Somalia, 2001, p.34)

Better security since then has improved the food security situation and access for international aid agencies. Although the RRA participated in the Arta peace conference, some of the leaders withdrew their support soon after it was concluded. Since then the RRA has sought to consolidate its own regional administration. While certain civil structures have been established, the RRA has yet to transform itself into an effective civilian administration." (UNDP Somalia 2001, p.53)

" This is the third regional administration to be set up in Somalia, following the establishment of Somaliland (northwestern Somalia) and Puntland (in the northeast).

The decision was reached at a meeting of the RRA central committee and over 70 elders from the Digil and Mirifle clans. The meeting, which had been in session in Baidoa, the capital of Bay Region, 240 km southwest of Mogadishu, since 22 March, elected Colonel Hasan Muhammad Nur Shatigadud, the chairman of the RRA, as president on Sunday. "He was inaugurated in Baidoa today, and will serve an initial four year term," Qalinle told IRIN on Monday. Baidoa will be the capital of the new state.

Shatigadud was a colonel in the notorious secret police, the National Security Service (NSS) of the former dictator Muhammad Siyad Barre, [...]

The move to establish the autonomous region now is seen by Somali observers as a way for the RRA "to come to the talks as an established administration as opposed to a faction". It may also sound the death knell of the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) said one observer. The SRRC is grouping of southern factions opposed to the Transitional National Government." (IRIN, 1 April 2002)

"As one of the most crisis-prone zones, the southern and central regions of Somalia, despite their comparative fertility to the rest of Somalia, are home to the largest populations of vulnerable and food insecure groups. Intermittent bouts of factional as well as inter- and intra-clan armed conflicts, fuelled by external support, and combined with periodic drought and flooding perpetuate their vulnerability. The central regions tend to experience less conflict, as opposed to areas such as Gedo, Bay and Bakool regions where periodic insecurity often results in reduced humanitarian access. Before the conflict, these were the greatest food producing areas of Somalia." (UN, November 2002, p.19)

"As a result, the second quarter of the year [2002] was marked by considerable internal and cross border displacement. In February, for example, fighting broke out in Bardera between the Juba Valley Alliance (JVA) and the SRRC. Then further north in Gedo, inter-clan fighting in May, which included the laying of landmines, hampered access to seriously drought-stricken pockets of the region. Finally, in Baidoa, a formerly stable humanitarian base, internal division within the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) erupted into heavy fighting in late July and early August. International staff have yet to return to the area." (UN, November 2002, p.3)

"Tension had been rising in the town as a result of a deepening split within the senior ranks of the RRA, which controls much of the Bay and Bakol regions of southwestern Somalia. The split originated from a power struggle between the RRA chairman, Hasan Muhammad Nur Shatigadud, and his two deputies, Shaykh Adan Madobe and Muhammad Ibrahim Habsade. Baidoa, which changed hands at least three times between July and December, is now in the hands of Shatigadud's rivals. Hundreds were killed and thousands displaced by the fighting." (IRIN, 17 January 2003)

Neighboring countries accused of being involved in Somali civil war, violating arms embargo (1996-2004)

- Panel of Experts on Somalia reported to the Security Council that Ethiopia, Eritrea, Yemen, Djibouti and Egypt were involved in arms trade to Somali factions
- In 1996 hundred thousand people displaced by Ethiopian attacks in western Somalia
- Ethiopian troops accused to invade Gedo and Bakool
- Ethiopia accused of violating Security Council resolutions and providing arms to clans opposed to interim government
- Security Council appointed Monitoring Group to monitor violations of the arms embargo until June 2004

"The Panel of Experts has found a clear pattern of violation of the arms embargo on Somalia. Weapons, equipment, training of militia and financial support to Somali factions have been given regularly by neighbouring States and others since the Security Council adopted resolution 733 (1992) on 23 January 1992. Weapons have also been purchased by Somali factions on the international arms market. These flagrant violations of the embargo continue today even as the Somali factions and their neighbours are participating in the Somalia National Reconciliation Conference, sponsored by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). They have signed the Declaration on Cessation of Hostilities and the Structures and Principles of the Somalia National Reconciliation Process (Eldoret Declaration), in which they agreed to implement fully the arms embargo and facilitate international monitoring.

[...]

Ethiopia has played an overt military role in Somalia. Not only has Ethiopia been a major source of weapons for a number of Somali groups, Ethiopia has also invaded and occupied parts of Somalia. Ostensibly, and perhaps justifiably, the first direct military involvement of Ethiopia in Somalia, in 1996 and 1997, was in response to the activities of the Somali Islamic militant group al-Ittihad al-Islami, including terrorist attacks in Ethiopia. Since then the threat of al-Ittihad and its tenuous links to al-Qa'idah have been used as an excuse for Ethiopian involvement in Somali internal affairs rather than for legitimate national security concerns.

After the establishment of the Transitional National Government, Ethiopia helped to establish the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council, which is made up of factions hostile to the Transitional National Government and its allies. The Ethiopian military has provided training and limited amounts of arms, ammunition and other supplies to all members of the Council.

Eritrea has also been a major supplier of arms and ammunition to Somali groups. As the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea descended into a protracted and bloody stalemate, Somalia became a secondary battleground between the belligerents. Unfortunately, the hostility engendered by the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia continues, and apparently continues to motivate Eritrean support for factions hostile to Ethiopia.

Yemen provided a small amount of military assistance to the Transitional National Government, soon after it was established at the Arta Conference in Djibouti.

[...]

Djibouti, according to reliable local and international sources, is also a significant trans-shipment point for weapons to Somalia, principally the Transitional National Government.

[...]

Egypt has acknowledged providing training and uniforms to the Transitional National Government police." (UNSC, 25 March 2003)

Ethiopia in particular is accused of supporting clan factions opposed to new interim government:

"In Western Somalia, several hundred thousand persons were temporarily uprooted [during 1996], when Ethiopian troops attacked an armed religious group based in Somalia. Most families displaced by the incident reportedly returned to their homes by September." (USCR 1997, p. 93)

"Briefing correspondents on the latest developments in Somalia, he said that in the last few weeks Ethiopian troops had continued to invade two major regions in south-western Somalia: Gedo and Bakool, capturing the capital of the Gedo region, Garbahaarrey, and a vibrant commercial centre near the Kenyan border – Bulla Hawa. [...]

The invasion has caused many innocent civilian deaths and displacement of thousands of people, he continued. As a result of the fighting, Bulla Hawa had been burning yesterday. In Garbahaarrey, the Ethiopian troops had captured the leadership of the region, whose fate remained unknown. Ethiopian troops were also poised to attack the southern port city of Kismaayo.

Earlier, with Ethiopia's military assistance, a coup d'état had been staged in the north-east of the country, he said, where elected legitimate authorities were overthrown by force. Ethiopia also continued to flood Somalia with all sorts of weapons, including mortars, AK47s and anti-personnel mines. In the last 10 days, large weapons consignments had been shipped by Ethiopia "to its own favouring warlords" in Mogadishu and several other towns.

Ethiopia's aggression against Somalia had become a pattern in violation of relevant Security Council resolutions reaffirming Somalia's unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Both resolutions and presidential statements (the latest of 30 March) adopted by the Council urged in the strongest terms that neighbouring countries should not interfere in the internal affairs of Somalia. The Ethiopian regime was also in violation of the arms embargo imposed by resolution 733 of the Security Council. The continued flow of arms into Somalia posed a threat not only to his country, but to the stability of the whole subregion of the Horn of Africa.

[...]

With regard to the national reconciliation process, Ethiopia continued to be the main obstacle to the achievement of peace and stability in Somalia, he said. It did not want to see a strong, vibrant and unified Somalia -- it wanted a "balkanized" Somalia of small fiefdoms it could dominate. He was asking Ethiopia to stop its aggression.

[...]

He also confirmed that the invasion was continuing at the time of the briefing. As it needed access to sea, Ethiopia was trying to capture Somalia's ports by force.

[...]

What form was the aggression taking? a correspondent asked. Mr. Hashi said that it was a military invasion, with Ethiopia's armed troops entering Somalia's territory.

[...]

Thus, a correspondent suggested, this was not a new, but a continuing, situation. Mr. Hashi responded that since 1996 Ethiopia had been repeatedly crossing the border, and its aggression had become a pattern.

[...]

While invading Somalia, Ethiopia could not be an honest broker in the reconciliation process. For that reason, it should be removed from the committee preparing the national reconciliation process.

[...]

The total number of people displaced by fighting in Somalia was actually unknown." (UNDIP, 17 May 2002)

"The interim Somali government had grown weary of keeping a low profile on Ethiopia's activities in Somalia, Galayr said. 'Ethiopia is obstinately and flagrantly continuing its interference in Somalia and is seeking to revive the civil war'." (IRIN-CEA 9 January 2001)

"Eritrea and Ethiopia were directly involved in the inter-factional fighting, with Ethiopia supplying troops, hardware and humanitarian support to the Rahenweyn Resistance Army (RRA) in Bay and Bakol. The RRA used its increased military power to contain the advances of Hussein Aideed's forces. Ethiopia also reportedly supported the Somali Salvation Democratic Front which had formed a government in the self-proclaimed Puntland State, and a faction of the United Somali Congress–Peace Movement. Eritrea and Yemen provided arms to the Somali National Alliance (SNA) militias of Hussein Aideed. Around 200 fighters from the Ethiopian armed opposition group the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), supported by Eritrea, were also involved in the Somali conflict on the side of the SNA. Hussein Aideed attended a series of meetings on peace and reconciliation with Ethiopian government officials in October [1999]. His forces subsequently disarmed a group of OLF fighters in their base in Mogadishu." (AI 2000, "Background")

"Mogadiscio est toujours divisée entre différentes factions, avec d'un côté une alliance de circonstance entre Aideed et Mahdi, visant à mettre en place une administration centrale dans la région, et de l'autre une opposition puissante. Les deux alliances sont soutenues respectivement par l'Erythrée et l'Éthiopie, et donc indirectement parties prenantes du conflit." (ACF 2000, "Contexte")

"In accordance with the Council's request, I have established a Monitoring Group composed of four experts, for a period of six months, to be based in Nairobi. The Monitoring Group is mandated, inter alia, to investigate violations of the arms embargo covering access to Somalia by land, air and sea and to provide a draft list of those who continue to violate the arms embargo inside and outside Somalia, and their active supporters, for possible future measures by the Council." (UN SC, 12 February 2004)

For more details on the supply of ammunitions delivered by Ethiopia to factions opposed to the TNG see UN Security Council document (22 May 2002) [External link]

Two approaches to political consolidation in Somalia (1991-2002)

- 'Building-block' approach encourages formation of regional political structures towards a re-unification of Somalia 'Building-block' approach criticized for encouraging clanism and secessionism
- Second approach seeks to install a Somali central state entity within a federalized system
- De facto regional governments have been established since the fall of Barre regime (1991-2002)

"External encouragement to political consolidation since 1998, however, has taken two somewhat incompatible forms. One, the so-called 'building-block' approach, has sought to encourage the emergence of regional or trans-regional political authorities, as a first step towards a re-unified Somali state with a loose federal or confederal form of government. After UNOSOM's failure at state building, this approach was initially embraced by neighboring countries, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the executive committee of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SCAB) in the late 1990s [...]. Its advocates consider it the path that can provide a more legitimate grass-roots and participatory form of governance to facilitate the task of rebuilding a war-torn society. Its critics contend that it has limited applicability in the south and that it encourages secessionism and clanism and is designed to meet foreign interests that want to keep Somalia weak and divided.

The second approach, which has regained the support of regional and international bodies, is based on reviving the Somali state through a process of national reconciliation and the formation of a national government, albeit within a federalized system." (UNDP Somalia 2001, pp.51)

"Somalia remains a highly militarised and divided society, with various de facto authorities continuing to control most parts of the country, as well as sections of Mogadishu." (UN, May 2002, p.3)

IRIN-CEA chronology of the conflict in Somalia (1960-2000)

"NAIROBI, 1 September (IRIN) - The following is a chronology of recent events in Somalia leading up to the establishment of a new interim administration which will govern the country for three years, pending elections:

26 June 1960: The former British Somaliland Protectorate gains independence

1 July 1960: The former Italian colony becomes independent. The former British (northwest) and Italian (south) colonies unite

15 October 1969: Democratically elected President Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke is assassinated by one of his police bodyguards

21 October 1969: The army under Major-General Muhammad Siyad Barreh overthrows the civilian government, after parliament hits deadlock trying to select a new president. The army suspends the constitution, bans all 86 political parties, and promises to end corruption. Siyad Barreh heads the 25-member Supreme Revolutionary Council, consisting of army and police officers

21 October 1970: The army junta declares Somalia a socialist country and adopts "Scientific Socialism". This signals a shift towards Soviet backing, and security organs and intelligence networks are given greater powers

21 October 1972: A written script for the Somali language is established. A modified Roman alphabet is adopted as the official orthography for the Somali language

1974: Somalia becomes a member of the Arab League

July 1977: A low-level war of attrition between Somali-backed insurgents and the Ethiopian army becomes an all-out battle between Somalia and Ethiopia, when Somalia declares war on Ethiopia. The war goes down in history as the fiercest Cold War battle on the continent, played out in the Ethiopian Ogaden region

13 November 1977: Somalia expels about 6,000 of Russian, Cuban and other Soviet allies, after the Soviet Union switched sides and allied itself with the Ethiopia

March 1978: The Somali Government announces the withdrawal of its forces from the Ogaden

8 April 1978: After the defeat of the Somali army, a group of army officers try to topple the Siyad Barreh regime. The attempted coup is crushed and Siyad Barreh tightens his grip further. He begins a process of putting power into the hands of his relatives, and sub-clan, the Darod Marehan. He also empowers the related Dulbahante and Ogadeni sub-clans

May 1988: The Somali National Movement (SNM) mounts an offensive in the north of the country, as a result of the regime's brutal post-Ethiopian war policies. Siyad Barreh responds by bombing the area. Hundreds of thousands of civilians are displaced, and many killed. It is the first real challenge to Siyad Barreh's rule, and the beginning of the proliferation of armed opposition to the regime

May 1990: A manifesto is published in Mogadishu calling for an all inclusive national reconciliation convention to avert protracted civil war. It is signed by 144 people, including politicians, religious leaders, professionals and business people, representing all Somali clans

December 1990: Armed uprising erupts in Mogadishu.

27 January 1991: Siyad Barreh flees Mogadishu. Forces loyal to the Hawiye-based United Somali Congress (USC) capture the city

28 January 1991: The Manifesto Group of USC appoints an hotelier, Ali Mahdi Muhammad, as president. The military wing of USC, led by General Muhammad Farah Aydid, rejects the appointment

17 November 1991: Full-scale fighting starts between the two factions of the USC

3 March 1991: A ceasefire comes into effect between the warring factions in Mogadishu

1991: Fighting erupts in the northeast region between the Al-Ittihad Islamic fundamentalists and militia loyal to the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), lead by Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmad

18 May 1991: The former British Protectorate of Somaliland declares independence from the rest of Somalia, in the town of Burao

July 1991: A conference was held in Djibouti, in which Ali Mahdi in which was chosen as interim president

April 1992: The United Nations Operation in Somalia, UNOSOM I, begins work in Somalia

December 1992: UNITAF forces under American leadership land in Mogadishu

February 1993: A three month conference in Borama seeks a new leader for the self-declared state of Somaliland. Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Egal, a former prime minister, is elected in May

March 1993: The next serious attempt at peace talks. An Ethiopian initiative evolves into a joint UN-Ethiopian sponsored reconciliation conference held in Addis Ababa

4 May 1993: UNITAF hands over to UNOSOM II

5 June 1993: 23 Pakistani peacekeepers are killed by Aydid loyalists

12 July 1993: American helicopter gunships kill over 50 unarmed Somalis holding a meeting in a private house in Mogadishu, increasing local hostility to the international intervention forces

3 October 1993: American-led forces looking for Aydid's senior aides are involved in a shoot-out, which leaves 18 Americans and hundreds of Somalis dead. The body of a dead American is dragged through the Mogadishu streets, and, caught on camera, sparks an international outcry

August 1996: Aydid dies of gunshot wounds sustained in operations against his former lieutenant, Osman Ali Atto. His son, a former American marine, Husayn Muhammad Aydid, is chosen by the clan to replace his father

November 1996: Ethiopian government-sponsored reconciliation conference brings most of the factions together. But it is boycotted by Aydid's son

November 1997: All faction leaders met in Cairo, with limited success, leaving Somalia without a national leader and Mogadishu still divided and insecure

2 May, 2000: On the initiative of the Djibouti government, the Somali National Peace Conference brings together more than 2,000 participants in Arta, Djibouti. It is the first conference where the warlords do not have control of the conference agenda

26 August, 2000: A 245-strong Transitional National Assembly, based on clan representation, elects Abdiqasim Salad Hasan as the new president of Somalia

27 August, 2000: President Abdiqasim Salad Hassan is sworn in an inauguration ceremony attended by the heads of governments of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Yemen, and the host country Djibouti, along with representatives from the UN, EU, Arab league, OAU, France, Italy, Kuwait, and Libya." (IRIN-CEA 1 September 2000, as found in UN Consolidated Appeal March 2001, Annex III, p. 128)

Causes of displacement

Mass displacement began with outbreak of civil war in 1988

- Hundreds of thousands displaced in northern Somalia after outbreak of civil war in 1988
- War moved into the streets of Mogadishu by late December 1990
- Some 400,000 persons said to be internally displaced by end of 1990
- By 1992 half a million people were killed and an estimated 1.5 people were displaced inside northern Somalia

"The outbreak of civil war in northern Somalia in mid-1988, and the Somali government's brutal retaliation against civilians in northern Somalia . . . led more than 400,000 Somalis to flee to Ethiopia and Djibouti and displaced hundreds of thousands of other Somalis within northern Somalia. Renewed fighting in northern Somalia led another 31,000 Somalis to flee to Djibouti. Other armed insurgent groups joined the battle against the government of President Siad Barre during 1990. Two of these groups, the United Somali Congress (USC) and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) scored major successes against the government, bringing the war into the streets of Mogadishu, the Somali capital, by late December [1990]. At year's end, chaos prevailed in Mogadishu. Foreigners were evacuated, tens of thousands of the city's residents had fled, there was fighting in the streets between government and rebel forces, indiscriminate shooting, raping, and pillaging by armed persons, and the bodies of the dead littered the capital. USCR estimate[d] that by late 1990 there were a minimum of 400,000 internally displaced Somalis." (USCR 1991, p. 53)

"Siad Barre's sustained military offensive crippled agricultural production, destroyed nearly all of the region's livestock, decimated northwest Somalia's businesses, places of worship, and water infrastructure, and uprooted almost the entire population of approximately 2.5 million people.

Fleeing war, mass executions, and torture, approximately 400,000 residents of northwest Somalia sought refuge in other countries.[...] An estimated 1.5 million additional people were displaced within northwest Somalia." (USCR, December 2001, p.15)

For a detailed survey evaluating the reasons why Somali families were forced to flee in the early phases of the conflict, see Robert Gersony's "Why Somalis Flee: Synthesis of Accounts of Conflict Experience in Northern Somalia by Somali Refugees, Displaced Persons and Others" produced for the US State Department in 1989 [External link].

Thousands forced to flee human rights abuses in Aideed-controlled areas during late 1990s

- Aideed's militia allegedly committed serious human rights abuses against people of Baidoa
- Individuals of Rahanwein minority were particularly at risk
- Due to abuses, Baidoa was called "city of death"

The Special Rapporteur of the U.N. Secretary-General reported the following after her visit to the region in late 1999:

"The independent expert visited Baidoa [Banadir region] on 17 and 18 November 1999. Aideed's militia had held this town, which was dubbed, during the peak of the Somali famine, 'the city of death', for the previous four years. During this period, the people of Baidoa and its surroundings left. Allegedly, individuals were massacred, women were raped, wells were destroyed, and villages were looted and burnt. Persons were allegedly detained without charge or trial, sometimes in containers. Their families were forced to pay to secure their release. As a result, the town, mainly inhabited by Rahanweins, was largely deserted. The Rahanwein are a minority group in Somalia, who have been widely discriminated against.

[...]

During the time Aideed's troops controlled the area, the village (Doynounay) [near Baidoa] was allegedly looted and burnt. The only building spared was said to have been the mosque.

[...]

Many serious violations allegedly took place in Doynounay. [T]he independent expert met a man who had allegedly survived a massacre. He told her that about 60 men from the village were rounded up and taken to Baidoa, where they were shot...During that time, women were allegedly raped, wells were destroyed and the village itself was burnt." (CHR 26 January 2000, pp. 20- 21)

Clan-based competition over resources is the main cause of displacement (2004)

- Displacements particularly in the southern fertile areas between Juba and Shabelle Rivers aimed at grabbing fertile lands from other clans
- June 1999 Kismayo changed control, the JVA evicted General Morgan's troops and Majerteen and Harti clans were displaced
- Juba Valley is fertile, and has market opportunities with sea access with Kismayo and proximity with Kenya
- Competition for political power went hand in hand with grab of resources therefore minorities on fertile lands disproportionately suffered from killings, destruction, land alienation, obstruction of humanitarian relief, and forced displacement
- IDPs from Galgala were displaced from Mogadishu and Middle Shabelle by the Abgal clan in 1991
- Bantu minorities were displaced from the Gosha area and nearly exterminated by Majerteen and Habargedir militias between 1991 and 1993

- Revenge killings between Marehan and Dir clans degenerated into fight over control for grazing lands in Galgaduud October 2003

"Throughout the civil war, these three regions have seen some of the heaviest conflict in southern Somalia. Conflict relates to three central issues: control of the strategic and lucrative port town of Kismayo, control of valuable land well suited for agricultural development and pastoralism alike, and debates over which clan grouping has legitimate historical claims to these different territories.

The change of control in Kismayo in June 1999, considerably altered the regional strategic map. The eviction of militia commanded by General Said Hersi 'Morgan' by the Juba Valley Alliance (JVA) has led to displacement of Majerteen and Harti communities and re-ignited claims over the rightful ownership of 'occupied territories'. [...]

The Juba Valley regions are endowed with a wealth of natural resources. The region benefits from one of the highest rates of rainfall in Somalia (approximately 500mm to 700mm per annum). The rains, river and rich soil support a wide range of agricultural productivity. Wide-ranging pasture has led to the regions' high concentrations of livestock. The Kismayo seaport and the proximity of the Kenyan border provide market access. Further, both ocean and river fishing provide subsistence bounties and trade possibilities for a variety of groups.

However, the complex dynamic between drought and environmental degradation of other regions has constituted trend of population movement toward scarce river-fed areas, the increasing encroachment and competition between pastoral and agro-pastoral communities over resources which has led to violence. There is also a clear imbalance between those clan and sub-clan groups which have the socio-political access to economic resources, including international aid, and those which are marginalised and excluded." (UNCU/OCHA, 30 July 2002, p.24-5)

"This report realized that the very nature and consequence of the civil conflicts makes the issue of displacement highly complex. In fact communities have suffered multiple displacement especially in the south where population fleeing conflict and later moving northward for their economic livelihoods. Moreover, land appropriation takes place along the banks of the Juba and Shabelle Rivers where the dispossessed lost their farming land.

[...]

As a consequence of the armed conflict that began in 1991 when the revolt against the oppressive Siad Barre regime has turned into a competition between the dominant groups including politicians for power and economic resources including fertile land which was owned by minority groups. Therefore, they were seen as targets "enemies", and suffered more than the general population. As a result, the minorities have disproportionately suffered wanton killings, destruction of their culture and identity, torture, ethnic and gender based discrimination, alienation from their lands, obstruction of humanitarian relief, and subsequently displaced from their lands to IDPs and refugees camps." (UNCU, 30 July 2002, pp.2;6)

"Causes of displacement from places of origin vary within the different IDP communities in Kismayo. The Galgala IDPs for example were displaced from their houses in Mogadishu and Gedi-Hir in Middle Shabelle region in early 1991 by the Abgal clan with whom they share a territory. Said Barre regime armed the Galgala against the Abgal. When the regime collapsed, the Galgala faced brutal Abgal reprisal that led to displacement of thousands of Galgala from their lands.

The Bantu were forcibly displaced from their lands, in the Gosha area, by Majerteen and Habargedir militias who fought over the control of resources and territories between 1991 and 1993. It has been reported by the displaced that Majerteen and Habargedir militias ensured extermination of the Bantu, appropriation of the best of the lands, and obstruction of relief food to force the Bantu farmers to abandon their lands. As last resort many Bantu sought protection in Kismayo and other neighbouring villages, while others migrated to Mogadishu and other areas in Puntland and Somaliland.

The Werdai were displaced from their lands in Bu'ale and Afmadow area following attacks by the Ogaden while the Tuni were forcefully displaced from their lands in Sablale area by Habargedir militia who occupied their land during the armed conflict in 1992.

The Ormala and Ajuran were displaced from Bardera, Sakaw and Bu'ale area mainly by droughts. They sought humanitarian assistance in Kismayo and elsewhere after losing all their livestock.

Recent conflicts in 2000 between the Juba Valley Alliances (comprising mainly of Marehan and Habargeder- Eyr) supported by the TNG and Majerten led by General Morgan in Lower and Middle Juba regions have led to displacement of dozens of families from their houses to Merka and Mogadishu. The majority of those who fled are families who had some resources to undertake their migration.

[...]

In December 2000, 11 villages including Barakamajindo, Adomow, Bandar, Moblen, Harawe, Qalaliyow, Libanga, Dambaley, Haji Tunal, Tanzani and Manane all in Jilib in district were burnt, crops and other properties were destroyed during this conflict. The conflict is believed to have been jointly fuelled by the Habargedir and Biyamal whose intention was to cause displacements of Bantu, and then appropriate their best agricultural lands. Though the Bantu (Jarar Weyne) community in the region armed themselves during the last three years in order to resist further occupation of their lands by other clans.

Almost all IDPs in Jilib have little prospects of returning to their lands soon until the situation back home improves. According to a Werdai elder, the Werdai IDPs can not return until their hostility with the Ogaden is addressed and solved.

[...]

About 2700 IDPs are estimated to be presently living in Qoryoley and its surrounding areas. Most of them are Garre, Tuni, Bantu, Biyamal, Rahaweyn and Galgale. The Garre and Jido IDPs were displaced from Alanfuto, Damanley, Jerow, and Abdi Ali villages in Kurtunwarey and Qoryoley districts by conflicts between Garre and Jido militias who fought over the control of these villages between 1998 and 2000. The Bantu and Biyamal were displaced mainly from Jilib and Jamame area in the Lower and Middle Jubba regions by conflicts between United Somali Congress (USC) led by General Aided and a coalition of Majerten, Marchan, Dhulbahante and Ogaden forces led by General Morgan. They fought over the control of territories and resources. Though the Bantu and Biyamal have not participated in the hostilities, because of their vulnerability, and most importantly for their resources, they became prime targets for attacks by the fighting clan militia. In Somalia, ethnicity and economic pursuit form the major components of the armed conflict, with agriculture and livestock being the major targets.

The Galgale IDPs were displaced from Mogadishu and Gedihir by the Abgal with whom they lived together. During the last days of his rule, Siad Barre armed Galgale militia against the Abgal. When Siad was defeated in 1991, the Galgale faced brutal reprisal from the Abgal and were forced to abandon their lands. The Habargedir militias who were controlling Bay and Bakol regions from 1995-99 displaced the Rahaweyn mainly from Burhakaba and Baidoa. They were subjected to severe human rights violations that forced them to abandon their lands." (UNCU 30 July 2002, pp. 25;30; 33-4)

"There has been sporadic inter-clan fighting between Murusade and Duduble in El-Bur district of Galguduud and between members of the Dir and the Marchan in the Heraale area of the Mudug region. On 27 October, a man from the Dir clan reportedly killed a Marehan clan member in revenge for the killing of his father in 1992. This murder degenerated into inter-clan fighting in Heraale village, in Abudwaaq district. The clashes have continued intermittently and have transformed the dispute into a fight for the control of grazing lands and water in Heraale." (UN SC, 12 February 2004, p.5)

Intermittent inter-factional conflicts in southern and central Somalia cause death and displacement (2003)

- Violent conflict between the SRRC and the Juba Valley Alliance (JVA) have displaced 6000 people from Gedo in early 2002
- Conflict in Gedo displaced 15,000 families to Bay and Bakool as well as across the border with Kenya in April 2002
- Hundreds of people continue to die in Mogadishu from violent armed confrontations between TNG forces and their allied militias and opposition forces
- An upsurge in inter-clan fighting forced 10,000 to flee from Bulo Hawo and Kismayo in Middle and Lower Juba in 2001
- Fighting between JVA and Morgan forces in Lower Juba killed 2000 and displaced hundred of families in 2001
- Conflict between rebel forces and pro-government troops over the main port of Kismayo displaced hundreds of thousands of people in 2001
- Conflicts rose in Baidoa's RRA's headquarters due to disagreements over the establishment of the self-declared autonomous region of the South West State of Somalia (2002)

Gedo:

"The most significant conflict during this reporting period took place in Gedo region in April, involving pro Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) and pro Juba Valley Alliance (JVA) militia. These clashes have resulted in the death of innocent civilians and have left many injured. Approximately 6,000 people from Bulo Hawa have been displaced as a direct result of the conflict." (UN, May 2002, p.2)

"However, the second influx from Belet Hawa town has remained in at location on the outskirts of Mandera known as BP1 (border Post 1) a few hundred metres inside Kenya. [...] Reports suggest that many of the refugees at BP1 are formerly internally displaced people from within Somalia who had been trying to make a living in Belet Hawa and who have no ties with the Mandera community. Even before these former IDPs arrived in Mandera, their nutritional status is likely to have been extremely poor." (FSAU, Food Security, June 2002)

"Thousands of people have fled, or are fleeing, their homes in the Gedo region of southwestern Somalia because of fighting between rival groups, local sources told IRIN on Thursday.

They have been streaming out of the border towns of Bulo Hawa, and Lugh, despite the onset of the main Gu season rains." (IRIN 25 April 2002)

"Families were leaving Bardhere town and the surrounding villages to the east, which bore the brunt of the fighting, and were moving in response to reports of renewed fighting and a fear that "the fighting will go on for some time [...].

Humanitarian sources told IRIN that people were also leaving the town of Baidoa, about 200 km northwest of Mogadishu, for fear that the fighting might spread from Bardhere. "We have had reports of families coming from Baidoa to Buur Hakaba [about 80 km to the southeast of Baidoa] in the last two days," (IRIN, 20 February 2002)

Mogadishu:

"The general security situation in Mogadishu was tense and unstable. The main seaport and airport facilities remain closed. The Somalia Transitional National Government (TNG) started collecting taxes in Mogadishu. Banditry and acts of violence were reported." (UNICEF 7 September 2001)

"The security situation in Mogadishu deteriorated with an increase in kidnappings, and an upsurge in armed conflict between the Somalia Transitional National Government (TNG) and opposition groups.

Militia loyal to Mohamed Dhere attacked the residence of TNG Interior Minister, Mr. Dahir Dayah. The attack caused significant casualties including death, injuries and destruction of property. Fighting broke out between TNG forces and opposition militias in North Mogadishu resulting in over 30 deaths and 60 injuries." (UNICEF, 12 June 2002)

Bulo Hawo:

"Heavy fighting in Bulo Hawo in April claimed the lives of over eighty militia and an unconfirmed number of civilian casualties. Up to 10,000 persons fled across the border to Mandera, Kenya. Although IDPs are now slowly returning to Bulo Hawo, the area remains tense and prolonged displacement may have an impact on food security." (UNICEF 12 July 2001, sect. 1)

Middle and Lower Juba:

"The JVA and Morgan have clashed in the nearby Lower Juba since July 27, leaving some 200 people dead and displaced hundreds of families, militia and medical sources said.

'Already dozens of families left and more others who can afford to get food during the voyage would go to Mogadishu and the port town of Merka,' said another Jilib resident, Asha Ibrahim." (AFP 3 September 2001)

Kismayo:

"Hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced by the recent fight for control of the southern port town of Kismaio between the rebel forces and those pro-government troops." (Xinhua 28 August 2001)

"The forces that captured Kismayo are made up of Morgan's Somali Patriotic Movement, drawn from the Darod clan, the Rahanwein Resistance Army, and the South Somali National Movement." (AFP 6 August 2001)

Baidoa:

"The RRA [Rahanweyn Resistance Army] referred to the situation of the internally displaced persons from Lower Shabelle region who are coming to Baidoa. The harsh conditions in the town make their absorption difficult. The RRA also emphasized that the Rahanwein in Lower Shabelle are still living under oppressive conditions." (CHR 26 January 2000, p. 21)

"Tension had been rising in Baidoa, the headquarters of the RRA, due to a deepening split between Shatigadud and his deputies over the establishment of the self-declared autonomous region of the South West State of Somalia (SWS). Shatigadud was declared SWS president in late March." (IRIN, 4 July 2002)

"The humanitarian situation in Bay and Bakool is dominated by the conflict and displacement of mainly women and children. As well as older men indicating the nature and severity of the conflict. Since June 2002, fighting in and around Baidoa between the combined militias of Muhammad Ibrahim Habsade (RRA Deputy Chairman) and Shaykh Adan Madobe (RRA Deputy Chairman), and the militia of Hasan Muhammad Nur Shatigadud (RRA Chairman) has led to population displacement on a large scale. This fighting, predominantly between the clans of the Leysan and Harin, has led to some of the worst killings in the region since 1991. Although reliable information remains poor, fighting and the targeting of unarmed civilians, including women and children, the burning of huts and the looting of grain stores has been reported in a wide northern arc from Daynune to the east (between Baidoa and Buurhakaba) to Awdiinley in the west. [...] This has led to waves of displacement of people from Harin villages in Baidoa district to other Harin villages in Bay and Bakool regions, Buurhakaba, and Mogadishu." (OCHA, 28 November 2003)

Mahaday:

"Heavy fighting once again resumed on Tuesday afternoon in Middle Shabelle region between the forces of the transitional national government (TNG) of Somalia and those of warlord Mohamed Omar Habeb best known as Mohamed Dhere.

[...]

Because of Tuesday's fighting, there have been hundreds of families who fled their villages [mainly Mahaday].

Many of these internally displaced people have reached Jalalaqsi district of Hiran region not very far away from where the fighting started.

[...]

Mohamed Dhere has accused the government of destabilizing Middle Shabelle region, while the government accused Warlord Mohamed Dhere of trying to force the people in Middle Shabelle region to support him forcefully and pay taxes." (Xinhua, 18 June 2002)

Galkayo:

"About 40 people have been killed and 60 wounded in inter-clan fighting in the Mudug region of central Somalia, sources in the regional capital Galkayo told IRIN on Wednesday.

The fighting was concentrated in and around the village of Afbarwaqo, some 200 km east of Galkayo, but has now died down.

According to a local elder, Muhammad Salad Du'ale, the fighting - which broke out two weeks ago - occurred between the Sa'd sub-clan of the main Habar Gedir clan, and the Dir clan. It was sparked off by revenge killings for the deaths of eight fishermen near Afbarwaqo, but the ensuing escalation of the violence was also attributable to the scarcity of water and grazing in the area, Du'ale said.

[...]

The violence has reportedly displaced hundreds of families, who have sought refuge in areas where "there is not a single well or water point", Sheko Harir said. "Those are the ones who need immediate help." " (IRIN, 30 January 2002)

Cruel combination of conflict and climatic extremes-cause repeated displacements in Somalia

- Clan conflict persisted in the face of a complete collapse of government structures
- Bay and Bakool have been the two worst hit regions by the combined effect of conflict and drought
- Rival militias in Bay and Bakool carried a scorched-earth policy deliberately destroying all infrastructure, looting crops and wanton killing
- Major flooding killed 2000 and displaced 230,000 people in 1997
- Violence forced 50,000 persons to flee their homes in first half of 1999
- People too exhausted to seek humanitarian assistance in towns were eating dead animals to survive drought in 1999
- 6,000 persons displaced by flooding of Shabelle River in 2000
- Drought severely affected families in central and southern Somalia during 2000

"As political confrontation and civil war degenerated into clan conflict, the remnants of government structures collapsed. What remained of Somalia's physical, economic and social infrastructure was largely destroyed. In 1991-92, the heavily populated inter-riverine areas (between the Juba and Shabelle river valleys) were very vulnerable. With crop failures and the escalation of the conflict combined with drought and flood, thousands of people became destitute. Famine resulted in mass population displacement, and widespread loss of life." (UN December 1998, p. 4)

"Bay and Bakool regions lie between the two main rivers of southern Somalia, the Juba to the west and the Shabelle to the south and east. Each consists of five districts; Bay: Baidoa, Bardale, Burhakaba, Dinsor, Qansahdeere, and Bakool: Al Barde, Hudur, Rabdhure, Tieglo and Wajid.

These two regions have been the worst hit during a decade of armed conflict. During this time, rival militia carried out a 'scorched earth' policy with deliberate destruction of infrastructure, theft of crops and livestock, underground grain pits and seed stocks, killing and destruction of towns and villages as well as laying of mines. Baidoa, known as the "city of death", was at the epicenter of the famine in 1992, during which thousands of person died. From 1991 hundreds of people were affected by armed conflicts of the civil war, lawlessness and subsequent displacement from many towns and villages of southern Somalia arrived in Baidoa to seek protection and assistance. However, most of them fled Baidoa due to a combination of insecurity and droughts resulted from the occupation of Bay region by various clans or power groups where the last one being the forces led by General Mohamed Farah 'Aideed' in 1995. During these times of occupation, its alleged that women were raped, water points destroyed and villages burnt to the ground." (UNCU/OCHA, 30 July 2002, p.27)

Major flooding in 1997-1998 was particularly devastating to Somali populations:

"[F]loods inundated much of southern Somalia's fertile land in late 1997, killing approximately 2,000 people. The floods destroyed food stocks, decimated 60,000 hectares of planted crop land, displaced 230,000 people, and left a total of one million affected." (USAID 1998 Annual Summary, para. 2)

"Heavy flooding during late 1997 and early 1998 affected an estimated 600,000 people and exacerbated harsh humanitarian conditions in southern areas of Somalia. More than 2,000 people died and up to 200,000 became temporarily homeless because of the floods. The floods destroyed crops – the harvest was one-third smaller than the previous year – and ruined about 40 tons of grain in storage.

The floods particularly harmed populations already displaced by the country's warfare. Heavy rains washed away makeshift huts housing displaced families in Mogadishu. Other displaced families in the capital continued to live in abandoned government buildings, schools, factories, and houses left empty by the country's decade of instability." (USCR 1999, p.88)

In the year 1999:

"A deadly combination of warfare, drought, and food shortages pushed tens of thousands of people from their homes during the year [1999], joining hundreds of thousands of Somalis uprooted in previous years. [...]

Violence in southwestern Somalia forced at least 50,000 persons to flee their homes in the first half of 1999, including about 20,000 who fled to Kenya and 10,000 who reportedly crossed into Ethiopia. Thousands of other families reportedly fled to Mogadishu from war-racked and drought-ridden southern regions during the year, while thousands of Mogadishu-area residents temporarily fled their homes when heavy fighting erupted in Mogadishu." (USCR 2000, pp. 115-116)

"It is likely that the stress in the rural areas is extensive. Many poor rural people are said to be too weak to come to the urban centres in search of food. The UN-EUE field officer was told that in some cases people migrating to town had died along the way, and he observed first-hand people eating the meat from animals that had died from weakness or disease." (UNDP-EUE 14 December 1999, pp.1,4)

In the year 2000:

"Some 900 families or about 6,000 people have been displaced by flooding in central Somalia after the Shabelle River burst its banks, a local official said Monday [in May 2000]." (AFP 22 May 2000)

"The impact of this drought is having major effects on up to 1,200,000 people, including 300,000 children under 5 years, in the districts of Bay, Bakool, Gedo, Hiran and Middle Shabelle in Southern and Central Somalia, and the area will remain at risk up to the next harvest following the next Dyer season (January

2001). Women, children and other vulnerable people in Bakool are now starting to move in search of water, food, and basic health services." (UNICEF 20 June 2000, para. 2)

Peace efforts

The Somali National Reconciliation Conference under the auspices of IGAD (Oct 2002-2004)

- The IGAD peace process initiated in Eldoret on 15 October 2002 gathered 24 key faction leaders, the TNG and representatives of civil society
- The first stage included a cease-fire: the Declaration on cessation of Hostilities and the Structures and Principles of the Somali National Reconciliation Process
- At the second phase of the talks six technical committees were formed to discuss on federalism, disarmament, conflict resolution, and economic reconstruction and land rights
- The third stage will focus on power sharing and should plan for the formation of an interim government and decide on mode of election of parliamentarians
- An agreement to form a 450-member federal parliament on the basis of quotas of the four main clans and seats for minorities was reached in October 2002
- The 27 October 2002 ceasefire was blatantly violated
- The independent expert on Somalia of the UNHCR recommends 'smart sanctions' for Somali warlords who prove to be actively blocking peace efforts
- The Somali National Reconciliation Conference was hindered by disputes over number of participants, allocation of seats by clan, and periodic absence of the President of the TNG as well as three key faction leaders
- In 29 January 2004 compromise was reached to adopt an amended version of the Transitional Federal Charter, whereby members of parliament would represent clans, minorities and women

"The 14th peace conference since 1991 opened in Eldoret, Kenya, in October under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a regional state grouping. AI called for human rights to be at the forefront of the talks and opposed a general amnesty for faction leaders and others who had committed war crimes or crimes against humanity under the previous Said Barre government or in the succeeding civil wars. The conference was supported by the European Union, the UN, the USA and the Arab League. Although boycotted by Somaliland, it brought together all faction leaders and numerous civil society groups. Faction leaders and the TNG signed a cease-fire on 27 October and a further truce in December, although outbreaks of fighting continued in Somalia. They concluded an agreement to form a 450-member federal parliament in 2003 on the basis of quotas of the four main clans with seats reserved also for minorities. Six committees were formed to make recommendations on a unified constitutional framework, disarmament and demobilization, land and property rights, economic reconstruction, regional and international relations, and conflict resolution and reconciliation, including human rights." (AI, January 2003)

"Transitional National Government (TNG) in the capital, and the resurgence of activity on the part of faction leaders, with attendant violence, shifting alliances and volatility. In October, a peace conference was held under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD). The conference brought together 24 faction leaders, TNG and representatives of civil society organizations. For the first time, all armed factions agreed to participate in the peace talks. However, "Somaliland's" administration decided to abstain. The conference was divided into three phases with the first devoted to agenda-setting and the signing of a declaration on the cessation of hostilities during the talks, the second to

committee work on key issues (federalism, demobilization, land and property disputes, economic planning, conflict resolution and international relations) and the third to the formation of an interim government. At the time of the writing of this report, all factions had signed a truce declaration and the conference was in its second phase, which was scheduled to last for a period of four to six weeks.

[...]

The independent expert welcomes the IGAD-sponsored peace process and urges the international community to lend its support to and express its interest in this process. The independent expert notes with particular interest the EU Council of Ministers' decision during its 2447th meeting on 22 July 2002, in which it, *inter alia*, called for the imposition of "smart sanctions" on faction leaders who prove to be actively blocking peace efforts in Somalia. He calls upon the Commission on Human Rights to recommend to the Secretary-General and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) the undertaking of a study on the applicability to Somali warlords of sanctions, such as the freezing of their foreign assets, the imposition of travel bans, stripping them of their foreign passports, the imposition of business boycotts and the establishment of a monitoring mechanism to enforce the Security Council mandated arms embargo on Somalia." (UNCHR, 31 December 2002pp.3;7)

"Muhammad Qanyare Afrah, one of the most important faction leaders in Mogadishu, speaking on-behalf of his counterparts Usman Hasan Ali Ato, Umar Mahmud Finish, and Mawlid Ma'ane, said they had "serious reservations" about the way the conveners were preparing for the conference, including the fact that the faction leaders had not been consulted.

"In the absence of other major initiatives, external support for peace has focused on the efforts of the IGAD, which aims to create a broad-based, all-inclusive government while maintaining the sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of Somalia.

However, as the preparations for the IGAD reconciliation conference got underway, tension and conflict increased considerably in some areas. The simultaneous need for, and aversion to, a central government in Somalia have been further exploited by actors who have a stake in the outcome. This includes those Somalis and individuals of other nationalities profiting from the war economy, who have proven reluctant to accept the compromises that come with peace." (UN, November 2002, p.14)

"During 2003 the key political activity revolved around the ongoing Somali National Reconciliation Conference. The talks, which started on 15 October 2002 in Eldoret, Kenya, under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), had registered significant initial progress with respect to securing the attendance at some point of all the main faction leaders in Somalia and some participation by civil society groups, and to the signing of the Declaration on Cessation of Hostilities and the Structures and Principles of the Somali National Reconciliation Process (the Eldoret Declaration) by all the Somali leaders on 27 October 2002. There have, however, been continued violations of the Declaration since its signing, leading to the establishment of an international committee - made up of the United States, the European Union, the African Union, the League of Arab States and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) - to monitor the ceasefire.

The conference has also been beset by a number of difficulties, including disputes over the number of participants and the allocation of seats by clan, as well as the fact that "Somaliland" has consistently refused to attend the conference based on the assertion that it is a state that is independent from Somalia. The proceedings have also been affected on several occasions by the periodic absence of Abdiqassim Salad Hassan, President of the Transitional National Government (TNG) and three other key faction leaders - Muse Sudi Yalahow, Osman Hassan Ali Ato and Bare Hiirale. The Government of Djibouti, a member of the IGAD Technical Committee, also in late September removed itself from the talks, reportedly claiming a lack of neutrality with respect to the events.

At the time of writing, the conference had completed the second phase of discussions within six technical committees addressing core issues of the Somali conflict: federalism, disarmament, conflict resolution, economic reconstruction, land rights and international relations. On 15 September, the conference adopted

a Transitional Federal Charter emanating from these committees. The Charter has been criticized by civil society groups for inadequately incorporating human rights and rule of law principles. The third phase of the conference will focus on devising power-sharing arrangements." (UNCHR, 30 November 2003, paras. 6-8)

"By mid-September 2003, developments at the Somalia National Reconciliation Conference at Mbagathi, Kenya, led to an impasse over the contested adoption of a charter (see S/2003/987, paras. 13-18). Some of the leaders, including the President of the Transitional National Government, Abdikassim Salad Hassan, Colonel Barre Aden Shire of the Juba Valley Alliance (JVA), Mohamed Ibrahim Habsade of the Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA), Osman Hassan Ali ("Atto") and Musse Sudi ("Yalahow") rejected the adoption, and returned to Somalia. On 30 September, a group of them announced the formation of the National Salvation Council consisting of 12 factions under the chairmanship of Musse Sudi. On 7 October, the National Salvation Council signed a memorandum of understanding with the President of the Transitional National Government, in which it acknowledged the continuance in office of the Transitional National Government. The signatories also announced their intention to convene a new national reconciliation conference separate from the one at Mbagathi. No parallel conference has been held, however.

[...]

The Transitional National Government and the National Salvation Council raised several objections to the proposed Leaders' Consultation. The main objection centred on the issue of representation. The group of leaders who had endorsed the adoption of a charter in mid-September wanted the Consultation to be held as scheduled and the participants limited to Abdikassim Salad Hassan and those leaders who had signed the Eldoret Declaration (S/2002/1359, annex) on 27 October 2002. On the other hand, the Transitional National Government and National Salvation Council groups wanted a larger representation of leaders and the exclusion of the former Prime Minister of the Transitional National Government and the Speaker of Transitional National Assembly (see S/2003/987, para. 9). In addition, both groups called for the postponement of the Leaders' Consultation to observe the final days of Ramadan.

[...]

On 29 January, the Somali leaders signed a document entitled "Declaration on the Harmonization of Various Issues Proposed by the Somali Delegates at the Somali Consultative Meetings from 9 to 29 January 2004". The document consisted of proposed amendments to the transitional federal charter adopted at the plenary meeting of the Conference on 15 September 2003. The leaders decided that the name of the charter would be transitional federal charter of the Somali republic; the name of the government would be transitional federal government; its term would last five years; and that the transitional federal parliament would consist of 275 members, 12 per cent of whom would be women. In addition, the document called for a national census to be undertaken while a new constitution was being drafted, as well as for its approval by an internationally supervised national referendum. A controversy subsequently arose, however, over the method of selection of the members of parliament, and efforts are being made to overcome the problem." (UN SC, 12 February 2004, paras. 3,7,13)

"The distribution of assigned seats by the various clans would start on 13 May and end 20 May, to be followed by the selection of members of parliament from 23 May to 5 June, Musyoka said.

The parliamentarians would be sworn in on 7 June, and would then proceed to elect "the Speaker of the Transitional Federal Assembly and his or her deputies... on 9 and 10 June," said the statement.

"The Speaker and his or her deputies shall oversee the election of the President of the Republic, which will take place between the 14th and 17th of June. The swearing-in ceremony will take place on 19 June, and the new government will be inaugurated here in Nairobi on 1 July 2004," it said." (IRIN, 26 April 2004)

On Somalia's conflict background, its peace processes and the role of IGAD see Institute for Security Studies, 26 Apr 2004) Somalia: Fourteenth time lucky? [External Link]

To have an in-depth analysis of the Somali peace negotiations see 'Negotiating a blueprint for peace in Somalia' (ICG, 6 March 2003): [External Link]

Also see 'Salvaging Somalia's chance for peace' (ICG, 9 December 2002): [External Link]

For the 'Declaration on Cessation of Hostilities and the Structures and Principles of the Somalia National Reconciliation Process' (UNSC, 13 December 2002), click here [External Link]

Arta Djibouti peace process resulted in creation of the Transitional National Government (TNG) (August 2000)

- Transitional National Assembly elects interim president at peace talks
- International community supports process and president

The Djibouti peace process:

"The peace process, which focuses on civil society groups rather than on faction leaders, was initiated last September [2000] by President Ismail Omar Guelleh of Djibouti. The peace conference started with a civil society technical symposium on 21 March [2000] in Djibouti and is scheduled to end on 15 July." (UNHCHR 10 July 2000, para. 5)

"A major Somali peace conference – the thirteenth peace effort since 1991 – got underway in neighboring Djibouti, attended by some 900 official Somali conferees and more than 1,000 other Somali observers. The gathering, known as the 'Somali Peace and Reconciliation Conference,' was still underway at the end of July [2000]." (USCR 28 August 2000, para. 12)

"The three months have been dominated by the conference in Arta, Djibouti, hosted by the Djibouti government. Several thousand Somalis from all walks of life, many of them living in exile, succeeded in electing a clan-based 245 member parliament after four months of deliberations." (IFRC 18 October 2000, para. 4)

Creation of Transitional National Assembly and election of Somali President:

"After 10 years of civil war, Somali parliamentarians of the Transitional National Assembly at the Djibouti Peace talks held in the town of Arta elected Dr Abd-al Qasim Salad Hasan as President on the morning of 26 August 2000." (UNICEF 7 September 2000, para. 1)

"In contrast to the anarchy and civil war that had prevailed in Somalia for the past 10 years, the recent creation of the National Assembly ushered in a new era for peace and stability and constituted the first step of restoring order and central authority in the country, the President of Somalia told the fifty-fifth regular session of the General Assembly this morning, as it continued its general debate.

The spontaneous reaction of hundreds of thousands of Somalis, he said, demonstrated vividly that they wanted to leave years of civil war behind and open a new era of peace, tranquility, good governance, restoration of the rule of law and national unity. He called upon the warlords to review their positions, hear the voice of reason and respect the legitimate aspirations of the Somali people to achieve national unity, social and economic development, and durable peace." (UNGA 15 September 2000, paras. 2 and 3)

International community supports Somali assembly and newly-elected President:

"On 16 August [2000], the UN Security Council met in informal consultations after which the current President of the Council gave a statement welcoming the Somali parliament and called on all political forces in Somalia to join the ongoing peace process." (UNCU 18 August 2000, para. 2)

"The European Union is willing to enter into dialogue with the new Somali authorities and, once they have established their authority, to support their efforts to rebuild the country, while continuing to give its backing to recovery measures in all areas of Somalia where stable conditions exist.

The European Union calls on the authorities of Somaliland and Puntland to establish constructive relations with the institutions which have emerged from the Arta process. It also urges the future transitional

government to establish a constructive dialogue as soon as possible with the aforementioned authorities for the purpose of re-establishing national unity in peace and with respect for the elements of stability achieved." (EU 8 September 2000, paras. 1-3)

For a detailed analysis of the Arta peace process, see November 2000 report by Ken Menkhaus [External link].

Over ten years of peace efforts in Somalia achieved little success (2003)

- International community responded to conflict and famine in Somalia with UN peacekeeping operation (1992-1995)
- UN deployed troops in 1992 despite threatening stance posed by Somali faction leaders
- UNOSOM troops experienced ambushes and suffered casualties in 1993
- All UNOSOM forces were pulled out by 1995
- Mediators' 'quick fix' approach to peace in Somalia has led to consecutive failures

"Most previous Somali peace initiatives have been touted by their authors (and many participants) as successes, even when evidence of failure had become inescapable – much like the old medical saw that "the operation succeeded but the patient died". In 1991, the announcement of a new government at the "Djibouti II" conference triggered the most vicious fighting Mogadishu has ever seen. The UN and the U.S. trumpeted the 1993 Addis Ababa accords as the first step in a bold international experiment in "nation building", only to find themselves at war with the late General Aydiid. UN Special Envoy Lansana Kouyate's breezy assertion after the May 1994 Nairobi talks that "the warlords are now peacelords" was followed by new fighting in the Jubba Valley, Merka, Mogadishu, and Beled Weyne. The Arta Conference continues to be heralded as successful peacebuilding despite the collapse of two regional administrations and eruption of some of the worst violence in years.

Many positive words have been spoken about the current process, but there is a real risk that it will go down the same road. Already jostling for position between factions before and during the conference has involved serious fighting in Mogadishu, Baydhowa, Puntland, Gedo, and the Juba Valley. February's clashes in Mogadishu are in part due to the rearrangement of factional coalitions during the conference, and more serious fighting could yet follow. The reality – that poor peace agreements actually make the situation worse – is one that all parties to the talks, Somali and foreign alike, should bear in mind as they consider their next moves. " (ICG, 6 March 2003)

"The international response to the armed conflict and the displacement situation was slowed by insecurity due to marauding factions and rampant banditry. Massive infusions of relief aid during the period from August through November 1992 helped to mitigate the impact of famine, but could not eliminate its causes (UN December 1998, p. 4). The continued violence prompted the formation of a UN peacekeeping force known as the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). Soon after their deployment the leaders of some of the contending Somali factions began to take an aggressive, threatening stance toward the United Nations." (UN 1996, p. 9)

"Extensive television coverage of famine and civil strife that took approximately 300,000 lives in 1991 and 1992 prompted an American-led international intervention in Somalia. The armed humanitarian mission in late 1992 quelled clan combat long enough to stop the famine, but ended in urban guerrilla warfare against Somali militias.

The last international forces withdrew in March 1995 after the casualty count reached the thousands. Approximately 100 peacekeepers, including 20 American soldiers, were killed. The \$4 billion United Nations intervention had little lasting impact. Today, neighboring countries and others as far afield as Libya and Egypt are reportedly backing competing warlords." (Freedom House 1999, "Overview")

"In June 1993 Hussein Aided's militia attacked Pakistani UNOSOM peace-keepers in South Mogadishu. Sporadic clashes between UNOSOM II forces and Aided's militia continued until October 1993 when a small US force was ambushed, suffering heavy casualties. The United States withdrew its forces, and by March 1995 all remaining UNOSOM forces had left." (UN December 1998, p. 4)

POPULATION PROFILE AND FIGURES

Global figures

An estimated 375,000 persons remain displaced in Somalia (Apr 2004)

- UN estimates that between 372, 880 and 376,630 people out of a total 7 million Somalis are displaced
- UN estimates that 280,000 IDPs live in Mogadishu, the town recording the highest concentration of displaced people
- IDPs concentrated in main town such as Bossaso (28,000 IDPs) and Kismayo (15,000 IDPs)
- Children and women make up 75% of the IDP population
- Accurate estimates of IDPs in Somalia are hard to establish due to a mix of factors leading to displacement: war, drought, seasonal herd migrations
- IDPs often mingle with urban poor and returning refugee 95% of whom were not able to meet basic needs
- Many IDPs are displaced temporarily and return to their areas of origin few months after once the crisis subsides
- In 1992, at the peak of conflict USCR estimated as many as 2 million Somali were displaced
- In northwestern Somalia up to 1.5 million people were displaced due to Siad Barre's counter-insurgency war, according to USCR

To see OCHA's complete table of IDP Estimates for Somalia by district or town as of April 2004 see bibliography below.

"The internally displaced persons of Somalia are widely dispersed throughout the country and currently estimated at around 350,000. However, defining exactly who is an IDP in Somalia is a somewhat problematic task as those persons displaced internally by inter-clan conflict are invariably living together in squatter camps of the major cities with repatriated refugees that have been unable to return to their home areas, with pastoralists displaced by drought, minority groups such as the Bantu, as well as the most destitute of the urban poor. It is estimated that these most highly vulnerable communities represent around ten percent (or about 700,000) of the Somali population, of which half are IDPs. Hence, programming specifically for IDPs has its limits, rather, the international community should target the most highly vulnerable communities (HVCs) among which the IDPs are embedded." (OCHA IDP Unit, 16 April 2004)

"Also crowded primarily in urban areas are more than 350,000 IDPs, [...] the majority of whom have been displaced for ten years or more as result of the violent upheavals and massive human rights violations of the early 1990s. In addition, each year more modest numbers of Somalis are displaced by localised conflict, usually temporarily and primarily in southern and central Somalia. Against this backdrop, it is often difficult to distinguish IDPs in the traditional sense of the term from their resident urban poor neighbours and economic migrants.

[...]

In Puntland and Somaliland, a growing numbers of IDPs and migrants are arriving from southern Somalia in search of work, ranging from house-help to construction work. In Bossaso alone, they now total about 28,000. [...] The highest concentration of IDPs of 150,000 [...] can be found in Mogadishu. These,

together with 15,000 [...] IDPs in Kismayo, are the most acutely vulnerable in southern and central Somalia, suffering from food insecurity and health threats." (UN, 18 November 2003, p.11,13)

"There are an estimated 370,000 IDPs throughout Somalia, most of them women and children and most of them living in abject poverty and in areas under the control of armed faction leaders. Of this number, about 150,000 (the majority) live in the capital, Mogadishu, with another 15,000 in the southern port city of Kismayo, 28,000 in Bosaso while the rest are scattered around the country
[...]

UN Humanitarian Coordinator Maxwell Gaylard, on a visit to Mogadishu in April, lamented the conditions of *circa* 280,000 IDPs resident in the capital." (OCHA, 31 October 2003, p.7)

"Throughout Somalia, an estimated 350,000 of the country's 7,000,000 inhabitants are internally displaced persons (IDPs) who, as a result of protracted conflict and insecurity, have experienced impoverishment, often combined with drought, which induces mass population displacement.
[...]

Notably, IDPs constitute nearly half of the estimated 750,000 Somalis who live in a state of chronic humanitarian need." (UNCU/OCHA, 30 July 2002, p.1)

"Approximately 350,000 IDPs live away from their homes throughout the country, with the highest concentration of 150,000 in Mogadishu.
[...]

Additionally, the large number of seasonal, economic and thus temporary IDPs, mixed with the mass of more permanent IDPs, compounds the difficulties of providing assistance difficult in a manner, which does not encourage urban migration." (UN, November 2002, p.17)

« IDP caseload in northwest Somalia (Somaliland) is approximately 40,500 persons (UNCU study 2000)
IDP caseload in northeast Somalia (Puntland) is approximately 30,500 persons (UNCU study 2000)
IDP caseload in southern and central Somalia, excluding Mogadishu, is approximately 86,000 persons (UNCU study 2002).
[...]

"This study provides an overview on the situation of IDPs in Somalia that they are dispossessed of significant proportional of their assets due to conflict and natural disaster such as successive droughts and floods. About 75% of IDPs are women and children who moved abnormally from areas of their habitual residence and are staying in camps and "camp-like" situation and are in need of assistance and protection." (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p.1)

"In this case, the vulnerable population would likely fall to near 400,000 people - roughly the same number as the caseload of internally displaced persons (IDPs)." (UN November 2001, p. 5)

"In Somalia, an estimated 350,000 of the country's 7 million inhabitants are internally displaced. This figure includes some 40-50,000 Somalis displaced in 1999. During the war to oust the Siad Barre regime, political violence, banditry and lawlessness produced famine conditions and induced mass population displacement. While there was a gradual return of IDPs to their locations of origin between 1993 and 1995, continuing violence, food insecurity and water shortages have exacerbated their living conditions." (UN March 2001, p. 114)

"The very complexity of the issue of displacement is rooted in the problematic associated with its definition. At a general level the issue is fairly clear-cut. That is, those clans from south and central Somalia such as the Raheeweyn, Ajjuran, Kale Jele, Shekhash, Biyo Mal Ahmed, Jarso, Ma'alin Weyne, Harin, and Ashraf fall under the conventional category of displaced persons. These are displaced communities that fled their home territories due to civil conflict and severe drought conditions, or both, and have found themselves in northern towns throughout northwest and northeast Somalia.

At another, more complex level, there are the "returnees" or those clans and sub-clans that over the last decade have been displaced or made refugees as many as two or three times and are only now returning to their ethnic home towns and villages. At a general level returnees are referred to as those from "Kilika Shanad" or Zone 5 designating them by the region in Ethiopia where they resided as refugees during the civil conflicts of 1988 and 1994.

[...]


As for those southerners displaced to the north these are simplistically referred to as "Gudhu" or "foreign speakers" since their Somali dialect can be easily differentiated from that spoken by Somalis in the Northwest. "Ghudhu" is thus a linguistic designation, which, far more than racial or cultural distinctions, distinguishes displaced persons arriving from central and southern Somalia." (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p7)

Estimates of internally displaced people 1992-2004:

Year	Estimated number of IDPs	Source
End 2003	350,000	(USCR 2004)
End 2002	350,000	(USCR 2003)
End 2001	400,000	(USCR 2002)
End 2000	300,000	(USCR 2001)
End 1999	350,000	(USCR 2000)
End 1998	250,000	(USCR 1999)
End 1997	200,000	(USCR 1998)
End 1996	250,000	(USCR 1997)
End 1995	300,000	(USCR 1996)
End 1994	500,000	(USCR 1995)
End 1992	2,000,000	(USCR 1998)

"At the peak of Somalia's upheaval in 1992, more than 800,000 Somalis were refugees in neighboring countries, and as many as 2 million people were internally displaced. Large numbers gradually returned to their home areas during 1993-95, despite sporadic violence and new population flight in some regions. Only 5,000 repatriated in 1996." (USCR 1998, p. 92)

"It is virtually impossible to estimate the number of IDP while it seems that most of the population has been displaced at one time or another during the past ten years of conflict. There are many different categories of IDP in Somalia. These include people who moved from one part of the country to another due to civil conflict and/or fear of persecution; economic migrants who had little option but to move to urban centres in order to survive; pastoralists permanently displaced by drought; returnees who have not been able to return to their traditional areas of origin; demobilised soldiers; widows and orphans." (IGAD/UNHCR/UNDP, December 2000, p.12)



Geographical distribution

IDPs in northwestern Somalia: Somaliland (2004)

- OCHA estimated 5,820 IDPs lived in Somaliland as of April 2004
- Hargeisa hosted about 4,200 IDPs, Burca 360, Berbera 360 and Yirowe 900 as of April 2004, according to OCHA
- The Northwest hosts about 11,000 IDPs, mainly in urban centers notably Hargeisa has four IDP camps: Mohamed Morge, Sheick Nor, Darmi and the State house in 2002
- Over 38,000 IDPs lived in and around major towns in northwestern and northeastern Somalia in 2002
- An estimated 15,000 IDPs lived around Hargeisa and Burao (2002)

To see OCHA's complete table of IDP Estimates for Somalia by district or town, as of April 2004 see bibliography below.

"In addition, it is estimated that over 38,000 IDPs live in and around major towns in northwestern and northeastern regions" (UN, November 2002, p.96)

"[T]here are approximately 15,000 IDPs in the north-western towns of Hargeisa and Burao." (UN, November 2002, p.37)

"Within Somalia there is also a significant population of IDPs whose situation needs to be addressed as a matter of urgency. There are an estimated 11,000 IDPs living in Northwest Somalia[...] primarily in Hargeysa and other urban centres." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p.4)

"By 1988 full scale civil war broke out in Northwest, where Siyad Barre's force attacked the city of Hargeysa in a brutal campaign against the Issaq clan that led to charges of genocide" (IGAD/UNHCR/UNDP, December 2000, p.7)

"Siad Barre's sustained military offensive crippled agricultural production, destroyed nearly all of the region's livestock, decimated northwest Somalia's businesses, places of worship, and water infrastructure, and uprooted almost the entire population of approximately 2.5 million people.

Fleeing war, mass executions, and torture, approximately 400,000 residents of northwest Somalia sought refuge in other countries.[...] An estimated 1.5 million additional people were displaced within northwest Somalia." (USCR, December 2001, p.15)

Hargeysa District:

"In and around Hargeisa, there are now four IDP camps: Mohamed Morge, Sheick Nor, Darmi and the State house area." (Lindgaard 23 March 2001)

"Hargeysa town is the biggest agglomeration in the Northwest and concentrates public administration, private sector and international community interventions. Urban growth started before the war with the migration of the rural population. Since the end of the hostilities Hargeysa has undertaken significant reconstruction and rehabilitation activities and is the destination for a large number of refugees and IDPs.

Hargeysa town hosts about 60% of the returnee population, most of whom are spontaneous returnees of 1991-1997. In addition, a considerable number of refugees remaining in the Ethiopian camps (Camaboker, Rabasso, Daror) are choosing Hargeysa as their zone of repatriation." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, pp.22-23)

Burao District:

"Burao town is an important livestock trade centre, with a considerable concentration of urban population. There are also a significant number of rural populations in the district. Strongly affected by the past conflict, both urban and rural zones have to cope with the presence of a very large number of IDPs (several camps of IDP are located in the district). It also has received many spontaneous returnees during the past years.

Burao district will be a significant destination of the repatriation movement as a large number of refugees remaining in the Daror camp in Ethiopia have selected this district." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p 23)

IDPs in southern and central Somalia (2004)

- Up to 90,270 people were estimated to be displaced in southern and central areas of Somalia as of April 2004, according to OCHA
- The majority of the IDPs, between 100,000 and 230,000 live in and around Mogadishu
- Thousands of newly displaced fled to Mogadishu in early 2000
- Internally displaced reportedly make up 20 to 25% of Mogadishu population
- There were about 87,770 IDPs in south and central Somalia excluding Mogadishu in 2002
- In April 2002 conflict in Gedo displaced up to 15,000 people
- Approximately 15,000 IDPs lived in Kismayo among whom 8,000 from Bantu and 5,000 from Galgala origins (2002)
- In Galgadud between 2000-9000 families were displaced by conflict in November 2003

- In Baidoa between 2250 and 6000 people were temporarily displaced by conflict escalation in October 2003 but most had returned by February 2004
- Some 300-400 IDP families congregated in Rabdure town, Bakool since April 2001, 70% of whom are Somalis who had taken refuge in Ethiopia in the early 1990s

To see OCHA's complete table of IDP Estimates for Somalia by district or town, as of April 2004 see bibliography below.

Mogadishu

"previous estimates of 150,000 IDPs have been updated to approximately 250,000." (OCHA, 23 April 2004)

"More than 200,000 displaced persons continued to live in some 200 Mogadishu-area camps and squatter settlements at year's end [2001]. Thousands of others remained internally displaced in relatively peaceful Somaliland, including newly uprooted civilians who had fled violence in southern Somalia." (USCR, 2002, p.94-97)

"Several thousand people fled into Mogadishu, further crowding the city with displaced families. About 230,000 displaced persons lived in some 200 Mogadishu-area camps and squatter settlements as the year ended [2000]." (USCR 2001, p. 105)

"More than 350,000 people are internally displaced and tend to live off subsistence wages for unskilled day labour, including over 100,000 in Mogadishu." (UN March 2001, p. 114)

"During the first half of the year [2000], thousands of newly displaced Somalis descended on the capital, Mogadishu; gunfights in Mogadishu and at other locations left hundreds dead; a local aid worker was killed and two international relief workers were kidnapped; and floods damaged two displacement camps and killed thousands of livestock." (USCR 28 August 2000, para. 2)

Estimates on the number of camps in and around Mogadishu vary: according to the Somali Refugee Agency SORA, there are 138 camps in Mogadishu, north and south, in which 30 per cent of the population are refugees, while the non-governmental organization Action Contre la Faim estimates that 234,000 displaced Somalis live in 201 camps in Mogadishu (IRIN-CEA 27 April 1999), whereas another source indicates the number of IDPs in Mogadishu is almost 250,000 in about 150 camps in open areas, comprising approximately 20 to 25 per cent of the population of Mogadishu. (FEWS Network 26 February 1999)

"Currently approximately estimates from recently survey revealed that there are as high as 87,770 IDPs mainly settled in major towns and villages in this portion of the country. This figure excludes Mogadishu IDP population which is estimated 150,000." (UNCU/OCHA, 30 July 2002)

"In April 2002, situation in Gedo drastically deteriorated due to intra-Marehan clan conflict, which flared up and caused the displacement of around 15,000 persons either across the Kenya border or throughout the region away from armed conflict area." (UNCU/OCHA 30 July 2002,p25)

Kismayo:

"About 60,000 of the estimated Kismayo District population of 88,000 (WHO NIDs figures, Oct 2002) live in Kismayo town. Among the residents are many internally displaced persons (IDPs) who have settled in over twenty camps [...] within Kismayo town since 1992/93. These IDPs fled some high potential areas of Mareley, Sanguni, Mugambo, Jowhar, Mahaday, Brava and Bay Region due to insecurity." FSAU Nutrition Update, 31 December 2002)

"The portal town of Kismayo, which is the largest town in the Juba valley region, accommodates the largest IDP population in the region. Approximately 15,000 IDPs the majority of whom are Bantu (8,000 persons), Galgala (5,000 persons), Tuni, Werdai, Ajuran and Ormala ethnic minority groups. The majority of IDPs are women and children." (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p.25)

Bakool:

"On this short trip, it was difficult to determine accurately the number of IDPs. Like the camps in Walaq and Biilala, a number of false dwellings add to this difficulty. Moreover, the number given by the IDPs themselves seems to be exaggerated. However, it is estimated that there are between 200 and 300 households at each site (with between 2-7 members per household, total estimated number is 2250 people)." (OCHA, 14 December 2003)

"Civil insecurity in October [2003], close to Baidoa, led to an assessment by WFP, UNICEF, World Vision and ACF during November which found that up to 6,000 persons are estimated to have been displaced from civil insecurity in the area." (FSAU, 10 December 2003)

"The fighting that broke out in July 2002 escalated late last year leading to the displacement of an estimated 3,000 women and children who are now crowded into four camps in Waajid district, Bakool region." (WV, 29 January 2004)

"In response to the recommendations of the Wajid multi-sectoral assessment in January 2004, World Vision visited Bakaar Yar and Bakaar Weyn IDP camps in early February, to provide primary health care services. However, World Vision found deserted IDP camps. The IDPs are reported to have returned to Baidoa after improvement of the security situation there and the fact that the land preparation period (Gu planting season in March/April) was approaching." (FSAU, 25 March 2004, p.3)

"For poor and very poor agro-pastoralist families in Bakool region, a 25-40% food energy deficit is expected over the one-year period from July 2001 to June 2002. However, some areas and populations within these areas are more vulnerable than others due to disproportionately low rains and/or influx of IDPs. Rabdure District in Bakool Region is one such area. Within a three-kilometre radius of Rabdure town, 300-400 families have settled within the past two months. The majority of these IDPs, at least 70%, are Somalis who had settled in Barey and Kumbul areas of Ethiopia due to insecurity in early 1990s but have returned to Somalia since April 2001 due to increased tension between them and the Ethiopian communities. These people had their origins in Rabdure and so may not be absorbed in other villages outside that area. The remainder of the IDPs have come from within Bakool Region (Wajid district and the surrounding villages of Rabdure town) with their movement being triggered by rumours of food distribution. It was reported that this latter group initially came in large numbers but have been moving out towards Elberde in search of pasture while some returned to their homes when they realised that there was no general food distribution. This trend may continue." (FSAU 16 August 2001, Bakool Update)

Galgadud

"Intense inter-clan fighting in the central region of Galgaduud, in Abudwaaq and Murusade districts (see para. 26), forced some 9,000 people to flee to surrounding towns whose inhabitants are themselves suffering from food insecurity because of drought conditions." (UN SC, 12 February 2004)

"During November [2003], civil insecurity in Galgadud continued to expose vulnerable groups to increased food insecurity. Some pastoralists have migrated away from the conflict area, reducing their grazing options. Those that have remained behind are expected to become extremely food insecure. IRIN reports that elders in the area say that 2,000 families are already displaced and are now living in the open without shelter and little access to food. The situation is compounded by the poor Deyr 2003 rains." (FSAU, 10 December 2003)

IDPs in northeastern Somalia: Puntland (2004)

- Puntland hosted about 30,540 IDPs according to OCHA, by April 2004
- About 28,000 IDPs live in Bosasso outskirts and about 22,000 of them live in about 10 camps grouped according to clan affiliation
- About 2,400 IDPs lived in Baadweyn as of April 2004
- The Northeast has no infrastructure to absorb an indeterminable numbers of IDPs from southern Somalia as well as influx of returnees
- Bossaso and Galkayo towns hosted about 33,000 IDPs in camps as of 2002
- IDPs were said to make up 30% of Bossaso's population in 2001 and in 2000 there were an estimated 165,000 IDPs

To see OCHA's complete table of IDP Estimates for Somalia by district or town, as of April 2004 see bibliography below.

Bosasso:

"There are approximately 28,000 (twenty-eight thousand) displaced persons living in five sections in the outskirts of Bosassi town. The largest IDP population has settled in the eastern section of Bosasso." (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p.18)

"The port city of Bossaso in northeastern Somalia has a total estimated population of 120,000 people. In addition, an estimated 22,000 IDPs live in various camps around the city in a very precarious situation. The IDPs are mostly from the regions of southern Somalia where they fled sporadic fighting and clan skirmishes. Some of the camp dwellers are internal migrants from the nomadic inland areas, attracted to the town by trading needs or by the possibility of jobs in the transport industries. [...] The IDPs are grouped according to clan affiliations in some ten major camps around the city. These camps are places of extreme deprivation. Overcrowding and lack of services have turned them into hotbeds of infectious diseases. (UN, 18 November 2003, p. 153)

"Due to its relatively unscathed status the Northeast has been the destination for many of Somalia's IDPs, particularly from the war-ravaged south. It is impossible to quantify the precise numbers of IDPs who have moved to this region since many of them have integrated into communities where they have family ties. However, it is clear that there has been a considerable influx of population into the region, which does not have the infrastructure to cope with such a population increase." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p.3)

In addition to this, an estimated 33,000 IDPs are living in camps on the outskirts of Bossaso and Gal kayo [...] in Northeast Somalia, with minimal infrastructure and economic livelihood opportunities." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p.4)

The total population of Bossaso District is estimated at 250,000 persons. Bossaso town suffered a moderate level of physical destruction and has to cope with poverty and environmental problems. Strongly affected by a large influx of IDPs (including an estimated 28,000 in settlements around the town [...]) the district has a limited absorption capacity because of its weak urban services. After the war Bossaso became the most important port of the Northeast, which is a unique employment source." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p. 23)

"In Bossaso, for instance, IDPs are estimated to make up 30% of the population. IDPs often come from the minority groups (Bantu) and clans with low status in the community." (Lindgaard 23 March 2001)

"Bossaso town suffered a moderate level of physical destruction and has to cope with poverty and environmental problems. Strongly affected by influx of IDP estimated at 165,000 and returnees (close to

8,000), the district has a limited absorption capacity because of its weak urban services. After the war Bossaso became the most important port of the Northeast, which is a unique employment source." (UNHCR/UNDP, December 2000, p.34)

"Tens of thousands of people remained internally displaced in relatively calm Somaliland and Puntland, according to aid agencies. Thousands of residents from southern Somalia fled to northern areas, particularly to Puntland, hoping to escape Somalia by boat to Yemen. Hundreds drowned in overcrowded boats en route to Yemen. Another 7,000 reached Yemen during the year." (USCR 2000, pp. 115-116)

Disaggregated data

Recent returnees from Ethiopia who are unable to reintegrate make up portion of the IDP population (2002)

- Southern IDPs in Somaliland are considered 'refugee' by local authorities who declared independence and IDPs by international organizations
- Southern IDPs in Somaliland intermingle with returnees unable to reintegrate (2002)
- IDPs in Somaliland from southern origin are called 'refugees' by local authorities and 'displaced' by humanitarian agencies
- Refugee returnees become IDPs as very little opportunities exist for returning to their areas of origin or to reintegrate due to mines, ongoing conflict, loss of assets
- An estimated one out of ten households considers itself to be IDPs out of a total of 8,600
- Half households from Southern Somalia consider themselves immigrants rather than IDPs
- Among the 1,700 families living in Daami 35% are from southern Somalia
- In Stadium among 5,000 residents, about 1/5 consider themselves IDPs although they are primarily Somalis from Somaliland or Ethiopia

"There is also another problem as Somaliland has stated that it is an independent state the government sees these people as refugees and the responsibility of UNHCR. But since Somaliland is not recognised the IDP's are therefore internally displaced within their own country, hence they are the responsibility of the state. This has brought untold hardship on the IDP's.

For that reason, it is essential to have better understanding of the problems faced by IDP's, in an attempt to enable the safe and fair existence of IDP's within the host community" (Ibrahim F., 15 August 2002, p.2)

"In a country that has to deal with the consequences of large numbers of people who are displaced, the distinction between internally displaced (IDPs) and refugees has little relevance. In the case of Somalia, refugees as well as IDPs may be reluctant to return to their home areas since they remain replete with mines. Many former refugees are now IDPs since on-going conflict often prevents them from accessing their regions of origin. Equally significantly, demobilised militia, who may still retain their arms, have little incentive to return to their original towns or villages." (UNDP, June 2002, p.5)

"Humanitarian sources in Hargeysa said people living in the [resettlement] camps had 'come from a variety of circumstances, and a variety of places'. Some were spontaneous returnees from Ethiopia who had been living in poor, makeshift accommodation for years, while others had returned through formal, assisted repatriation programmes by UNHCR. There are also small groups of displaced people from southern Somalia – who are known as 'refugees' by the Somaliland authorities, but considered 'displaced' by international humanitarian agencies. "These are the 'invisibles'," a local source said of the southerners.

[...]

Humanitarian sources told IRIN that most returnees had congregated in the Somaliland capital rather than returning to their original home areas. Various reasons had been suggested for the phenomenon, including loss of livestock and homes, the need for cash-based employment, dislocation and habitual dependency, the source said." (IRIN-CEA 22 August 2001)

"In and around Hargeisa, there are now four IDP camps: Mohamed Morge, Sheick Nor, Darmi and the State house area." (Lindgaard 23 March 2001)

"Categories of people include returned refugees, IDPs, and immigrants." (Clark, June 2002, p.20)

"Two thirds of the households living in these eight areas consider themselves to be returned refugees, while one in seven considers itself to be immigrant. One in 10 households considers itself internally displaced." (Clark, June 2002, p.27)

Population profile:

"-The total population in the 8 areas was estimated at 8,600 households, or 57,000 people.

-Households in the survey ranged in size from 2 to 18 members, with a median of 6 members.

[...]

-20% of households in the areas reported that they are female-headed.

[...]

-One half the population living in these areas is under age 15, while almost two thirds are under age 20 years." (Clark, June 2002, p.5)

"-The middle half of all area residents (25th to 75th percentiles) have lived in their settlement area for between 2 and 4 years. The duration of residence in the area did not correlate significantly with a household's current wealth.

- Over all 8 areas, 60% of households were in Ethiopian refugee camps immediately before arriving at the Hargeisa returnee settlement areas; 8% were from Southern Somalia, and 16% reported they moved there from elsewhere in Hargeisa. The remaining households reported that they had been in Ethiopia though not in a camp (9%), elsewhere in Somaliland (4%), or elsewhere abroad (2%).

- 80% of the residents are originally from Somaliland before the wars, 9% from Southern Somalia, and 8% are non-Somali Ethiopians. 3% are Somali Ethiopians.

- Daami area contains most of the Southern Somalis, and Daami and Sheikh Nur share the non-Somali Ethiopian population. The settlement areas are in general ethnically organized, and minority ethnicities tend to group together within the areas.

-One half of those families from Southern Somalia consider themselves immigrants rather than IDPs. Overall, 1 in 7 families living in the returnee settlements considers itself to be an immigrant household.

- 80% of those living in the areas plan to remain there, insh'allah.

- Of those families who consider themselves returned refugees and who returned after 1997, 51% reported receiving assistance from UNHCR." (Clark, June 2002, p.6-7)

"In summary, most of those originally from Somaliland consider themselves returned refugees, while those considering themselves immigrants are split between Southern Somalis and Ethiopians, both Somali and non-Somali. Southern Somalis often consider themselves immigrants rather than IDPs. Virtually all the non-Somali Ethiopians consider themselves immigrants." (Clark, June 2002, p.28)

Daami:

"The population of Daami encompasses Southern Somali IDPs and immigrants, Ethiopian immigrants, and minority clans, all in relatively large proportions. The Southern Somali IDPs and immigrants are primarily from Baidoa, Wajid, Beletweine, and Mogudishu, and settled in Daami in 1994 after fleeing the conflict in the South. This population is mostly of the [xxx] subclan; most had their possessions in the south looted or stolen before moving north (Medani, 2000). [...] The [other] Somalis living in the area [...] consider

themselves returned refugees, while the Southern Somalis split between considering themselves immigrants and IDPs*.

[...]

This assessment estimates the population living in Daami neighborhood at 1,700 families, or roughly 10,000 people, making it the second largest returnee settlement area in this survey." (Clark, June 2002, p.21-2)

"In all areas, a majority of households say they are originally from Somaliland; this number is lowest in Daami, with a high percentage of families from Southern Somalia (35%) and non- Somali Ethiopian households (14%)." (Clark, June 2002, p.27)

"In Daami, all those from Ethiopia considered themselves immigrants, while 24 of the 35 families from Southern Somalia considered themselves not IDPs but immigrants." (Clark, June 2002 p.28)

Stadium:

"Stadium is the most central of the eight returnee settlement areas in this assessment, located on the south bank of the river next to the old Hargeisa football stadium. The land belongs to the government, which insists that the settlement there will not be a permanent one and is currently engaged in a strategy to relocate the population to permanent sites.

[...]

About 1/5 of residents consider themselves IDPs even though they are primarily Somalis originally from Somaliland or Ethiopia.

Stadium is geographically quite small (approximately 17 hectares), but is very densely populated. This assessment estimates the population at about 750 households with 5,000 people." (Clark, June 2002, p.23)

"The residents in Stadium stand out because more than 1/5 of respondents originally from Somaliland consider themselves IDPs." (Clark, June 2002 p.28)

**Note that on request of the government, names of clans have been removed.*

PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT

General

IDPs tend to flee northwards where some degree of peace and stability subsist (2002)

- Security is better in Somaliland, Bay, Bakool and Middle Shabelle
- Somaliland hosts the highest number of IDPs
- Urban-rural patterns of displacement as IDPs fled to their 'clan-areas' considerably expanded smaller regional towns during the 1990s
- This trend was further exacerbated by the lack of decentralisation of humanitarian assistance

"At the same time, this reporting period has seen modest improvements in the security situation in some regions including "Somaliland", Bay, Bakool and Middle Shabelle. Cooperation of local authorities in these regions towards maintaining peace and stability has resulted in the increased ability of humanitarian agencies to expand programmes. The Northwest/"Somaliland" hosts the highest number of IDPs who tend to flee northwards to escape drought, poverty and conflict. It also hosts the largest number of refugee returnees. It is imperative that humanitarian and development work continue as "peace dividends" in these more peaceful parts of Somalia." (UN, May 2002, p.2)

"For a time during the war this process was reverse as people fled the main towns and moved to areas that their clans came from. Consequently, the populations of previously small regional towns such as Beletweyne, Galkaiyo, Qardo or Baidoa, and rural villages such as Jeriban, rose dramatically. The population of Bosasso is estimated to have increased from 10,000 to 60,000 since 1991, as people fled fighting in Mogadishu, the Lower Juba and the interriverine areas. [...]Smaller towns are experiencing similar trends, which present a challenge for urban planning. The concentration of aid agencies in urban centers such as Hargeisa, and a lack of clear policies by the administrations on investment in rural areas, exacerbate this trend." (UNDP Somalia, 2001, p.58)

People tend to flee from urban areas to main towns (2003)

- Many IDPs fled to Kismaayo due to conflicts in the early 90s, 20002 and 2003
- Most IDPs in Kismaayo originate from Juba Valley, Gedo region, Mogadishu, Galgaduud and Bay regions
- When General Aideed occupied Bay and Bakool regions between 1996-1999 people fled to Mogadishu, Puntland, Somaliland, Luuq, Mandhera, and Kismaayo
- Causes of IDP movement intermingle with transhumance and war
- Since 1999 displacements have often temporary and caused by intermittent insecurity mostly in Mogadishu, Gedo, Lower and Middle Juba, Lower and Middle Shabelle regions
- Today 60% Somalis are nomadic compared to estimates as high as 80% in pre-war Somalia due to loss of livestock
- Prior to conflict people traveled great distances in search of food, pasture and water

"At the height of the conflict in the early 1990s, over one million Somalis are estimated to have fled to neighbouring countries in the region and outside of Africa.²⁸ People continued to leave southern Somalia in large numbers until 1995. Others chose to move to safer areas within Somalia inhabited by their kin and extended families. Waves of More recently, there have been distinct waves of migration to Kismaayo (and to the camps), a consequence of conflict in the early 1990s, the El Niño floods in 1997, and conflict again in 2002 and 2003. The main areas of origin have been the Juba Valley and Gedo region to the north, Mogadishu and, further afield, Galgaduud region to the west, and Bay region to the north-east. The 'pull' of potential aid resources, social connections, economic opportunities and the 'West Bank' effect (the legitimisation of occupation), all have drawn migrants to the town. There is also continuous movement between Kismaayo and the Juba Valley to market farm produce, seasonal migration for land preparation, and the familial migration of resource sharing." (ODI, 31 December 2003, p.11)

"Since 1991, Rahaweyn communities in Bay and Bakool experienced different periods of conflict displacement. The first took place in 1991, when Ogaden militia led by Colonel Omar Jess captured Baidoa. A second wave of displacement took place in 1992, when General Siad Barre's Marehan militia occupied Baidoa. The largest displacements took place between 1996 and 1999 during the occupation of the two regions by General Aideed's SNA/USC forces. Most of the displaced people during these periods fled to Mogadishu, Puntland, Somaliland, Luuq, Mandhera, and Kismaayo.

More recently, between July 2002 and August 2003, fighting in and around Baidoa, between the combined militia of Mohamed Ibrahim Habsade (Deputy RRA chairman) and Sheikh Adan Madobe (Deputy RRA chairman) and the militia of Hassan Mohamed (Nur Shatigadud), has led to population displacement on a large scale. The fighting, which occurred in the northern arc from Daynoney to the east (between Baidoa and Burhakaba) and to Awdinle in the west, has led to waves of displacement from Harin villages to other Harin villages in Bay and Bakool. [...]" (OCHA, 14 December 2003)

"The regions [Juba Valley] contain a patchwork of different clans, sub-clans and minority groups. Population figures of the regions are difficult to estimate. A pre-war census established 500,000 inhabitants as the baseline. However, the area's history of large-scale displaced movement and seasonal migration patterns and recent urbanization, have rendered that figure uncertain at best. [...]"

However, the civil war prompted the latest and probably the largest migration in Juba Valley area's history. Hundreds of thousands of Darods fled clan violence in Mogadishu by moving south. The IDPs primarily fled into Kismayo, but also into other areas of the west bank of the river and settled in the urban centers. Most of these urban Darods had never lived anywhere but Mogadishu, but the historic concentrations of Darod clans in the areas was seen as providing a safe haven." (UNCU/OCHA, 30 July 2002, p.25)

"About 60% of Somali population live in nomadic lifestyle. Movements of people in search of food, water and pasture in times of stress as part of the normal livelihood and living conditions of nomadic population. Furthermore, considerable movement from the rural areas into the urban centers took place since mid 1980s. In this normal movement, the majority of the populations are young moving to urban centers in search of economic opportunities and assistance. They normally return to their areas for cultivation or when the situation in their areas improves. Also in Bay and Bakool regions seasonal movement is the major pattern of livelihood where most of the male rural farmers leave their areas after the harvest to the urban centers searching for labour opportunities and other sources of income. However, the trend of population movement has changed from normal/voluntary movement to abnormal since the collapse of the central government in 1991 and the spread of violent conflicts across the country.

Since 1999 no major population movements have taken place in Somalia, that said, small and temporary incidents of displacement have occurred due to intermittent insecurity in Mogadishu, Gedo, Lower and Middle Juba, Lower and Middle Shabelle regions. Due to the effect of the armed conflict coupled with lack of systematic monitoring procedures of population movements, it has become difficult to distinguish normal from abnormal movements and to identify IDPs. This is attributed to the fact there is no agency with wide field coverage mandated to identify IDPs and assess their status." (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p.1)

"Another key factor is the declining numbers of transhumant pastoralists who form the majority – 60 per cent – of the Somalia population. This percentage was estimated higher in pre-civil war Somalia even in the wake of the numbers of people who moved from rural to urban areas. This movement is part of the global phenomenon, "urban drift" or "urbanization", which illustrates *pastoral dropout* as the movement of young people search of economic opportunities and improved living conditions. In comparison, transhumant movement of people and household assets is related to the seasonal search for food, water and pastures as a normal way of living in arid and semi-arid environments." (UNCU/OCHA, 30 July 2002, p V)

"Quantifying displacement is extremely difficult in Somalia given the prevalence of nomadic and semi-nomadic social structures. Even prior to the collapse of the central state, populations travelled great distances in search of food, pasture and water during times of stress. The protracted nature of displacement offers its own analytical challenges, particularly given the recurrence of multiple 'waves' and directions of displacement.

Displacement trends are also changing. With the decreasing volume and regularity of food relief distributions, 'food camps' no longer exist. Households now move from drought- and conflict-stricken areas toward riverine and urban areas, returning when situations improve. Populations communicate over long distances to ascertain better knowledge of localised conditions before deciding on their direction of movement. Many long-term IDPs have dispersed in large towns. They are destitute: populations living in shanty camps and abandoned buildings in peripheral urban areas." (UN March 2001, p. 114)

"The Somalis are largely nomadic, roaming throughout the Horn of Africa. They live in small, temporary hamlets that are dismantled and loaded on to camels for quick and easy migration. Because of this nomadic way of life, social units tend to be small and self-sufficient...

Roughly 80% of the Somali population is 'pastoral nomadic' and only 20% can be described as urban agricultural. ." (Jama 13 December 2000 in Humanitarian Affairs Review, Nomadic culture)

"More than two-thirds of Somalia's populace are nomadic or semi-nomadic. During the dry season the nomads concentrate in villages near water sources; when the rains begin they disperse with their herds. Traditionally, nomadism is the most desirable life-style. Somalis constitute the vast majority of the population. Cultural divisions between pastoral nomads (the *Samaal*) and sedentary cultivators and herdsmen (the *Saab*) have been weakened by large migrations from the countryside into towns, but most Somalis maintain a strong loyalty to one of many clans and sub-clans." (Encyclopaedia Britannica, Micropaedia, 1993, p. 4)

Somali families move and split up in order to survive (2003)

- Every clan moves and rotates around main resources such as grazing and cultivating lands, trading centers and water points.
- Members of families do not necessarily live together all year round due to migration patterns
- When rain fails, pastoral families moved their animals in search of better grazing areas earlier than the usual seasonal migration time
- Many families also move in search of employment in urban centers where some have relatives
- Families in 'Puntland' sometimes split up to take refuge in Yemen or Saudi Arabia

"The history of migration and conquest in Somalia influences everything, from dialects and language to the nature of ethnic or clan identity, land tenure and ownership rights, and the fluidity of political and clan alliances. Population movement is a common and often 'normal' feature of Somali society, notably among pastoral and agro-pastoral economies, where population displacements are by no means random or

limitless. In its grazing, permanent cultivating and trading centres, and above all in its wells and water points, every clan and group possesses a series of points between which movement rotates. Migration and household splitting do not necessarily reflect an exception to the normal patterns of society. In agricultural and agro-pastoral populations, household members do not even necessarily live together continuously year-round: the numbers present at any given time depend largely upon the season, the nature of the productive assets available to the household, economic and employment opportunities elsewhere (most likely to be found in urban centres), kinship ties and the strength of social networks, and the nature of the shock or stress experienced." (ODI, 31 December 2003, p.11)

"An inter-agency co-ordination meeting in Baidoa discussed the drought situation in the zone resulting from poor Gu rains and its effect on vulnerable communities in Bay and Bakool regions. Reports from partners in these areas indicate estimates of 50-90 per cent population migration from villages seriously affected by the drought into larger towns within the district in search of water and food. Farming communities are worst affected because of successive crop failure." (UNICEF 7 September 2001)

"The dry weather has also seriously affected the grazing and fodder conditions for livestock. Many families have already begun to take their animals elsewhere in search of better grazing while others have left the area seeking alternative means of survival. Migration is normal in this region, but this year it has started far too early." (WFP 22 August 2001)

"Nearly a million Somalis are affected by drought in large areas of their country, a minister in the new transitional government said on Sunday [15 July 2001]." (Reuters 15 July 2001)

"There are also some indications of the beginnings of population movement...That is a standard coping mechanism. When people see the rains have failed and they are not going to have much of a harvest, and they have livestock to feed, they try to move to areas where they can graze their animals or get employment. And they move considerable distances. Water is another trigger, and the water supplies throughout the south are very low indeed." (IRIN-CEA 9 July 2001)

"The independent expert in her report to the Commission in 1998 (E/CN.4/1998/96) reported about the situation of the internally displaced. She said that Bosaso hosted tens of thousands of internally displaced persons, who constituted about one third of the city's population. She reported that many internally displaced preferred that part of their family became refugees by crossing the Gulf of Aden by boat to Yemen in order to be eligible for refugee status and to be assisted by UNHCR, or that they continued to Saudi Arabia." (CHR, 26 January 2000, p. 32)

"Many families in the camps have been repeatedly displaced, and for some, it is their second or third time in the capital. Some arrive seeking relatives, but others come because it remains a traditional migration route – even with Mogadishu's precipitous decline, the displaced still expect the capital to provide opportunities. The majority [of IDPs] said they survived by begging, by receiving food scraps, and by earning a little cash by providing 'carrying services' to people in the market – earning about 2,000-3,000 Somali shillings a day." (IRIN-CEA 27 April 1999)

PHYSICAL SECURITY & FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

Physical security

IDPs in Somalia are deliberate targets of gross violations of human rights and humanitarian law (2004)

- Somalis are deliberately displaced by warlords and militias aiming at gaining or maintaining control over resources
- Lack of competent central authority hampers implementation of international protection standards as set forth by the Guiding Principles on Internal displacement
- UN re-affirms that IDPs in Somalia qualify as "the most vulnerable of the vulnerable" being subject to prostitution, human trafficking and forced recruitment among others (2004)
- IDPs from the south in Somaliland are at risk of 'deportation' for authorities consider them 'illegal migrants'
- Yearly, about 1,000 IDPs try to leave Puntland to Yemen or Saudi Arabia on overcrowded boats which often capsize and this caused the death of 950 people in 2002
- Civilians continue to be deliberate targets of attacks as militias do not recognize any rule of law international or customary
- In the absence of a functioning state, murder, looting and destruction of property, child soldiering, kidnapping, discrimination against minorities, torture, arbitrary arrests without trial are recurrent and remain unchecked

"Throughout the country, human rights violations remained endemic. These include murder, looting and destruction of property, child soldiering, kidnapping, discrimination against minorities, torture, unlawful arrest and detention, and denial of due process by local authorities.

[...]

In both the CAP Workshop for 2003 (August 2002) and 2004 (August 2003), as well as in numerous other reports [...], aid actors in Somalia have re-affirmed the three most vulnerable groups in Somalia to be IDPs, returnees and minorities. While many other categories of vulnerability have been identified, [...] these groups, which include women and children, qualify as the "most vulnerable of the vulnerable," primarily due to having suffered from: 1) the loss of assets through exposure to a major shock, whether it be economic, climatic or conflict-related; 2) having little to no access to protection from clan affiliations, and 3) being exposed to multiple vulnerabilities or risks.

[...]

Comprised predominantly women and children from weak, minority agricultural groups, they have little clan protection and are often at the mercy of "camp managers" who restrict their movements and who divert aid intended for IDPs. They are also vulnerable to prostitution, human trafficking and forcible recruitment by militia leaders." (UN, 18 November 2003, p.11,13, 14)

"Implementing an effective protection strategy will also require close collaboration with the authorities in Somaliland and Puntland. In the latter case, there appears to be some interest on the part of the Government in addressing this issue. In Somaliland, the protection issue has been exacerbated by that Government's edict that it will deport all 'foreigners' – IDPs and other minorities that are not of Somaliland origin. This situation needs to be monitored closely and adds urgency to OCHA's deployment of the Hargeisa post." (OCHA IDP Unit, 16 April 2004)

"For the protection of IDPs, there are international instruments and particularly the UN Guiding Principles, which specifically and comprehensively address the rights of IDPs. However, in Somalia, a collapsed state, with no competent central government, the key problem is implementation and enforcement of the international instruments and principles. The country is divided into armed fiefdoms ruled by clan militia that do not respect or adhere to the rule of law.

UN agencies and NGOs representing the main humanitarian actors, they have limited influence on clan militia and their leaders to respect the protection instruments. However, it yet appears that constructive engagement in collaboration with the civil society in the form of non-governmental organizations, as they can contribute invaluable experiences, local knowledge and insights, is only way forward to propomting local protection mechsansims." (UNCU, 30 July 2002, pp1;6)

"IDPs in Somaliland (40,000) have since attacks last October [2003] been treated as foreigners and pressured to leave – some have moved to Puntland, others elsewhere.

Because of lack of basic services/status IDPs continue to leave Puntland (Bossaso) by risky boats to Yemen (about 1,000 per month currently) – trafficking and loss of life involved. Authorities very concerned to prevent these movements." (McNamara, 10 February 2004)

"In September, the "Somaliland" administration issued a directive for the deportation of "illegal immigrants" in areas under its control. Internally displaced persons from southern Somalia are also classified as illegal immigrants. Although the "Ministry of the Interior" is registering internally displaced persons who want to return to their areas of origin, the deadline has now passed without any obvious expulsions. The United Nations has registered its concern with the authorities and has stressed that the forced expulsion of asylum-seekers would be in contravention of international law." (UN SC, 12 February 2004)

"Several dozens of people drowned after a vessel carrying illegal immigrants to the Middle East from Puntland capsized in late August. The incident marked the latest in a series of similar incidents which have claimed the lives of hundreds of Somalis trying to find a better life in Yemen and the Gulf states. Puntland authorities estimate that 950 people drowned while trying to reach Yemen and Gulf destinations in 2002 and the death toll in 2003 from these incidences stood at 290 in August. The 'refugees' pay up to US \$ 500 for the trip in perilous conditions. Authorities in Puntland launched a crackdown on emigration from the region and promised tough legal action on those engaging in the activity." (OCHA, 31 October 2003)

"Although there are international instruments and UN guidelines for the protection of IDPs and civilians in conflict, in most parts of Somalia the implementation and enforcement of international laws and principles is weak as the conditions of a collapsed state prevail. These conditions also mean that IDPs are often not afforded protection by authorities in the absence of a functioning legal system in many areas. Thus, IDPs in Somalia are especially vulnerable as a result of their ambiguous status with the various *de facto* authorities across most of the country." (UNCU/OCHA, 30 July 2002, p3)

"Though the IDPs are not combatants, they are treated as enemies during conflicts. In Somalia clan militia do not fight decent wars. Because reasons for fighting as understood by many may not be only political, but span a broad spectrum from competition for economic and natural resources to attempted genocide or even unrestrained lawlessness. The warring militia are not prepared to acknowledge any existing rule be a traditional or an international one. For example article 3 of the 1948 Geneva Convention; article 38 of the CRC, and the Birimageydo customary law all protect non-combatants. However, they are less applicable in today's conflicts in Somalia. To the clan militia, it is not relevant, whether the people they harm are IDPs or not. Since they belong to the same groups as the enemy, they are seen to have no rights to exist." (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p.36-7)

IDP camps set on fire in northern Somalia (2003)

- Repeated fires in an IDP camp east of Bosasso, killed five displaced people, destroyed a thousand homes and left 1,200 homeless in July 2003
- IDPs who lived from begging had dispersed and were without assistance with sick children, lack of access to food, water and education
- The Acting Governor of Bosasso, reported that in the view of the civil society, IDPs in camps were considered as economic migrants who brought bad habits such as drug abuse
- It was decided to relocate the camps hosting about 2,800 families and provide the IDPs with land, electricity and water
- The IDP camp 'New Hargeisa' where 300 IDP families lived was also partly burnt in late 2003 killing one woman and two children

"It is reported that on 9 July the Buulo Elay IDP camp east of Bosasso caught fire, causing the deaths of five persons and making 1,200 homeless. At the end of July, a second fire was also reported in the same camp. UNICEF and WFP had responded with assistance.

[...]

The expert visited the IDP camp called "New Hargeisa", which housed an estimated 300 families. Part of the camp had recently burnt, causing the death of one old woman and two children. The expert was told that most inhabitants earned a living through begging. At the time of the visit, women and children were visibly in the majority, and there was no apparent security.

[...]

The expert met with the Minister of Commerce, then serving as the "Acting Governor" of Bosasso. [...] He said that he had consulted with sheikhs, women's groups and others in the community on the problems posed by IDP camps, whose inhabitants were largely viewed as economic migrants who had brought with them bad habits such as drug abuse. It was decided to relocate the camps, estimated to house 2,800 families, and to provide land, electricity and water.

[...]

The expert visited the Buulo Elay IDP camp where a fire in July had destroyed many of the dwellings. It was reported that the former inhabitants had dispersed and were now without assistance. One of the IDPs stated that many of the children were sick, there was inadequate food and water, and that the only school was without teachers." (UNCHR, 30 November 2003, paras.50, 59, 66, 69)

"Five people were killed when a fire broke out in the Buulo Elay IDP camp in Bosaso, Puntland in early July. An estimated one thousand dwellings were destroyed as well as the personal belongings of 1,200 families living in the camp. One half of the camp was destroyed by the fire and 600 families left homeless. The camp is home to *circa* 28,000 IDPs. Many of the IDPs in the camp are displaced from southern Somalia because of the insecurity. In 2002, The United Nations-appointed independent expert on Human Rights for Somalia condemned conditions in the camp as 'sub-human' and among the worst he had ever seen." (OCHA, 31 October 2003, p.7)

"Gatekeepers" or camp leaders play a dual role as protectors and usurpers of assistance (2003)

- Some gatekeepers reportedly extorted as much as 75% of aid delivered to IDP camps
- Gatekeepers sometimes offer some degree of protection to camp residents particularly those from minority groups
- Gatekeepers sometimes rent shacks in IDP camps to economic migrants, who pay with the aid allocated to the displaced

"Aid gatekeepers are an important element of the protection environment. These were seen as a potential obstacle in the research process. In terms of aid, they are generally considered a negative influence, positioning themselves prior to the delivery of assistance to the camps to take advantage of potentially valuable resources. One interviewee suggested that the gatekeepers took as much as 75% of the aid delivered to the camps. At the same time, however, gatekeepers offer some degree of protection to camp residents, especially those from weak or minority clans. A Somali proverb describes this situation well: *Ama buur ahaw ama mid ku-tiisanaw* ('Either be a mountain or lean on one'). In other words, members of weak clans seek protection from a strong one, in terms of sheegata (adoption and client status) or, more immediately, the protection of a gatekeeper. Even though living conditions are extremely poor, many of the displaced feel safer as part of a group in a camp, receiving 'protection' from a Marexaan gatekeeper. Moreover, economic migrants might consider living in a camp as lowcost housing: rents for an arish (a wooden shack) are in the region of SShs40-60,000 per month, whereas a room in a stone house would cost SShs100,000 a month.³⁰ In return for this 'protection', and in lieu of 'rent', the gatekeeper will receive a portion of the assistance packages allocated to the displaced." (ODI, 31 December 2003, p.13-4)

The protection of IDPs in Somalia depends on location: living in clan "home areas" (2003)

- In order to guarantee protection against human rights abuses, IDPs need to live in an area where their clan is dominant
- De facto authorities who are responsible for the protection of civilians living in areas over which they claim control are sometimes unaware of or choose to ignore international conventions
- IDPs are often viewed as 'undesirable guests' by local communities
- IDPs are often beaten, robbed and harassed when they compete with local workers and when they beg on the streets
- IDPs from the Harin sub clan who fled conflict in Bakool took refuge in their clan area for protection, however assistance was limited as hosts were suffering from drought
- Displaced and politically less organised groups such as the Bantu and Bajuni are least able to secure protection from extortion, rape and other abuses

"While "de facto" authorities are accountable for the human rights situation in the areas they control, many are either not aware of or choose to ignore international conventions, or do not have the capacity to enforce justice. As a result, an environment of impunity reigns in many areas, which presents a major challenge for UN agencies and NGOs seeking to strengthen measures to ensure the protection of civilians.

[...]

For many, income received from irregular, cheap casual labour barely covers their food needs and, isolated from their own relatives, they often face difficulties accessing clan support systems and receiving remittances. Moreover, they lack full protection and, often viewed as undesirables or "guests" by the local community, can be subjected to an array of human rights violations, including beatings, robberies and other forms of harassment, especially if they compete with local labour or beg in the streets. Most live in sprawling shanty towns on the outskirts of urban areas.

[...]

The chronic and widespread level of underdevelopment in Somalia makes a large portion of the population vulnerable not only to humanitarian crisis, but also to violations of their human rights. Somalis with no clan affiliation, and thus protection, are the most vulnerable to such violations, including predatory acts by criminal and militias, as well economic, political, cultural and social discrimination. The lack of clan affiliation can depend on location, i.e. a member of major clan living in an area where his clan is not dominant is more vulnerable to human rights violations than when he is among his own relatives. Socio-

economic standing and sex are also factors in determining one's level of risk." (UN, 18 November 2003, pp. 11-14)

"These IDPs [in Bakool region 2003] are mainly women and children from the Harin subclan of the Rahaweyn who have moved into Bakaar Yar and Bakaar Weyn in search of clan protection and international assistance. [...] Children include some who witnessed the killing of their mothers during the attack. Most of the IDPs arrived two months ago.

[...]

The IDPs fled the conflict and their homes in search of clan protection and international assistance. However, social network assistance in the area is very limited, and has had little impact on the situation of the IDPs. In fact, the agropastoral host population in the village of Bakaar Yar, have suffered from recurrent crop failure and are unable to provide much support. Though some IDPs have benefited from relief aid distributions to the camps in Walaq and Biilala (in early December), this is not sufficient and is unsustainable. Coping mechanisms include begging and looking for casual jobs in Wajid town." (OCHA, 14 December 2003)

"Notwithstanding the general perception of Somalia as 'anarchic', basic law and order is in fact the norm in most locations. Though hard data is not available, anecdotal evidence suggests that much of the Somali countryside – especially Somaliland, Puntland, and pockets of southern Somalia – is safer for local residents than is the case in neighbouring countries. There are, to be sure, shifting zones of very dangerous **banditry and criminality in places like Jowhar, the lower Jubba valley, and parts of Mogadishu.** It is also true that both Somali nationals and foreigners associated with an international organization or a profitable business are frequent targets of kidnapping for ransom, especially in Mogadishu. But it is important not to confuse the security problems of international aid agencies with security problems for average residents.

Public order, rule of law, and personal security throughout the country continue to be based on a combination of traditional mechanisms: kinship protection, or mutual obligations within blood-payment groups (*diya*); clan-based customary law (*xeer*) and mediation structures provided by elders or respected sheikhs; and protection of weaker social groups via the practice of *shagad*, or adoption into a stronger clan.

[...]

In practice, rule of law, guarantees of personal security, and protection of human rights in Somalia vary from location to location and according to the social standing of the individual. Most Somalis ensure their personal security by residing in the 'home areas' of their clan, where they are assured full status and protection by their kin group. Ironically, for many Somali urbanites, this arrangement can lead to a situation in which they are simultaneously 'at home' in their clan's territory, but 'internally displaced', in that they are forced to live in areas far from their actual homes in the capital city. Somalis are increasingly able to both visit and live in cities outside their clan's traditional domain, but typically as a guest of more dominant clans, an arrangement which requires time and sometimes protection money to ensure. Politically weak social groups, such as the Bantu and Bajuni, are least able to secure protection from extortion, rape, and other abuses by criminal elements of more powerful clans; they remain somewhat vulnerable no matter where they reside." (Menkhaus November 2000, p. 9)

Direct correlation between minorities and displacement in Somalia (2003)

- Minority groups: Bantu, Bravenese, Rehamar, Bajuni, Eyle, Galgala, Tumul, Yibir, Ogadenis, Rahanweyn and Gaboye), represent one third of the Somali population and have been forcibly displaced from valuable agricultural lands
- An IDP camp sheltering 400 families was burnt down in Bosasso in September 2002
- Most of the IDPs who fled to the north come from minority groups such as Rahaywen sub clan, Bantu, Ajuuran, Jarso, Madhiban and Ashraf
- Southern IDPs in the north are considered as 'criminals'

- IDPs from minority groups lack protection political representation, and are denied basic rights including access to humanitarian assistance
- Minorities are subject to human rights abuses, attacks, discrimination, exploitation, displacement and land dispossession by militias and bandits
- IDPs like the Galgala were prevented from buying animals and houses

"But historically, minority groups in Somalia have suffered from greater levels of discrimination and exclusion, and thus are generally among the poorest of the poor. Cultural values that label them as inferior and not deserving of equal rights contribute to their low social, economic and political status. Insecurity, and sometimes forced displacement from valuable agricultural lands, has further impoverished this group. Comprised of an estimated two million people, or about one third of the Somali population, these groups include the Bantu, Bravenese, Rerhamar, Bajuni, Eyle, Galgala, Tumul, Yibir and Gaboye." (UN, 18 November 2003, p. 14)

"An IDP camp on the outskirts of Bossaso with about 400 families was totally destroyed by fire at the beginning of September. Humanitarian organisations have expressed their concern at the lack of permanent settlement for IDPs in the Puntland. IDPs themselves have cited insecurity of land tenure as one of their major problems." (ACC/SCN 39, 31 October 2002p.15)

"Links were also made to the minority status of many IDPs, who were reported to be driven from their lands and disproportionately victimized by dominant groups following the outbreak of civil war in 1991. It is further noted that refugees benefit from significantly more protection than IDPs insofar as refugees fall under the authority of UNHCR, and some authorities, such as in "Somaliland", recognize the rights of returnees. Other international instruments of protection are rendered ineffective, given the predominance of faction leaders and weak administrations.

[...]

It was especially noted that IDPs were viewed as criminals and a burden to society, which created tensions in the community and significant discrimination against them." (UNCHR, 31 December 2002,p.15;19)

"Personal security of IDPs, as members of minority groups, remain at stake because most of them continue to suffer discrimination and denial of basic rights by local authorities and some of the local communities. Women suffer most because of both gender and ethnic discrimination, therefore, they have very limited access to resources. Moreover, women in the IDP camps suffered some cases of rape, abduction and forced marriage. A woman who is subjected to rape face entrenched social attitude and tradition that hamper their family relation in the long run.

[...]

IDPs in the north are originally from the sub clans from the south such as Rahaween, Bantu, Ajuran, Jarso, Madhiban and Ashraf. They lack the political power and protection of the dominant sub clans of the north and they are vulnerable to personal insecurity, access to income generating opportunities and political representation. Application of the Guiding Principles in such a complex situation in an absence of reliable governance system has not been tried. All these situations pose unique problems for research and analysis.

Also the report reflects the importance of clan and sub clan affiliations which are determinant in understanding the plight of IDPs across the Somali regions. It appears there is a direct correlation between minorities and displacement in Somalia. Most of those who are dispossessed and displaced whether in the north or the south are from minority groups e.g. Bantu. This social structure also influences effective and targeted delivery of humanitarian assistance to IDPs and minorities." (UNCU, 30 July 2002, pp1;6)

"The security of each Somali individual or clan is mainly influenced by the position of the individual person or clan in the Somali's social structure. Those who have no clan lineage and particularly the minority groups are the most vulnerable ones. Because of their position as minorities, the IDPs from the Bantu and Galgala suffer a wide range of human rights violations which include discrimination and

economic exploitation by the Habargedir and Marchan Militia who are now in control of the city. On the ground that they are affiliated with the Majerten, the Galgala suffered more than even the Bantu IDPs because they are considered as part of the enemy. As a consequence many Galagala were summarily executed during the conflicts between the Majerten and Habargedir, and between Majerten and Marchan in Kismayo. Because of fear of persecution, many Galagala IDPs fled Kismayo to Kenya, while others remained as IDPs.

[...]

The Bantu IDP, being ethnically different from the rest, suffer discrimination and exclusion from all social and economic activities in the city. Some Bantu elders in the camps claimed that they were denied even access to relief food. They claim that during General Morgan's period, before aid agencies ceased their humanitarian operation in Kismayo, relief food intended for them was diverted to other communities in Kismayo or elsewhere or to the markets for sale. They also claim that they are denied access to profitable work such carpentry, driving etc.

Since they are also less dominant in Kismaio town, the Ajuran, Ormala, Tuni and Werdai are also treated as the Bantu and Galgale IDPs. They are discriminated, marginalized and persecuted. In April 2001, a young Werdai IDP boy selling second hand cloths was stabbed to death by a Marchan man in a robber attack at the market. No any form of legal action against this has been taken by either the Marchan elders or local authorities.

[...]

Over 99% of the Bantu live in absolute poverty and have no access to their basic needs. Periodic attacks and robbery of food has further deteriorated the situation of Bantu and their IDPs.

[...]

The Galgala IDPs complain that their traditional symbol on their animals for identification was erased by the Abgal, with an intention to appropriate the Galgala livestock. The Galgala IDPs also suffer discrimination. They allegedly claim that some members of the IDP community were denied to buy animals and houses in Adale. They were also denied integration into the main population." (UNCU, 30 July 2002, pp.25-6;39; 47)

"Non-discrimination is a fundamental principle embodied in the first paragraph of common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Although Somali society appears to be homogeneous, there are several minority groups in the country. These minorities have been the main victims of the famine and the civil war. The Bantu minority lives along the banks of the Juba and Shabelle rivers, which constitute the life lines of Somalia. The Rahanweyn minority lives between these two rivers, in Bay and Bakool. While the Bantus are largely unarmed, the Rahanweyn Resistance Army is armed to some extent, although insignificantly compared to the other groups. Other minorities live in the coastal areas.

The Bantus, who are thought to descend from slaves brought to Somalia from other east African countries in the eleventh century, are considered a low-status ethnic group. They frequently suffer discriminatory practices and violence. For instance, the Bantus in the Hiran region require permission to go to Belet Weyne, the main town of the region. They have their own market and they are not allowed to mix with the rest of the population. They are brought into town for hard labour. They have less access to education and fewer economic opportunities than other Somalis. Their villages have been burnt, and Bantu women have been raped. During the civil war, the Bantu population has been systematically pushed off their land towards the river by militias or bandits. They are now so close to the river that they face a real risk of their settlements being washed away during floods.

[...]

The Rahanweyn minority lives on fertile agricultural land and is more advanced in agriculture. It too has been subjected to dispossession and displacement." (CHR 18 February 1999, paras. 77-80)

"In Somaliland and Puntland, there are problems of discrimination against minorities and internally displaced persons. (CHR 26 January 2000, p. 5)

UNICEF survey on IDP's perceptions about their own protection situation (Dec 2003)

- IDPs considered themselves as the most disadvantaged groups for being displaced rather than because they were from outcast/segregated groups or unarmed clans
- The general population considered most disadvantaged were first outcast/segregated groups, second unarmed clans and third IDPs
- Self-reported IDPs and IDPs in camps reported they continued to be displaced due to insecurity
- 37% IDPs chose to stay where they were because of security in camps
- IDPs suffered more significantly the loss of home and property, fear and murder compared to the general population
- 31% of the children reported rape as a problem in their family, significantly higher than among the general population (12%)
- Commonly, when a woman or girl from a minority group was victim of rape, nothing was done to stop the crime

"The study interviewed and analysed the lives of children and adults living in IDP 'camps' in all three of Somalia's zones.

[...]

A quarter of the general population reported that segregated or outcast groups were the most disadvantaged, another quarter said unarmed clans, while the third group on the list were internally displaced people (IDPs).

People Living in Displacement Camps

Although the child sample from the displacement 'camps' agreed that segregated/outcast clans were the most disadvantaged group, the adult sample ranked IDPs as the most disadvantaged. A further 9% of adults in the camps ranked returnees as the most disadvantaged, while 12% ranked refugees from other countries. In contrast to the general population, it was clear that the people interviewed in the camps were often referring directly to themselves.

[...]

Both populations reported that they continued to be displaced due to insecurity, while significantly more people in the 'camps' also attributed their continued displacement to poverty.

[...]

When the respondents were asked for the most important reason why they chose to stay where they were, 37% of the adults cited the security provided by the 'camps'.

[...]

A few problems affected them significantly more than the general population:

- The displaced adults reported the loss of home/property, fear, displacement and murder significantly more than the general adult population;
- The displaced children reported the loss of home/property, assault, murder and rape significantly more than the general population of children.

[...]

The study found that 29% of the adults in the 'camps' reported problems with rape affecting their families. Due to the small sample size, this was not significantly different from the level of 21% reported by adults in the general population.

However, 31% of displaced children reported rape as a problem in their family, which was significantly higher than the 17% of children in the general population.

[...]

This was a significant finding. The fact that nearly a third of the children living in 'camps' claimed that their families have been affected by rape has major implications about the levels of safety and protection available to children in these camps. This finding confirms a UNCU/UN-OCHA 2002 study, which states

that gender based discrimination and violence — particularly the rape of girls and young women — is "widespread" among 14 minority groups in Somalia. However, while the study makes reference to a series of stories of reported rape, it does not offer any clear statistical evidence to back up this claim.

One CPS enumerator reported hearing numerous stories of rape from women members of minority groups in one of the displacement 'camps' visited. It was reported that these rapes had been committed by an armed man from a powerful clan whose identity was known. However, nothing had been done to stop the assaults. Advisory groups reported that it was common that nothing would be done to stop a perpetrator from a powerful clan if the victim was from a minority group.

[...]

Groups identified as the most disadvantaged in Somalia include segregated or outcast clans, unarmed clans and internally displaced people. The displacement 'camp' sample considered themselves significantly more disadvantaged than the general sample. Despite the fact that the majority of displaced people are also members of segregated, outcast or unarmed clans, they believe their disadvantage stems more from being internally displaced and refugees.

[...]

While 13% of adults and 20% of children in the general population report their families being fully or partly dependent upon a child's earnings, these figures rise to 30% of adults and 42% of children in the displacement camps. The displaced populations also reported:

- Lack of employment, poverty, lack of education and healthcare as significantly more common than among the general population;
- More serious economic and social consequences due to the hostilities;
- Significantly more problems with violence, immorality and disputes within families;
- Significantly more loss of property, fear, displacement and murder reported by adults;
- Significantly more loss of property, assault, murder and rape reported by children;
- Reports of rape in the family reported by 31% of the displaced children, as compared to 17% of children in the general population." (UNICEF, 10 December 2003, Chapter 8, pp.15,23,24,29,30,33,34)

Internally displaced women and girls lack protection (2003)

- One third of IDP children residing in camps reported rape as a problem within their family, according to a UNICEF report
- In 2002, militias raped women and girls of opposing clans, in particular from displaced and minority groups like the Bantu, Midgan, Tumul, Yibir, Bravanese and Benadiri, during inter-factional and inter-clan fighting in the south
- Women suffer sexual abuses, beatings, thefts and non-payment of wages both in the workplace and in camps
- Displaced women head of households are often subject to sexual violence, abduction forced marriage, human trafficking, prostitution and discrimination upon access to humanitarian assistance
- Displaced women suffer both ethnic and gender discriminations
- Women and girls are often raped and abducted while collecting firewood
- Rape of IDP women within their community is often triggered by the lack of income men have to pay for dowry
- Women raped often suffer from social exclusion in addition to psychological traumas

"A 2003 report by UNICEF Somalia, *From Perception to Reality: A Study On Child Protection in Somalia*, indicates that gender-based violence is a problem of concern in Somalia, despite a widespread culture of denial. The study's Household Survey shows that 75 per cent of the population believes that sexual assault does not exist at all - yet 12 per cent of the adult population and 8 per cent of children attest

to personally knowing of a rape victim. Females in displaced persons camps are especially vulnerable - the study notes that "nearly a third of all displaced children (31 per cent) reported rape as a problem within their family, compared to 17 per cent of children in the general population" (UNCHR, 30 November 2003, para.24)

"Inter-factional and inter-clan fighting in the south claimed scores of civilian, as well as combat casualties lives [in 2002]. Several factions used children as combatants and scores of people died from landmine injuries. Faction militias and other gunmen raped women and girls of opposing clans and other vulnerable groups, particularly internally displaced people and the severely underprivileged Somali minorities such as the Bantu (also known as Jarir), Midgan, Tumul, Yibir, Bravanese and also the wealthier Benadiri community. Dozens of people, including children, were kidnapped for ransom, including Mohamed Abokor, a UN official released in May after four weeks' captivity." (AI, January 2003)

"There are numerous accounts of gender-based violence: of sexual abuse in IDP camps and in the workplace. General abuse takes the form of theft, beatings, the non-payment of wages and the constant reinforcement of socio-ethnic status (through the use of terms such as *adoon* or *slave*). When human rights violations take place, in the absence of any properly functioning mechanisms for the rule of law, individuals from 'minority' or weak clans in Kismaayo often have little recourse to systems of justice - whether through customary law (*xeer*) or religious law (*sharia*). The subtleties of political, economic and social discrimination remain largely hidden to outsiders." (ODI, 31 December 2003, p.13)

"Approximately 350,000 IDPs live away from their homes throughout the country, with the highest concentration of 150,000 in Mogadishu. Some are nearly as established as their urban poor neighbours and benefit from clan support and protection. But for many, their income received from irregular, cheap casual labour barely covers their food needs and, isolated from their own relatives, they often face difficulties accessing clan support systems and receiving remittances. Moreover, they lack full protection and can be subjected to an array of human rights violations, particularly in Mogadishu where IDPs, predominantly women and children, are robbed of any commercial assets, including aid; forced into prostitution; trafficked as brides; and forcibly recruited by militia leaders. The prevalence of the sexual abuse of women and children, if not addressed, will remain a major area of concern. While UN agencies and NGOs have provided limited assistance to IDP communities, insecurity in areas such as Mogadishu and the Lower Juba, Lower Shabelle and Gedo regions has regularly hindered their efforts. As a result, aid agencies are exploring new ways to work effectively through local partners." (UN, November 2002, p.17)

« Rape is a security threat to every woman in the district. IDPs women are the most vulnerable off all. Reports indicated that those who venture out of the villages to collect firewood are at high risk. In May 2001, two IDPs girls were reported to had been gang raped in the bush while they collect firewood for their survival. Apart from physical injuries and personal trauma, rape victims suffer social stigma within their communities. Rape in the Somali tradition is considered as shame. Any girl who is raped is considered as unclean, and suffers abuses and social exclusion from their own communities." (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p.34)

"Cases of women raped by men from their own Rahaweyn community have been reported. This has been attributed to the social and economic problems facing the IDPs. IDP men have no resources and good income to pay dowry as a fee for marriage. This was not a problem in Somalia before the civil war. The extended family or relatives were supporting young men in raising the dowry. However, now in a situation of displacement, it is difficult for an IDP man to do so. As a result, rape, elopement and the abduction became the alternative solution for young IDP men. Another type of gender violence that comes from the community is forced marriage. Women with no husband are usually vulnerable to discrimination and humiliation by men. To protect them, families force their girls to marry one from their relatives. This has also created other serious problems such as continues domestic violence." (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p.55)

"Rape against women and teenage girls are common and widespread in the IDP camps. It is used as a military strategy to terrorize and demoralize the enemy. The Galgala IDPs reported that gunmen raped most

of their women and girls. One of the Galgala elders in Nuh Mohamud camp in Kismayo reported that gunmen raped about 20 Galgala women within two months in the year 2000. The elders also reported that an 18 years old girl was abducted while she was in the bush to collect firewood. The girl was later freed after she was used as a sexual slave for three months." (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p.26)

"Gender discrimination is deeply rooted in the traditional socio-cultural structures of Somali society and remains a formidable barrier to women's participation in decision-making and access to resources. Violence against women and girls, resulting either from tradition or the civil war, includes the almost universal practice of female genital mutilation and sexual violence against the displaced, particularly against members of rival clans and minority groups." (UNICEF 2000, paras. 7 and 8)

"Gender discrimination is deeply rooted in Somali society, where the rights of women in both the private and public spheres are seriously undermined. Rape, which was uncommon in Somalia before the war, has become a weapon of war for the militia and bandits, as well as in camps for displaced persons and returnees. Women belonging to minority groups, such as the Bantus and the Rahanweyn, are particularly subject to these crimes." (CHR 18 February 1999, para. 74)

Displaced children lack protection (2004)

- **Displaced children of single-headed families** often contribute to household survival therefore miss school 5% of the children reported a sibling carrying a gun or assisting militias according to a UNICEF survey 2003
- Child soldiers in Galgaduud were growing in numbers, forced to stay in areas of conflict to fight (2003-4)
- Displaced children often from southern minority groups are forced to seek 'protection' by joining urban gangs
- Displaced children are often exploited and have jobs dangerous to their health
- Children displaced from minority groups such as Bantus and Ogadenis particularly suffer from deprivation and abuse
- Displaced children are sexually abused
- Displaced children in single-headed families often end up on the streets and are often drawn into drug-dependency
- Displaced children who live on the streets and in orphanages often end up forcibly recruited by militias
- 3,000 orphan children were thrown on the streets after the orphanage hosting them had to close because shut down because the Saudi aid agency funding it was banned by the US on alleged terrorist links

"The long duration of the Somalia conflict has increased the vulnerability of internally displaced and abandoned children, minorities and women. The latter have been particularly affected by gender-based violence and the fact that many women are often heads of households or otherwise find themselves as the main breadwinner of the family. As a result, children have to take on household chores and other support functions, which contributes to low school enrolment rates for girls and denies them the enjoyment of crucial child rights. Food insecurity has also increased their workload and early marriages abound as well. Weak political and economic infrastructures have limited their access to power and resources, while limited respect for good governance and the rule of law – especially in the southern and central regions of Somalia – have created a culture of impunity in which human rights violations go unpunished. In the absence of functioning judicial systems, victims are unable to hold governing authorities accountable." (UN, November 2002, p.16)

"Child soldier exists and growing in number according to interviewed people [in Galgaduud]. Some five children under the age of eighteen wounded in the recent clashes at Heralé were admitted to Dhusamareb hospital. Also some previous discharges were reported. Meanwhile most young groups were compelled to stay at Heralé to defend the territory from external aggression." (OCHA, 6 April 2004, p.6)

"The involvement of children in the hostilities was also not significantly different from the general population, with 5% of children reporting that either they or their siblings had carried a gun or assisted the militias at some time in their lives." (UNICEF, 10 December 2003, p.30)

"These children are very vulnerable and support themselves by begging on the streets, in which case they are always involved in car accidents; they are run-over and mostly die from their injuries. As one child explained *"we are unable to complain or report accidents because we fear retaliation"*. Another child explained, *"The only way we can survive is by joining gangs for protection"*. Gang rivalry is another problem, which is challenging the survival of the Bantu children. Fights are very dangerous and sometimes lead to the death of the youngest and weakest child." (Ibrahim F. 15 August 2002, p.5)

"To supplement household income, parents allow their children to be part of the household income, and work from an early age of 13 or less. Indeed, the parents do not consider their children's involvement in the household income as a threat to their children's social and physical well being, but they consider it as a task, which has an economic importance for the household. Most of the IDPs children workers have already lost their community network, and suffer dramatic effect on their health and future. Children undertake marginal jobs such as carrying goods, delivering water, and farming in return of marginal wages or some food. It appears that the IDPs children will continue to suffer from economic exploitation and from work that is hazardous to their health, and to their future, until solution is found for the Somali crises." (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p.38)

"All children in Somalia can be considered as being in 'especially difficult circumstances' but, there are subgroups who have special social problems and needs – and have a right to – special care, protection and, in some cases, social reintegration over and above the basic survival and development needs of children in general.

There are tens of thousands of displaced children, youth and women living in camp conditions in extreme poverty; many thousands of children living on the streets; hundreds of children live in orphanages; large numbers of physically and mentally disabled and handicapped children; and, unknown numbers of children attached to militia groups.

While many benefit from some forms of support from the traditional clan assistance mechanisms, some, mostly minority groups such as Bantus and Ogadenis, who are generally marginalised by the Somali society, are particularly vulnerable, and often suffer from deprivation and abuse." (UN March 2001, p. 76)

"Human rights defenders reported to the independent expert that there are many cases of sexual abuse of women and children, particularly among the internally displaced population. The situation with regard to internal displacement is making the number of street children rise. Although most of these children are 'Somalilanders', there are also other groups, including Ethiopians. An increase in the use of alcohol and hashish among children has also been cited." (CHR 26 January 2000, p. 26)

Freedom of movement

IDPs freedom of movement hampered by militia roadblocks and extortion (2003)

- In southern Somalia, IDPs and local residents are charged fees to pass militia roadblocks
- Roadblocks particularly threaten IDP's safety as their status of deprivation makes them less able to pay taxes unlawfully levied
- IDPs are also charged at water points to collect water from the river

« Des violences inter-claniques mettant la population en situation de précarité nutritionnelle et sanitaire...

Des années de guerre civile en Somalie ont abouti à la division du pays en zones claniques, contrôlées par des chefs de guerre, d'où un climat d'insécurité permanent et une forte criminalité. Les populations subissent cet état de fait au quotidien et ne peuvent s'aventurer hors de leur zone sans risques.

Cette situation ne fait qu'accroître leur précarité nutritionnelle et sanitaire. En effet, sans liberté de mouvement, il devient impossible pour elles de mener à bien des activités professionnelles, agropastorales principalement, ou d'accéder aux soins et à l'eau potable, déjà rares en Somalie. » (ACF, 5 February 2003)

"The personal security of IDPs in Qoryoley is at stake and it is affected by the security condition of the district, which the UN and other aid agencies have described as poor. The IDPs found themselves in situations where violence against the civilian population by armed men is pervasive and rampant. According to the IDPs, killings, rape, and extortion are some of the major security threats in the district and **they are rampant in the villages of Gayawarow, Ayarto, Abdi Ali, and Afgoye Yare. The Habargodir militia** set up roadblocks in these villages to charge local residents and also IDPs Sh.sh 500 every time they pass through the roadblocks. Similarly at water points, So.sh 500 are charged every body who wants to draw water from the River. Farmers are charged between So.sh 100,000- 500,000 for cultivating and irrigating their farms. The IDPs are the most vulnerable of all. Because they are poor, they can not afford to pay for extortion. As a consequence sometimes they are denied access to water or pass through the roadblocks. This affects not only their economic livelihoods, but also their freedom of movements and their rights to survive." (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p.34)

SUBSISTENCE NEEDS

General

Somalia ranks among the five least developed countries 2003

- IDPs in Somaliland and Puntland were 'very impoverished and lacking most basic services', and that the situation in the south was even worse, according to UNHCR's Inspector General
- Somalia is the fifth poorest country in the world with 43% of Somalis living in extreme poverty
- Yearly 225 children under five die out of 1000 infants born
- 80% of the Somali population have no access to safe water and nearly half have no access to sanitation
- Only 19% of the adult population can read or write
- Only 14% children attend primary school

"Mission visited IDP groups in Somaliland (Hargeisa) and Puntland (Bossaso and Garowe) – unable to visit Mogadishu and Kismayo for security reasons.

[...]

Overall situation of IDPs seen by the mission was very impoverished and lacking most basic services, including shelter, access to water, health and education. IDPs in the south not visited but according to UNHCR staff even worse off than those we saw.

[Note: Majority of local population also deprived in these areas, but IDPs more vulnerable]" (McNamara, 10 February 2004)

"Even before the war, Somalia was one of the poorest countries in the world; its Gross National Product per capita was calculated at only US\$ 170, the fifth lowest on earth. [...] Today, nearly three million Somalis, or 43.2%, live in *extreme* poverty on less than US\$ 1 a day, mainly in rural areas. Those living in *general* poverty, on US\$ 2 per day, comprise 73.4% of the population. Only 19% of the adults (aged 15 and above) can read and write. Only 16.4% of the primary school aged children are enrolled. [...] It is estimated that nearly half the population live without access to sanitation and nearly 80% without access to safe water. [...] Out of every 1,000 infants born, 225 die before they reach the age of five." (UN, 18 November 2003, p.12)

"As a result, localised armed conflict and insecurity caused by inter- and intra-factional clan and political conflicts continue to be the main impediments to peace, reconciliation and sustainable recovery in Somalia, which after more than ten years of disorder, is characterised by some of the lowest human development indicators in the world. The country is ranked among the five least developed countries on earth by UNDP's *2001 Human Development Report for Somalia*. In 1990, it was estimated that 60% of the population were living below the poverty line. With the deterioration of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), it is most likely that the proportion of the population living in poverty remains at least as high as twelve years ago, if not higher." (UN, November 2002, p.14)

Food

IDPs are three times more at risk of malnutrition than resident populations (2004)

- Global acute malnutrition among IDPs in Hargeisa, Bossaso, and Burao ranged between 15.3% and 18.7%, due to poor shelter, sanitation and lack of income (2001-2003)
- Global malnutrition rates among IDPs are as high as 25% compared to 17% in the general population
- Crop production predicted for 2004 are expected to continue to be "normal" that is 70% below pre-war levels
- Food vulnerable regions mainly due to insecurity are in the north Sool, Sanag and Bari, in the center Mudug and Galgadud and in the south Baidoa, Burhakaba, Buale, Jilib, Luuq and Garbarhary regions
- Micro-nutrient deficiencies leading to increased mortality and morbidity rates particularly prevalent among under- five IDPs
- Malnutrition rates amongst the internally displaced in rural areas reportedly as high as 40% (2000)
- Somalia lacked one-third of the daily food intake normally needed according to FAO (2001)
- MSF findings that malnutrition rates reached 75.6% in some conflict areas in 1991-2 confirms man-made famine theories

"Recent nutrition surveys in IDP (Internally Displaced People) settings indicate a poor nutrition situation. Nutrition surveys amongst IDPs conducted in Hargeisa, Bossaso and Burao between June 2001 and Oct. 2003 found global acute malnutrition rates ranging between 15.3% and 18.7%. An analysis of the various studies on IDPs in Somalia indicate that they are disadvantaged by a combination of factors including : poor shelter, poor sanitation, limited access to sources of income, weak coping strategies, limited access to remittances and social support." (FSAU, 14 January 2004)

"It is estimated that up to 300,000 [...] people in Somalia can be categorised as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and are living in conditions that are significantly worse than those of the surrounding populations. This has occurred as a direct result of the civil insecurity in the country that has lasted for over a decade and most are settled in the peri-urban areas or in main towns like Hargeisa, Burao, Bossaso and Mogadishu[...] nutrition surveys carried out on displaced populations in Somalia indicate a persistently poor nutritional status. The global acute malnutrition rates have remained above 15% and the severe acute malnutrition about 2%. Repeat nutrition surveys among IDPs in Hargeisa and Bossaso show no significant improvement in the nutritional status of children despite the efforts of a number of humanitarian interventions.

[...]

"Among the factors found to be influencing the nutritional status of these population are limited *food accessibility* – both in quantity, quality and variety due to income deficits, poor child care/feeding practices, inadequate sanitary facilities and morbidity (mainly diarrhoea and ARI). An urban household economy assessment in Hargeisa undertaken by FEWSNET in February 2003 showed that expenditure on meat, milk and vegetables was minimal among poor households. As in other studies, it was clear that lower level of income was associated with a higher proportion of the diet consisting of cereals. The *variety of foods* in the diet (the essential diversity) increased as income increased. In all IDP areas surveyed, the quality and quantity of foods eaten is minimal" (FSAU, 17 December 2003)

"Among IDP populations malnutrition rates as high as 25% have been recorded in the last two years, compared to a global malnutrition rate for Somalia of 17%, and 10% among more established populations." (UNICEF, 30 October 2003)

"Further, given that climatic indicators now predict a "normal" year for Somalia, programmes in this CA are based on the assumption that total crop production will continue at levels below 70% of the post-war average, with no large abnormal livestock movements or deaths occurring.

[...]

This has left the country particularly vulnerable to "soft" humanitarian crises, characterised by chronic food shortages, high levels of malnutrition (71% of the population is undernourished [...]) and low access to health services, sanitation facilities and safe drinking water.

[...]

The combined effects of food insecurity and poor health has meant that Somalia continues to suffer from sustained high malnutrition rates that would trigger an international response in other countries, but have become accepted as the norm in Somalia. The global malnutrition rate for children under five over the last 18 months is 17%. [...] Malnutrition in areas surveyed to reach this average has varied from 8.3% in Galcayo in the Mudug region [...] to 21.5% in Belet Hawa district in the Gedo region." (UN, 18 November 2003, p.2,10,25).

"This has generally reduced acute food security problems, with some exceptions in the north-west where this year's Gu rains appear delayed and in areas in the south where conflict and the lack of access is affecting the ability of some farmers to harvest their crops. Areas of continuing vulnerability can be found in the northern Sool, Sanag and Bari regions, where successive dry seasons have created water and pasture shortages; the central Mudug and Galgaduud regions, where limited rains and market access, combined with insecurity, have adversely affected livelihoods; and in the southern areas surrounding Baidoa and Burhakaba towns in Bay region, Buale and Jilib towns in the Lower and Middle Juba regions and Luuq and Garbarhaley towns in Gedo region. In these areas, insecurity remains the primary obstacle to good harvest production. In Gedo, although the two most recent rains have been good, the effects of drought and insecurity have slowed recovery, especially for the poorest who remain vulnerable from three years of drought." (UN, 3 June 2003, p.2-3)

"MSF's findings in 1991 and 1992 of consistently high global malnutrition rates among the war-displaced in Kismayo, Mogadishu, Kansardere and Baidoa - rates reaching highs of 75.6% - supports the thesis that conflict fuels hunger." (MSF, 9 December 2002)

"The Sahil nutritional survey (see above) confirms **the high vulnerability of IDPs/returnees. They are three times more at risk of malnutrition than the resident population.**" (ACC/SCN 39, 31 October 2002, p.16)

"Except some few IDPs who have got access to clan assistance or profitable jobs are able to eat two meals a day. The rest eat only one meal in twenty-four hours. Under these conditions, children are the most vulnerable of all. Some children in the camps suffer from mild to chronic malnutrition, an effect that can leave serious implication on their health and social performance." (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p.27)

"Micro-nutrient deficiencies, notably Vitamin A, iron and iodine, remain prevalent in Somalia, leading to increased mortality and morbidity among women and children." (UN Appeal, November 2001, p.24)

"Nutritionists also stress that the cumulative damage to personal health caused by a decade of war and malnutrition cannot be healed by a single year of improved food security." (UNDP Somalia 2001, p.73)

"In October [2000], the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) rated Somalia as the 'world's hungriest country.' The FAO reported that Somalia lacked one-third of the daily food intake normally needed. UNICEF found that about 40 percent of Somalis were malnourished in rural areas and at sites for internally displaced populations." (USCR 2001, p. 105)

"UNICEF has conducted nutrition surveys in southern and central Somalia finding an average global malnutrition rate of 23%, (average severe malnutrition rates of 5%). Rates vary across regions and among different population groups and can be as high as 40% in areas with high concentrations of displaced families." (UN November 2000, Strategy Paper, p.9)

For regular, detailed information on the situation of nutrition and food security in Somalia, please refer to the UN Somalia webpage at <http://www.unsomalia.org>

IDPs nutritional status in various regions (2004)

- IDPs who fled fighting in Baidoa in October 2003 recorded critical global malnutrition of 17.2% and severe acute malnutrition of 3.1% due to lack of food, health care and water
- Under-five mortality rate at 3/10,000 per day indicated an alert situation among the IDP population and 24% of under-five deaths were attributed to diarrhoeal diseases in Baidoa early 2004
- The lack of cooking utensils limited meal preparation to once a day
- Acute malnutrition rate among Burao IDPs is 15.3% and only one third of the children up to two years old were breastfeeding end 2003
- IDPs commonly have minimal quality and quantity of food: Burao IDPs had a diet made of cereals with serious deficiencies in vitamins and proteins and 35% of the children ate only once or twice daily
- IDPs in Buaale have no access to food due to high taxes levied by militias on imported food, loss of assets and limited presence of humanitarian agencies
- Global acute malnutrition at 15.3% and severe malnutrition 3.8% in Hargeisa IDP settlements in 2003 showed no improvements since 2001
- Bossasso IDPs suffered from persistent high malnutrition rate at 16.2% and global acute malnutrition at 3.2% mainly due to poor purchasing power, early weaning and high incidence of diseases
- 39% of IDP children in Mogadishu were malnourished and 7.1% severely malnourished in 2002

Baidoa

"Tension remains in Baidoa and civil insecurity is undermining food security due to the displacement of people from Baidoa to Wajid (Bakol), and the limited accessibility and mobility of food within the region and between neighboring regions." (FSAU, 14 April 2004)

"On January 20/21 2004, the FSAU, UNICEF, WFP, ACF and World Vision conducted a joint multi-sectoral assessment in the three IDP camps of Bakaar Yar, Bakaar Weyn and Dhurrey in Wajid District, (Bakol Region) to review the food security situation and identify ways to address the current crisis. The IDPs were displaced from villages in Baidoa District in October 2003 following inter-clan fighting. They fled their homes without food, seeds or farm tools.

The findings revealed critical global and severe acute malnutrition rates (WFH z scores) of 17.2% and 3.1% respectively and a high mortality rate of 3/10,000/day. (during the 30 days preceding the assessment date).

These results were attributed to a poor food security situation; lack of primary health care, inadequate access to water and a poor child care environment.

In addition to providing support to the ongoing reconciliation talks in Wajid among warring clans, the assessment team recommended interventions that would increase IDP access to food and non-food items (e.g. General Food Distribution, FFW and CFW), primary health care services, water and agricultural inputs to prepare for their eventual return to Baidoa" (FSAU, 11 February 2004)

"The retrospective under five mortality rate in the previous 30 days was found to be 3.0/10000/day, indicating an 'alert' situation (WHO classification). The relatively small proportion of under fives was

attributed both to the split in families, with some members remaining in Baidoa and to the high mortality. Additionally, the total population figure could not be verified.

The food security situation was poor in terms of availability, access and coping strategies. Additionally, IDPs lacked cooking utensils and coped by sharing the few available ones, a practice that limited the frequency of meal preparation and consumption to once a day. IDPs were hopeful that the Peace and Reconciliation talks among warring clans in Baidoa would enable them to return to their villages.

No primary health care intervention was being undertaken in any of the camps. Subsequently, measles vaccination coverage of 16.4% and vitamin A supplementation in the previous six months of 1%, were very low compared to the minimum recommendations of 85% (Sphere). The prevalence rates for diarrhoea (37%), ARI (34%), fever (39%) in the two preceding weeks, and measles (1.7%) in the preceding one month were also significant. Lack of treatment of these diseases resulted in inadequate dietary intake with the outcome of wasting and deaths. About 24% of under five deaths were attributed by caregivers to watery and bloody diarrhoea, 22% to ARI, 20% to fever, 12% to measles and 22% to other diseases." (FSAU, 20 February 2004)

"The IDPs are reported to have returned to Baidoa after improvement of the security situation there and the fact that the land preparation period (Gu planting season in March/April) was approaching." (FSAU, 25 March 2004, p.3)

Galgadud

"Both the displacement and the effects of the harsh dry season have significant repercussions on the communities affected by the repeated violence and conflicts. Their needs are apparent and great. Resources of the better off groups are at threatening point as they shared the little they had with displaced relatives and drought affected families. Much of the region is experiencing acute water shortages and deteriorated pasture conditions impacting livestock conditions and reproduction capacities." (OCHA, 6 April 2004)

"UN-OCHA Somalia and FSAU carried out a low level mission to Galgadud (13-20 December 2003) to districts where people had been displaced following civil insecurity in the region. This displacement, combined with a two month delay in the onset of the *Deyr* rains has undermined agricultural and livestock activities, increasing the risk of food insecurity." (FSAU, 14 January 2004)

Bay and Bakool

"The situation of IDPs in Wajid district is one of the major humanitarian concerns in Bay and Bakool region. However, little concrete information has been received about this situation. In Wajid district, the displaced have moved into three main locations: Wajid town, Biilala village (30km from Wajid town in the direction of Baidoa), and Walaq village. [...] Some arrived more than 40 days ago.

Although the short-term needs of shelter, water, food, and health interventions are clear the displacement has longer-term repercussions too. Agricultural activities in the Baidoa area, such as land preparation and planting, ahead of the *deyr* rains, have halted and farms have been abandoned. Undoubtedly, this will affect the availability of food in the coming months. Until confidence in the security situation returns it is likely that there is little hope of IDPs returning to their areas of origin." (OCHA 28 November 2003)

Burao:

"Burao town in Burao District, Togdheer Region hosts four main settlement camps namely Kosaar, Siibakhti, 15 May and Ali Hussein. The majority of the population of over two thousand are returnees and displaced people from South Somalia and Ethiopia and although some have been in the area for around ten years, new arrivals from Ethiopia continue to take up residence within the informal settlements.

Availability of basic infrastructure and amenities in these camps is minimal. The housing structures comprise of mainly makeshift shelters which predispose the occupants to common communicable diseases including respiratory tract infections and tuberculosis. Health services and water availability within the camps is minimal with only one health post and borehole (which reportedly yields salty water) in Kosaar

camp. Hence, these populations have resorted to seeking these services from Burao town. In addition to having minimal assets, the means of livelihood are limited and unreliable. Limited information on the nutritional status of this population is available.

[...]

The preliminary survey results indicate a poor nutrition status with global/total acute malnutrition rate of 15.3 % while the severe acute malnutrition rate was 1.9 %. As shown on the table, the incidence of ARI and diarrhoea two weeks prior to the survey was high. [...]

Data analysis showed that diarrhoea had a significant association with children's nutritional status in the settlements reflecting the earlier observations on poor sanitation and sub-standard environment. At the time of the survey, only about a third of the children aged between 6 - 24 months were breastfeeding. Of those below 2 years that had stopped breastfeeding, more than half (56%) had stopped breastfeeding below the age of one year. The feeding frequency for a good proportion of the children is inadequate with 35% being fed twice or once in a day. Qualitative data further indicates that children are mainly fed on Anjera (Somali pancake made from wheat flour and water with some vegetable oil added after cooking) and plain rice which are lacking in essential nutrients like proteins and vitamins." (FSAU, 1 November 2003)

Buaale and Hagar:

"Armed clan conflict that started in a form of revenge killings in the inland pastoral areas north of Hagar during November 2002 spilled over into a large area in Buaale and Hagar districts (see affected areas on the map). In the course of the fighting, many houses were burned particularly in Bulo Galool, Banta, Tatey, Kafinge, Qardhale and Anole - all sedentary farming villages along the Juba River - southwest of Buaale. Vulnerability assessment and baseline work recently carried out by FEWS NET and FSAU in March 2003 suggests that 15-25 percent of the houses in Buaale town were burned down. Moreover, properties and food stocks were looted. Houses, business, standing crops and underground granaries (*bakaar*) were destroyed or looted and civilian populations displaced. Because of insecurity extending more than five months now, people from Buaale town and surrounding villages migrated to Hagar, Afmadow, Salagle, Sakow and Jilib towns as IDPs far from their normal sources of food and income.

[...]

The short-term food security implication is that poor households and IDP groups will not have access to their normal income from seasonal land preparation wage labor. Due to the limited presence of aid agencies in the area, there have been no significant humanitarian interventions up till now. The IDPs put an additional burden on the resource-poor community hosting them. Food shortages and poor health and water access are worsening the situation. Imported food prices remain high due to the high exchange rate between the US dollar and Somali Shilling and high transport costs between Mogadishu and Hagar, inflated by many 'toll-collecting' militia checkpoints. Apart from Buaale town and Hagar, staple foods are generally available in the markets. But for poor displaced households without sufficient income that find themselves priced out of the markets, food accessibility is becoming a critical issue. Access to paid employment is also limited due to surplus labor in areas where households fled, especially Salagle and Sakow. Traditional self-employment activities, like the sale of water, fire wood, fodder, local construction materials, as well as fishing opportunities, have been greatly disrupted." (FEWS, 8 May 2003)

Bossasso

"UNICEF in collaboration with MOH and FSAU carried out a repeat nutrition survey among Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Bossasso in July 2003. Preliminary results indicate a persistently high malnutrition rate of 16.2% (Weight for Height <-2 z-scores or oedema) for global acute malnutrition and 3.2% (Weight for Height <-3 z-scores or oedema) for severe acute malnutrition. A previous survey in June 2002 also showed a high global acute malnutrition rate of 18.7% (Weight for Height <-2 z-scores or oedema) and a severe malnutrition rate of 7.5% (Weight for Height <-3 z-scores or oedema). Factors found to have a profound negative influence on the nutritional status in 2002 were poor purchasing power of the residents, poor weaning practices, high incidence of childhood diseases (mainly diarrhoea, respiratory infections and measles) and unsanitary environment. It is notable that just some two weeks prior to this year's survey, there was an outbreak of cholera among the IDP population although the situation had been stabilised at the time of survey." (FSAU, 12 August 2003)

Hargeisa:

"Preliminary results of the nutrition survey undertaken in early February in *Hargeisa* indicate a disappointing lack of improvement in malnutrition rates among children under 5 years in the returnee/resettlement/ IDP areas in *Hargeisa* since the previous survey in June 2001. Global acute malnutrition rates now reach 15.3% (Weight for Height <2 Z-scores or oedema) including 3.8% severe malnutrition (W/H <3 Z-scores or oedema)." (FSAU, 10 April 2003,p1)

Mogadishu:

"In the insecure region of Benadir, (districts around Mogadishu) malnutrition is particularly evident among displaced persons and the poor. In one month, 30% of children attending health facilities in the area were identified as malnourished." (FSAU, 14 January 2004)

"The TFCs continue to admit high numbers of severely malnourished cases.[...]Over 86.3% of the beneficiaries were residents of Mogadishu while only a minority (13.8%) were IDPs. Of the beneficiaries that were IDPs, 57.1% were from Bay region by origin. This is not very surprising in view of the unrest that has persisted in Bay region since July 2002." (FSAU, 17 December 2003)

"Mogadishu hosts an estimated 230,000 Internally Displaced Persons and since the collapse of the Somalia Government in 1990 and the resultant conflicts, has remained one of the most insecure areas in Somalia. Consequently, access for delivery of humanitarian aid to Mogadishu has been a major challenge both to the local and international community. In general, it has been difficult to collect any qualitative information. Qualitative reports had indicated that the IDPs and the urban poor of Mogadishu were negatively affected following the closure of Barakat money exchange agency. The burning of Bakara market was further blow to Mogadishu residents as many had depended either directly or indirectly on the market.

Between 26th and 29th June 2002, FSAU conducted a rapid assessment using MUAC among all under five children present at the time of survey in five IDP camps in Mogadishu. Out of the 487 children screened, 39% were malnourished (MUAC measurement <12.5cm or oedema) while 7.1% were severely malnourished (a MUAC <11.0cm or oedema). A further 21% were at risk of malnutrition (MUAC 12.5 cm-13.4cm).

The population is reported to have very low purchasing power, as income opportunities are limited. Looting and thefts are also common throughout Mogadishu. People live in fear each day and there are a number of traumatised individuals especially among the poor town residents and IDPs. It is also reported that milk and other protein rich foods are unaffordable to the poor IDP residents. IDPs reside in shanties and abandoned buildings that are crowded and unsanitary. Childcare practices are therefore compromised within the camps while the incidences of common child illnesses like diarrhoea and respiratory infections are very high." (FSAU Nutrition Update, 31 August 2002)

Health

78% people have no access to health facilities and have alarming health status (2002)

- Diarrhea-related diseases, respiratory infections and malaria account for more than half of all child deaths (2002)
- Somalia has among the highest incidence of TB in the world
- MSF estimates there are 15 qualified doctors per 1million people in Somalia (Dec 2002)
- 1,191 cases of cholera and 63 deaths reported to WHO between 12 March 2002 and 22 April 2002

- Under five mortality rates of 210 per 1000 and maternal mortality rates at 1,600 per 100,000, amongst the highest in the world
- Infectious and communicable diseases are the major prevalent health risks particularly amongst displaced populations in peri-urban settlements
- Lack of safe water and sanitation leads to cholera outbreaks every dry season
- Somalis totally dependent on international community for delivery of health services as infrastructures were ravaged by war and no medical staff have been trained since 1991
- Displaced persons cannot afford health care treatment and drugs
- Displaced who are constantly on the move find themselves outside health coverage system

General health indicators:

"Diarrhoea-related diseases, respiratory infections and malaria continued to account for more than half of all child deaths in the country, while neonatal tetanus and other birth-related problems also contributed significantly to infant mortality. Although measles immunisation levels reached 40% in 2001, a record high for Somalia, outbreaks continued to cause many deaths in 2002. Polio also remained a continuing threat to children. Somalia remains amongst the countries with the highest incidence of tuberculosis in the world and meningitis and cholera are endemic in most areas." (UN, November 2002, p.4)

"As of 22 April, WHO has received reports of 1 191 cases and 63 deaths (CFR, 5.3 %) in the country since the outbreak began on the 12 March 2002. Five out of 18 regions are affected: Banadir (Mogadishu), Lower Shabelle (Merka), Middle Shabelle (Jilib and Haranka), Hiraaan (Belet Weyne) and Bari (Bossasso) regions." (WHO, 23 April 2002)

Health care system:

"Lack of adequate health care is one of the biggest problems facing Somalis today. A staggering 78% of the population has no access to health services. MSF has estimated that the country has less than 15 qualified doctors per million people. Trained healthcare professionals fled the country to safety during the 1990s. The only nurse training facilities are in Bosasso and Hargeisa - and the few health workers that remain tend to be based in the more secure urban centres. The whole of eastern Sanag, for instance, had only one doctor in 2001.

[...]

MSF's OPD/MCH in North Mogadishu is in the Yaqshid area, near the Green Line. Many of the patients here are Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from elsewhere in the country. It sees an astonishing 250-300 consultations per day, around 95,000 consultations per year - a reflection of the absence of other, affordable health services in the area. Immunisation of under-fives, pregnant women and women of child-bearing age (16-45), plus monitoring the nutritional status of under-5s, are automatically part of any treatment given to women and infants." (MSF, 9 December 2002)

"The health care system, along with all state services, has collapsed. Most doctors have fled the country and, apart from staff working with NGOs, no doctors or nurses have been trained in Somalia since the outbreak of war. The only available public or free health care is via the few NGOs still working in the country." (MSF 13 December 2001)

"The health status of the Somali population as a whole reflects the years of crisis the country has experienced. Average life expectancy is 47 years of age, one of the lowest in the world, while the maternal and infant mortality rates are considered to be the highest in the world, with an infant under five mortality rate of 210 per 1000. [...]

The Somali health care system was never very comprehensive. Before the civil war health services and health professionals were concentrated in Mogadishu. The conflict destroyed most facilities, disrupted the supply of medicines, ended all training and broke down the already poor management systems, which were based on government ministries and departments. As with other social services, the health care system in Northwest and Northeast Somalia has had to be developed from scratch.



At the moment, the health system takes a more curative than preventive approach to health problems. To date there has been little emphasis on health education, and consequently the health system is characterised by late treatment seeking behaviour among patients, low prioritisation of health care expenditure among communities and a general reluctance to pay for health services at public facilities. "(IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p. 19)

"The civil war and the absence of a central government have wiped out the government health service. Health care is provided by NGOs and through market channels at a cost. IDPs are outside the system of health coverage and are constantly on the move, so cannot access health cards, or undergo any long-term treatments. There are too few clinics to provide for the settled population, let alone the IDPs, who come and go." (Redding and Hansen 1998, p. 83)

Extremely poor health status of IDPs in most regions of Somalia (2002)

- Health assistance provided by MSF and UNICEF in Kismayo region jeopardized by persistent war between Majerteen and Marehan militias
- Cholera is endemic in Somalia especially during the dry season
- 250 children monthly accepted in ACF Therapeutic Feeding centers in Mogadishu (2001)
- Gedo recorded the worst health indicators in Somalia, basic health services are next to inexistent and the only Hospital in Luuq has hardly any equipment and is understaffed (2001)
- IDPs in Hargeisa indicate the lowest health services compared to other displaced populations (June 2002)
- Vaccination rates were lowest among Southern Somali in Hargeisa
- Southern Somali women displaced in Hargeisa were less likely to receive prenatal care and had no access to a trained attendant
- Sheikh Nur only IDP settlement with operational public health facility (September 2001)
- Very low attendance to health facility due to unaffordable fees and unsuitable opening times

Kismayo:

"Poor living conditions (limited access to adequate food, safe clean drinking water, and good shelter), and poor sanitation in the camps are the major causes of health problems facing IDPs. Reports from UNICEF supported MCH activities in Kismayo indicate that anaemia, malaria, worm infection diarrhoea and urinary tract infection is among the most common communicable diseases in the area. UNICEF and other aid agencies provide health care support to the population in Kismayo. However, due to insecurity it is difficult to provide adequate assistance to the vulnerable groups particularly the IDPs. Cholera outbreak normally takes place during dry seasons (from January up to March). During this period, there is an acute shortage of water in Kismayo especially in IDP camps, which leads also to poor sanitation and poor health. Most of the IDPs have no access to adequate water to clean their hand and utensils before food. This fosters the spread of epidemic diseases in the camps. Unconfirmed reports indicate that twenty people including seven IDPs died of cholera outbreak in February 2001.

Limited health care provisions are provided to the IDPs. After MSF withdraw from Kismayo hospital, the only hospital in city, has no adequate drugs and qualified medical personnel that address the high demand of medical care by Kismayo residents. There are about 6 MCH, 60 OPDs and 34 health posts assisted by UNICEF. However, their activities have been jeopardized by persisting insecurity and sporadic clashes between the Majerteen and Marehan militia. Recent clashes between the Juba Valley Alliance and Majerteen have further deteriorated the humanitarian activities in the area. There are a large number of private clinics

and chemists in the city. However, because of poverty, IDPs can not afford to pay for drugs and health services." (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p.27)

Hargeisa

Interagency assessment conducted in 8 areas around Hargeisa (Somaliland) in returnee and IDP settlements (June 2002). The second largest settlement, Daami hosts about 10,000 people, of whom 35% are displaced from Southern Somalia (Clark, June 2002, p.27)

"- Southern Somalis and non-Somali Ethiopians were significantly less likely than Somalilanders or Somali Ethiopians to receive TT shots during pregnancy or to receive prenatal care." (Clark, June 2002, p.8)

"The rate of under-5s receiving any vaccinations is significantly lower in Ayaha and Daami than in other returnee settlement areas, and vaccination card retention rate of those under-5s who received vaccinations is significantly lower in Daami and State House than in other areas. Southern Somali children under 5 years old and 12-23 months old were vaccinated at significantly lower rates than Somalilanders living in the areas." (Clark, June 2002, p.59)

"Generally the health services in the survey areas is poor. Only Sheikh Nur, the largest settlement, has an operating public health facility, which provides services including immunization, under five clinic, antenatal care and delivery. But even here attendance is very poor - less than fifteen people per day. The cost recovery approach adopted by the Ministry of Health and Labour may be one of the reasons why the poorest population groups sometimes cannot utilize the health services as the policy which should provide guidelines on exemption for very poor is not always regularly applied. Moreover, the public health facilities work only in the morning hours while most parents or caretakers are out of the daily bread. No outreach services other than immunization and Vitamin A distribution programmes has ever been developed for Sheikh Nur.

All the other survey areas have no public health service facilities. However, Mohamed Mooge has several private pharmacies. The construction of a health center there has been completed recently, with the assistance of UNHCR, but it is not operational yet due to some managerial and staffing issues. For the Stadiim and Fadumo Bihi settlements the nearby Iftin health center is accessible but the MCH hardly ever operates due to staffing issues. The State House and Daami communities are close enough to the Jig-jiga Yar and New Hargeisa health centers respectively." (UNICEF/MoH&L/PSAU, September 2001, p.6)

Mogadishu:

"In the capital, where 500,000 to 700,000 people live, including 150,000 displaced people, there are no safe drinking water provision systems, sanitation installations are drastically insufficient and health structures are almost entirely absent. A significant number of children are suffering from diarrhoea, the first cause of malnutrition in the town, to which can be added numerous cases of infections, such as measles or tuberculosis. More than 250 severely malnourished children are admitted each month to the two Therapeutic Feeding Centres run by Action Against Hunger in north and south Mogadishu, where the children receive intensive treatment and immunisation.

To add to this dramatic situation, cholera, an endemic disease, usually occurs from December to May and affects several thousand people each year.

Action Against Hunger is preparing to launch an anti-cholera programme amongst the most vulnerable to avoid the spread of the epidemic." (ACF, 21 December 2001)

Gedo:

"There is little doubt that the health and overall welfare of the population of Gedo Region is already the worst in Somalia." (PSAU 20 September 2001, Southern Somalia)

« Dans les causes sous-jacentes à la malnutrition, qui ne cessent d'empirer année après année, il faut souligner la quasi inexistence de soins de santé primaire dans la région, une couverture vaccinale des plus

faibles et un très faible approvisionnement en eau et en structures sanitaires ; éléments favorisant tous le développement des maladies. Sur Luuq, des cas de choléra viennent ainsi d'être déclarés, rendant la situation encore plus précaire. Les équipes d'Action contre la Faim assistent le personnel de l'hôpital de Luuq -seule structure médicale existante-, notamment au niveau de l'approvisionnement en eau, afin de pouvoir endiguer l'épidémie au plus vite." (ACF 26 July 2001)

Water and sanitation

Most IDPs have no access to safe drinking water and sanitation facilities (2003)

- Less than 25% Somalis have access to drinking water and 48.5% to sanitation
- IDPs have often to pay to use very basic latrine on the land they have settled, in addition to paying rent
- 43% of IDPs in camps in Kismayo and Burao have no access to sanitation facilities
- IDP camps in Kismayo and Burao are littered with human waste because latrines have collapsed
- IDPs in Wajid district and an average 2-4 litres of water per day while the minimum recommended is 15 litres and women spent most of their time fetching water and collecting firewood leaving little time for breastfeeding
- In Boqolka IDP camp latrines built by UNICEF were closed to IDPs by 'landowners' on the argument that IDPs did not pay their fee
- In Hargeisa price of water was three times higher for IDPs than residents
- Some IDPs walk up to one hour to access the closest well
- Construction of latrines along the Juba River was disrupted by looting and insecurity
- In Southern Somalia most wells are unsuitable for drinking purposes, saline and most IDPs drink from the river contaminated by organic matters and waste because they cannot afford to buy water
- Out of 175 wells in Bay and Bakool, at least 101 have been voluntarily destroyed beyond repair during war

"Following an 11 day visit to the country in September, The United Nations-appointed independent expert on Human Rights for Somalia Dr Ghanim Alnajjar called for urgent action to address the plight of IDPs in Somalia from the international community, local authorities and civil society groups lamenting that the camps have absolutely no basic services such as water, health facilities or schools and IDPs have to pay to use very basic toilets on the land on which they have settled and in addition, are also charged rent." (OCHA, 31 October 2003, p.8)

"Sanitation in IDP settlements is a problem. In Kismayo and Burao, human waste has been observed littered in the camps. Survey findings show more than 43% of the population without access to sanitation facilities in the various areas surveyed." (FSAU, 17 December 2003)

"The biggest reason for cholera outbreaks being endemic and recurrent now is the lack of safe drinking water and sanitation, with less than 25% of Somalis having access to potable water and 48.5% to sanitation (taking population groups and regions into account). The risk of acquiring water-borne diseases like dysentery, cholera, diarrhoea and Typhoid Fever are increasingly high as a result." (MSF, 9 December 2002)

"Only 31% of the population have access to safe drinking water, with an important variation between urban areas (46%) and rural areas with (28%). Only 43 % of the population have access to adequate sanitation disposal, 39 % in rural areas and 69 % in urban areas." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p.19)

"The expert visited the Boqolka Bush camp for IDPs on 30 August. The conditions were extremely poor, perhaps even to a degree unfit for human habitation, with inadequate or no access to water and sanitation facilities, shelter, education or protection from criminal activity. IDPs lived in dwellings of 2 metres by 2 metres for which rents were charged; toilets built by UNICEF were locked by the landowner, reportedly because of the inability of tenants to pay user fees." (UNCHR, 31 December 2002, p.15)

Burao

"The population estimate for the three IDP camps [Burao] was 6400 people (1600 families of four) comprised mainly of women and children; [...]

An average of 2.0-4.7 litres of water was available per person per day (minimum recommendation of 15 litres); attributed to long distances to and capacity of water points and lack of storage containers. Sanitation and hygiene practices were generally poor, leading to high prevalence of diarrhoea. Caregivers spent a significant portion of the day fetching water, food, income and firewood, leaving little quality time for breastfeeding and child care. Reduced feeding frequency of younger children was manifested in the high level of wasting in the 6-23 month age group." (FSAU, 20 February 2004)

Hargelsa:

"In addition, the price of water [in the eight returnee/IDP settlement areas] was more than triple the price in areas where residents are settled, the incidence of disease was high and childcare was inadequate." (ACC/SCN 41, April 2004)

Kismaayo:

"The IDP camps of Kismaayo are crowded, and most shelters are rudimentary structures made of scavenged materials. They lack adequate sanitary facilities, and the incidence of communicable diseases appears to be high, although conditions vary between camps. Many latrines have collapsed or are simply full, and have been abandoned. In some instances, communal areas outside of the camps are used as informal latrines. The domestic use of contaminated water is a major contributor to poor nutritional status. For groups along the Juba Valley unable to purchase clean water, the river provides for their needs. This greatly increases the risk of water-borne disease." (ODI, 31 December 2003, p.13)

"Access to adequate and clean water is very limited. IDPs use water from shallow and unprotected wells contaminated with organic matters. Some of the camps are far from the water points. For example, there is one hour walking distance between Nuh Mohamud camp and the nearest well. Water shortage in the IDP camps is acute during the dry seasons when the level in the wells falls down.

In terms of sanitation, congestion of the camps along with lack of latrines and proper waste disposal system results in poor sanitation condition in the camps. Sanitary activities in the area are constrained by insecurity. Latrines built in villages along the Juba River by UNICEF have already been destroyed and the concrete slabs were looted. Piles of garbage and human wastes disposed everywhere in the camps, causes nuisance and poor sanitation." (UNCU, 30 July 2002, pp26-27)

Jilib:

"IDPs access to safe drinking water is very limited. The town's only drilled borehole is not functioning. There are 6 shallow wells, but they yield saline water, which is not suitable for drinking purpose. Both the IDPs and the local people use water drawn from the river for their drinking purposes, but the river is contaminated with organic matters washed out from the wastes thrown into the river by the local residents.

The general sanitation condition of Jilib is poor. The IDPs have no toilets. They use the empty rooms of the abandoned houses for defecation in open." (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p.31)

Jalalqsi:

"These IDPs have no access to adequate and clean drinking water. Water from wells is sold at So Sh 200 to 500 and prices are not affordable to the IDPs. Because of their economic difficulties, the IDPs collect water from the river as their drinking water. However, this water is contaminated and is not fit for human consumption." (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p.53)

Mogadishu:

"Where Mogadishu residents used to have clean running water at the turn of a shiny brass tap, they must now depend on hand-dug wells. Dirty water, hauled up from about 30 metres underground, sells at Somali shillings 2,000 (US \$0.20) per drum. People and animals use the same water supply. Among the devastated buildings, in the maze of broken streets, women with jerry cans join the goats and camels, and the queues of donkey carts. The wells are owned – but not maintained – by individuals. Aid agencies occasionally provided chlorine to treat the drinking water, but no one really monitored its use or distribution, health workers said.

Once the water system had collapsed, many people dug their own wells. The wells that used to provide the city with running water are now in the hands of militia. One set of wells is on the Afgoi road between Mogadishu and Afgoi town; the other to the north of the city, between Mogadishu and Balad. The wells are in total disrepair.

So far, efforts by the new interim government to start tackling the 10 year-old waste dump – once a beautiful coastal capital – have barely touched the tip. Mogadishu has lacked government structures and services for almost a decade. 'You can't clean up 10 years of piled-up rubbish without a complete campaign, with the right equipment,' said one Mogadishu resident. Sanitation workers and equipment are available, but have yet to be mobilised, signed up and funded. Since establishing itself in October, the new government is struggling with other priorities: funding, peace and reliable personnel. And in a city where money, militia and warlord-run ruffians have ruled since 1991, even rubbish is 'owned', explained the resident. Gangs expect nothing less than a cut from sanitation projects." (IRIN-CEA 20 December 2000)

"As families flee conflict areas, the few safe water sources that do exist are being abandoned or destroyed. Wells, generators, pumps, and pipes have been destroyed or intentionally contaminated by warring factions. Out of 175 wells in Bay and Bakool, at least 101 have been destroyed beyond repair. " (US Fund for UNICEF 6 September 2000, "Water and sanitation")

"In largely arid Somalia, access to water is limited for human and animal consumption. Livestock, Somalia's main export, is the mainstay of the economy and is dependent upon rainfall for adequate pastures and upon ground water for watering. People require daily access to safe sources of water. In most areas however, community access to any water source is restricted, especially in the dry seasons, and access to safe water (typically from ground water sources) is available for only about 30 percent of the population, mostly in urban areas.

Poor access leads to higher prices (stretching poorer incomes to the limit) and greater distances in water collection (increasing the workload of women and girls). In turn, diarrhoeal diseases, cholera epidemics, and malnutrition of children are all directly or indirectly caused by limited access to safe water and poor personal and environmental hygiene practices.

Ground water constitutes the principal source of potable water in most areas of Somalia. Studies show that there is sufficient quantity of good quality ground water to cover the domestic needs of the whole population of Somalia. Though they are seasonal, rainwater catchments are a major water source. These reservoirs include: ware, an excavated reservoir, sometimes lined with plastic sheets, common in the south; bally, a depression in the ground which may be natural or artificial; maxiid, a hand-dug vertical pit; and berked, a cemented underground catchment mostly found in the central and northern regions." (UN November 1999, p.30)

Shelter and non-food items

Most IDPs live in shacks in slums or in public buildings (2003)

- As police tried to move IDPs out of a secondary school to a new site in Burco (Somaliland), a riot broke out in September 2003
- IDPs are sheltered with plastic sheeting, pieces of cloth and cardboard, and this inadequate housing predisposes IDPs to many diseases
- IDPs in Kismayo live under shacks which provide no protection against rain, wind and sun
- Displaced in Mogadishu congregate in make-shift camps
- Others live in abandoned government buildings, schools and factories
- Huts are made of scavenged paper, sticks, sacks and cloth
- Floods wash away IDP shacks together with mountains of trash

"A riot took place in Burco, "Somaliland", on 1 September. The incident occurred when the police tried to move a number of internally displaced persons from the secondary school to a new site in the town. The move had apparently been agreed to, and the reason for the clash is not yet clear. One internally displaced person was killed and a police officer was injured. The school, the only secondary school in the region, was badly damaged by fire during the incident." (UNSC, 13 October 2003)

"In most instances, the settlement areas are unplanned, unsanitary and overcrowded with minimal availability of basic amenities. Housing generally consists of simple structures made of nondurable materials like plastic sheeting, pieces of cloth, cardboard and cartons that fail to provide adequate *shelter*, a factor that predisposes families to a range of communicable diseases, including respiratory tract infections." (FSAU, 17 December 2003)

"IDPs in Kismayo live in the shelled houses and government offices or in huts made of sticks, pieces of plastics, and clothes that give no protection against rain water, wind and sun." (UNCU, 30 July 2002, pp26-27)

In Mogadishu, "an overwhelmingly poor but tenacious population has made homes amongst the shell-shattered houses and offices, or congregates in makeshift camps for the internally displaced. International development aid has effectively been suspended, and those displaced by war and hardship are left to a precarious hand-to-mouth existence." (IRIN-CEA 27 April 1999)

"Heavy rains in early July [2000] caused flash floods in Mogadishu, damaging buildings and washing away several hundred of the shanty structures in the displaced camps in the south of the city. The floods brought a tide of sewage through the shanty towns, raising concerns about the potential for the spread of disease." (IRIN 7 July 2000 in UN Sub-Commission on Nutrition 25 July 2000, p. 31)

"The floods [of late 1997 and early 1998] particularly harmed populations already displaced by the country's warfare. Heavy rains washed away makeshift huts housing displaced families in Mogadishu. Other displaced families in the capital continued to live in abandoned government buildings, schools, factories, and houses left empty by the country's decade of instability." (USCR 1999, p. 88)

"Makeshift camps of displaced Somalis and refugees (primarily originating from Ethiopia in the 1970s and 1980s) have mushroomed in the city since the fall of Siad Barre's government in 1991. Most of the dome-

shaped huts are made from paper, sticks, sacks and cloth scavenged from the growing mountains of rubbish, with barriers of scrap metal delineating different sections of the camps. Some camps receive rudimentary help from humanitarian agencies or Islamic organizations, but the vast majority of internally displaced people must rely on their own survival skills." (IRIN-CEA 27 April 1999)

ACCESS TO EDUCATION

General

Minimal access to education for the Somali population (2003)

- While only one child out of five receives basic education, the situation for IDPs is much worse
- Less than 40% of teachers are trained and many have not completed primary education
- Neither education authorities nor community education committees can afford to remunerate teachers
- Primary enrolment increased 29% from 2001 to 2002
- In 2002 there was 30% more teachers than in 2001
- Adult literacy rate for Somalia's urban population is estimated at 35% compared to only 10% for rural and nomadic populations
- Somalia's educational indicators rank it amongst the lowest in the world with 17,1% adult literacy and 13,6% primary school enrolment
- Koranic school sustained by parental and community support have functioned throughout the conflict
- Informal education through radio or satellite school facilities would be a way to reach displaced and nomadic populations
- 90% of school facilities were destroyed by war and some school buildings were occupied by IDPs

"One Somali child out of every five receives basic education. Even among these, girls are more disadvantaged. Only one Somali adult out of every six is literate and women are poorly represented among the literate adults. Less than 40 out of every hundred teachers has gone through pre-service training. Teachers have only recently started to receive a one-time standardised in-service training, and while no new teachers have completed pre-service training over the last 12 years, the number of untrained teachers grows every year. Only 13 out of every hundred teachers are women. Neither education authorities nor community education committees are able to support adequate education services such as the remuneration of teachers. [...] If these statistics look ominous for the population in general, the situation is much worse for the vulnerable groups such as refugees, returnees, IDPs, minorities and also for nomadic groups that constitute about half the population, as well as and the new urban poor." (UN, 18 November 2003, p.22)

"Equally important to the eventual survival, rehabilitation and development of the Somali state is education. Only one in six Somali children currently receive formal primary school education in any form, the current efforts of the UN and NGOs notwithstanding. In addition, an entire generation of young people has been deprived of their right to education over the past decade or more, with the result that the achievement of high rates of adult literacy in the 1970s and 1980s are a distant memory." (UN, 3 June 2003, p.8)

« According to field data, the number of primary schools in Somalia increased by 29%, from 859 in the academic year 2000/2001 to 1,105 in 2001/2002. Moreover, Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER) witnessed an upward trend from 13% (11% for girls and 15% for boys in 2000/1) to 17% (14% for girls and 19% for boys) in 2001/2. There was also a 30% increase in the number of teachers. Such encouraging developments served to underline the importance of sustained, coherent and community-focused promotion of formal and non-formal education, in particular targeting girls." (UN, November 2002, p.5)

"For example the adult literacy rate for Somalia's urban population is estimated at 35% whereas the rate for rural and nomadic populations is only 10%. Similarly while 50% of the urban population have direct access to health services, the rate for the rural population is only 15%. Female adult literacy is estimated to be only 52% of the male rate, and the female primary school enrolment ratio similarly only 53% of the male rate. Few data are available for variation in development across Somalia's regions, but it is clear that levels of development remain vulnerable to concentrations of fighting and instability which continue to cause localised crises of food security, health and displacement." (UN. 27 September 2002, pp.9-10)

"On average, only about one in ten children of primary school age are enrolled, and only two thirds of them are boys. Of the youth aged 14-18 years, almost all are out of school and without access to education or other basic services. The few operational primary schools function mainly through community and parental support. All secondary education remains confined to highly urbanised areas.

The quality of education on offer is generally very poor. About 40 percent of all teachers are unqualified; many have not completed their own primary education. The absence of a central educational authority has led to a lack of consistency in educational standards, including acceptable curricula and textbooks. Much of the pre-war school infrastructure has been destroyed. Poor families, communities, and local authorities have insufficient funds to meet even the very basic expenses related to teachers' salaries and effective supervision. The absence of any learner assessment or certification system has rendered the appraisal of the quality of education impossible.

Koranic schools have continued to operate throughout the conflict, with the support of parents and communities. These schools do not offer opportunities for secular education and are primarily religious institutions imparting knowledge of the Koran. Pilot projects have been initiated for the inclusion of some elements of basic education in the daily teaching of selected Koranic schools and the results are awaited.

Private language schools are mushrooming in most towns and some rural communities teach informally, borrowing curricula and textbooks from other countries. Some language and vocational education schools are also integrating some primary subjects on an ad-hoc basis. There is, however, a near-total lack of early childhood education, alternate forms of primary education, and adult informal education in Somalia. The potential of reaching excluded communities, such as by way of satellite schools, informal education centres, and radio, is as yet untapped." (UN November 1999, p.32)

"The civil war dealt another devastating blow to the formal education system, which completely collapsed in 1990. Many teachers and pupils were displaced and forced to seek security in their clan areas or flee to refugee camps abroad. . . . The aftermath showed that about 90% of school buildings in the country were either completely or partially destroyed. In addition, many were occupied by internally displaced persons. Almost all educational materials and equipment were looted." (UNDP 1999, Chapter 3, "History of education in Somalia")

IDPs' access to education is determined by their ability to pay for private services (2003)

- There is no free education thus IDPs cannot afford to send their children to schools as Quranic schools cost up to SShs10,000 and non-religious ones cost up to SShs40,000 monthly
- Women are particularly disadvantaged in access to education as they have to remain home to help their mothers who are often away to undertake small-business
- Low school attendance of IDP children due to illness
- IDP parents often prefer to send their children to get some income rather than to school
- Most IDP children are rejected from schools due to lack of room and local children given priority

"There is a common and strong desire for education amongst IDPs and other vulnerable groups in Kismaayo (as elsewhere in Somalia). In Kismaayo, where there is no free primary or secondary education, access is determined by the ability to pay for private facilities (Quranic schools cost up to SShs10,000 a month per child, and non-religious schools SShs20,000–40,000/month/child). For minority groups, including many in the camps, the ability to pay is partly determined by socio-ethnic status." (ODI, 31 December 2003, p.13)

"Hardship – violation of rights – is frequently experienced by children, particularly their right to education as either access to education is constrained (schools in settlements are not completely rehabilitated or built or they are some distance from the settlements.) In this respect girls are particularly disadvantaged by the need expressed that they remain home to help since the mother must be out of the home to undertake small-scale business." (UNICEF, 30 October 2003)

"Even Koranic schools that have been set up in some camps, for example in Jenyo, Hanshi, and Aideytoi IDP camps [Kismayo region], the attendance of IDPs children is very low. This is due to the fact that IDPs children are sick most of the time. They cannot regularly attend the schools. More over IDP parents prefer to send their children to generate some income at the expense of their physical and social well being." (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p.27)

"Almost all the IDPs (in Bu'ale) children are illiterate and they have no access to education. There is only one primary education that receives UNICEF and World Vision support. However, because of the limited size of classrooms and lack of enough education facilities, there is no room for the IDP children. First priorities are given to children from local communities. There are several koranic schools and two private schools. However, because of economic constraints, very few IDPs children attend these schools. Instead of education, the IDP parents prefer to send their children to generate some income." (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p.30)

School enrolment status in Hargeisa: the lowest among IDPs populations due to begging and discrimination (June 2002)

- On average only 13,8% of the Somali population receives primary education
- 74% of boys age 10 to 14 are enrolled in school compared to only 46% of girls
- Children of households from southern Somalia more likely to be working rather than at school
- Low enrolment among southern Somali IDPs explained by discrimination of minority clans and use of their children to beg

"Overall primary school enrolment is 13.8%, with enrolment rates of girls being slightly lower at 12.1%." (UNICEF, 11 February 2002)

Interagency assesement conducted in 8 areas around Hargeisa (Somaliland) in returnee and IDP settlements (June 2002). The second largest settlement, Daami hosts about 10,000 people, of whom 35% are displaced from Southern Somalia

"-Boys and girls are enrolled in schools at similar rates until age 10. Over age 10, girls' enrollment plateaus at below 60% before dropping off, while boys' enrollment climbs to 80% at age 13. For both sexes, a majority of those enrolled in school are enrolled in primary schools by age 10.

- Boys age 10 to 14 are enrolled in school at an aggregate rate of 74%, while girls in that age range are enrolled at an aggregate rate of 46%.

[...]

- Southern Somalis and non-Somali Ethiopians are enrolled in school at lower rates than Somalilanders, more so for girls than for boys.
- Children in households from Southern Somalia and Ethiopia (both Somali and non-Somali) are more likely to be working to bring income into the household than households originally from Somaliland." (Clark, June 2002, p.7)

"Ayaha and Daami are near the bottom for boys' and girls' enrollment across the board." (Clark, June 2002, 43)

"The Daami focus groups addressed this issue, saying that some of the difference was due to ostracization of minority communities and that Southern Somali and Oromo families use their children to beg and they are therefore not in school." (Clark, June 2002, 44)

"In Daami, social exclusion of minority groups was reported as another major reason that Returnee Settlement Area Assessment, June 2002 children were not in school." (Clark, June 2002, p.46)

"Daami's adult population is significantly less educated than any of the others" (Clark, June 2002, p.47)

ISSUES OF SELF-RELIANCE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

Self-reliance

IDPs' survival strategies eroded by years of protracted conflict and drought (2003)

- Internal displacement and the collapse of the industry and service sectors has led to 60% unemployment rates which sustains large number of militias
- Women are often the main income-earner through the sale of khat (amphetamine) or charcoal
- War and deterioration of livelihoods forced thousands of Somalis to migrate to main towns
- Several surveys found that the majority of IDPs have low-skill, low-income and labour intensive jobs as porters, domestic workers and casual labourers
- There was a significantly higher percentage of children from IDP families working compared to the general population
- Paradoxically, some coping mechanisms like clearing land for agriculture, producing charcoal, overgrazing herds on shrinking pastureland and selling timber for construction are all eroding long-term coping mechanisms
- Post-war harvests total less than 40% of pre-war levels
- Most IDPs receive hardly any assistance, have no economic safety net as they do not benefit from the clan system neither from remittances
- Seasonal migration, adoption into another clan area and exogamy are traditional survival strategies
- Changes in consumption and intake of famine foods, sacrificing short-term needs for long-term life-investment
- Mutual trust and reciprocity between kin have been considerably eroded by protracted droughts and conflicts

"This deterioration of traditional livelihoods has forced thousands of Somalis to migrate to urban areas -- such as Mogadishu, Bosasso, Galkayo and Hargiesa -- as they can no longer meet the minimal requirements for life in their home communities. [...] Nearly 60% of the urban population aged 15 to 64 are unemployed. [...] Unemployment among youth, who were aged 10-30 and have come of age since the time of complete state collapse, is a particularly disturbing problem. This generation has little to no formal education, few marketable skills, and in many cases has been drawn into militia activities and/or criminality. As such, they pose a serious challenge to peace and security as well as the economic and social development of Somalia." (UN, 18 November 2003, p.10)

"In the displacement camp sample, 56% of the adults and 84% of the children reported poverty as the overriding problem of being disadvantaged, while 50% of the children reported feeling excluded from society. This corresponds with UNCU\UN-OCHA's 2002 findings that IDPs constitute nearly half of all Somalis living in a state of chronic humanitarian need.

[...]

This is supported by UNCU\UN-OCHA, which found that the majority of IDPs and returnees are porters, domestic workers or casual labourers. They reported that this type of employment actually perpetuates their poverty, as it is "labour intensive, low-skill and low-income" employment. As employment is so difficult to secure, there is often a great deal of competition between urban residents and the displaced population.

[...]

Children and adults living in displacement 'camps' reported a significantly greater dependence upon the income of children for their family upkeep. This suggests that a higher number of children living in the camps are working." (UNICEF, 10 December 2003, pp.19,22,25)

"IDPs generally largely remain marginalized. Most of the families have an average of 5-7 persons and in many of these, women are usually the income-earners through, for instance, petty businesses like the sale of *khat* (an amphetamine leaf akin to the coca leaf of South Africa widely chewed in Somalia) or charcoal. Some men could be employed as artisans or labourers in the relatively booming construction business. Some have small kiosks where they sell items." (UNICEF, 30 October 2003)

"It is estimated that there are about 350,000 internally displaced persons throughout Somalia with an estimated 150,000 IDPs in Mogadishu alone. They receive little or no assistance and most survive through irregular and cheap labour. Incomes barely cover basic food needs. Most cannot access clan support systems and do not have the benefit of receiving remittances. Moreover, they lack any form of protection and are subject to an array of human rights violations." (UN, November 2002, p.92)

"For their survival, the IDPs generate their income from marginal jobs. They work as farm attendants or domestic servants. Others collect firewood or deliver water. Yet women do not get equal treatment as men, though they perform the same job as men. Women's wages do not exceed 5000 So Sh per day. Reports also indicate that some women work only for some subsistence food, and are economically exploited. They have no bargaining power to demand an increase of wages to improve their livelihoods. Harsh living conditions and their need to survive forces them to accept any wage and any work conditions, even if it exposes them to economic exploitation.

In addition to poor wages, inflation and steady increase of the prices of food jeopardizes the purchasing power of IDPs. For example, the price of one KG of maize, the main diet of IDPs had increased from So.sh 2000 to 6000 between May and July 2001. The IDPs can not therefore afford to buy the quantity of food they require. Most of the IDPs eat once in 24 hours a day." (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p.35)

"Individuals and communities are not passive in the face of crisis but employ their intimate knowledge of the environment, or political and social relations to mitigate against disaster. Rural households in Somalia employ a range of strategies to cope and survive in adverse circumstances. These can include the diversification of livelihood strategies through seasonal migration for employment, changes to dietary intake, or the consumption of famine foods. Often, short-term needs are sacrificed to preserve a 'way of life'. In the absence of any formal welfare system in Somalia, resource transfers and wealth redistribution within social networks play a crucial role in the maintenance of livelihoods. Anecdotal evidence suggests that in hard times resources from their informal networks can account for 25-60% of the household economy.

[...]

Migration is an integral part of people's way of life in Somalia and a critical coping strategy in a risk-prone environment. Migration, resettlement through adoption into another clan (*sheegata*), and exogamous marriage mean that most Somali families have relatives spread among clans and over a large geographic area. These personal and familial networks can be drawn on in times of conflict or drought. Mobility as a coping strategy of pastoralists during drought, however, is restricted during conflict.

[...]

Clan affiliation and identity with a place of residence form a system for the sharing and co-operative control of resources at the level of the household, compound, community and clan. [...] [T]raditional obligations of assistance, in the form of food, shelter, and water [...]. Other forms of assistance include the loan of farmland (*hoorsi*) or a milking animal (*irmaansi*), the restocking of livestock, and the giving of credit (*amaa*). Helping those most in need is also integral to the religious and social obligations of Islam, institutionalised in the giving of *zakat* and *sadaqa*.

[...]

When widespread conflict and drought are combined, as witnessed in the early 1990s, the impact can be devastating. Production systems and household and community assets, such as food stores and livestock, were destroyed or looted and the option of migration was constrained by warring militia. As livelihood options were reduced and trust within and between clans was eroded, the geographical spread of the resource networks contracted, and families retreated to the reassuring safety of the community." (UNDP Somalia 2001, p.69)

"Prior to the war it was estimated that over 70% of the population lived in the rural areas and that over 75% of the population drew their livelihoods from pastoralism and agriculture, 16% from the service sector and 8.4% from the industry [...]. There are currently no estimates of levels of income or employment for various sectors [...]. The rural sector continues to provide the main source of employment of people, but due to massive internal and external displacement and the collapse of industry and public services a high percentage of the population in both rural and urban areas is unemployed or underemployed. Lack of employment opportunities is one factor sustaining the large numbers of militia, particularly in the urban areas of southern Somalia." (UNDP Somalia, 2001, p.70)

"Ironically, some efforts to earn a living – clearing land for agriculture, producing charcoal, overgrazing herds on shrinking pastureland, selling timber for construction – contribute to the problem, are jeopardizing Somali's ability to eke out a living from the land in the future.

'Somalia is caught in a vicious cycle where poverty and desertification are intertwined,' said Randolph Kent, UNDP Resident Representative. 'You can't address one problem without addressing the other.'" (UNDP 18 June 2001)

Self-reliance in the Northwest: Somaliland (2003)

- IDPs from the South are discriminated upon and associated with the crimes of the 'southern' Barre regime by Somaliland authorities
- IDPs in Somaliland, unlike returnees have no social networks or family support to fall back on
- The majority of IDPs are agro pastoralists or farmers who lack the skills to generate income in urban settings
- Most IDPs work as porters, domestic workers and casual laborers
- Women are the main bread winners but they receive lower wages than men
- Although only a few IDPs benefited from remittances, the closure of remittance companies after September 11 adversely affected IDPs as purchasing power and job opportunities in dramatically decreased
- 50% of IDPs in Hargeisa are destitute compared to 7% of urban residents (2002)
- In Hargeisa competition for jobs on the informal market between IDPs and local residents is so fierce that the latter have organized to prevent IDPs from getting jobs
- At least 80% IDPs in the South live out of begging compared to 9% in Hargeisa
- In the Haryan and Ajjuran camps only 9% IDPs generate income from service and market-oriented jobs
- IDPs from Bay and Bakool who took refuge in Burao and Yirowe rely 93% on begging to survive because they lack merchant and pastoral skills to integrate in the informal economy
- As IDPs in Burao live on purchased food and they lack income, 60% survive through borrowing money

"The difference between the internally displaced persons and returnees is a very fundamental issue that needs to be clearly understood. *Returnees are returning to their former hometowns and cities and are therefore able to look towards their clan members or relatives for assistance and guidance. Where as the IDP's have travelled a long distance from their home cities and are unable to call on any clan member or relative for assistance. Their voices are not heard because they have no representatives in the parliament, ministries and other government institutions; thus there are no influential members who, they can turn to in their distress.*

[...]

"Unfortunately the IDP's are unable to access any of these employment or businesses opportunities, unlike the returnees who are able to access small income generating loans from UNHCR and a few INGO's and are able to look towards their clan elders for support and assistance.

[...]

Integration is impossible stated the community of the IDP camps, as we have two very distinctive characteristics that cannot be overlooked: a) distinctive face features and b) different dialogue from the Somalilanders, which will not assist them to integrate.

They are also associated with the previous crimes that have been alleged to have taken place in Somaliland." (Ibrahim F., 15 August 2002, p.2;4-5)

"Somaliland's estimated unemployment rate in mid-2001, however, exceeded 80 percent." (USCR, December 2001, p.7)

"The majority of IDPs have been living in poor shelter in camps or in destroyed houses as in Mogadishu for about 10 year. They have limited access to food, water, health and sanitation facilities. This coupled with the fact that most IDPs are farmers and agropastoral groups who lack the right skills to generate income in the main urban centers. Therefore, the majority of IDPs are working as porters, domestic workers and casual labourers. Women remain to be the breadwinners despite the poor working conditions, which affects their health conditions and their caring capacities.

[...]

While aggregate economic indicators identify Somalia as one of the poorest nations, analysis of the informal economy depicts remarkably different picture. In particular, the role of remittances in sustaining household incomes illustrates an important dynamic of informal economy upon which a significant number of Somali families depend. Social networks and kinship support represent another dynamic in the household economy that has not yet been quantified by modern economic methods.

The situation of IDPs in Somalia varies significantly between the different regions of the country. In the northeast (Puntland) and northwest (Somaliland) where some degree of stability and some economic development took place in the last five years, IDPs in Hargeisa and Basso are essentially dependent on remittances in sustaining their livelihood. Thus the study of IDPs in the northeast and northwest provides special attention to the economic livelihood particularly the role of remittances in household income and hence the livelihood of IDPs. It is worth noting that this important source of livelihood has been subjected to a major shock such as the US sanction, after the 11th of September 2001, on ALBARAKAT Company, the main Remittances Company in the country. That said, the impact of ALBARAKAT closure on livelihood of IDPs remains outside the focus of this study.

In south and central Somalia where intermittent insecurity prevails such as Gedo, Lower and Middle Jubas and Mogadishu, IDPs have limited access to the informal economy. Their main benefit from the market is in the form of service provision such as porters and casual labour. The IDPs are dependent on social network support for their livelihood, besides the limited assistance from the international community in some regions e.g. Gedo." (UNCU, 30 July 2002, pp1;2)

Hargeisa:

"Not surprisingly there is a stark difference between urban residents and the IDPs and returnees living in camps on the outskirts of Hargeisa. While only 7 percent of urban residents can be categorized as destitute, as many as 50 percent of the Returnees and IDPs in the camps belong to this category.

[...]

There are no large-scale labor market surveys of the Hargeisa municipality. However, according to our survey the majority of urban residents (a total of 61percent) are involved in largely informal market and service oriented economic activities. A similar proportion (67percent) of returnees and IDP households earn the majority of their income from market and service oriented work mostly in petty trade and unskilled labor including work in construction and as porters. This implies a keen competition between resident and returnee/IDP in these sectors. For example, urban residents working in the construction sector have organized informal labor unions to keep out displaced persons, particular from southern clans, from competing in the construction sector. Both IDP and returnees complain bitterly of the lack of job opportunities, and the importance of clan and familial contacts in securing gainful employment.

The key distinction between resident and returnee/IDP populations is that the 23 percent of urban households enjoy access to remittances from overseas as a major source of income. In addition, while few households in Hargeisa proper derive income from begging, as many as 9 percent of the displaced – primarily among the Ajjuran of Dima camp—live almost exclusively by begging. Indeed, taking into account the IDPs from the south alone, the percentage of households whose income includes begging is over 80percent.

[...]

The graph below, demonstrates that in terms of sub-clan categories the dominant Isaak sub-clans in Hargeisa receive remittance on a largely even basis. No particular sub-clan has a monopoly of remittance inflows. Consequently it is safe to assume that who benefits from them is dependent on a previous asset base that is contingent on the fortunes of particular households, rather than a particular sub-clan." (UNCU, 30 July 200, pp.8-9;11)

"- 73% of men work to bring income into their households, while only 32% of women work to bring income into their households.

- The most common jobs are market activities and casual employment.

- Men have received vocational training at four times the rate that women have. 16% of adults have been through vocational training." (Clark, June 2002, p.7)

"In Daami, Sheikh Nur, and Stadium the women also work as household servants. On the other hand, men tend to work as construction laborers, charcoal producers, livestock brokers, and porters. Day laborer incomes were reported as between US\$1 and US\$2 per day. Some men in Sinai and Stadium generate income through donkey cart businesses, while it is worth noting that only the men in Stadium were identified as bringing in income through work as soldiers, waiters, or latrine diggers. Only in Ayaha, Daami and Mohamed Mooge were men identified as working in the livestock brokerage business.

Daami was the only area where notably different skills and trades were relied on for generating income. Immigrant and Southern Somali men work as farm laborers, livestock brokers, and construction laborers while the women beg with their children. In contrast, the minority groups rely on their traditional skills to generate income. The men work as barbers, blacksmiths, shoemakers, and rubbish collectors while the women earn money through practicing female circumcision and producing traditional items such as water pots, wedding pots, brooms, and stoves." (Clark, June 2002, p.50)

"Majority of the population in the resettlement camps falls within the very poor and poor wealth groups. The urban food economy group relies on purchases as a source of food or may have relatives in the rural areas that send them gifts in form of cereals, milk or meat. Other sources of income and food for this group include employment in construction ventures or large/small scale trade, and gifts and remittances from relatives.

The food security situation of the population in the resettlement camps of Hargeisa is greatly affected by issues that either increase the cost of foods or reduce income accessibility. Of importance in the past one year has been the cessation of construction activities in Hargeisa town, devaluation of the Somaliland shilling and impact of the livestock ban imposed by the Gulf countries in September 2000. This led to

reduction in foreign income inflow culminating into decreased employment opportunities and low business activities. The resettled population in Hargeisa camps, just like any poor sections of the town have been greatly affected by these mentioned factors and their food security position compromised." (UNICEF/MoH&L/FSAU, September 2001, p.7)

Togdheer region:

"Casual employment as porters, cleaners in restaurants, construction related activities and house-helpers form a main source of income for this population. All these activities are not sustainable and pay a relatively low wage rate. Considering that purchases are the main food source, the limited and unsustainable income available to these populations places them in a vulnerable food security situation. Additionally, borrowing (60%) and begging (9.4%) were the main coping strategies while remittances were reported by only 7.5%." (FSAU, 19 November 2003)

"The socio-economic picture for IDPs from the south residing in Haryan (Burao) and Ajjuran (Yirowe) camps is far worse. In the absence of a formal administrative and legal framework, the labor market in Burao-Yirowe (as elsewhere) is regulated by clan and sub-clan networks. As a result, IDPs from Bay and Bakool, in this instance, find it very difficult to find gainful employment in the service, market or trade activities. Only 9 percent of households in Haryan and Ajjuran camps generate income from service and market oriented jobs, and there are no families that are engaged in trade dominated by the Isaak sub-clans of Haber Younis and Haber Jaalo. The fact that they are not pastoralists or merchants from the south has made it difficult for most to integrate into the local informal economy. They are separated from Yirowe residents and all its commercial activity. As a consequence southern IDPs rely on their traditional survival mechanism, begging. As many as 93 percent of households depend exclusively on the women and children of the household begging for either money or cooked food to sustain them. Nor do any families among the southern IDPs receive financial assistance from relatives living and/or working abroad." (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p15)

Self-reliance in the Northeast: Puntland (2003)

- Most IDPs in Bosasso live off purchased food and the loss of jobs and reduction in income have critical consequences for their food security
- 77% of Bosasso's 28,000 IDPs work as unskilled and semi-skilled laborers
- 17% of IDP households rely on market activities as major source of income and only 4% have the capital and networks to enter the more lucrative informal trade
- Only 2% of IDP receive remittances compared with 38% of urban residents
- Bosasso IDPs earn about US\$1 daily which represents 50% higher wage than for Hargeisa IDPs
- IDPs chances to find seasonal work in the Gulf was restricted by Bosasso port security regulations

"The poor urban groups and IDPs in Bosasso continue to be in a vulnerable state. These populations rely heavily on casual employment as a source of livelihood and therefore purchase most of their household food requirements. The closure of the Bosasso sea port in July 2003 due to the seasonal tides contributed to a reduction in job opportunities, consequently reducing the income available to these populations. Households (consisting averagely of 7 members) currently have access to a lower income of US\$1.1 – 2.3 per day than in 1998 when it was US\$ 2.5 – 3.1 per day. Over the recent months, cereal prices have been on the increase and are currently about Ssom 5,000 per kg of rice from the 'normal' Ssom 3,500-4,000." (FSAU, 12 August 2003)

"The majority (77percent) of Bosasso's estimated 28,000 IDPs work as. Although, IDPs serve as casual laborers, rarely finding regular work. However, given the fact that few of IDP households possess significant capital or other assets and they hail from marginalized clans and castes they have minimal

opportunity to enter the market or trade sectors. The Majerteen and other Harti sub-clans dominate the latter. In fact, only 17percent IDP households can count on market activities as their major source of income; while only 4percent have the capital or social networks to enter the more lucrative informal trade sector.

Remittances also play an important role in supplementing incomes and establishing a modicum of economic well being. However, while as many as 38percent of urban residents enjoy assistance from expatriate relatives, only 2percent of IDP households receive remittance on a regular basis. Consequently, in addition to their vulnerability stemming from ethnic and geographical marginalization, the lack of access to remittance compounds the relative poverty of residents living in IDP camps.

[...]

In comparison to Hargeisa, Bosasso residents enjoy a higher standard of living if we compare average daily incomes. While urban residents of Hargeisa earn, on average, about \$1 a day, Bosasso residents earn over \$4. Naturally, with respect to Bosasso, IDPs earnings are far lower. Most IDP households in Bosasso earn a daily wage of a little over a \$1, which is more than 50percent, more than most returnee/IDP families living in and around Hargeisa. However, for Bosasso's IDPs these earnings are seasonally dependent.

There is less economic activity in Bosasso's main port during the summer months and since most IDPs work in activities associated with port trade, the figures cited above reflect earnings during the more busy winter months. Many IDPs said that since job opportunities decrease greatly in the summer, they often migrate southward towards Nugal and Mudug regions of Puntland. However, the significant income earning opportunities for IDPs explains the fact the most cite shelter, health and food as priorities rather than job opportunities. Nevertheless, conditions for IDPs in Bosasso are the most severe in northern Somalia. The majority are economic migrants, many with hopes of continuing their migration to nearby oil-producing Gulf countries. However, in recent years local authorities have tightened regulations and security around Bosasso port restricting the chances of many IDPs from travelling to the Gulf. In Bosasso, the issues are largely related to urban planning. In contrast, as noted below, IDPs in Mergaga camp north of Gelkayo are victims of drought. As such, they require different kinds of interventions." (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p.20-1)

Livestock ban has led to major income deficits for pastoralists and IDPs (2000-2003)

- Livestock ban imposed by Gulf States since 2000 due to outbreaks of Rift Valley fever have hurt the economy of nomadic pastoralists representing 44% of the population
- The re-direction of trade inside Somalia and concentration of livestock has led to overgrazing and environmental depletion
- IDPs in Mogadishu and Bosasso hit by loss of trade-related employment.
- Printing of new currency leads to hyperinflation, devaluation and reduces purchasing power and labor opportunities placing IDPs at particular risk
- Livestock production is estimated to be the main source of livelihood for 70% of the population in Somalia
- Livestock ban imposed by Gulf countries since 2000 severely eroded purchasing power undermining food security in main livestock producing areas Puntland and Somaliland
- Somaliland is particularly hard-hit with shortfall in export earnings of US 2.4 million
- On alleged links with terrorist networks the US closed Somali remittance companies the single most powerful business generating the bulk of the national product Remittances are estimated to reach of to US\$ 1 billion yearly, while foreign assistance amounted to \$US 360 million in 2000
- Most IDPs must purchase their food therefore to have an income is determining in having access to food, however, but remittances only contribute between 0.3% to 14.3% to IDP's income, compared to 1.6% to 18% among the general population

Livestock ban imposed by Gulf countries since September 2000:

"Other factors have combined to threaten Somalia's traditional livelihoods. The prolonged and continuing ban -- in place since September 2000 -- on the import of Somali livestock by the Gulf states in response to outbreaks of Rift Valley fever in Saudi Arabia and Yemen has badly hurt nomadic pastoralists, who comprise roughly 44% or 2.7 million [...] of the population, and depend on the livestock trade as a vital source of income. Terms of trade for livestock have continued to drop against the value of dry food rations, placing greater stress on poorer pastoral households. While livestock continue to be exported today to alternative markets, their numbers have increased within Somalia since the ban. This overpopulation has left some rangelands in the north and central portions of the country overgrazed and fragile, adding still more pressure on pastoralist livelihoods. Riverine farmers, who at 400,000 [...] comprise about 6% of the population, have also suffered. Only a fraction of riverine land devoted to irrigated agriculture is under production, and rain fed farming has been hurt by insecurity and the displacement of many of Somalia's small farmers. Post war grain harvests have generally totalled less than 40% of pre-war levels." (UN, 18 November 2003, p.10)

"The economy of northern Somalia is significantly dependent on livestock production. It is estimated that livestock production contributes to 60% of the income of Northwest Somalia and 90% of the income of the Northeast. Livestock production is estimated to be the main source of livelihood for 70% of the population. The ongoing livestock ban imposed by Saudi Arabia has had a devastating impact on the social and economic systems of Somalia. ." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR June 2002, p.17)

"The first reported outbreak of Rift Valley Fever (RVF) outside of Africa, in Saudi Arabia, has resulted in a regional ban on imported livestock from Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Kenya and Djibouti.

[...]

Most seriously affected by the regional ban is likely to be Somalia, a country which depends heavily on export of livestock. It lacks an established government and institutions to cope with the ban, and has very limited opportunities for economic diversification. Without a recognised central government for almost a decade, Somalia has struggled to find ways to get livestock certified for export.

[...]

According to one Somali livestock expert, the ban 'reflects not just on export quality but also on local markets and the environment. It will result in the over-production of herds, without the usual market outlet, which will cause environmental damage.'

Somali sources told IRIN that there was an urgent need for international agencies to assist by helping to establish systems to 'investigate the health of animals.'" (IRIN-CEA 22 September 2000, "Introduction" and "Somalia")

"The current livestock embargo was initially imposed by the Saudi government on the 19th September 2000, following a reported outbreak of Rift Valley Fever in early September. Many of the Gulf countries followed suit some days later, banning the importation of all livestock from the main livestock exporting countries in the region. [...] The knock-on effects of restricted trading are expected to reduce employment opportunities and effect access to other important income sources. The economy in the northern and central parts of the country being most susceptible." (FSAU/FEWS 15 October 2000, "Highlights")

"The last time the Saudis issued such a ban, in 1998, it was only partially enforced, due to widespread smuggling through Yemen. This time, however, Yemen appears to be clamping down as well, making this episode potentially much more disruptive." (Menkhaus November 2000, p. 7)

Ban has resulted in significant loss of income at macro and micro levels for Somalis:

"The livestock bans have particularly hurt urban populations, including returning refugees and IDPs who, being dependent on the market, are reliant on a healthy economy for access to jobs and income generating opportunities." (UNDP Somalia 2001, p.68)

"Other Urban Areas, including Mogadishu Estimated Vulnerable Population: 40,000

Urban areas are largely dependent on the modern trade economy, including domestic food produce and imported commodities such as sugar, salt and non-staple items. This makes urban residents and IDPs particularly vulnerable to economic shocks that may limit increase price levels and limit market access. In addition to the livestock ban, the printing of new currency has placed a severe strain on the purchasing power of poor households. Further, opportunities for casual labour at the ports have diminished." (UN Appeal, November 2001, p.5)

"Bari, Nugal and northern Mudug Estimated Vulnerable Population: 33,400

The most vulnerable pastoral population group is lying along the coast where food availability and market access are severely reduced by the impact of the livestock ban and the poor state of infrastructure. Pastoralists in the Iskushuban area are particularly affected. In general, however, northeastern pastoral areas are not considered to be severely at risk to food insecurity or cholera outbreaks at the moment. That said, poor urban households and IDPs in the surroundings of Bossaso are extremely vulnerable following the loss of trade-related employment." (UN Appeal, November 2001, p.4)

"There has been substantial loss of income at macro and household levels, which had limited the purchase of many goods, including medicine, and had accelerated the depletion of assets. Market failure because of the livestock ban would 'threaten livelihoods for many groups'. FSAU monitors and nutritionists said there was particular concern for the urban poor and Internally Displaced Population (IDPs) in and around most towns in the north. Burao, in Somaliland, was marked out as of particular concern as it was a 'heavily livestock dependent'. Bossaso and Galkayo in the self-declared autonomous region of Puntland, northeast Somalia, were also of concern, the report said. However, the worst effects of the livestock ban on food security had been mitigated by 'unusually good livestock production and reproduction', resulting in a high level of milk for consumption and sale." (IRIN-CEA 12 February 2001, Somalia)

Closure of remittance companies by the US because of alleged links to terrorist activity, led to the country's economic collapse:

"Remittances contribute a significant proportion of many households income in Somalia. However with reference to nutrition surveys, it is estimated that the figure ranges between 0.3% to 14.3% among the IDPs compared to 1.6% to 18% in the general population. With purchases being the main source of food among all the IDPs surveyed (ranging between 85% and 99%), income availability is crucial in defining the food security status of these populations." (FSAU, 17 December 2003)

"Remittances from the more than one million Somalis living abroad have mitigated the effects of poverty. While estimated annual flows of remittances into Somalia, including Somaliland, vary, it is estimated between US\$ 750 million to 1 billion [...] is sent each year, far more than the country receives in foreign aid (US\$ 115 million in 2000). [...] This income forms not only the backbone of the commercial and service sectors, but of individual and household purchasing power. It is estimated that of the total amount remitted each year, US\$ 360 million directly contributes to household incomes. [...] Keeping this lifeline of Somali remittances from the Diaspora open is critical to ensuring that some of the most vulnerable populations receive an income. But the downside of this survival buoy is that it has fostered gaps between the relatively privileged and the destitute who often lack access to remittances." (UN, 18 November 2003, p.10)

"Families with access to overseas remittances enjoy privileged access to social services and have better food security than households without.

[...]

Remittances have long been a critical part of Somalia's economy. Currently, with very low levels of agricultural production and manufacturing, remittances from the large Somali diaspora enable the country to run a balance of trade deficit and to enjoy higher levels of food security and access to private social services than would otherwise be the case. Future trends in remittances will be a key factor in sustaining human development.

[...]

The service sector is the most dynamic part of the economy. Money transfer companies and telecommunication companies have expanded throughout Somalia and increased the range of financial services, facilitating the flow of remittances from the diaspora and commercial transactions. These companies, which did not exist a decade ago, are amongst the most powerful businesses in Somalia today." (UNDP Somalia, 2001, pp.38-9)

"Another study estimates that remittances to Somaliland alone could be as high as US\$500 million per year. That is four times the value of livestock exports from Somaliland in a normal year [...]. Another study estimates annual remittances to Somalia of US\$800 million.

[...]

A study in Hargeisa, Burco, and Bosasso calculated that remittances constitute nearly 40% of the income of urban households.

[...]

The rural poor and the internally displaced from groups who have fewer relatives abroad receive fewer remittances and are less well served by telecommunications. One study found that while the majority of households in Hargeisa received remittances, only 5% of rural households did [...]. In Hargeisa and Bosasso, there is clear evidence of significant differential access to remittances between urban residents and displaced populations and economic migrants from southern Somalia." (UNDP Somalia, 2001, pp.104-105)

IDPs self reliance in southern and central Somalia complicated by drought and conflict (2002)

- IDPs in Mogadishu survived by begging, by receiving food scraps, and by earning about 2,000-3,000 Somali shillings a day for 'carrying services' in the market
- To make a living IDPs use their own skills which run along ethnic identity
- However, Bantu and Galgala minorities suffer ethnic discrimination and are prevented from using their traditional farming and wooden crafts
- They mostly end up in non-skilled jobs working as porters or digging latrines
- IDP women generate the largest income in the household working as domestic servants, cleaners, petty trading, or porters
- Displaced women in Bu'ale sell water from the river or firewood
- Bantus displaced in Jilib are exploited economically by the same Habargedir people who grabbed their agricultural lands
- In Bay and Bakool IDP coping strategies for their food supply are hampered by conflict, drought and inflation

Mogadishu:

"Many families in the camps have been repeatedly displaced, and for some, it is their second or third time in the capital. Some arrive seeking relatives, but others come because it remains a traditional migration route – even with Mogadishu's precipitous decline, the displaced still expect the capital to provide opportunities. The majority [of IDPs] said they survived by begging, by receiving food scraps, and by earning a little cash by providing 'carrying services' to people in the market – earning about 2,000-3,000 Somali shillings a day." (IRIN-CEA 27 April 1999)

Kismayo:

"Many of the displaced now live in or close to destitution with the main sources of income consisting of casual work (farm labour, household chores, loaders/porters at the port) and bush product collection (firewood and charcoal burning). Although the unskilled labour rates in Kismayo (less than 25,000Ssh/day) are lower than in other areas of Lower Juba, they remain well over those in other areas of

Southern Somalia. Unlike the local residents, IDPs have no kinship support and tend to be engaged in less regular and lower status occupations. On the other hand, the *urban poor* of Kismayo are involved in petty business, sale of water and farm labour." (FSAU Nutrition Update, 31 December 2002)

"The IDPs in Kismayo are in extreme poor economic conditions because of loss of their properties, productive assets, difficult social and political environment and lack of relief food and assistance by aid agencies. For their survival, IDPs use their own skills and each IDP community has its own skills, which correlates with its distinct identity and culture, which shape its own way of survival. For example, the Bantu IDPs are traditionally small-scale farmers whose major skill is farming, while, the Galgala IDPs are traditionally wooden craftsmen. The Galgala IDPs capitalized on their skills depend on that for survival. The Bantu IDPs prefer obviously in working on non-skilled work such as carrying goods, loading and offloading of trucks, digging latrines etc. Their women work as domestic servants as washers and cleaners.

The IDPs have no bargaining power. They are forced to work cheaply and under unfair working conditions that have led them to be in servitude conditions. The maximum wage earned by is about 3000 to 5000 So.Sh, which is equivalent to \$0.15-0.25. Although that small income it doesn't help IDPs to meet their basic needs. A Somali household of 6 to 10 family size needs a minimum of 80,000 So.Sh (USD 4) for its daily subsistence food.

Some Bantu IDPs have profitable skills and they can work as carpenters and mechanics. However, ethnic discrimination denies them to get access to such jobs. IDP's access to land is also very limited. There is no farming land inside Kismayo town. However some Galgala IDPs are engaged in some sort of farming activities on the outskirts of the city, and near the airport. Because of lack of resources and high dependence on rain, the production is very little food. No crop sharing practices is practiced in this area.

Being more dominant than men, IDP women a key role in generating the largest household income in the camp. Some work as domestic servants as cleaners, while others generate their income through petty trading, selling tea or cooked food in the market. The only way they can generate their income is to work as street peddler or porters."(UNCU, 30 July 2002,p26)

Bu'ale:

"IDPs in Bu'ale are very poor. Their economic livelihoods depend largely on subsistence income that comes from non-skilled work or begging. Being more dominant than men, women play a greater role than men do in household income. They sell water from the river at 500 SoSh per jerrycane of 20 liters. However, because most IDPs collect their own water, there is less demand for water IDP in the camp. A woman could generate between So.sh 10,000 to 15,000 as income, which is much below the required income for subsistence (average So.sh 30,000). Other women generate income by selling of firewood at 500 SoSh per bundle, while others beg in the markets.

Most of the IDPs men are agropastoralists with no profitable skills. They generate marginal income through non-skilled work, such as digging latrines and constructing huts. They have no bargaining power to demand an increase of their wages, which range from So.sh 5000-10,000 per day."

Jilib:

"These living conditions have exposed many IDPs to economic exploitation by the Habargedir and those who took over agricultural lands in the area. Some IDPs alleged that they are forced to work the whole day for only So.sh3000 to 5000. This is not even enough for the breakfast of an IDP household. Others claimed that instead of money, they are given only some cooked maize for the heavy work leaving their families remain without food in their houses. The work the IDPs undertake includes ploughing, sowing, harvesting or guarding harvest from birds and other animals." (UNCU, 30july 2002,p.31)

Bay and Bakool:

"The poor harvest is hitting many areas where levels of malnutrition have been relatively high for the last two years. Assessments carried out in Bay, Bakool and Gedo as well as information collected from feeding

centres indicate that many poor families are at the end of their resources. Most of the poorer households have no stocks from previous years and possibilities to find jobs or generate income are very limited.

Low cereal production and resultant food shortages will impoverish, even further, families who already live on very little, and whose nutritional state is already fragile." (WFP 22 August 2001)

"Recent escalations in tensions have once again caused displacement of populations into communities that are unable to assist because of their own limited stocks and it appears that some IDPs and resident populations are already becoming quite desperate in their search for external assistance.

[...]

The anticipated food scarcity resulting from failure of the Gu harvest has exacerbated the problem as otherwise the returnees would have been easily absorbed within the existing community social support. Although the IDPs are engaged in coping strategies like selling firewood, water and construction materials; digging toilets and seeking for community support (mobilised handouts) for their food supply, the general downturn of economic avenues occasioned by drought and inflation weighs heavily against any significant contribution to their food security. Food availability is also reported to be low in the market. Gifts from the community have also reduced, as the community does not have sufficient stocks to allow sharing to take place.

At the time of the visit, no support interventions for this group were in place. Most of the IDPs were seen crowding around the IMC health facility in search of assistance, in particular hoping to be admitted to the ongoing Supplementary Feeding Programme/family ration programme. The health facility in Rabdure is also strained with additional need for supplies. Immediate needs of this group include assistance with shelter, food, medical attention and chlorinated water." (FSAU 16 August 2001, Overview and Update on Bakool).

Access to land

IDP women cannot access land without male support (2002)

- Most IDP women who lost their husband in conflict or during displacement are in a predicament to access land and feed their families

"Representing the majority of IDP population in the district, women play a key role in supporting the household income. In their camps, the IDPs women bear two responsibilities reproductive and productive to support their household income. However, discrimination affects their socio-economic activities both in and outside their households. Traditionally women need a husband or male relative to have access to land. However, most of the IDPs women are single parent mothers who lost their husbands during the conflicts or displacement. They suffer lack of access to cultivable lands, which they can use to produce some subsistence food. Even when the husband is present, women still suffer social problems that results from entrenched attitudes of men towards women. In many cases men misuse their responsibilities and harass their wives, particularly when they want to misuse the household income to buy unnecessary goods such as miraa. Because of lack of jobs, most of the IDPs men are depressed and they chew miraa to entertain themselves." (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p.35)

Coping mechanisms

Traditional coping mechanisms eroded by protracted conflict and drought (2002)

- IDPs in Somalia receive hardly any assistance and most survive through cheap and irregular labor which barely covers basic needs (UN 2002)
- Most IDPs have no economic safety net as they do not benefit from the clan system and either from remittances
- Economic diversification and informal employment options account between 25-60% of household economy
- Seasonal migration, adoption into another clan area and exogamy are ingrained strategies in risk-prone environments
- Changes in consumption and intake of famine foods, sacrificing short-term needs for long-term life-investment
- Mutual trust and reciprocity between kin have been considerably eroded by protracted droughts and conflicts

"It is estimated that there are about 350,000 internally displaced persons throughout Somalia with an estimated 150,000 IDPs in Mogadishu alone. They receive little or no assistance and most survive through irregular and cheap labour. Incomes barely cover basic food needs. Most cannot access clan support systems and do not have the benefit of receiving remittances. Moreover, they lack any form of protection and are subject to an array of human rights violations." (UN, November 2002, p.92)

"Individuals and communities are not passive in the face of crisis but employ their intimate knowledge of the environment, or political and social relations to mitigate against disaster. Rural households in Somalia employ a range of strategies to cope and survive in adverse circumstances. These can include the diversification of livelihood strategies through seasonal migration for employment, changes to dietary intake, or the consumption of famine foods. Often, short-term needs are sacrificed to preserve a 'way of life'. In the absence of any formal welfare system in Somalia, resource transfers and wealth redistribution within social networks play a crucial role in the maintenance of livelihoods. Anecdotal evidence suggests that in hard times resources from their informal networks can account for 25-60% of the household economy.

[...]

Migration is an integral part of people's way of life in Somalia and a critical coping strategy in a risk-prone environment. Migration, resettlement through adoption into another clan (*sheegata*), and exogamous marriage mean that most Somali families have relatives spread among clans and over a large geographic area. These personal and familial networks can be drawn on in times of conflict or drought. Mobility as a coping strategy of pastoralists during drought, however, is restricted during conflict.

[...]

Clan affiliation and identity with a place of residence form a system for the sharing and co-operative control of resources at the level of the household, compound, community and clan. [...] [T]raditional obligations of assistance, in the form of food, shelter, and water [...]. Other forms of assistance include the loan of farmland (*hoorsi*) or a milking animal (*irmaansi*), the restocking of livestock, and the giving of credit (*amaa*). Helping those most in need is also integral to the religious and social obligations of Islam, institutionalised in the giving of *zakat* and *sadaqa*.

[...]

When widespread conflict and drought are combined, as witnessed in the early 1990s, the impact can be devastating. Production systems and household and community assets, such as food stores and livestock, were destroyed or looted and the option of migration was constrained by warring militia. As livelihood options were reduced and trust within and between clans was eroded, the geographical spread of the resource networks contracted, and families retreated to the reassuring safety of the community." (UNDP Somalia 2001, p.69)

Public participation

There was no functioning court adhering to international standards in Somalia except in Somaliland (2003)

- The three systems of law in Somalia, secular, Shariah and customary law coexist but lack harmonization
- IDPs from weak clans and minority groups have little recourse to systems of justice when human rights violations take place in the absence of a functioning judiciary system
- The expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia reports that members of the judiciary in Kismayo had no copies of the laws and made judgments based on memory
- Women are particularly disadvantaged by the lack of harmonisation between the three systems of law which are male-dominated
- The only functioning regular courts in Somaliland sometimes dismissed judges arbitrarily
- Customary clan level courts function
- Sharia courts functioning in Mogadishu and other areas do not adhere to international standards of fair trial
- Faction militias enjoy impunity for their human rights abuses

"Technically, Somalia follows three systems of laws: secular law, Shariah and customary law. Although these three systems coexist, there is a lack of harmonization in the way they address crimes and other legal issues. The ability of Somali women to claim and defend their rights is affected by their social status and the prevailing legal environment, which consists mainly of a combination of Shariah and customary law and is applied differently in each region." (UNSC, 13 October 2003)

"When human rights violations take place, in the absence of any properly functioning mechanisms for the rule of law, individuals from 'minority' or weak clans in Kismayo often have little recourse to systems of justice" (p. 6).

The denial of due process

The legal framework throughout the country remains poor. Persistent challenges include untrained staff, low salaries, lack of basic equipment, training and reference materials, gender inequity and lack of harmonization among secular, customary and Islamic laws. On his visit to Kismayo the expert met with members of the judiciary who informed him that they had no copies of the laws and made judgements based on memory.

[...]

In a report on gender justice published in August 2003 by the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), the observation is made that:

"There are three parallel systems of law, the Secular law, the Shariah law and customary law. ... Our findings revealed that this environment that allows operation of more than one system is inequitable, restrictive and disadvantageous to women. For example on a murder charge men who murder their wives are tried under customary law where the sentence is *dinya* which is blood money/compensation, women are tried under the secular law where the sentence is death. ... There is limited access to secular justice for women, due to economic and social restraints, and low literacy amongst women. Customary law is perceived as gender unfriendly as the traditional elders who convene the traditional courts are all male, and their points of view and traditional norms influence decisions. Shariah law is the most preferred system of law amongst women because of its divine source, however it is open to misapplication due to the fact that

there are no mechanisms in place for certifying judges or recording precedence in the context of Islamic jurisprudence" (p. 3)." (UNCHR, 30 November, paras. 25,26,32)

"Regular courts functioned only in Somaliland, although many judges were arbitrarily dismissed in mid-2002. Puntland had an embryonic court structure incorporating *Sharia* (Islamic) law, but these courts did not function regularly. In other parts, the few functioning courts, other than at the customary clan level, included a number of *Sharia* courts in Mogadishu and other regions. These did not adhere to international standards of fair trial and there was generally impunity for faction militias which committed human rights abuses. Courts imposed several death sentences which were swiftly carried out. An amputation sentence from the Benadir regional court in Mogadishu in June was widely criticized as unfair, and withdrawn under TNG pressure for a retrial." (AI, January 2003)

Gender discrimination barrier to public participation (1998-2002)

- Conflict and displacement have opened new opportunities for women's participation beyond traditional gender roles
- Women's newly acquired roles and skills as widows and household-heads needs to be carefully considered during the rehabilitation and return processes taking place in northern Somalia Women prevented from participating in decision-making and from accessing resources
- Increased role in commerce sometimes makes women more vulnerable to discrimination

"Gender discrimination is deeply rooted in the traditional socio-cultural structures of Somali society and remains a formidable barrier to women's participation in decision-making and access to resources. Violence against women and girls, resulting either from tradition or the civil war, includes the almost universal practice of female genital mutilation and sexual violence against the displaced, particularly against members of rival clans and minority groups." (UNICEF 2000, paras. 7 and 8)

"Gender discrimination is deeply rooted in Somali society, where the rights of women in both the private and public spheres are seriously undermined. Rape, which was uncommon in Somalia before the war, has become a weapon of war for the militia and bandits, as well as in camps for displaced persons and returnees. Women belonging to minority groups, such as the Bantus and the Rahanweyn, are particularly subject to these crimes." (CHR 18 February 1999, para. 74)

"Female-headed households are particularly vulnerable; in some areas half of the households are headed by women, who shoulder all household responsibilities while generating family income through commerce or farming. There is throughout Somalia an increased role of women in meeting household needs, in participating in community affairs, in agricultural production and in business activities. Since the collapse of the state, the role of women in commerce has grown markedly. The element of rapid change has been important; for many women it has made them more vulnerable, while for others it has opened vistas of opportunity virtually impossible in Somalia before the war.

[...]

In line with this changing role of women in post-war Somali society, evidence is emerging of women gaining political awareness. However, gender discrimination is deeply rooted in the traditional, socio-cultural structures of Somali society and remains a formidable barrier to women's participation in formal decision-making processes and bodies." (UN December 1998, pp. 7, 47)

ISSUES OF FAMILY UNITY, IDENTITY AND CULTURE

General

Lineage identity is central organizing force in Somalia (2002)

- The six major Somali clans are Darod, Dir, Hawiye and Issak forming the Samale group, and the Rahaweyn (Digile and Mrifle) known as the Sab group
- Minority groups who fall outside major clan lineage divisions are often discriminated and marginalized in Somali society
- Minorities are traditionally hunters or craftsmen
- Bantu minority groups tend to be small scale farmers or laborers and lived in the riverine areas
- Bantu were victims of cultural genocide now all speak Somali except the Mushunguli group
- Clan networks provide physical and social security for Somalis

"Based on their patrilineal kinship and lineage segmentation, the Somali people are divided into six major clans, which in turn branch out into numerous sub clans, and minority groups. The major clans include Darod, Dir, Hawiye and Issak collectively known as Samale group, and the Rahaweyn (Digile and Mrifle) community categorized as Sab group. The Hawiye clan includes Habargedir, Abgal, Murusade, Hawadle, Galjel, Moblen, Sheikal, Djijele, Badi Adde, and Ajuran while the Darood group include Majerten, Marchan, Dhulbahante, and Ogaden, LeelaKase, Ortole, Kaskiiqabe and Dashiishe.

The Dir sub clans include Biyamal, Gadsan, Gadabursi, Fiqi Muhumud, Samaron, Qubeys, Werdai and Akishe. The Issak are subdivided into Habar Awal, Habar Jalo and Habar Yunis, Edigale, Ayub and Arab. The Digil and Mrifle are subdivided into sub clans. The Digil include Geledi, Shanta Aleen, Bagadi, Garre, Tunj, Jido, and Dabarend while the Mrifle are divided into Siyed and Sagal. Some of the major subclans in the Mrifle group are Laysan, Harin, Elay, Boqol Hore, Jiron, Jilible, Gelidle, Hadame, Luway, Huber and Yantar.

Those who fall outside the major clan lineage divisions are considered as minorities. They are disadvantageous of being minorities except when they have patrons or patron clan that support them. This lack of clan protection puts them at the mercy of arbitrary action by major clans.

According to their lineage, the minority groups are divided into two groups: A group, which has similar ethnic origin with the Samale group, but traditionally considered as cast people who have no equal rights with others. This group includes Midgan, Tumul and Yibir (collectively known as Baidari group), Gaheyle and Galagale and Boni. They are traditionally hunters, leather and metal workers, and craft makers living in some parts of north, central and southern Somalia.

A second group, which is distinct from other Somalis in ethnic identity, cultural and tradition. They include Bantu, Benadiri and Eyle. The Bantu, who are referred to as "Jarer", which literally means thick hair are small scale farmers or labourers who live in the riverine areas in southern Somalia. They are also divided into various sub clans with different ethnic origin. Some for example the Mzigua, Mzaramo, Magindo, Myao, Makua, and Manyasa collectively known as Wa Gosha "forest people" or Oji are believed to be descendants of Tanzanians, Mozambicans and Malawi's who were taken to Somalia in the 19th century by Arab slave traders (MRG, 1998). They live and practice some subsistence farming in the Gosha area in the Lower and Middle Juba regions.

Second Bantu sub clans, which include Shidle, Shabelle, Makane and Kabole, are believed to have descended from early non-Somali agricultural communities. They are also small-scale farmers who predominantly live in the Middle Shabelle and Hiran regions. The third Bantu group lives in the Lower Shabelle region. Because of cultural genocide, and most importantly for protection reasons they have identified themselves with the other Somali communities in the region. These include Jarer-Hintire, Jarer-Wacdan, and Jarer-Biyamal. Except the Mushunguli group who retained their Mushunguli language, the other Bantu speak Somali language and have become assimilated into local Somali communities. However, they have never been recognized as real Somalia, as a result, they suffer ethnic discrimination which placed them into servitude class. They are marginalized and excluded from main stream of administration, education and minimum social and economic development.

[...]

The Somali clans are grouped into clan bonds or clan alliances formed to safe guard the mutual interest and protection of the members of the alliances. The Social contract or "xeer" is the most important component that cements together the alliances. It calls upon the collective response of any threat to members of the alliance. As marginalized groups, the minorities are outside this system, and they are vulnerable to attacks and human rights violations by the dominant clans." (UNCU, 30 July 2002, pp 5-6)

"In Somali culture, clan is the inherited patriarchal lineage of ancestors, passed down orally in detail, generation to generation, determining origin, social standing, and access to territory, property and power. **In times of trouble, the clan also pays a penalty for inflicting death or injury, which relieves the burden** from individuals and families. At its worst, clan leads to conflict, xenophobia and control. But at its best, the clan works like the western world's social security welfare system. It protects, it means that all actions against you and your family will have consequences," said a Somali source." (IRIN-CEA 15 June 2001)

"In addition to conflict, technological change, trade, religion, migration patterns and the return of the Somali diaspora have broken down geographical and social boundaries. This has resulted in fundamental local and familial changes. In the absence of a central authority, the clan represents the lowest denominator in providing group and individual protection and social security. Yet, the clan remains the most potent force in contributing to social and political division and diffusion." (UN November 1999, p. 4)

"The social context of human development in Somalia cannot be understood without reference to clan affiliation. Lineage identity is a central organizing force in Somali society. At the grassroots level, clan elders and other community leaders play a vital role in providing most of the day-to-day governance throughout Somalia, in the absence of effective state authority, and are often instrumental in maintaining local stability. One of the paradoxes of contemporary Somalia is that some of the most powerful social and economic forces are simultaneously sources of both stability and insecurity. On the one hand, clan networks provide an essential level of physical and social security to many Somali households; the clan is a vital source of group protection, social security and customary law in the absence of state infrastructure. On the other hand, clannism is a powerful force contributing to unstable alliances, diffusion of power and communal conflict over scarce resources. In the period of state collapse, it has proved to be a divisive and destructive tool in the hands of political leaders. A second force, economic and business interests, at times promotes inter-clan and inter-factional accords for the sake of improved market conditions. However, these players also resort to armed conflict in pursuit of market control and price-fixing." (UN December 1998, p. 7)

PROPERTY ISSUES

General

Land dispossession is the main driving force behind conflict in Somalia (2003)

- Bantu minorities' lands were occupied by Habr Gedir, Galjeecel and Absame clans
- Bantu and Rahanweyn minorities have been and pushed closer towards the river banks where their fields are flooded seasonally
- IDPs from minority clans with a low status in the community are unable to buy land (2001)
- Jiddu clan fighters in Qoroley displacing other farmers in land dispute (October 2000)

Bantu and Rahanweyn minorities forced off lands:

"Although land grab is not a new phenomenon during the past decade, Bantu communities on the west bank of the river Juba in particular (notably between Kamsuuma and Kismaayo) have seen their land occupied by the Habr Gedir and Galjeecel and, around Buale, by Absame clans. Agricultural implements and water pumps have been looted, water management systems have fallen into disrepair, and where land is no longer farmed it has reverted to scrub. Although some patron-client sharecropping arrangements exist on land under 'occupation', the collapse of plantation agriculture has dramatically reduced income opportunities." (ODI, 31 December 2003, p.11-12)

"During the civil war, the Bantu population has been systematically pushed off their land towards the river by militias or bandits. They are now so close to the river that they face a real risk of their settlements being washed away during floods.

[...]

The Rahanweyn minority lives on fertile agricultural land and is more advanced in agriculture. It too has been subjected to dispossession and displacement." (CHR 18 February 1999, paras. 77-80)

"Bantus continue to be forced off their land, their property continues to be looted and their villages destroyed." (CHR 26 January 2000, p. 17)

IDPs of minority clans only able to rent land:

"IDPs often come from minority groups (Bantu) and clans with low status in the community. One problem of the IDPs is that the major clans will not sell land to 'outsiders'/members of other clans. IDPs therefore only have access to rented land." (Lindgaard 23 March 2001)

Jiddu sub-clan claim to own all land in Qoroley:

"Fighting between different clans with rival claims to land has left at least 10 dead and 15 injured in Qoroley, 75 km south of the Somali capital Mogadishu, the Associated Press agency (AP) reported on Monday [23 October 2000]. The fighting, which began on Sunday and continued sporadically Monday, pitted members of the Jiddu sub-clan, which claims to own all the land around Qoroley, and farmers from other clans who it claims have occupied its land, the report said. 'The Jiddu clan fighters have started displacing all of the other farmers, by either setting their animals to graze in the others' farms or just destroying them,' AP quoted a traditional elder Abdullahi Khalif Kobleh as saying. So far, six members of the Jiddu and four from other clans had been killed." (IRIN-CEA 24 October 2000, "Ten reported dead in Qoroley land struggle")

Most IDPs from Southern Somalia in Hargeisa rent land from private individuals (June 2002)

- Displaced from southern Somalia do not own their land and 30 out of 34 interviewed Southern Somali families paid rent

Interagency assessment conducted in 8 areas around Hargeisa (Somaliland) in returnee and IDP settlements (June 2002). The second largest settlement, Daami hosts about 10,000 people, of whom 35% are displaced from Southern Somalia (Clark, June 2002, p.27)

"- 30% of area residents report they owned property before the war and virtually all report having no access to it now, citing war and insecurity as the primary reasons why they no longer have access.
- Almost half of the residents currently own their land. The rest of the households live on land owned by the government (primarily Stadium and State House residents) or by private individuals (primarily in Daami). Three out of four households currently owning their land were allocated it by the government.
- Somalilanders are most likely to own their own land, while Southern Somalis generally do not own their land and are the group most likely to be paying rent for their land/home.

"75% of Daami residents who don't own their land pay rent on it; these residents are predominantly the Southern Somalis and Ethiopians. In Daami, 30 out of 34 interviewed Southern Somali families paid rent, while 11 out of 13 Ethiopian families paid rent. In Daami, only 4 out of 50 families originally from Somaliland pay rent." (Clark, June 2002, p.32)

Bosasso IDPs evicted from their plots by original owners (2002)

- The fact that public land is 'privatized' by local residents and then rented for exorbitant prices worsens IDP status
- Many IDPs are victims of forced relocations
- IDPs recurrently evicted incur high re-settlement expenditure
- Haphazard settlements and poor sanitation contributing factors to April 2002 cholera outbreaks

"The larger problem of the IDPs in Bosasso is the complete lack of urban planning and management of the town. While IDPs are the most vulnerable, the fact is that a high degree of land grabbing in which public land is spontaneously "privatized" by a resident landowner has worsened the status of the IDPs. More specifically, the landowners of land occupied by IDPs in Bosasso charge exorbitant rents not only for the occupied land, but also for the use of latrines and in many cases even the charge collection of water from shallow wells or water tankers. UNICEF officials have repeatedly discussed this issue with the camps' landowners and asked them to reduce the rents they charge for UNICEF constructed latrines and water facilities.

A significant number of the displaced population are very vulnerable to spontaneously and forced relocations. The insecurity of land tenure and ownership on the part of IDPs was cited as the primary concern of the majority of IDPs we interviewed. To make matters worse the security situation in the camps is quite precarious and often dangerous for residents of the IDP camps. This is a particular source of concern for non-Darod clans such as the Madhiban and others displaced from Bay and Bakool." (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p.19)

"Significant proportion of the Bossasso District's population lives in the urban areas and is involved in business activities. However the high number of IDPs in Bossasso town and its environs as well the urban poor struggle to meet their daily needs. They are engaged in casual labour such as portering, house help

activities, garbage collection and begging. The IDPs are constantly evicted by original owners of plots they have settled on and consequently incur high expenditure on their resettlement. The haphazard settlements have negative implications since little consideration on the environment is made resulting in poor sanitation and increased risk to diseases. On 13th April, Bossasso town received heavy showers, a most unusual occurrence in the area. Measles cases were reported in Bossasso town at the time of the assessment and a serious cholera outbreak hit Bossasso town in the week of 14th to 21st April 2002." (FSAU Nutrition Update, May 2002)

PATTERNS OF RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT

General

Many IDPs mainly from minority groups have not been integrated into the host communities (2003)

- Authorities need more assistance to integrate IDPs in the economic, social and political life of the host communities where they live
- Over half a million Somali refugees returned mainly to northern Somalia since 1997
- Most returnees live in slum areas and face the same problems as IDPs and over 95% cannot meet their basic needs according to the UNHCR
- IDPs and returnees could upset the relative socio-economic balance achieved in the northern regions of Somalia unless substantial reintegration assistance is invested there

"Approximately 350,000 Somalis, or about 5% of the population, are internally displaced. Some are nearly as established as their urban poor neighbours, including some economic migrants, and as such benefit from clan support and protection. But the majority of these internally displaced do not find it easy to return home due to insecurity and/or difficulties in maintaining their livelihoods in their places of origin. They are largely from minority groups, and despite their often extended periods of displacement, have not been integrated geographically, economically, socially or politically into their host communities.

[...]

Since more than 800,000 Somalis fled their homeland at the height of the crisis in 1991 and 1992, about 465,000 have returned home with some form of international assistance, mainly to northern Somalia. Many more have returned home spontaneously. About 400,000 remain in exile mainly in Kenya, Djibouti, Yemen and Ethiopia.

[...]

The vast majority of those refugees who have returned home report improvements in their physical and legal safety as well as in their own dignity and right to self-determination, when compared to their situation in exile. But, after the short-term assistance they receive upon returning is depleted, they share the same multiple problems faced by IDPs and other vulnerable groups in Somalia, as the struggle to become self-reliant continues at home. According to a 2003 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) survey of returnees, more than 95% of them cannot meet their most basic needs. Only 5% are able to afford three meals a day. Most, or 64 %, live on one. Their access to basic services is also limited. More than 64% have no access to a health facility and nearly half are 30 to 50 minutes away from the nearest water source. Women and girls are more vulnerable to abuse and are often unable to take advantage of educational opportunities, as their days are spent trying to feed the family through small scale trade, casual employment, market selling and begging. Returnees themselves most frequently summed up their current situation in two phrases: "labour market doesn't exist" and "lack of income makes us vulnerable to disease and malnutrition."

The challenges of helping returnees integrate are equally severe for local authorities. Somaliland, the largest recipient of returnees (since 1997, 210,000 with UNHCR assistance and another estimated 400,000 who returned spontaneously), has been unable to prevent the establishment of slum areas where returnees concentrate, despite major town planning efforts. Its flagging economy has meant increased competition over scarce resources for all, which has the potential to threaten the hard won peace there. In Puntland, 600 refugees have been assisted to voluntarily repatriate in 2003, while over the years at least another 100,000 returned spontaneously on their own, attracted by the region's current economic boom and relative peace.

But the fragility of this economic upturn could pose major problems for their sustainable reintegration in the future, and thus the stability of the region, unless substantial reintegration assistance is forthcoming." (UN, 18 November 2003, p.12-3)

"The relatively peaceful atmosphere in the northern regions has led to a large influx of internally displaced persons, returning refugees or simply economic migrants coming mainly from the south. While current data may show declining trends in IDPs, some of the IDPs are gradually returning to their original homes. However, there is little economic incentive to do so and some do not feel it is safe. The fact that IDPs and returning refugees are largely viewed as a burden to their host community makes their integration into the host community a long and difficult process. Providing them with skills that could make them self-reliant will therefore hasten the process of reintegration. It is worth noting that literacy centres run by women NGOs are providing some of the vocational skills but lack proper management and funding." (UN, 13 October 2003, p.10)

IDPs from the South have little to return to owing to recurrent conflicts and unchecked human rights violations (2003)

- Few IDPs are returning to their areas of origin and most have been displaced for over 10 years
- IDPs' right to return can be drawn from the ILO Convention No. 169 for Indigenous and Tribal People in Independent Countries, concerning freedom of movement and right to choose one's residence
- Very few displaced return to the south due to lack of security and no economic viability in their war-ravaged areas of origin
- Most IDPs are from minority groups and are afraid of returning to their home areas by fear of persecutions and attacks from the clans de-facto controlling their lands
- The unresolved issue of violent transfer of property and land along clan nepotistic policies is a major obstacle to return
- 44% IDPs from Southern Somalia in Hargeisa want to stay there
- Over 80% Southern Somalis state war as the main obstacle to return
- No social services or infrastructure in communities of origin
- Poor security is impediment to return and reintegration

"In Somalia the current declining incidence and scale of new internal displacements is a positive trend. However, few of the existing displaced seem to be returning to their original homes. In the South, many IDPs have been displaced for 10 years or more. For many, if not most, it is not possible to return to their areas of origin since in the course of a decade of conflict, other clan groups have since occupied them. For those displaced from rural areas such as Bay and Bakol, there is little economic incentive to do so. For others who were originally residents of Mogadishu, a significant proportion do not feel it is safe or viable to return there. (There is little information available on the displaced in and around Mogadishu area, although this area is thought to have the biggest concentration of IDPs.)" (UNICEF, 30 October 2003)

"Once persons are internally displaced, they need to be guaranteed the right to return voluntarily and in safety to their place of residence. Although there is no general rule that affirms the right of internally displaced persons to return to their original place of residence or to move to another safe place of their choice. However, such a right can in principle, be deduced from the freedom of movement and the right to choose one's residence. ILO Convention No. 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal People in Independent Countries states explicitly that "whenever possible, these people shall have the right to return to their traditional lands, as soon as the grounds for relocation cease to exist" (art.16 para.3)" (Ibrahim F., 15 August 2002, p.4)

"The Rahanweyn constitute over 50% of the IDPs in Luuq. They came from Hudur and Wajid following the violence and occupation that occurred in Bakool and Bay region from 1995 to 1999. Despite harsh living conditions of the IDPs are ambivalent about returning to their original lands. For example the Marehan IDPs have expressed profound fear of the persisting insecurity and sporadic clashes between Marehan subclan which caused their displacement. The Rahanweyn IDPs indicate that that the situation in their original lands is not yet good for their return." (UNCU/OCHA, 30 July 2002, p.26)

"All IDPs have little prospects of returning to their original places, as conflicts and human rights violations still persist in some of these original places. For example, the Galagale IDPs have profound fear of persecution from the Abgal clan who is still in control of their territories. The Bantu lost all what they had during the conflict and they have little hope of getting back their ancestral lands. The Rahaweyn IDPs reported that situation in their original is not yet conducive for their return." (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p.34)

"However, few of the existing displaced seem to be returning to their original homes. For some who were displaced from rural areas such as Bay and Bakol, there is little economic incentive to do so. For others who were originally residents of Mogadishu, a significant proportion do not feel it is safe or viable to return there. This is a potential obstacle for future reconciliation. First, because it reflects the continuing instability of several regions, and second because it reflects a consolidation of population realignments and the violent transfer of property, such as land, that occurred during the war." (UNDP Somalia, 2001, p.61)

Interagency assessment conducted in 8 areas around Hargelsa (Somaliland) in returnee and IDP settlements (June 2002). The second largest settlement, Daami hosts about 10,000 people, of whom 35% are displaced from Southern Somalia (Clark, June 2002, p.27)

"All respondents were asked if they planned to remain living "here" for the rest of their lives, insh'allah; [...] Residents in all areas but Daami, State House, and Stadium responded "yes" in large numbers. The residents of State House and Stadium are aware that they do not own the land and that they may well be resettled, accounting for the low rate of planning to remain there. Overall, non-Somali Ethiopians planned to remain at a significantly lower rate than those from Somaliland (a rate of 71% [56-82%] versus 85% [81-89%] ($P<0.05$)). Those originally from Southern Somalia planned to stay at a rate of 44% [30-60%] compared to 85% [81-89%] ($P<0.0001$) for those originally from Somaliland." (Clark, June 2002, p.28)

"Southern Somalis report owning land before the wars at a significantly higher rate than those residents who are originally from Somaliland. Over 80% of Southern Somalis who had land before the war cited war or insecurity as a reason they could not return; the rest cited drought (under "other reason")." (Clark, June 2002, p.31)

"It is unlikely that the Somali diaspora can be attracted to return to a country where mere survival is often the main priority, development beyond aspiration and where social services and economic and administrative infrastructure have collapsed. Effectively addressing these gaps in services is crucial to the reintegration of the absolute poor, including returning refugees, IDPs and the poorest sectors of the urban and rural populations, who live on the brink of disaster.

[...]

Until security issues are addressed, recovery or progress towards it through reintegration, will remain under threat. Insecurity is a key component of recurrent emergencies in Somalia and one that needs to be taken into account in order to find viable and enduring solutions. Rehabilitation and reintegration interventions have significant potential to reduce insecurity. In particular, the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-militia during rehabilitation phases contribute to overall security in a region. Settling the militia has been a pre-requisite for lasting peace and security in current zones of recovery and transition." (UN December 1998, p. 10)

Mayor of Bosasso requested assistance to settle some of the 28,000 IDPs (2002)

- International community has provided hardly any support to the 28,000 Bosasso IDPs
- Mayor of Bosasso has put aside some land for resettling some IDPs, expecting assistance from UNICEF however disagreements hampered implementation of this pilot project
- Puntland Minister of Interior informed that he planned to return Bosasso IDPs in areas of origin with assistance from UNHCR

"There are approximately 28,000 (twenty-eight thousand) displaced persons living in five sections in the outskirts of Bosasso town. The largest IDP population has settled in the eastern section of Bosasso. By most accounts the IDP population according to local authorities, poses great risks in terms of sanitation, and health. The meager shelter available is also vulnerable to frequent fires. The Mayor of Bosasso has complained about the fact that for the last ten years none of the international agencies have done anything about the IDPs in Bosasso. The Mayor has asked international agencies to provide assistance and prepare other sections of the city for the permanent settlement of the IDPs.

The local authority has in recent months made significant moves to begin to alleviate the plight of the IDPs. Most notably, the Mayor of Bosasso, has officially set aside public land measuring 400 x 400 meters with the expectation that UNICEF and other agencies would contribute to planning and resettlement of some IDPs. The idea of this pilot project is to provide shelter, the extension of water and proper sanitation as a model for future relocation of more IDPs presently living in severe conditions. However, this plot is sufficient to house only a small fraction of the IDP population and as such cannot, in itself, represent a viable solution for the majority of IDPs. At present, the implementation of this pilot has stalled owing to a recently resolved disagreement between UNICEF and the Puntland administration over the management of a municipal engineering project in Bosasso. This issue was resolved as at early January 2000. However, both municipal and central authorities that a number of larger issues must be addressed within the context of both resident and displaced populations. This would include proper urban planning, an assessment of water needs, land management, and the strengthening of capacity building of the municipality.

There may also be potential disagreements between municipal and central authorities vis-à-vis a long-term policy towards the IDPs in Bosasso. For example, while the Mayor of Bosasso is quite willing to entertain the permanent settlement of these populations, the Minister of Interior informed us that he envisages the eventual return of these IDPs to their original areas with the assistance of UNHCR. In short, prior to any coherent policy with respect to the IDPs, it is vital that a clear and coherent policy be agreed upon both between local authorities as well as with the Puntland administration and international agencies." (UNCU, 30 July 2002, pp.18-9)

HUMANITARIAN ACCESS

General

Symptoms of complex emergencies hamper humanitarian work in most of southern and central Somalia (Oct 2003)

- During 2003 the towns of Mogadishu, Baidoa, and the regions of Middle Shabelle and Gedo remained the most unstable and dangerous
- Potential for conflict hindered humanitarian operations in south Mudug, Lower Shabelle and greater Bay regions, as well as in Buaale, Middle Juba and Kismayo
- Tensions over Sool and Sanaag regions between Somaliland and Puntland hindered humanitarian access
- Several humanitarian workers deliberately killed in Somaliland 2003-4
- **Wajid-Baidoa road connecting Bay and Bakool has been closed since June 2002 when the conflict arose leaving IDPs out of reach to humanitarian agencies (Nov 2003)**
- As a result of the lack of a functioning judiciary system agencies are often victims of targeted attacks, criminality or caught in the cross fire
- Security enjoyed in the self-declared (not recognized) Republic of Somaliland has enabled the sustained work of 38 international NGOs and 11 UN agencies
- Puntland witnessed relative stability since end 2002 enabling the quasi uninterrupted work of humanitarian agencies while being off limits for most of 2002
- While Southern and Central regions witnessed violence stability has returned in some pockets, enabling access to assist 15,000 IDPs in Juba and Kismayo in 2003

"Key flashpoints of conflict in 2003 included Mogadishu and Baidoa towns as well as the Middle Shabelle and Gedo regions, and the potential for conflict loomed in areas such as the south Mudug, Lower Shabelle and greater Bay regions, as well as in Buaale in the Middle Juba region and the port town of Kismayo. While some areas of stability exist in southern Somalia, they remain susceptible to sudden reverses, and thus are still problematic operating environments. The possibility of conflict between Somaliland and Puntland over the contested status of Sool and Sanaag regions, which both entities claim as their own, continued to hinder humanitarian access and prevent a comprehensive approach to assistance despite humanitarian needs in both regions. Against this backdrop, aid agencies must daily negotiate everything from project agreements to access with a host of non-state actors amidst shifting clan, economic and political interests, lawlessness and insecurity, underscoring the need for transparency, accountability, information sharing and coordination, as well as do-no-harm approaches to aid.

[...]

Thus, Somalia remained a largely dangerous, unstable and non-permissive environment for aid agencies and beneficiaries in 2003. Most of the southern and central regions of the country continued to exhibit chronic symptoms of complex emergencies: little to no authoritative government, high levels of criminality, sporadic armed conflict, lack of economic recovery, endemic humanitarian needs, minimal health care and education, and population displacement. By mid-year, the prolonged absence of key leaders at the peace talks, combined with efforts by the leaders to consolidate their areas of influence during power sharing negotiations, ensured that violence and armed conflict continued throughout much of the south, in particular in Mogadishu, Baidoa and the Middle Shabelle and Gedo regions. While pockets of stability exist in the south, they remain susceptible to sudden setbacks due to armed clashes and threats,

making them a difficult and largely inhospitable environment for sustainable aid interventions. At the writing of this Appeal, aid agencies could safely operate in only a handful of places in southern and central Somalia.

[...]

The threat to UN and NGO staff and work in Somalia arises from a variety of sources. The level of risk varies from place to place but staff can fall victim to an attack anywhere in the country.

Intentional targeting

Incidents of this type of targeting usually arise when an agency is involved in a contractual or financial dispute. There are limited legal systems in most parts of the country and people with a grievance regularly use violence against agency staff and facilities. There are many examples of such attacks involving guns, grenades and/or kidnapping. There is also a risk in some areas of staff being targeted by extremists.

Criminality

All agencies and staff can be victims of looting and other forms of common crime.

Inadvertent incidents

Agencies and staff can be innocent, or collateral, victims of inter-factional fighting. Such fighting is a frequent cause of temporary withdrawals from areas of Somalia." (UN, 18 November 2003, p.1,5,6,21)

"The death of the SOS workers bring to four the total number of international aid workers killed in the past 37 days, three of them in Somaliland. On 15 September 2003, Mr. Oyaw Abdiwahid, a Kenyan National employed by the Adventist Development Relief Agency, was brutally murdered while traveling to a project site in Dhamasa village in Gedo region. Subsequently, Italian aid worker Dr. Annalena Tonelli was shot at close range on 5 October 2003 on the grounds of a tuberculosis treatment center she founded in Borama in Somaliland." (UN RC, 22 October 2003)

"The Wajid-Baidoa road connects Bay and Bakool, the different Rahanweyn subclans in the region (including the Leysan and Harin), and aid agencies to these three IDP sites. This road has been closed (and access is restricted within a 40km radius of Baidoa) to all UN international staff (and the movement of national staff is strictly controlled) since June 2002 when the conflict arose. Although there have been reports that a number of people travelling on this road have been killed by militia and land mines, the recent reconciliation efforts and subsequent cease-fire agreement has led to an improved overall security situation, and greater road traffic." (OCHA, 28 November 2003)

"Inter-clan fighting around Baidoa also continued. The confrontation, which is in part a leadership dispute within RRA, has prevented access to the town for 14 months and has claimed numerous lives. The protagonists regularly use landmines. The ferocity of the conflict is illustrated by episodes such as the killing of a young woman by one side on 18 June, which was followed by a series of revenge killings in which at least four young women were reported killed.

In the Gedo and Lower Shabbelle regions there is hardly any established authority. As a result, armed groups are able to set up checkpoints to extort money from travellers. The lack of local authority has significantly reduced the frequency of visits by aid workers to places such as Belet Hawa, Luuq and Bardera." (UNSC, 13 October 2003)

"While fragile, the relative levels of stability achieved in northern Somalia and more recently in some pockets of the south have allowed for increased advocacy for access to and protection of civilians as well as cautious consideration of expanded operation in some areas. The comparative security long enjoyed by the international community working in the self-declared, but otherwise unrecognised Republic of Somaliland, and more recently in the Puntland State of Somalia toward the end of 2002 has continued. While still fledgling and limited in capacity, local institutions continue to develop in both regions, including ministries and networks of regional, district and local authorities. Somaliland's continual move away from conflict culminated in its first peaceful multi-party presidential elections on 14 April 2003. Thirty-eight

International NGOs and eleven UN agencies continue to work in this region in an increasingly coordinated manner.

In Puntland, the year so far has been characterised by relative stability, following a violent political and constitutional crisis that restricted access to the northeastern region for much of 2002. This has allowed aid work to continue with comparatively little interruption and for the UN system and its partners to take steps to expand its operations there in support of peace building, as well as to revitalise coordination mechanisms. While the southern and central regions remain largely characterised by violence and armed conflict, some levels of stability have improved in the Juba regions, in particular, in the areas of Kismayo, where the Juba Valley Alliance (JVA) has created a relatively secure operating environment. As a result, several NGOs and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have recently undertaken assessments with a view to possibly re-establishing operations there, and the UN, namely UNDP and OCHA, are initiating work in the area to complement the longstanding programmes of UNICEF, Muslim Aid and the Somali Red Crescent Society, in particular, in strengthening assistance to some 15,000 IDPs and local destitute populations. It remains imperative in 2003 that the UN and NGO community take advantage of such pockets of peace to work with whatever local and regional administrations are in place to enhance access to basic services and support wider rehabilitation potentials in support of peace building." (UN, 3 June 2003, p.1-2)

Warlords and militias regularly extort humanitarian assistance (2003)

- Access in Somalia is constrained by lack of authoritative government, high levels of criminality and sporadic and unpredictable armed conflicts
- Clan rivalries need to be taken into account by aid agencies working in Somalia in order to guarantee access and staff security
- The 'market value' of international staff for militias forced ACF to pull out of Luuq in March 2002
- Insecurity in Mogadishu, Lower Juba, Lower Shabelle and Gedo resulted in sub clans controlling these regions diverting more aid than that reaching IDPs
- Militias de-facto controlling some territories divert assistance by granting 'protection' to humanitarian convoys
- In the North authorities have been reluctant to design comprehensive IDP policies and have sometimes blocked or diverted humanitarian assistance to IDPs
- The 20 roadblocks between Jilib and Kismayo dramatically increase food prices for IDPs

"Against this backdrop of unpredictability, Somalia remained an extraordinarily complex operating environment for aid agencies. Its shifting balance of clan, economic and political interests, amidst lawlessness and insecurity, present unique challenges to outsiders and demand maximum flexibility on the part of aid agencies. In addition to insecurity, aid actors must often, in particular in southern and central Somalia, negotiate everything from access to project agreements with a host of non-state actors whose attitudes range from helpful to predatory. Rivalries between sub-clans are often a factor aid agencies must contend with in hiring and project design, and any project which increases the value of private property, brings material goods to a community, or involves even the simplest contracting of services, such as for car rental, can serve as a lightning rod for conflict. Reliance on national staff, due to insecurity, often places tremendous pressure on those staff to provide employment and contracts to community members. If not properly navigated, these potential stumbling blocks can have a devastating impact, including threats, assault and even the death of staff members. Such incidents can ultimately result in restricted access, curbing assistance to those who need it most." (UN, 18 November 2003)

« Des violences inter-claniques mettant la population en situation de précarité nutritionnelle et sanitaire... »

Des années de guerre civile en Somalie ont abouti à la division du pays en zones claniques, contrôlées par des chefs de guerre, d'où un climat d'insécurité permanent et une forte criminalité. Les populations subissent cet état de fait au quotidien et ne peuvent s'aventurer hors de leur zone sans risques.

Cette situation ne fait qu'accroître leur précarité nutritionnelle et sanitaire. En effet, sans liberté de mouvement, il devient impossible pour elles de mener à bien des activités professionnelles, agropastorales principalement, ou d'accéder aux soins et à l'eau potable, déjà rares en Somalie. » (ACF, 5 February 2003)

« ...et rendant difficile et dangereux le travail des ONG »

Cette situation est délicate pour les ONG qui, sans interlocuteur étatique ni institutionnel, doivent morceler leurs interventions et ont donc difficilement accès aux populations. A Mogadiscio en particulier, elles ne peuvent intervenir que par l'intermédiaire de leur personnel national car le risque d'enlèvement est considérable pour les Occidentaux, dont la " valeur marchande " constitue un véritable enjeu dans l'économie des milices. Présente à Luuq (Région du Gedo, Sud-Ouest Somalie) depuis 1999, Action contre la Faim a dû évacuer en mars dernier en raison de la recrudescence des combats. » (ACF, 5 February 2003)

"The provision of assistance varies from one zone/region to another dependent on the degree of stability and security of the region.

UN agencies such as UNICEF, WFP, UNHCR, UNDP and some NGOs provide limited assistance. Insecurity in some areas in the south such as Mogadishu, Lower Juba, Lower Shabelle and Gedo affected effective delivery of humanitarian assistance. In such a situation it has been claimed that some of the sub clans that control these regions have benefited more than the target group "the IDPs" by manipulating the delivery of assistance because the clan militia provide security and safe passage to aid workers and supplies.

[...]

Relief food and aid assistance does not normally get through to the IDPs. Most often, relief food is not IDP focused, and the Habargedir and other militia who are in control of the district manipulate the delivery of humanitarian assistance because they grant aid workers a safe passage only to areas that are beneficial to their clan militia groups. Little aid tends to reach IDPs and other vulnerable groups. An IDP elder indicated that the IDPs would continue to suffer high incidences of food insecurity as a result of discrimination." (UNCU, 30 July 2002, pp.2-3; 34-5)

« Persisting insecurity has affected agricultural activities and other coping mechanisms of most of the residents in the Lower Juba region, including relief assistance. Aid agencies found it difficult to effectively monitor the humanitarian condition in the region and provide adequate assistance to the IDPs and other vulnerable groups. There are over 20 roadblocks on the road between Jilib and Kismayo, at which the public transport are forced to pay extortion each time they pass through the roadblocks which increased food prices." (UNCU, 30 July 2002, p.27)

International presence in Mogadishu on a visiting basis only (2003)

- Due to the volatile security, agencies operate from Nairobi, whenever security allows
- Mogadishu is divided between north and south by militias since 1992
- Most international humanitarian agencies working in Somalia are based in Nairobi since the UNOSOM's withdrawal in 1995
- Somalia declared by UN the most dangerous operational environment, with unrelenting banditry, extortions and kidnappings

- Fighting over control of strategic towns and key ports are common
- ACF is only international NGO in Mogadishu
- Without permanent presence, information about the humanitarian situation is scarce

"The security situation in Somalia in 2003 continued to be tense and the dynamic environment presented significant challenges to Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD) in managing UN staff safety and security. As a result, the international aid community largely continues to operate from a permanent base in Nairobi to reduce the risk to staff. It conducts fieldwork from semi-permanent bases in Somalia. Activities take place whenever and wherever there is opportunity. If insecurity worsens in one place, staff members are moved to another, more secure site where they can work effectively and safely." (UN, 18 November 2003, p.1,5,6,21)

"In Mogadishu, where an estimated 20% of the Somali population lives, including 150,000 IDPs (many of whom have been displaced for over a decade), access remains restricted to UN international staff due to ongoing clan conflict and criminal activity" (UN, 3 June 2003, p.2)

« En revanche, dans la capitale Mogadiscio, l'association poursuit son action depuis 1992. Mais, deux programmes distincts doivent coexister : un dans le nord de la ville et l'autre dans le sud, conséquence de la division de la ville-même et de la difficulté pour les populations de se déplacer d'un quartier à l'autre. En effet, une ligne de démarcation, contrôlée par des milices, divise Mogadiscio et il est très risqué de la traverser. » (ACF, 5 February 2003)

"All UN agencies have a permanent presence in Somalia, although they have remained based across the border in Kenya since UNOSOM's withdrawal in 1995. With such an operation, there are a number of over-arching constraints. These include restricted and unpredictable access due to insecurity; lack of presence in much of southern and central Somalia of international partners; limited or late funding curtailing emergency prevention and preparedness, as well as longer-term activities where feasible. However, in light of the changing security dynamics in the country, UN projects and programs are increasingly being relocated to Somalia, in order to strengthen the local monitoring / response capacity in four main areas of Baidoa, Garowe, Hargeisa and Mogadishu. Additionally, a common UN House is being rehabilitated in Baidoa to accommodate further staff." (UN Appeal, November 2001, p.2)

"Continuing insecurity poses the greatest constraint for UN agencies and NGOs providing relief to the most vulnerable populations in Somalia. Although large-scale factional fighting is rare, banditry, extortion and kidnapping threats are rife in the absence of any authority to enforce law and order. This was demonstrated by the attacks on ACF, MSF and UNICEF in Mogadishu in late 2000 and early 2001.

Insecurity is often related to contractual and administrative disputes, preventing the modification of project designs and slowing rapid response to emergencies by aid agencies with risk-averse project designs. To overcome these constraints, UNICEF, WFP and other UN agencies ensure flexible operational profiles, balance national staff with members of all Somali clans, and use novel forms of sub-contracting and bonded transport.

Reaching vulnerable groups in Somalia is further complicated by the dispersion of destitute populations. For instance, since 1999, there are very few IDP camps in Somalia. Rather, IDPs and other high-risk groups are integrated within larger urban communities and rural villages. This renders their vulnerability less visible and makes targeting difficult, although the suffering of poor Somalis is no less real.

Four regions in Somalia – Middle and Lower Juba, Lower Shabelle and Benadir / Mogadishu – due to insecurity and lack of funding, have very little continued agency presence and programmes. Hence some 1.6 million Somalis are denied access to basic social services and relief assistance." (UN November 2001)

"The recent flare-up of fighting in Somalia has led to concern among humanitarian agencies over the impact of renewed conflict on an already vulnerable population. Fighting in the southern port of Kismayo and in the northeastern port of Bosaso has been among the heaviest seen in recent years. It comes at a time when aid workers are trying to sound the alarm over poor rains and crop failure in areas of the south, and the effects of general economic malaise as a result of a livestock export ban imposed on Somalia by the Gulf states in 2000. Randolph Kent, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia, Nairobi, talked to IRIN about the need to establish essential humanitarian access in the face of the new crisis. "(IRIN-CEA 7 August 2001)

"ACF is the only international NGO in Mogadishu with a permanent presence in both north and south Mogadishu." (UN Sub-Committee on Nutrition 25 July 2000, p. 31)

"The vulnerability of Somalia is exacerbated by the pull-out of most international humanitarian organisations, leaving Mogadishu very isolated. The threat to aid workers in Mogadishu was such that aid moved out of the capital and almost exclusively into the regions - particularly Somaliland, Puntland, and areas of southern Somalia - with expatriate presence in Mogadishu on a visiting basis only. In Mogadishu, since the pull-out of the humanitarian and military operation, expatriate staff are, in many ways, seen as a "commodity" or a "resource". Hostage-taking has sometimes resulted in huge pay-outs by local businessmen. Likewise, aid programmes are seen far more as an economic opportunity than a humanitarian effort - in terms of employment, finances and equipment. Not only an economic asset, the expatriate aid worker is also a political target, with resentment over the international military and humanitarian effort still a factor.

International organisations have therefore headquartered themselves in Nairobi and operate 'in absentia' through a skeleton local staff, which results in large proportions of available funding being used for logistics and salaries - and has increased feelings of resentment. One consequence of this is that Mogadishu has become one of the most isolated capitals in the world. Apart from the strictly controlled aid flights, no commercial flights as such operate from the capital - chartered small aircraft from Nairobi, carrying the stimulant plant qat, take only one or two passengers at a time. Information is therefore very scarce, and dependent on the security perspective of humanitarian agencies based in Nairobi - which try to act in concert over threats, kidnappings and killings in order to protect staff and programmes. This extreme isolation of Mogadishu and lack of information in itself inhibits development.

[...]

Western humanitarian organizations maintaining a rudimentary presence in Mogadishu are ICRC, MSF Spain, Action Internationale contre la Faim, Peace and Life (Sweden), and Daily Bread from Germany. United Nations offices include representatives from UNDP, FAO, UNHCR, WFP and WHO. These humanitarian agencies presently have no permanent expatriate presence and depend on a skeleton structure of local staff. Some local Somali humanitarian organizations have made efforts to work in the camps, but lack funding. For example, the Somali Refugee Agency SORA, founded in December 1998, has mapped out the camps and compiled lists of families, adults and children, as well as the main health and sanitation problems." (IRIN-CEA 27 April 1999)

Serious challenges facing the TNG regarding improvement of security and humanitarian access (2001)

- Security situation has been new president's biggest challenge and main priority
- Mogadishu business community has provided 300,000 USD per month toward establishment of a security force

"In Somalia, the Transitional National Assembly and the new Government have stated their determination to address the chronic insecurity prevailing in the South and other areas of Somalia. Opposition to the

establishment of a new Government is generating new forms of instability with potential regional dimension that may pose a security concern for the humanitarian community." (UN 2001, p. 13)

"The biggest hurdle is the security situation, particularly in Mogadishu - which the new government decided was nevertheless secure enough to move to. Although the security situation has improved considerably over the last two years, businessmen and international humanitarian staff still rely on protection from militia, and an absence of law and order means fire fights between gunmen and clans can break out without restraint. Talking to reporters after his arrival, Abdiqasim said the security situation would be his priority.

[...]

Somali political sources pointed out that, in order to succeed, the government must have a cohesive cross clan force that answers only to a centralised authority, and not to their respective clans. Presently, the militia and their 'technicals' - jeeps mounted with heavy weaponry - belong to the clan. "We have to break the link between the security forces and the clans" said a businessman. Previously, faction leaders proved unable to break the clan's grip on the militias and their weapons. They depended on clan allegiance to utilise gun men they were otherwise unable to pay or equip.

As a central authority, the interim government now faces the challenge of finding the means to pay its nascent security force - and also equip it. The Mogadishu business community, tired of large overhead costs on security, have so far pitched in to the tune of \$300,000 a month toward the establishment of a security force for Mogadishu. 'How long can they sustain this?' a Mogadishu resident posed.

Local and international expectations will focus on the ability of the new government to get a grip on Mogadishu. During the Djibouti peace process, when clan representatives negotiated power, the Hawiye, who control the capital, were given the presidency in recognition that it was the only way to reestablish peace and security in Mogadishu - after a decade of competing Hawiye sub-clans laying waste to the city. 'The Hawiye created this mess, they have to sort it out', one of the clan representatives said during the peace talks.' (IRIN-CEA 16 October 2000, "Security")

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES

National response

Authorities in northern Somalia have done little for IDPs (2003)

- Both the Somaliland and Puntland authorities recognize the needs of highly vulnerable communities however lack resources to respond to their needs
- Authorities in northern Somalia still need to develop comprehensive policies targeting IDPs
- As the Guiding Principles of Operation reiterate, the local authorities are accountable for "the protection, safety and well being of populations living in the areas over which they claim control"
- The Administrations of Puntland and Somaliland have not designed comprehensive IDP policies particularly concerning shelter and property issues
- Some officials have blocked and diverted assistance meant for IDPs, according to the UN

"In the northwest and northeast the administrations are not enthusiastic to design a comprehensive policy targeting the IDPs and returnees e.g. issues of urban planning, legal status and property rights. There are some cases where officials have blocked efforts to effectively assist these communities and in some cases diversions of assistance from IDP camps were reported." (UNCU, 30 July 2002, pp.2-3; 34-5)

"Local capacities to assist these groups vary greatly within Somalia. In 'Somaliland' and 'Puntland,' local authorities are increasingly recognising the special needs of highly-vulnerable communities but lack both the necessary human and financial capital to address them. The lack of resources impedes the implementation of their commitment to provide services for even the most vulnerable. In some areas, local authorities have yet to fully embrace and prioritise the development of comprehensive policies targeting IDPs.

[...]

Accountability

It is recognised that there are four stakeholders in the provision of aid assistance: the beneficiary community; the local authority; the donor and the aid agency. Within this relationship, international aid agencies shall hold themselves accountable to both the beneficiary communities (that their needs are met) and the donors (that assistance is provided for the proposed purpose). Local authorities, on their part, shall hold themselves accountable for the protection, safety and well being of populations living in areas over which they claim control." (UN, 18 November 2003, p.14,15)

Coordination

The Somalia Aid Coordinating Body (SACB) (1994-2004)

- The Somalia Aid Coordinating Body (SACB) established in 1994 includes UNCT, NGO Consortium and the Red Cross Movement
- The SACB has established a Working Group on Rule of Law and Protection to strengthen coordination and collaboration in this field

- In Somaliland the UN and NGOs coordinate their work through the sub-office of the SACB established in February 2003 in the Ministry of Planning and Coordination in Hargeisa
- In Puntland, improved stability enabled agencies to revitalise coordination between local authorities, OCHA and SACB
- In 2003 OCHA deployed four national officers to improve coordination in Kismayo, Belet Weyne, Huduur and Mogadishu
- SACB's five sectoral committees provide close co-ordination in specific sectors and establish humanitarian ground rules
- SCAB developed the Guiding Principles of Operation to implement the principles of humanitarian law
- MSF withdrew from SACB in July 2001 in effort to maintain neutrality

"Since 1993 aid assistance to Somalia has been influenced by a unique experiment aimed at consensual decision-making between donor community, UN Agencies and NGOs. After the Humanitarian Assistance Conference in December 1993, in Addis Ababa, the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) was established to undertake most of the tasks associated with aid coordination including information sharing, common planning and implementation. It consists of donors, the UN Country Team, the NGO Consortium, and The Red Cross Movement. The NGO Consortium is a voluntary association of the approximately 60 international NGOs working in Somalia. **The Red Cross Movement includes the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), and the Somali Red Crescent Society (SRCS).**

Six years on, the SACB has become an important forum whereby the main aid constituencies in Nairobi share information within the various sectors and themes of emergency and developmental assistance. Over time the SACB has developed into a system of committees and working groups that facilitate the coordination of aid agencies. It comprises a policy level (Executive Committee) and an operational level (led by the Sectoral Steering Committee) and a public interface (the Consultative Committee)." (UNRC 4 February 2000, sect. 1.4.A.3)

"The Somalia Aid Coordination Body also established a Working Group on Rule of Law and Protection, which aims to strengthen coordination and collaboration among international and local partners in these fields." (UNCHR, 30 November 2003, para.95)

"In Somaliland, UN agencies and international and local NGOs are continuing to develop appropriate coordination mechanisms, supported by a sub-office of the SACB Secretariat established in February 2003 in Hargeisa in the Ministry of Planning and Coordination. In Puntland, following a prolonged absence of aid international aid workers due to insecurity, UN agencies and NGOs, with support from OCHA, focused on in 2003 revitalising the previously functioning coordination mechanisms established in cooperation with local authorities, with support from the UN Coordination Unit/OCHA and the SACB Secretariat.

In southern and central Somalia, the level and effectiveness of coordination varies, largely because insecurity has frequently and for extended periods of time disrupted evolving coordination mechanisms and dispersed key actors. In response, OCHA in 2003 deployed four national officers to Kismayo, Belet Weyne, Huduur and Mogadishu to help strengthen ongoing coordination efforts in situ throughout southern and central Somalia. These officers cover the regions of: Lower and Middle Juba; Hiran and Lower and Middle Shabelle; and Bay and Bakol; as well as Mogadishu. To date, this has enabled the strengthening of coordination among UN agencies in Mogadishu, as well as between UN and NGOs operating in Hiran region, Huduur and Kismayo, and aid actors have requested assistance in strengthening coordination in other areas, such as Jowhar and Merca. However, due to continuing insecurity and logistical obstacles, there remains a need for many activities to be coordinated and decided upon at the Nairobi level, through the SACB mechanisms." (UN, 18 November 2003, p.20)

"In implementing their various mandates, individual UN agencies continue to coordinate and cooperate closely together through the range of readily available mechanisms, including the framework of the UN Country Team (UNCT), the CAP itself and the SACB. The recent recruitment of five national Humanitarian Affairs Officers for the south/central zone has enabled OCHA to start building a field coordination network that will greatly enhance the role of SACB in its efforts at strategic coordination of aid activities in the country. In particular, the decentralisation of coordination will improve the participation of Somalis and Somali leadership in the coordination process, and allow more decision making to take place closer to the ground. The SACB has set up a secretariat in Hargeisa to allow this process to develop in "Somaliland" (UN, 3 June 2003, p.5).

"In the case of Somalia, external donors, UN agencies, and NGOs have created a formal mechanism, the Somalia Aid Co-ordination Body (SACB) as a forum to co-ordinate development and humanitarian approaches, policies and strategies in Somalia.

The SACB is a unique structure for a unique development context, facilitating co-ordination that under normal circumstances would involve the participation of an organ of the State. The SACB's five sectoral committees provide close co-ordination in specific sectors, and play a valuable role in managing the prioritisation and programming of global issues." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p.15)

The Guiding Principles of Operation (June 2002)

"In an effort to promote humanitarian principles and human rights and to reduce the chances of aid manipulation and insecurity, the UN agencies have instituted, with their partners, a number of initiatives to ensure a principled framework for intervention. Chief among them are the *Guiding Principles of Operation*, which were developed on the basis of the following frameworks for international activities in Somalia, in effect since the early 1990s.

Code of Conduct for International Rehabilitation and Development Assistance to Somalia
SACB Policy Framework for Continuing Co-operation in Somalia
SACB Operational Framework for Continuing Co-operation in Somalia

Drawing from these sources, as well as international humanitarian law and principles, the newly endorsed *Guiding Principles of Operation* provide a framework for the interface between international aid representatives and local authorities in Somalia through the establishment of the basic responsibilities and roles of each group and covers aspects such as recruitment procedures, immunities and privileges, information sharing and procedures for the settlement of disputes. Plans are underway to translate this document into Somali, alongside a comparative analysis of the humanitarian elements of Islamic teachings, in an effort to build awareness among local authorities, as well as among agency and UN partner staff, of their purpose. The *Guiding Principles of Operation* were developed by a SACB working group and endorsed by the SACB Executive Committee in June 2002." (UN, November 2002, p.16)

MSF withdraws from SACB (2001)

"The international medical aid organisation Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) today announced that it has withdrawn from the Somali Aid Coordination Body (SACB). MSF fears that continued coordination through the SACB will be in conflict with the organisation's principle of neutrality and impartiality in conflict areas.

According to the organisation, the Coordination Body's mandate to 'provide policy and operational co-ordination for rehabilitation and development activities' has led some SACB actors to be increasingly involved in peace-building efforts. However, with a view to recent political developments in Somalia, MSF sees peace-building activities by humanitarian organisations as a threat to the basic principle of neutrality and impartiality in providing assistance to people in need, which could limit the access to such a population.

The organisation sees the trend within the SACB to - sometimes publicly - affirm and support peace-building through the support to Transitional National Government as a threat to the neutrality of humanitarian assistance, and understands it is not the humanitarian agencies' role to strengthen any administration.

Over the last few months, MSF has tried to reverse this trend from within the SACB. However, this did not lead to satisfactory results. According to MSF, the needs of the Somali people should be the only criteria for such assistance." (MSF 11 July 2001)

UN Coordination (2004)

- The fact that UN agencies and NGOs are based in Nairobi creates a disconnect between Nairobi and the field
- Often the SACB assumes a parallel coordination role to OCHA
- One major impediment to efficient field coordination is that field posts requiring competent international staff remain unfulfilled
- OCHA's coordination role with local NGOs and civil society could be strengthened through continued support with the Wartorn Societies Project's affiliates
- The UN Country Team (UNCT) comprises 13 UN agencies
- The UN Coordination Unit (UNCU) is responsible for facilitating coordination among the UNCT in Nairobi and in operational areas

"Overall coordination of assistance to HVCs in Somalia is affected by three factors, namely a) that the UN agencies and most NGOs are based in Nairobi thereby creating a much greater disconnect between 'capital' and field than would normally be the case; b) that in the absence of Government in much of the country, the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) has assumed a coordination role that at times appears to run parallel to that of OCHA's; and c) all too often, it is difficult to coordinate effectively and reliably with local stakeholders.

[...]

A major problem that OCHA has faced in providing good field-coordination is that of placing competent international staff into the field - even the national staff posts remain unfilled in Luq and Bossaso. The Hargeisa international post has been vacant for over eighteen months and the Baidoa post (currently moved to Wajid) has been unfilled for almost a year. The former is now to be filled but will also have responsibility for Puntland, which, given the needs in Somaliland, risks overstressing the capacity of one person. Every effort should be made to fill the international post for south/central Somalia, not only for heightened field coordination but also for the confidence-building factor that more international presence brings to this region.

OCHA's coordination role with local NGOs and civil society could be strengthened through continuing support and consolidation of links with the three Wartorn Societies Project's (WSP) affiliates, and especially with the Center for Research and Dialogue in Mogadishu, as these can act as entry points for interaction with key national stakeholders." (OCHA IDP Unit, 16 April 2004)

"The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs is expanding its field presence through the recruitment of additional staff in country. Its primary objectives are to strengthen field coordination in collaboration with the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB); to negotiate and maintain humanitarian access; to promote humanitarian policies, including the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement; to ensure that the needs and rights of internally displaced persons and other vulnerable communities are being met; and to manage information. SACB has established a secretariat in Hargeysa to allow this process to develop in "Somaliland". The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs also chairs the SACB

Humanitarian Response Group to ensure a rapid, appropriate and coordinated response to emergencies." (UN GA, 11 July 2003)

"The UN Country Team (UNCT) is comprised of 13 UN agencies, several large project teams, as well as a number of organizations with observer status. Each of these organizations has a responsibility for good management towards effective achievement of its individual mandate. In addition to their individual agency responsibilities for good management, collectively the UNCT is responsible for good management in four main areas affecting the efficiency and effectiveness of interventions in Somalia" (UN December 1998, p. 19). These are (i) ensuring ongoing consensus on the priority problems, the strategies to address them, and the division of labour among UN agencies and their partners; (ii) strengthening of its 'area-base' approach through the necessary flexibility to take into account differing circumstances and attitudes in different parts of Somalia, as well as employing participatory approaches and emphasizing Somali leadership and responsibility; (iii) improving the monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian assistance and development activities, as a management tool, and (iv) continuing to seek ways to reduce and to share the high cost of operation in Somalia, such as the transport savings achieved through the UN Common Air Services.

[...]

Primary responsibility for IDPs rests with their governments. In the case of Somalia, where there is no central government, local authorities must in principle accept this responsibility, though in practice these entities are not yet sufficiently capable to provide IDPs much protection. The international community therefore must do its utmost to assist. Recently, the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator was given the mandate to ensure the protection of and assistance to IDPs, and to coordinate implementation of the activities by UN Agencies and partners which are operational in Somalia.

[...]

The UN Coordination Unit (UNCU) is responsible for facilitating coordination among the UN Country Team in Nairobi and in operational areas. In Nairobi UNCU helps to assure representation of UNCT interests in various multi-agency forums, particularly the committees of the Somalia Aid Coordinating Body (SACB). In Somalia the UNCU is responsible for facilitating and, where appropriate, assisting operational UN agencies to coordinate among themselves in terms of common issues of policy, administration, logistics, security, planning and programme implementation. UNCU's main functions are: (i) secretariat support to the UN Country Team; (ii) support to UN humanitarian affairs in Somalia; (iii) human rights advocacy, and (iv) monitoring of and reporting on UN activities in Somalia." (UN December 1998, pp. 20, 53, 64)

The NGO Consortium (2002)

- The NGO Consortium is a voluntary association of international NGOs working in Somalia
- Due to the state vacuum in Somalia, international NGOs have become donor's implementing partners, in turn international NGOs used local NGOs as implementing partners

This is "a voluntary association of virtually all the international NGOs working in Somalia, i.e. currently about 25 active agencies. The Consortium, with its seven-member Executive Committee, has three main aims: exchange of information of common interest and concern, including technical information and lessons learned; orientation of NGOs new to Somalia; and a 'cascade' system for rapidly notifying members of urgent matters. Consortium members meet in Nairobi and in Hargeisa every month. Its elected executives help to represent NGO interests in the various SACB committees." (UN December 1998, p. 63)

"In response to the vacuum created by the absence of a Somali state many donors have turned to international NGOs to act as their implementing agencies. These NGOs have, in turn, gravitated towards structures familiar to them and used local NGOs as implementing partners and sources of local input." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, June 2002, p.15)

UN Joint Action and Recovery Plan for Somalia (JARP) launched in 2002

- JARP prepared by the UNCT is a common framework for agency programming in humanitarian, recovery and development assistance aimed at strengthening coordination
- In the absence of a functioning national partner, UNCT partnership includes local and regional authorities, civil society, national and international NGOs
- Strategy of JARP is to use humanitarian and development assistance for grass roots peace-building complementing IGAD and supported by the UN Trust Fund for Peace-Building in Somalia
- JARP's 4 priorities include 1) protection and integration 2) primary and vocational education 3) maternal and child health 4) food security
- JARP focuses on IDPs protection and integration needs and longer-term development needs including governance, rule of law, institution-building, economic recovery and support civil-society
- The inter-agency Joint Working Group (JWG) will be responsible of information exchange on JARP progress and four working groups will monitor JARP's implementation

"1.The UN Joint Action and Recovery Plan (JARP) for Somalia for 2002-2003 is a common strategic framework for the humanitarian and development activities of UN agencies operating in Somalia. It aims to strengthen UN coordination in programming, resource mobilisation and programme execution, and through this to increase the UN system's impact in Somalia.

2.The JARP was prepared by the UN Country Team (UNCT) during 2001-2002, drawing on frameworks established by the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) and the annual UN inter-agency consolidated appeal (CAP). At the end of 2003 the UNCT will review implementation of the JARP and, based on findings, extend the JARP (with revisions as needed) or prepare a new JARP or equivalent to cover a multi-year period beginning from 2004, in line with the harmonisation of agency programming cycles scheduled for 2004.

3.The strategy and priorities set out in the JARP were formulated by the UNCT on the basis of its assessment of the humanitarian and development situation in Somalia. In the absence of an overall national partner, the UNCT drew on a range of partners and sources for its assessment and determination of priorities. These included local and regional Somali authorities, civil society organisations, national and international NGOs and individual agency assessments and reports. JARP priority areas were selected according to criteria of consensus over priority issues, areas of existing collaboration, and areas and activities where the UN has a comparative advantage and most impact.

4.The return of peace and stability in Somalia is of paramount importance for the avoidance of further humanitarian crises and for the development of the country and its people. The JARP sets out a strategy for the UN system in Somalia to use humanitarian and development assistance *to build peace from the grassroots up, creating conditions that will help sustain an eventual agreement between warring parties*. This approach aims to complement UN support to the efforts of the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), or other concerned parties, to bring about peace through political negotiations. It is supported by the establishment in 2002 of the UN Trust Fund for Peace-Building in Somalia, which is intended to support ground-level peace-building activities by agencies and supplement the inter-agency CAP for Somalia.

5. The JARP is structured around four overall priority areas for assistance, which were formulated and developed by thematic working groups during 2001: (i) Protection and integration, (ii) Primary-level and vocational education, (iii) Maternal and child health, and communicable diseases, and (iv) Food security.

[...]

7. In **Protection and integration**, the JARP defines the overall objective or intended outcome of UN assistance as: *Increased protection and sustainable integration of refugees, returnees, IDPs, demobilised militia (including women and children) and resident vulnerable populations, supported by improved governance and economic recovery.* The UN system will aim to address together the immediate humanitarian and protection needs of vulnerable populations, and the longer-term development needs, such as governance, the rule of law, institution-building, economic recovery and the development of civil society. The JARP sets out a framework of outputs and activities in two areas:

Capacity building of local and regional authorities and civil society organisations; and
Increased economic opportunities.

[...]

The inter-agency Joint Working Group (JWG) is responsible for assisting the exchange of information about on-going and planned programmes and facilitating the development of joint initiatives.

13. Other bodies with roles in UN system coordination and support include: the Heads of Agencies group, the Security Management Team, the Joint Working Group (composed of senior programme officers), the UN Coordination Unit / OCHA, the Humanitarian Response Group, the Gender and Human Rights Working Group, the Operations Working Group, the Information Officers Group, the Statistical Working Group and the Data and Information Management Unit. Four thematic groups, each with a designated lead agency, are responsible for monitoring the goals and objectives set out in the JARP and for liaising within the UN system and the broader aid community to ensure optimal distribution of programmes and resources." (UN, 27 September 2002, pp.3-5)

International response 2004

UN CAP 2004 for Somalia will focus on meeting the needs of IDPs

- UNCT identified UNIFEM as Head Agency for coordinating and monitoring the UNCT protection and human rights activities
- UN and participating NGOs appeal for over US\$ 110 million through the UN CAP for Somalia 2004
- Three strategic goals within the Common Humanitarian Plan of Action, (CHAP) are strengthening human rights, good governance and economic development and meeting basic needs and self-reliance
- The CAP specifically targets IDPs, returnees, minorities, as well as ex-combatants and youths who otherwise will continue to be destabilising forces
- In 2004, humanitarian and recovery needs are not expected to change significantly, whatever the outcome of the Somalia National Reconciliation Conference
- In the event of the successful creation of an all-inclusive government in 2004, there will be need to step up demobilisation and reintegration activities for IDPs and refugees

"At its Annual Retreat held in Nyeri Kenya from 14-16 January 2004, the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) for Somalia, in reviewing progress on its strategic operational objectives for 2003, discussed and agreed upon the UNCT strategic objectives for 2004. The UNCT identified Heads of Agency who will be responsible for coordinating UN activity and monitoring and reporting progress against each of the strategic objectives.

[...]

PROTECTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS (UNIFEM)

Strategic Objective: to ensure better protection and respect for human rights in all respects of vulnerable communities in Somalia, including internally-displaced persons, returned refugees and minority groups, and to raise the standards of monitoring of, and compliance with, human rights standards.

Specific Activities/Targets: a consistently applied rights-based approach to all UN programming; application of the recently-developed UNCT livelihoods approach and implementation of subsequent recommendations in at least two specific locations inside Somalia; capacity building of local authorities and stakeholders on roles and responsibilities for fulfilment of UN IDP Guiding Principles in at least two locations inside Somalia; promotion of the integration of human rights standards into legislative and policy reforms at regional and, if possible, national levels; establishment of regional human rights institutions; adoption of a systematic and high level advocacy initiative on human rights and protection of vulnerable civilians with all Somali leaders; strengthening of existing local human rights monitoring and reporting mechanisms and of the UNCT's response capacity to provide protection and assistance to vulnerable populations." (UNCT, 19 March 2004)

"Within the framework of the [Common Humanitarian Plan of Action] CHAP, the UN and participating NGOs will continue to work closely with local authorities and communities towards the following three strategic goals:

- Enhance the protection of, and respect for, the human rights and dignity of Somalis;
- Help emerging governance structures, civil society groups and communities to gain the skills to function effectively and contribute to the stability and economic development of Somalia;
- Save lives, alleviate human suffering and help vulnerable communities become self-reliant.

While recognising the humanitarian imperative to address the needs of all Somalis given both the severity and scope of vulnerability in Somalia, projects in this CA will to the greatest extent possible focus in 2004 on meeting the needs of the acutely vulnerable groups of IDPs, returnees and minorities. About 70,000 to 100,000 ex-combatants are also targeted not based on traditional measures of vulnerability, but as a special category of, mainly youth, which if not meaningfully integrated into society, will continue to act as a destructive force, creating anew or exacerbating existing vulnerabilities.

[...]

Given the context and planning assumptions (see sections 3.1 and 3.2.1), response plans in this Appeal are based on the expectation that humanitarian and recovery needs will not significantly change within the year. [...] whatever the outcomes of the Somalia National Reconciliation Conference. Further, given that climatic indicators now predict a "normal" year for Somalia, programmes in this CA are based on the assumption that total crop production will continue at levels below 70% of the post-war average, with no large abnormal livestock movements or deaths occurring.

[...]

Monitoring the provision of international assistance in Somalia is difficult, chiefly due to persistent insecurity and the resultant lack of access. UN agencies and NGOs will continue in 2004 to strengthen efforts to jointly monitor progress against the CHAP goals and objectives, not only of aid delivered but also of the overall strategy, through the mid-year review, as well as more systematic engagement under the direction of the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator.

The inter-agency programme outlined in the Appeal will cost the United Nations and participating NGOs US\$ 112,876,825 in 2004. For a summary of the requirements of this appeal by agency, sector and project, please refer to Annex I. It is hoped that the international donor community will continue, through financial and in-kind donations to this appeal, to assist the UN and NGOs to better meet the needs and build the capacity of Somalis through timely and effective aid interventions.

[...]

Should the Somali National Reconciliation Conference produce an all-inclusive government in 2004 (Scenario 1), humanitarian and recovery needs throughout Somalia are not expected to significantly change within the year, with the exception of an immediate acceleration of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration activities, as well as in the return of refugees, and potentially for the resettlement of some internally displaced persons. Comprehensive planning for such a scenario continues within the UN, led by

the United Nations Political Office in Somalia (UNPOS) in cooperation with the UN Resident the Humanitarian Coordinator. Complementarity between the CAP and programmes in support of peace building are being ensured. In the meantime, ongoing programmes in support of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), as well as the integration of returnees and IDPs, are included in this CAP.

Other factors that might in 2004 necessitate an extraordinary humanitarian response and disrupt humanitarian operations include widespread drought or flooding (Scenarios A and B). However, climatic indicators now predict a "normal" year for Somalia and programmes in this CAP are, therefore, based on the assumption that total crop production will continue at levels below 70 percent of the post war average, with no large abnormal livestock movements or deaths occurring. While there are no standard indications to support the increased likelihood of major flooding in Somalia in 2004, the progressive deterioration of river control systems and lack of comprehensive rehabilitation activities have increased the likelihood of heavy rains causing serious incidents of localised flooding, accompanied by damage to farmlands and possibly short-term displacement including, malaria and cholera outbreaks. To better prepare for such eventualities, operational early warning mechanisms, field-based inter-agency preparedness measures, including contingency planning, and community response plans are being developed by UN agencies, NGOs and donors under the SACB Flood Working Group.

In the event that the situation deviates from these assumptions, the CAP will be revised accordingly.

[...]

In 2004, the aid community, in cooperation with its local counterparts, will strive to:

- enhance the protection of, and respect for, the human rights and dignity of Somalis;
- help emerging governance structures, civil society groups and communities to gain the skills to function effectively and contribute to the stability and economic development of Somalia;
- save lives, alleviate human suffering and help vulnerable communities become self-reliant." (UN, 18 November 2004, p.2,16,18)

UNDP programme for the reintegration of returnees and IDPs (2003)

- At the request of the authorities of the Northwest and Northeast Somalia, UNDP and UNHCR are assisting IDPs and returning refugees to reintegrate
- 70% of the Programme went to quick-impact projects to meet basic needs in partnership with UNHCR, WHO, UN-Habitat and ILO
- 30% of the Programme invests on long-term development aims included good governance and capacity-building
- **Rights-based approach particularly targets IDPs who seriously lack access to basic services in northern areas**
- The programme will include activities in Human Rights, health, education, water and sanitation, environmental rehabilitation, with the participation of the target population

"The authorities of Northwest and Northeast Somalia have requested for the support of UNDP and UNHCR in the process of reintegrating returning refugees and displaced populations through the provision of basic social services. Due to the magnitude of this challenge, it was agreed during the first implementation phase of the project that to achieve this successfully, a **multi-sectoral, multi-agency coordinated approach** and development-oriented activities was required.

Projects for quick-impact in areas of immediate need were implemented in Northwest Somalia and inter-agency joint programming activities have been successfully carried out in partnership with UNHCR, WHO, UN-Habitat, and ILO for the formation of Local Systems.

The overall strategic goal of the programme is two fold addressing: **Immediate basic needs and longer-term development needs** (change to regular text) to ensure sustainability through the support of the formation and strengthening of local capacities and to promote good governance in the area of reintegration at the local level. Identification of needs and implementation of activities will be in collaboration with local communities concerned, including inter alia local development committees. Based on reintegration priorities identified during the first phase, 70% of the investment should be allocated for the provision of basic services and 30% for capacity development activities. Implementation of project activities will take place through sub-contracts with UN Agencies, national and international NGOs and local contractors following UNDP rules, regulations and procedures.

[...]

ACTIVITIES

Considering a rights-based approach addresses issues of concern for all, but also gives special consideration to the poor and vulnerable sections of society, and considering a rights-based approach can guarantee some "safety nets" and targeted policies for the poor [...], UNDP/RRIDP is addressing the lack of access to basic services affecting returnees and IDP's alike in the main settlement areas in Northwest Somalia, and plans to start programme activities in Northeast Somalia in January 2004, and eventually another areas of Somalia where operational conditions allow effective operations.

For the UNDP Reintegration of Returning Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons Programme, the practical application of a rights based-approach means a variety of distinct activities which are being **implemented under integrated management, these components include Human Rights, Health, Education, Water and Sanitation, Environmental rehabilitation and Participation:**

- Construction and provision of water and sanitation facilities for the most vulnerable returnee and IDPs settlement areas.
- Construction and provision of education facilities for the most vulnerable returnee and IDPs settlement areas.
- Construction and provision of health facilities for the most vulnerable returnee and IDPs settlement areas *(please refer to the UNDP project proposal presented jointly with WHO, as a specific component of the UNDP Reintegration of Returning Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons Programme, included within the Health Sector of the CAP).*
- Implementation of community-based programmes to rehabilitate watersheds and protect ecologically fragile zones.
- Dissemination and awareness of Guiding Principles of Internal Displacement, International Laws and Treaties on Humanitarian Assistance, non-discrimination of minorities and aliens.
- Capacity building of local administrative bodies in their traditional role of basic service providers, as well as to allow them to perform more innovative functions based on effective management of available resources, and to perform a more catalytic role based on the joint identification of needs and subsequent search for new partnerships through the consolidation and promotion of Local Systems.

OUTCOMES

The expected situation in the areas of intervention at the end of the Reintegration of Returning Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons Programme will be the following:

- Each of the areas of intervention with rehabilitated basic social services necessary to create a sustainable environment for the reintegration of returnees and IDPs;
- Local administrative bodies strengthened in their capacity of basic services providers. The extent to which national actors have the capacity to participate in and facilitate the reintegration process has major implications on bridging the relief-development gaps;
- Somali Civil Society, national, regional and local administrations aware of Guiding Principles of Internal Displacement, International Laws and Treaties on Humanitarian Assistance." (UN, 18 November 2003, p.122)

UNDP programme to strengthen district and local health structures in the northwest where IDPs and returnees concentrate (2003)

- Health structures in northwestern Somalia were destroyed or seriously damaged during the war and there are no health services at district level
- The UNDP reintegration programme has already improved the provision of health services to IDPs in urban areas
- The programme will be implemented in collaboration with WHO in the districts of Awdal, Waqooyi Galbeed and Togdheer, where a significant number of IDPs have settled
- The programme aims at upgrading health facilities where existent and establishing new ones, and it includes capacity building in health management

"As a result of Somalia's civil war, hundreds of thousands of Somali began fleeing to neighbouring countries. Since 1997, some refugees returned to northwestern Somalia. During the war, most of the health infrastructure such as hospitals and clinics were either destroyed or damaged. Many of the trained health personnel left the country and are only starting to return home. The health personnel in the country have limited opportunities to upgrade their skills and receive appropriate training in the sector.

Despite the current level of stability and peace existing in northwestern Somalia, there are no sustainable health care provisions/services at the district level that adequately respond to the health needs of the community.

Under the UNDP Reintegration of Returning Refugees and IDPs Programme significant progress has been made, in particular in the provision of basic social services, including health care for returnees and IDPs of major urban areas. Infrastructure for basic health service delivery and essential curative and preventive health services are available to the general population, including the most vulnerable. Local authorities, including district and village level development committees, are being established and playing a vital role in implementing basic services. An integrated area development action plan was developed in 2002 through the active involvement of key sectoral ministries, local government and international aid community.

The proposed District/Local Health Strengthening Programme is one of the components of the UNDP Reintegration of Returning Refugees and IDPs Programme social service provision, and it is partially funded by UNDP. The programme will be implemented in collaboration with WHO and other UN agencies.

ACTIVITIES

- Establishing and strengthening of appropriate district health management systems and structures with the involvement of local authorities, local government and communities at large.
- Establishing and/or upgrading of health facilities targeting rural and nomadic populations.
- Building the capacity of health managers, health workers and community representatives in order to deliver better services, improve management, and increase effective and efficient planning.
- Developing and implementing alternative health care financing strategies to contribute to sustainable district health systems.
- Increasing access to basic health care at the community level through community health volunteer programmes and outreach services.
- Establishing functional referral systems at district levels.

These activities would take place in three selected districts of Awdal, Waqooyi Galbeed and Togdheer, where a significant number of returnees and IDPs have been settled.

OUTCOMES

- Health facilities in select villages, towns, districts and regions are rehabilitated, and services provided to communities are upgraded.
- Local health systems are established at the district and village levels.
- Management structures are set-up, trained and strengthened to help communities' sustain at the district level, including the planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation capacities of personnel.
- Women's groups and community health volunteers will participate in all stages of programme implementation, identification, prioritisation, formulation, monitoring and evaluation in order to develop a community-based health promotion system." (UN, 18 November 2003, p.151-2)

UNFPA programme for emergency reproductive health for IDPs in Puntland (2003)

- Somalia has one of the highest maternal mortality rates in the world at 1,600 deaths per 100,000 live births and the situation may even be worse among IDPs who have limited access to already scarce social services
- Bossaso where 28,000 IDPs live has only one mother and child health centre for the whole population of the city and IDP women have little access to it
- The programme will include training of health staff, health education, strengthening existing health centre and medical supplies

"Somalia has one of the highest maternal mortality rates in the world, currently estimated at 1,600 deaths per 100,000 live births. The situation may even be worse in IDP/returnee settlements, which have limited access to already scarce basic social services, including health services. Adult prevalence of the HIV, though still comparatively low at an estimated 1%, is thought to be increasing rapidly, especially among the more mobile segments of the population.

The port city of Bossaso in northeastern Somalia has a total estimated population of 120,000 people. In addition, an estimated 22,000 IDPs live in various camps around the city in a very precarious situation. The IDPs are mostly from the regions of southern Somalia where they fled sporadic fighting and clan skirmishes. Some of the camp dwellers are internal migrants from the nomadic inland areas, attracted to the town by trading needs or by the possibility of jobs in the transport industries. These mobile populations are particularly vulnerable to sexually transmitted infections and HIV infection. The IDPs are grouped according to clan affiliations in some ten major camps around the city. These camps are places of extreme deprivation. Overcrowding and lack of services have turned them into hotbeds of infectious diseases.

Bossaso has only one mother and child health centre, which is supposed to cater for the entire population of the city. Women living in the IDP camps have limited access to this centre, either in terms of physical distance or in terms of facility capacity.

ACTIVITIES

- Training of reproductive health staff.
- Carrying out a baseline study in the IDP camps.
- Providing essential medical supplies and equipment through a mobile clinic.
- Strengthening of Bossaso mother and child health centre.
- Implementing information, education and communication activities to raise awareness on reproductive health and family planning and HIV/sexually transmitted infections among the IDP community.
- Monitoring and supervision.
- Incorporating HIV prevention, including condom distribution, in all activities.

OUTCOMES

The project will contribute to the strengthening of the capacity of the Bossaso mother and child health centre to deliver reproductive health services through a mobile outreach service and to improve the overall reproductive health status of the IDP population.

- IDP women of reproductive age will have better knowledge of safe delivery and family planning methods.
- A greater proportion of the deliveries taking place in IDP camps will be attended by trained medical staff, contributing to a reduction in maternal mortality.
- HIV and sexually transmitted infection incident rates will be reduced among the male IDP population, reducing the effectiveness of this bridge between high-risk and low-risk groups.

If successful, the project will be handed over to local health authorities and will be replicated to IDP camps in other cities." (UN, 18 November 2003, p.152-3)

UNICEF and UNIFEM programme for HIV prevention and care (2003)

- While HIV prevalence in Somalia is low, there is great danger for the spread of HIV due to population movements and very low awareness and misconceived ideas about HIV
- UNICEF and UNIFEM programme will target youths, women and IDPs
- **Awareness and preventive activities will aim at cultural-sensitive behavioral change**
- Counseling and testing will also be key activities

"While the HIV prevalence rate is still relatively low in Somalia, various factors contribute to increased likelihood of a 'full-blown' HIV/AIDS epidemic. These include low awareness levels as well as widespread misconceptions and the stigma associated with HIV/AIDS. If these factors are not urgently addressed, the humanitarian situation in Somalia will further deteriorate.

Prevention among youth is a central element of any successful HIV/AIDS response. Youth friendly health services, adapted to the local context, are among the documented international best practices for HIV/AIDS prevention and control. A core element of the approach is voluntary counselling and testing, as knowledge of sero-status is a prerequisite for active personal prevention, in the event of HIV negative diagnosis, or positive living, in the event of HIV positive outcome. The service provision is removed from the health sector and integrated into youth and life skills development, recreation, information and psycho-social support activities in a non-judgemental and information-rich environment. This context enables a continuum between accessible secondary/primary prevention as well as care and support interventions. It not only encourages the transfer of knowledge on HIV/AIDS prevention and control, but also provides the tools and encouragement to put the knowledge into practice.

In order to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS in a low prevalence setting, it is important to reach out to population groups with identified risk-behaviours or heightened circumstantial vulnerabilities. Culturally sensitive behaviour change communication interventions that make use of popular forms of expression through poetry, songs and drama target these 'bridge populations,' including clients with sexually transmitted infections, militias, economic migrants, refugees, internally displaced and mobile populations. Most affected communities are key to the prevention of a large-scale generalised epidemic. Outreach-based project design enables flexibility and responsiveness to actual needs.

One of the target groups of this project is IDP women. They suffer from multiple vulnerabilities for HIV transmission, ranging from low literacy levels to poor access to health care. The role of women's groups and NGOs as community mobilisers is critical for communicating gender and HIV/AIDS issues. A recent study by Health Unlimited revealed that many women have distorted information on the ways in which HIV and other sexually transmitted infections are spread, as well as about the methods of protection and

treatment. Cultural taboos that discourage open discussion of such issues only strengthens the imperative of providing accurate health messages to the community, in particular young women.

The two appealing agencies will work together to develop effective communication tools and increase the access of vulnerable groups to services.

UNICEF ACTIVITIES

The introduction of youth friendly health services and behaviour change outreach will be gradual and targeted, and be based on the comparative advantages of actors, as well as vulnerability assessments of priority locations. These concepts are based on international models, adapted to respond to the specific needs in the context of Somalia.

- Introduction of integrated youth friendly health services in six priority locations.
- Support to life skills development programme and youth development activities as an entry point to create demand for and promotion of youth friendly health services.
- Development of context-specific information, education and communication and targeted behaviour change communication tools for community outreach.
- Training of behaviour change communication and voluntary counselling and testing community outreach implementers.
- Introduction and active promotion of behaviour change communication and voluntary counselling and testing community outreach.

UNIFEM ACTIVITIES

- Train IDP women mobilisers to communicate gender issues pertaining to HIV/AIDS in women's groups and community health workers.
- Develop relevant gender sensitive advocacy tools using the suggestions provided in the SACB HIV/AIDS communication strategy framework
- Conduct training for women's organisations to build their capacity to advocate for gender specific issues in relation to HIV/AIDS and to educate women on the link between gender-based violence and HIV/AIDS.

UNICEF OUTCOMES

The project will directly contribute to the accessibility of HIV testing and related service provision as well as increased awareness of risk behaviours and ways to enhance prevention among at-risk population groups.

- Six facilities are equipped with trained staff and supplies for youth friendly health services.
- Tools for effective life-skills based education for in-and out-of school youth are developed and used in a minimum of 20 formal/informal youth facilities.
- Tools for community development theatre and appreciative inquiry are developed.
- Six behaviour change communication and voluntary counselling and testing community outreach teams are established and a minimum of 120 sessions held.

UNIFEM OUTCOMES

- A minimum of 50 female IDPs are trained as community mobilisers who mentor women's groups to develop relevant advocacy tools.
- The number of gender based violence survivors counselled to seek medical and legal support is appropriate.
- The understanding of the gender dimensions of HIV/AIDS among a number of health workers and community leaders deepens, and they develop positive attitudes towards female IDPs living with HIV/AIDS and the survivors of gender based violence.
- A number of advocacy campaigns by women NGOs are focused on the HIV/AIDS-related human rights and health issues facing IDP women." (UN, 18 November 2003, p.165-6)

UNDP programme for rule of law and security, demobilisation and reintegration including psycho-social support particularly targeted at IDPs (2003)

- Programme which started in Somaliland and will expand to the South aimed a weapon control and sustainable reintegration of demobilised people

"Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration is the most pressing priority for peace, and a pre-requisite for basic governance and development. Thus the programme activities will benefit the entire community and in particular IDPs, returnees, and other minority groups. The project aims to achieve its objective through proper weapons control, reduction in the size and cost of the armed, security and custodial forces and through sustainable reintegration. The implementation of the project has begun in Somaliland and will be extended to other parts of Somalia when appropriate.

ACTIVITIES

- Conduct security sector reviews.
- Provide technical assistance for developing a security policy and strategy.
- Conduct disarmament and stockpile management.
- Conduct demobilisation and reintegration of security forces members.
- Provide psycho-social assistance to the demobilised.
- Conduct capacity building.
- Implement exploratory pilot projects in Puntland and Southern Somalia.

OUTCOMES

- Security sector reviewed and policy developed.
- Technical advisory to payroll systems developed.
- Demobilisation policy/plan developed by Local Authorities.
- Capacity to plan and manage DDR by Local Authorities.
- Demobilisation of 2,500 ex-combatants achieved.
- Psycho-social component of Somaliland Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme developed and piloted.
- Initial preparatory DDR project developed and piloted in Puntland.
- Multi-year DDR programme designed for Somalia." (UN, 18 November 2003, p.104)

ODI study advocates for an integrated protection approach to assistance in Somalia (2003)

- The impact of aid in Somalia has often been criticised for reinforcing existing socio-ethnic divisions of power and legitimising de facto authorities
- The legitimising factor of aid endangers staff security as aid agencies are no longer perceived to be neutral
- The bottom line between operational pragmatism and principled pragmatism is rarely defined which opens the door to manipulation of aid
- ODI study suggests the need to transfer responsibility from de-facto authorities to Somali civil society such as religious leaders, clan elders and businessmen
- Also suggested is to use mobile resources such as health clinics cutting across clan and areas
- It is also argued that the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacements and international laws should be promoted to complement sharia, xeer and secular laws operating in Somalia
- Monitoring of the operational and protection environments should use indicators such as degree of access to resources based on clan representation or the role of gatekeepers

"One of the key issues raised during this research concerned the potential negative impact of aid. In Kismaayo, aid resources are likely to be a source of dispute, destabilising an already-fragile environment and reinforcing the existing socio-ethnic divisions and patterns of power. This raises a number of issues (and challenges) outlined below. One interviewee asserted succinctly that if these are not addressed, it would be like putting 'fuel into the fire'. Rather than simply 'rushing in' in an ad hoc manner, this suggests a more tentative and coordinated approach to committing resources, which incorporates answers to these challenges in an operational plan.

1. How does the international community work with a de facto authority like the JVA without conferring credibility on its occupation and illegitimate administration? Although this issue is not new in Somalia, the perceptions of other (excluded) groups remain important.³¹ If this is ignored, the aid community runs the risk of adding to the security threat faced by international and national field staff.

Some interviewees suggested that potential aid flows into Kismaayo and the Lower Juba will be insignificant compared to the revenue collected from the sea and airport. What is sought by the JVA is not material assistance per se, but a reinforcement of their claim of authority in the wider Somali political arena. By working with the JVA clan duopoly in Kismaayo, the international community is, in the eyes of the clans inside and outside of Kismaayo town (whether *guri* or *galti*), legitimising this claim, albeit inadvertently. The international community is no longer perceived to be neutral in its engagement in the region. This is reinforced by concentrating assistance in Kismaayo to the exclusion of other clans and clan areas.

To counter this, a much more transparent and inclusive approach to engagement in the region, not just in Kismaayo, is required. All clan parties in the region, *guri* and *galti*, must be approached and brought into negotiations on the provision of assistance. This is a much higher tier of engagement than that normally considered in Somalia (where negotiations are held with local authorities only). However, this may lead to accepting some degree of trade-off between identified needs and operational pragmatism.

2. The international aid community in Somalia falls somewhere between operational pragmatism and a principled approach ('principled pragmatism'). But how pragmatic (or unprincipled) is the international community prepared to be? There must be a bottom line below which agencies suspend activities or withdraw. This is rarely defined, and the negative impacts of aid are rarely monitored. Consequently, the boundaries of operational pragmatism continually shift. Although this lack of clarity and consistency allows the international community to continue working in contested environments, this comes at a cost: it allows those seeking to manipulate the resources of aid to operate between these fuzzy boundaries.

3. International assistance must be sensitive to the multiclan topography of Kismaayo and the Lower Juba in general. This means 'thinking multi-clan' at several levels:

[...]

But how does the international community work with or around entrenched socio-ethnic divisions to ensure that aid resources most benefit those targeted? Similarly, how does the international community work with or around aid gatekeepers? Ultimately, we can either accept some degree of diversion (the pragmatic approach) or enforce a zero-tolerance policy (a principled approach). However, both require that effective monitoring and evaluation indicators are applied and enforced.

[...]

5. The focus of humanitarian assistance is on those considered most vulnerable. To encourage local 'ownership' of project activities, the international community should endeavour to use the 'pillars' of Somali society (such as the *ulamaadiin* or religious leaders, clan elders and the dynamic business community) to work for the benefit of the vulnerable and the implementing agencies. Using these 'pillars' to provide resources (such as cash or credit), act as guarantors, or simply to facilitate access, transfers the responsibility and risk of potential asset loss to these intermediaries.

6. Due to the fragility of the security situation and the multi-clan topography of the region, 'mobile resources' such as mobile health clinics or veterinary services may be more appropriate than 'fixed' facilities such as hospitals. These could operate a routine multi-location and multi-clan itinerary (Tuesday in Buaale, Thursday in Afmadow, and so on) and could incorporate health education literature (on HIV/AIDS, female genital mutilation and sanitation). In case of renewed fighting, they could be 'evacuated'. This approach has the added benefit of addressing two common complaints: why do all the resources focus on Kismaayo; and why do they tend to focus on urban areas?

[...]

The development of ground rules can lead logically to the first elements of building a protective environment. Once the ground rules have been developed, a process for building the capacity of duty-bearers can begin, typically by promoting the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. This would normally be led by OCHA, in collaboration with other agencies according to capacity. This can appear to be wildly optimistic in the kind of predatory operating environments like Kismaayo, and especially where there is likely to be resistance to 'Western-driven' instruments of international law. However, the engagement of religious leaders and arbiters of customary law (xeer) and secular law may place the Guiding Principles within a more appropriate cultural fabric. Of course, there is the potential for discrepancies in the detail between the three bodies of law operating in Somalia (i.e., sharia, xeer and secular law) and international law, but the essence or spirit of the laws are compatible and complementary.

[...]

In Somalia, UNDP has an active programme (Rule of Law and Security or RoLS) incorporating reform of the judiciary, police reform/ training and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) components, all of which have great potential to address some fundamental issues affecting Somali society, especially vulnerable communities. Having IDP issues at the heart of the programme would enable a focus on aspects such as improving access to the law for IDP women, or incorporating IDPs into the police forces, and including the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement as well as human rights law as an integral part of police training.

[...]

A monitoring and evaluation component is central to the efficacy of this approach. This paper has argued that many of the problems facing IDPs and other vulnerable groups in Kismaayo relate to the linkage between socio-ethnic status and access to resources. This infers that monitoring and evaluation must move away from implementation checklists, noting the number of wells constructed, tarpaulins delivered or people fed. What is needed in addition are more subtle indicators that depict the real impact of activities. These indicators could include the degree of access to resources based on clan representation (and particularly the degree of access that minority clans can develop); the presence or absence of aid gatekeepers and the degree of resource diversion; the scale of the security threat – to beneficiaries, staff and the wider community – or even changes in port activity. As this component underpins basic and structural needs phases, and indeed should provide the impetus for continuing engagement or disengagement, a systematic reporting system that is transparent and involves all stakeholders should be established." (ODI, 31 December 2003, p.14-5, 17-20)

International response pre-2004

CAP 2003 focuses on integration and protection of IDPs

- Three main goals of CAP 2003 for Somalia are 1) saving lives and improving livelihoods 2) integration and protection of IDPs and vulnerable groups 3) good governance, peace building and economic recovery
- CAP 2003 presents 56 projects from 14 UN agencies and NGOs which amount to US\$ 77,824,105

- Decentralized rural livelihood support: new UN strategy to reduce permanent and temporary displacement, prevent destitution of resident populations, encourage return in rural areas and check IDP numbers in urban areas
- Main obstacles to humanitarian operation are insecurity, the difficulty to distinguish IDPs from seasonal migrants, and lack of central authority
- Lack of willingness of de facto authorities to protect and respond to IDP needs and ensure the safety of aid workers are common challenges facing the UN
- Working against positive perception of the UN in Somalia are its past failures notably: the UNOSOM intervention, the stalled Arta process, the non-recognition by UN Member States of 'Somaliland' and the establishment of the TNG
- Operations are further constrained since 1995 by the costs of cross-border operations and resulting inability to gather quality and systematic information
- UNICEF is one of the few agencies who established operational sub-office in Jowhar Somalia

"As before, the Appeal for 2003 is structured around three key themes that are reflected throughout the programmes, but with a greater emphasis on emergency preparedness, cross border operations, public information outreach and the protection of the vulnerable, as follows.

Saving lives and improving livelihoods by: 1) meeting immediate needs and strengthening the coping mechanisms of vulnerable households, 2) enhancing access to vulnerable populations through strengthened field security, information and coordination measures, and 3) promoting linkages with regional organisations and other actors within the Horn of Africa.

Assisting in the integration and protection of internally-displaced populations, minorities, refugees and returnees and other vulnerable groups by enhancing protection efforts aimed at: 1) building of local/national protection capacity, 2) participation in governance, 3) increased humanitarian access, 4) awareness raising among populations and local authorities, and 5) the development and promotion of durable solutions.

Supporting good governance, peace building and economic recovery through projects aimed at enhancing organisational and managerial capacities of civil society organisations and NGOs through labour-intensive public works projects and effective market support designed to: 1) stimulate household income, 2) ensure adequate access to and terms of trade, 3) encourage the lifting of the livestock ban, and 4) diversify income generating opportunities.

The Appeal contains 56 projects from 14 UN agencies and several Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). It totals US\$ 77,824,105." (UN, November 2002, p.1)

"To this end, the UNCT for Somalia is developing three national, multi-agency initiatives that encompass both the humanitarian and developmental elements of a peace-building strategy. The first, *Skills for Somalis* will coordinate and build upon current efforts to provide technical and vocational training skills to Somali youth through the establishment of "centres of excellence." The second, the *Provision of Basic Services* project (as an extension of the existing Reintegration of Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons programme), will attempt to ensure that the four basic services of water, sanitation, health and education are available to vulnerable communities of returnees, IDPs, host populations and marginalised minority groups (such as the Bantu and Bajuni tribes). The third, *Technical Expertise for Somali Professionals* will provide opportunities for the exchange of experience and knowledge and the development of uniform standards of operation to Somali professionals from a wide range of technical and administrative disciplines." (UN, November 2002, p.3 ;4)

"Decentralised, rural livelihood support to resident populations at risk of destitution could help prevent further long-term economic displacement and reduce the need for the temporary economic displacement of

those seeking urban labour to complement inadequate rural livelihoods. It could also potentially have a rural pull effect, encouraging the return of the economically displaced to their homelands. This type of approach would not solve the IDP problem, but can help reduce the pressure on and the numbers of IDPs in urban settings, where assistance is extremely difficult to provide and only temporary in nature.

To this end, based on the work done by UNCU/UN-OCHA, UN agencies and partners working in Somalia are stepping up their efforts to address the needs of IDPs and further explore livelihood approaches to assistance. Meanwhile, the authorities in areas where IDPs have sought refuge bear the responsibility of ensuring their protection and the respect of their rights. The UN and its partners have an important role to play in supporting and promoting their efforts in this regard." (UN, November 2002, p.17)

Challenges

"While UN agencies and NGOs have provided limited assistance to IDP communities, insecurity in areas such as Mogadishu and the Lower Juba, Lower Shabelle and Gedo regions has regularly hindered their efforts. As a result, aid agencies are exploring new ways to work effectively through local partners.

Additionally, the large number of seasonal, economic and thus temporary IDPs, mixed with the mass of more permanent IDPs, compounds the difficulties of providing assistance difficult in a manner, which does not encourage urban migration." (UN, November 2002, p.17)

"Efforts to address the humanitarian and development needs of Somalia are hampered by, among other constraints, insecurity and limited humanitarian space; the lack of a central authority and the political fragmentation of local substitutes comprised mainly of *de facto* authorities. Further, the unwillingness or inability of these authorities to take responsibility for the special needs of IDPs and other vulnerable groups, as well as the safety and security of aid workers, often hinders progress. Aid actors in Somalia must also counter misperceptions of the UN as a whole due to the role and failures of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), UN involvement in the stalled Arta process, the UN's position on Somalia (including the non-recognition by UN Member States of 'Somaliland' as an independent state) and the status accorded to the TNG [...] through its participation in the General Assembly, the origins of which are often misunderstood.

Further, overcoming the inherent constraints of a cross-border operation continue to pose challenges to the UN system, which has been based in Kenya since UNOSOM's withdrawal in 1995. These include high operating expenses and the difficulties of remote information gathering and analysis. As a result, the UN, while continuing to maintain its Somalia country offices in Nairobi, will continue to the greatest extent possible, security conditions permitting, to decentralise programme management to Somalia and establish operational sub-offices, as has been done with some success by a few operational agencies such as UNICEF, which maintains a base in Jowhar." (UN, November 2002, p.14)

UN Humanitarian Coordinator called on the Somali leaders to publicly reaffirm their commitment and accountability for the protection of IDPs in areas they control (2003)

- Strengthening IDP protection one of three priorities of the UNCT (2003)
- UNHCR urged Somali leaders to prevent displacement of civilian populations
- The UNHCR warned Somali leaders that they could be prosecuted under the International Criminal Court for the abuses and human rights violations against IDPs
- UN is developing a multi-agency approach to strengthen protection mechanisms in Somalia through an inter-agency advocacy campaign
- OCHA and UNICEF assessing IDP protection and livelihood needs in Kismayo
- Protection programmers have only received 21% of the funds appealed in CAP 2003

- UNDP Operational Framework recommends that the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement be placed into an Islamic 'faith-based' context to attract Somali leaders' acceptance

"Subsequently, in an open letter to Somali leaders attending the Somali Peace Talks in Kenya, Gaylard expressed concern over the appalling living condition of IDPs in the country in early April. The letter said in part that *Throughout Somalia, IDPs often do not have access to even the most basic of social services, and many suffer violations of their human rights, including denial of access to basic services, and sexual violence against women and girls.* Gaylard called on the leaders to publicly reaffirm their commitment and accountability for the protection of IDPs who are located in areas under their control and urged the leaders to ensure that civilians were not displaced. He cautioned the leaders against the abuse and violation of the rights of the displaced, and warned that the International Criminal Tribunal could in future prosecute those suspected of such violations." (OCHA, 31 October 2003, p.8)

"The third priority area for the UNCT is protection and human rights, which aims to ensure better protection in all respects for vulnerable communities in Somalia, including women and children, IDPs, refugees and minority groups, and to raise the standards of observations of human rights. To this end, the UN and its partners are in the process of developing a comprehensive multi-agency approach to strengthening protection mechanism in Somalia, including through a sustained inter-agency advocacy campaign in respect to Somalia leaders, including faction representatives, elders, religious leaders and civil society. OCHA, in collaboration with UNICEF and others, is conducting a pilot assessment of IDP needs in Kismayo that will combine protection and livelihood needs using analytical framework. This is an innovative approach intended to enable a multi-sectoral, potentially, multi-agency response and involve working closely with local authorities to assist them in meeting their responsibilities for the protection of civilians, in particular IDPs. It is hoped that this approach can then be replicated throughout Somalia. Humanitarian policy workshops are also being planned for the Juba Valley Alliance (JVA), as well as the Puntland authorities. Continued funding of OCHA, operational agencies in the field and NGOs are critical to the success of these initiatives. Existing protection programmes in the CAP are only 21% funded." (UN, 3 June 2003, p.8)

« The Guiding Principles for IDPs should underpin all protection activities throughout Somalia. The principles must be clearly laid out to all authorities at every opportunity. Although based on international conventions and covenants that Somalia signed, there appears to be considerable ambivalence among Somali leaders to accepting the Guiding Principles either because they are not legally binding or because they are seen as a 'western' instrument. The latter concern should be addressed by placing the Guiding Principles into an Islamic 'faith-based' context since all the principles are also manifest in key Islamic writings." (UNDP, 31 July 2002, p.5)

IRIN Outreach Radio Project covers IDP and human rights (2003)

- In January 2001 OCHA launched the IRIN Outreach Radio Project on the premises that freedom and pluralism of information can build human security and democracy
- The project supports conflict resolution and reconciliation and informs about the humanitarian situation
- Features cover peace process, education, refugees and IDPs, justice and the rule of law, health, HIV/AIDS, women's issues, the environment and human rights

"Access to impartial, contextual information and open debate has the power to influence the behaviour of communities and nations. This access can strengthen human values and allow even remote populations to participate in governance and shape development. Without freedom and pluralism of information within societies, there can be no true democracy or human security.

The IRIN Outreach Radio Project was set up in January 2001 to provide impartial news and information to the victims of humanitarian crises and to provide them with a better understanding of the activities and objectives of the humanitarian community. At the same time, this project is an attempt by IRIN to seriously address the information and technology imbalances that exist in developing countries by undertaking the capacity building of radio stations in Somalia.

IRIN Outreach Radio chose Somalia as a pilot project with the aim of providing the Somali people with access to vital and unbiased information. Somalia was identified and selected in a bid to support its peace process and its attempt to emerge from conflict. Radio was recognised as the most efficient channel through which to reach local communities and to make them aware of what was happening in their country by countering propaganda and misinformation.

ACTIVITIES

The Outreach Radio Project supports efforts towards conflict resolution and reconciliation by providing radio broadcasters in Somalia with special audio features which are recorded in the Somali language in the IRIN studio in Nairobi, and sent to state and private radio stations for broadcasting. The themes of the audio programmes (features) cover such areas as developments in the peace process, education, refugees and IDPs, justice and the rule of law, health, HIV/AIDS, women's issues, the environment and human rights. In 2003, the project will continue to support the peace process by helping to make local communities, internally displaced people and refugees aware of what is happening in the country and involve them in issues that affect their lives.

In 2003, IRIN radio will be incorporating new ideas into its project so as to ensure a more bottom-up approach to radio programming. Key elements of the Radio project will be the formation of partnerships with NGOs and other voluntary bodies, such as community-based organisations and other groups engaged in community development in selected rural areas, specifically those affected by conflict.

Through its collaboration with NGOs and community-based organisations, IRIN will promote humanitarian principles and human rights through training and advocacy, as well as enhance the capacity of national radio journalists to gather and deliver relevant, timely and impartial information. Part of this approach will involve bringing local radio journalists together for intensive training with the radio team and working with them on the ground in their respective countries. Co-productions between IRIN and local radio stations will also be undertaken, allowing partners to learn new production and digital editing techniques and encouraging them to abide by the fundamental principles and guidelines of professional, ethical and balanced reporting." (UN, November 2002, p.119)

OCHA IDP Unit workshop on vulnerable communities in Somalia (2002)

- OCHA IDP Unit convened a workshop on vulnerable communities in Hargeisa 21-24 July 2002
- It aimed at exploring how the international community can best support national actors to answer the needs of IDPs
- It aimed at determining responsibility and accountability for protection and assistance for IDPs
- It seeks ways to establish enhanced information base on IDPs
- The workshop gathered international and UN agencies and over half of the participants were Somali nationals
- Based on the workshop's outputs the Unit developed an Operational Framework for Vulnerable Communities

"The Unit for Internal Displacement in OCHA was requested by the UN HC/RC to act as co-facilitator for a workshop on Vulnerability Communities in Somalia convened in Hargeisa from 21-24 July 2002. Specifically, the Workshop was tasked with: _ Exploring how the international community can best support national actors committed to interventions that address the fundamental need of vulnerable communities, especially IDPs; _ Determining responsibility and accountability for protection, assistance and durable solutions for IDPs in Somalia; _ Establishing an enhanced information base on IDPs (how many, where, what condition, the primary needs, etc) drawn from participating UN agencies and NGOs currently operating inside Somalia.

The Unit was also required to produce a first draft of an operational framework for addressing vulnerable communities based upon the discussions and outputs of the Workshop. A Senior IDP Advisor from the Unit was deployed and was assisted by a junior colleague from the Unit.

3 The Workshop on Vulnerable Communities in Somalia

The workshop's 40 participants were drawn from a broad range of stakeholders, namely UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, UNIFEM, UNESCO, UNHCR, WHO, OCHA, OHCHR, IOM, FSAU, SCF (UK), CARE, IRC, Danish Refugee Council, WSP, IMC, CRD, Africa 70, Puntland Development Research Center, USAID, and the EC.

Well over half of the participants were Somali nationals, including representatives from Mogadishu, the south/central regions and Puntland.

The workshop evaluated a number of research papers on IDPs, minority groups and vulnerable populations and sought to define an operational framework through which the needs of such populations can best be addressed, especially in areas where there was little or no international presence.

4 The Operational Framework for Vulnerable Communities in Somalia

Based upon the workshop's discussions and outputs, the Unit developed a first draft of an Operational Framework for Vulnerable Communities in Somalia that proposes a set of objectives and operational modalities that the international community should adopt in assisting dedicated Somali actors in addressing the needs of vulnerable communities, including IDPs. The underpinning construct of the Framework is that leadership needs to be given to Somali actors and that a crosscutting 'livelihood approach' (based on a framework developed by DfID) should be adopted instead of the more traditional sectoral approach used by the UN. The Framework addresses the issues of vulnerable target population, the operational environment, protection and access, responsibility and accountability, roles of Somali, assets and vulnerabilities to be addressed, and resource mobilization.

5 Next Steps [...]

Pparallel to the Framework consultations, the OCHA Somalia team will develop a matrix of responsibilities, based upon the workshop findings, which will provide the basis for future systemic interventions on behalf of the most vulnerable." (OCHA IDP Unit, 7 August 2002)

Return and reintegration of uprooted populations is a key priority of the UN since 2002

- Joint UNDP/UNHCR project to promote sustainable reintegration of returnees and IDPs in northwestern and northeastern Somalia
- Reintegration efforts in Hargeisa, Burao, Bosasso and Garowe in Northern Somalia include dissemination of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement
- Many IDPs reside in areas of return therefore assistance programs target IDPs returnees as well as host communities totaling 670,000 beneficiaries

- Security conditions in the northeast and northwest of Somalia have attracted many displaced and returnees
- Return and reintegration greatly hampered by recurrent livestock import bans undermining absorptive capacity of the Northwest
- The programme addresses physical needs in sectors such as water, education and health, as well as long-term socio-economic requirements by strengthening policy and governance structures through participation and capacity-building
- The first phase of the programme will produce an inter-agency needs assessment in view to facilitate reintegration of IDPs and returnees
- The second phase will be in light of the assessment findings to implement projects to strengthen governance, enlarging economic opportunities and improving basic social services

"Saving lives and supporting livelihoods;
Supporting good governance, peace building and economic recovery;
Assisting resettlement and reintegration of displaced populations." (UN, November 2001)

"The Programme for Reintegration of Returning Refugees and Displaced Persons in Somalia is part of a sub-regional initiative launched by IGAD, UNHCR and UNDP to facilitate the reintegration of uprooted populations in the Horn of Africa.

[...]

Initial implementation will be in four pilot districts - Hargeysa and Burao in Northwest Somalia and Bosasso and Garowe in Northeast Somalia. It will then expand into other areas of northern Somalia, which require support in reintegrating returning refugee and displaced populations." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR, pp.1,2)

"As part of a sub-regional initiative to facilitate the reintegration of up-rooted populations in the Horn of Africa, a joint UNDP/UNHCR programme has been formulated and implemented to promote sustainable reintegration by providing adequate basic social services and economic opportunities for returnees and the host communities. During phase I of this joint UNDP/UNHCR programme, wide consultations have taken place to ensure the full participation of the authorities and the communities in reintegration activities. Mechanisms are also in place to coordinate activities of all UN agencies and international NGOs in returnees receiving communities. The second phase involves the implementation of identified interventions, initially in four pilot districts, and later expanding to other areas. The programme targets the northwestern and northeastern regions of Somalia as the two areas requiring support in reintegrating returning refugees and displaced populations

[...]

Efforts to promote human rights, gender equity and the eradication of all forms of discrimination – as necessary conditions for the return of refugees – included the dissemination in 'Somaliland' of the *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement* and international humanitarian and human rights law in the Somali language.

[...]

While opportunities for joint agency action to support reintegration were abundant, some of these could not be carried out due to lack of funding available to agencies." (UN, November 2002, p.9,10)

Implementing partners: UNHCR and UNDP:

"Between 1993 and 2000 UNHCR spent approximately US\$12.5 million (excluding international procurement such as vehicles, pipes, pumps etc.) on its programme in Northwest Somalia which served to facilitate the repatriation and reintegration process by rehabilitating and reconstructing water, infrastructure, agriculture and environmental projects through QIP mechanisms. Although all these project initiatives have been geared to benefit directly the returnees in their respective areas of origin, the internally displaced population and the population in the impacted areas have benefited and continue to benefit from the project assistance packages.

[...]

The UNDP-Somalia Programme Strategy has three inter-linked programme objectives: (i) Peace and Security; (ii) Governance; (iii) Economic Recovery and Poverty Eradication.

[...]

Other UN organizations involved:

UNICEF, UNESCO, UNFPA, WFP, WHO, FAO, IFAD, UNHCHR, UNIFEM

NGOs involved:

Danish Refugee Council (DRC), SC-USA, Swiss Group, IRC

Target groups:

"Based on UNICEF (1998) population figures, it is estimated that the pilot phase of this project will benefit at least 670,000 persons[...].

[...]

In a country that has to deal with the consequences of large numbers of people who are displaced, the distinction between internally displaced (IDPs) and refugees has little relevance. In the case of Somalia, refugees as well as IDPs may be reluctant to return to their home areas since they remain replete with mines. Many former refugees are now IDPs since on-going conflict often prevents them from accessing their regions of origin. Equally significantly, demobilised militia, who may still retain their arms, have little incentive to return to their original towns or villages.

The impact of these categories of displaced people upon the communities they enter and the needs of the displaced themselves rarely benefit from a process of categorisation. In this sense, any intervention must assume a holistic perspective that does not categorise different populations within a community but instead addresses the needs of the entire community. Viewing displacement from such a holistic perspective is the only way to foster durable solutions that will positively affect communities as a whole.

[...]

The Northeast have not yet developed such a specific plan to address repatriation and reintegration needs, but a recent statement the authorities in the Northeast highlighted the return and reintegration of refugees and IDPs as a high priority on their policy agenda. A thorough assessment of the specific needs of Northeast Somalia, particularly in relation to IDPs, is a crucial factor in ensuring that a successful reintegration and rehabilitation process occurs. The first phase of this programme needs to ascertain the current situation regarding returning refugees, IDPs and demobilised militias and the existing capacity to deal with this.

[...]

Justification:

"The authorities of Northeast and Northwest Somalia have requested support from UNDP and UNHCR to support the process of reintegrating returning refugees and displaced populations through rehabilitation activities. It is generally agreed that to achieve this successfully a multi-sectoral, multi-agency coordinated approach and development-oriented activities are required.

UNDP and UNHCR have built upon the experience gained through the implementation of the November, 1997 agreement on "Co-operation with regard to development activities affecting refugees and returnees", and this joint proposal for Reintegration of Returning Refugees and Displaced Persons in Somalia was instituted subsequent to this agreement." (IGAD/UNDP/UNHCR June 2002, pp. 1-15)

"Many of the IDPs actually reside in areas to which Somali refugees will return. Therefore targeting the returnees and ignoring the IDPs would negatively affect the reintegration process especially the reconciliation aspect. Although UNHCR is not directly responsible for IDPs in Somalia and does not provide individual assistance packages to them, they will benefit from the reintegration activities in those areas receiving returnees." (UN Appeal, November 2001, p.106)

"The present prevailing security conditions in many regions – particularly the northeast and northwest of Somalia – has prepared the way for the return and reintegration of many of these populations. UNHCR and

UNDP's joint efforts in Somalia are part of the Regional Programme for Refugee reintegration recognising the need to promote integrated and comprehensive development to returnees and resident populations alike, in areas of return as well as former host communities. The comprehensive and lasting reintegration and rehabilitation of returnees and IDPs cannot be sustained without rebuilding the productive capacities of the affected areas." (UN Appeal, November 2001, p.105)

NGO Response

UN, Red Cross Movement and over 60 NGOs work together with local authorities to provide humanitarian assistance (2003)

- The Common Humanitarian Plan of Action (CHAP) is developed by the UN together with 16 international NGOs, among which 10 are funded through the UN CAP 2004
- Through the SACB sectoral committees, The Red Cross Movement and over 60 NGOs work with local authorities where possible to plan, implement and monitor programmes

"Taking into account the needs of the population, the difficulties faced by local administrations and authorities in meeting them, and the absence of effective and constructive partners in some areas, the UN, the Red Cross Movement, and NGOs work to the greatest extent possible with local authorities and communities to provide the civilians most affected by the crisis with material support to ensure their survival and potential for self-reliance. The CHAP provides a framework for the humanitarian community, and when and where possible, for its close interaction with the authorities. Increasingly in Somalia, the CHAP is developed not by the UN system alone but by a host of international NGOs, who played a critical and equal role in developing, and in some cases are appealing for funds in this CAP. They are:

Action Contre La Faim (ACF);
 Adventist Development and Relief (ADRA)*;
 CARE International*;
 Cooperazione Internazionale (COOPI)*;
 Emergency Pastoralist Assistance Group (HISAN-WEPA);
 Handicap International (HI)*;
 HealthNet International*;
 Horn of Africa Relief Development Organisation (HORN RELIEF);
 International Committee for the Development of Peoples (CISP)*;
 International Medical Corps (IMC)*;
 Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)*;
 NOVIB Somalia (Oxfam Netherlands)*;
 Save the Children-United Kingdom (SCF-UK);
 UNA;
 World Concern International (WCI)*;
 World Vision (WV).

* Indicate those NGOs that have appealed for funds in this appeal.

The UN Humanitarian Coordinator, supported by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA), manages strategic coordination, and advocates for issues facing the beneficiaries and humanitarian community, in particular on humanitarian access. Through the SACB sectoral committees, aid organisations work to the greatest extent possible with local authorities and each other to plan, implement and monitor programmes in order to address the priority needs. The Red Cross Movement and

more than 60 NGOs contribute actively to this process by working closely in tandem with the strategy presented in this appeal." (UN, 18 November 2003, p.18,19)

Action Contre la Faim one of the only international NGOs assisting IDPs in Somalia since 1992 (2003)

- ACF assists about 6000 people displaced by fierce fighting in south western Somalia
- ACF admits more than 250 severely malnourished children in its Therapeutic Feeding Centres in Mogadishu
- ACF is one of only aid organizations working in northern and southern Mogadishu
- ACF programmes aim at reducing malnutrition and supporting clean water access

Bakool and Bay

Depuis octobre 2003, les populations civiles du sud-ouest de la Somalie sont victimes de luttes de pouvoir inter-claniques. Pris entre deux feux, les villageois ont dû fuir précipitamment, abandonnant tous leurs biens, pour trouver refuge à Walaq, Bilale et Wajid (régions de Bakool et Bay). Afin de venir en aide à ces 6 000 déplacés, Action contre la Faim a lancé en urgence un programme de distributions de farines infantiles et de kits de première nécessité.

Des civils victimes d'affrontements inter-claniques

Depuis la création d'une nouvelle région dans le sud-ouest de la Somalie, en mars 2002, un conflit ouvert oppose partisans Harins et Leysans. En octobre 2003, le conflit est entré dans une nouvelle phase encore plus violente, les populations civiles étant désormais directement prises pour cibles : mises à sac de villages, destructions des réserves de grains, exécutions arbitraires. Pour échapper à ces exactions, de nombreuses familles ont dû quitter précipitamment leur maison et se cacher dans les environs. Le fragile cessez-le-feu instauré fin octobre 2003 leur a permis de gagner, après plusieurs jours de marche, les villages de Walaq, Bilale et Wajid, plus au Nord.

Des milliers de déplacés dans une situation très précaire

Selon les estimations, le nombre des déplacés serait d'environ 6 000 personnes, dont près de 3 000 enfants. Dans des abris de fortune qui les laissent à la merci des intempéries, fréquentes à cette saison, manquant d'eau potable et de nourriture, ces populations totalement démunies sont dans une situation très précaire. Les premières évaluations montrent que plus de 10% des enfants souffriraient déjà de malnutrition. Cette situation pourrait se détériorer davantage dans les mois à venir : les mauvaises conditions sanitaires dans lesquelles vivent les déplacés risquent de favoriser des épidémies de choléra et de malaria, dont les enfants âgés de moins de 5 ans seront les premières victimes.

Des besoins urgents auxquels Action contre la Faim tente déjà de répondre

Présente en Somalie depuis 1992, Action contre la Faim est l'une des rares ONG à venir en aide aux populations. Pour porter secours aux familles déplacées dans le sud-ouest du pays, Action contre la Faim vient de lancer en urgence des distributions de nourriture et de kits de première nécessité (bâches, ustensiles de cuisine, couvertures, savons...). » (AAH, 16 December 2003)

Mogadishu

"More than 250 severely malnourished children are admitted each month to the two Therapeutic Feeding Centres run by Action Against Hunger in north and south Mogadishu, where the children receive intensive treatment and immunisation.

To add to this dramatic situation, cholera, an endemic disease, usually occurs from December to May and affects several thousand people each year.

Action Against Hunger is preparing to launch an anti-cholera programme amongst the most vulnerable to avoid the spread of the epidemic." (ACF, 21 December 2001)

"Etant l'une des rares organisations humanitaires encore présentes à Mogadishu, tant au sud qu'au nord de la ville, Action contre la Faim intervient tant auprès des populations déplacées dans les camps qu'auprès des résidents, marqués par des années de guerre civile. Elle s'emploie maintenant à lutter contre la malnutrition de la population, notamment des déplacés vivants dans la capitale et a pour objectif de développer le réseau d'eau potable. De plus, et afin de répondre à la grave crise alimentaire dans le sud, Action contre la Faim a récemment ouvert un programme nutritionnel dans la ville de Luuq, région de Gedo. Enfin, et afin d'apporter un soutien logistique à ces deux bases, Action contre la Faim vient également d'installer une base arrière dans la ville de Merca." (ACF 2000, "Contexte")

CARE projects for IDPs in areas of food security (2002)

- Objectives include improve food and livelihood security for 162,860 persons displaced in southern Somalia
- Food for work projects as well as Therapeutic Feeding for will primarily target IDPs
- CARE will purchase sorghum seeds from surplus areas to sell them to areas affected by conflict and drought such as Bay, Gedo and Bakol

"CARE proposes to significantly improve the food and livelihood security of 162,860 persons displaced by the continuing conflict in Somalia, through emergency and rehabilitation activities in 6 regions of Somalia. Food for Peace commodities will be incorporated into two major project components, including Food for Work (FFW) and Emergency Food Distributions (EFD). Supplementary and/or Therapeutic Feeding for extremely vulnerable individuals, primarily recent IDPs will be conducted through the assistance of other international NGOs operating in the regions.

Project Area: 24 districts in 8 regions - Middle Juba, Hiran, Bakol, Bay, Gedo, Lower Shabelle, Middle Shabelle and Galgadud." (Care, Project Information, 2002)

"This proposal is a request to OFDA to fund the provision of 350 metric tons of sorghum seeds to 17,500 farmers in the rain fed areas of Bay located in Southern Somalia. For the past 8 months, 158,000 people have been coping with critical food insecurity as a result of sporadic internal clan fighting, looting and limited water supply. In response, the international community, the UN, and PVOs have implemented a targeted relief assistance initiative in the regions of Bay, Bakool, and Gedo to support both residents and internally displaced populations.

The intent of this complementary project is to purchase locally available sorghum seeds from surplus regions and transport them along with CARE's food to the chronically vulnerable areas." (CARE, Project Information, 2002)

Islamic organizations have provided assistance in Mogadishu displaced persons' camps (1999)

"In the IDP camps, Islamic organizations provide some assistance to the displaced, but mainly during Muslim festivals. Some 20 or 30 head of sheep are delivered to each camp for the Eid festival. Otherwise, Islamic organizations are concentrating on orphanages, funding Koranic schools, or injecting money into business ventures. The main Islamic organizations operating in Mogadishu are the International Islamic Relief Organization; Al Haramayn; Al-Islah Charity; Monazamat Al-da'wa; African Muslim Agency and Muslim Aid UK." (IRIN-CEA 27 April 1999)

Selected activities of the Red Cross Movement

ICRC: the most active organization in central and southern Somalia since the 1990s (2004)

- In terms of budget, Somalia counts among ICRC's top ten operations in the world with over 300 projects country-wide
- Since the early 1990s ICRC has access to most regions of Somalia and maintains a deep understanding of Somali society and its problems through its national staff who focus on analysis, media monitoring, project assessment, dialogue and negotiations with authorities and liaising with Somali Red Crescent Societies (SRCS)
- ICRC established an office in Nairobi in 1994 with delegates who focus on programme strategy and management, project evaluation and skill-sharing
- ICRC has a programme to distribute staple seeds to 10,000 IDP families before the two main rain seasons
- ICRC provided essential household items to 17,450 families displaced by the violence (approx. 4-5 persons per family)
- ICRC supported the return of 3,300 displaced families to their place of origin with tools, essential household items, and seeds
- ICRC projects focus on agro-pastoralists and farmers' access to water and irrigation
- In the ICRC-supported hospital south of Mogadishu, as many as 90% of all patients are gunshot-wounded civilians most of whom are IDPs and street children
- The Somali Red Crescent Society (SRCS) is one of the only Somali institution functioning at the national level, ICRC's key partner

"In budgetary terms the Somali operation is among the ICRC's top ten operations worldwide. The ICRC is the most active organization in the conflictual regions of central and southern Somalia, its neutrality is widely recognized and it is well accepted by the Somali population including all the various political and traditional leaders and actors.

The ICRC is still well remembered for its role in the first half of the 1990s and while certain areas are temporarily out of bounds for security reasons it has regular access to most regions. A large spectrum of assistance activities, a network of experienced and qualified national staff, and its partnership with the Somali Red Crescent Society (SRCS) allows the ICRC to maintain a good understanding of Somali society and the problems it faces.

In many ways this is an ICRC operation unlike any other. The delegation itself has officially been based in Nairobi since 1994. The ICRC does not maintain any physical structures or transport fleet within Somalia itself. In order to remain effective and relevant in the country, it has over the past ten years developed and fine-tuned a set-up and an innovative modus operandi tailored to the operational reality.

Currently, there is in Nairobi a team of 13 expatriates attached to the Somalia operation. In 2003 this team succeeded in having an average of two expatriates inside the country each day. The role of the expatriate delegate focuses primarily on strategy and management of programmes, project development and evaluation, know-how and skill sharing.

Crucial to the entire operation is the ICRC team of 20 Somali field officers whose knowledge of the context enables them to carry out multifaceted tasks including: contributing to and updating of political analysis; media monitoring; identifying and assessing projects; establishing dialogue and carrying out negotiations

with community elders, private sector and various political or traditional leaders; liaising with regional branches of the SRCS; overseeing of logistics and security arrangements; hiring daily workers; and taking care of local procurement and rentals. In effect the national staff of the ICRC Somalia operation exercise more autonomy and carry more responsibility than is the case with ICRC operations elsewhere.

During all field trips to and within Somalia, ICRC field staff oversees all logistics and security matters. Security concerns remain foremost and measures are regularly adapted to the reality on the ground. Armed escorts are commonly used as a deterrent but are only one aspect of a comprehensive security strategy which includes systematic gathering of information, the development of a network of contacts and an ongoing dialogue with beneficiary communities - all of which amounts to a deliberate and prudent approach on the part of the ICRC.

[...]

While keeping a capacity to react to emergencies, the ICRC Somalia operation is very much project-based, with over 300 projects up and running throughout the country. In the sphere of Assistance (the bulk of the ICRC budget) there is a deliberate, integrated approach. In what is termed the 'Livelihood Approach', needs are identified and addressed across the economic security, health, and water and habitat fields, and a tailored solution is sought for the community in question.

[...]

The ICRC's assistance programmes focus on restoring or protecting the essential means of production of farmers and agro-pastoralists while ensuring water access for pastoralists. Special emphasis is put on irrigation facilities along the Shebele and Juba rivers (on which farmers rely heavily for their food production) through the rehabilitation of former pump irrigation schemes (PIPs) and water-controlling gates (GRIPs).

[...]

Through community projects (CIPs), cash is injected into communities with reduced access to food and moreover, ensures the rehabilitation of community-owned infrastructure. The rehabilitation of water points like wells and boreholes remains central to sustaining the corresponding livelihoods of agro-pastoralists and pastoralists in areas away from the rivers.

[....]

In Somalia there are two rainy seasons - the Gu between April and July and the Deyr between September and November. This means that there are two seasons for harvesting. To coincide with this, the ICRC carries out a distribution of staple seeds (maize, sorghum and sesame) before each rainy season (in March and in August) to some 10,000 small-scale farming families. This makes it possible for families, normally without access to seeds, to plant 1.5 ha of crops. A similar programme is in place to distribute staple seeds to 10,000 IDP families.

[...]

Today in Somalia the ICRC provides support for:

- 2 referral surgical hospitals in the capital, Keysaney in north Mogadishu and Madina in south Mogadishu
- 18 health posts jointly supported through branches of the SRCS
- 3 pre-hospital care facilities
- 5 oral rehydration centres

[...]

In January 2004, of a daily average of 50 inpatients some 60% were weapon-wounded as a result of clan fighting.

[...]

Madina is a 65-bed hospital in south Mogadishu and specializes in treating weapon-wounded and providing surgical care. Formerly a 500-bed facility offering a wide range of health care for the police force and the general public, the ICRC has supported the hospital since 2000 after a direct appeal from the local community elders. Today, Madina is the main referral hospital in Somalia and according to its chief surgeon, Dr Jusef Mohammed, "probably as many as 90% are gunshot-wounded civilians. And most of these civilians are street children or IDPs."

[...]

With 19 branches (one in each region of Somalia) reporting to one of the two coordination offices in Mogadishu and Hargeisa, the Somali Red Crescent Society (SRCS) is often cited as the only Somali

institution functioning at the national level. The SRCS is a key partner of the ICRC, especially in areas such as health (see above), dissemination and tracing." (ICRC, 9 March 2004)

Donor Response

CAP 2003 for Somalia received only half of the funds pledged (2003)

- Donor funding dropped by about 90% since the fall of the dictator Barre in 1991
- UNHCR's Inspector General urged donors to drastically increase their support in 2004 to reintegrate returnees and IDPs in Somalia
- CAP 2003 which initially requested US\$ 77.8 million for humanitarian relief was revised downwards to US\$ 71.5
- As of October 2003, 45,3% of the pledges were covered and 63% as of April 2004
- Funding levels rose in the sectors of coordination, agriculture, education, mine action and security
- Funding dropped in the sectors of food and water and sanitation from 48% in 2000 and 12% in 2003 respectively
- Projects for integration, protection, human rights and rule of law, and economic reconstruction activities could not be implemented due to lack of funding
- CAP 2003 only 26% funded at June 2003 out of US\$77.8 million targeting up to 900,000 vulnerable people
- Protection programmers were only 21% funded
- Donors response to the Somalia CAP 2003 is low in all sectors because funds earmarked for Africa were re-located to the Iraq crisis
- Assessment or programs indefinitely postponed due to unmet modest needs of CAP 2003

"Last year, all UN agencies received only \$35 million – or about half the requirements they had presented in the UN Consolidated Appeal for Somalia. Most of this was for humanitarian needs.

"This is totally inadequate in this critical transitional period, including for an increased voluntary return of refugees to safe areas of the country and for internally displaced populations to rebuild their lives with dignity," said McNamara. "The amount of support to all UN programmes and other agencies working in Somalia must be drastically increased in 2004 if these populations are to be stabilized.

[...]

Donor funding for Somalia has dropped by some 90 percent since the fall of the Siad Barre regime, and the country receives little direct transition and development aid. This has deprived the displaced of the most basic support. Currently, a drought in the northern part of the country exacerbates an already dramatic situation.

[...]

"Despite the poor conditions in the camps, thousands of refugees are reluctant to return home because conditions are even poorer in Somalia," said Simone Wolken, UNHCR's Representative for Somalia. "If donors want to further cut aid to the camps – as some do – they need to channel this support to Somalia to improve conditions there. Refugees need incentives, not just pressure, to go home." (UNHCR, 30 January 2004)

"The 2003 United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Somalia initially sought US\$ 77.8 million from the international community to enable UN agencies and NGOs to provide humanitarian relief to civilians affected by the crisis in Somalia. This was revised downward to US\$ 71.5 during the mid-year

review. Humanitarian assistance within the CAP framework aimed to complement relief assistance provided by Somalis themselves, international organisations and NGOs in the areas of protection, food aid, agriculture, shelter and non-food items, health, water and sanitation, education, mine action, governance, rule of law, integration and economic recovery and infrastructure. As of 13 October 2003 12 donors had given US\$ 32.4 million or 45.3% of the requirements. Please see Annex VII. for detailed funding tables.

While on par with the level of resources provided by donors to other longstanding crises, this is down from last year's CAP funding. Then, about the same number of donors provided US\$ 42.9 million, or 52%, of the total appeal of US\$ 82.6 million. Funding patterns also changed significantly from 2002 to 2003, with more funding being given to the coordination sector, which rose 51 percentage points, as well as to the agriculture, education, mine action and security sectors, whose funding rose on average by 17 percentage points. Funding of health activities remained steady at 34%. Funding dropped precipitously in the food and water and sanitation sectors, both of which were over funded in 2002 but in 2003 were only 48% and 12% funded, respectively. Funding for integration, protection, human rights and rule of law, and economic reconstruction activities dropped by an average of 13%. As a result mainly of under funding, projects in each sector could not be implemented. The three NGOs who participated in last year's CAP did not receive any funding, and as a result, their projects in the areas of agriculture, economic recovery and infrastructure, critical reproductive health, mine action and protection were also not implemented. While non-implementation of projects in the CAP did not affect the survival of the target population, the activities planned in these sectors could have provided an important opportunity for increasing beneficiaries' access to social services and self-reliance." (UN, 18 November 2003, p.7)

"United Nations (UN) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have achieved limited lifesaving and peace building interventions despite chronic under-funding. The current CAP is only 26% funded at the mid-year point, and a further US 53 million is requested to fulfill current requirements. Areas of particular concern regarding funding include the education, health, water and sanitation and economic recovery sectors.

[...]

Through the 2003 CAP, UN agencies and NGOs requested US 77.8 million targeting between 800,000 and 900,000 vulnerable people throughout Somalia. As of 22 May, the total response to the Appeal was US 18,367,014.

[...]

Existing protection programmes in the CAP are only 21% funded.

[...]

Efforts to initiate new programmes and maintain the pace of existing ones may be jeopardised if the modest needs of the 2003 CAP are not met in a timely manner. Some donors have already indicated that funds initially earmarked for Africa are now being re-allocated to the Iraqi response. In addition to the diversion of funding from Somalia activities, some programmes have already been delayed or indefinitely postponed as technical experts recruited to carry out assessments or support activities inside the country are increasingly, based on the travel advisories of their national governments, declining to accept employment within Somalia.

To achieve peace and stability in Somalia, the international community needs to remain fully engaged. Although dismally low, human development indicators have remained steady for the past several years, indicating the positive effect of humanitarian aid and development assistance in keeping the situation stable. However, without increased and sustained donors' commitment, the outlook for Somalia remains grim. Any reduction in the existing modest response efforts, both relief as well as medium to long term, would immediately upset the precarious balance achieved, with particularly devastating effects on women and children." (UN, 3 June 2003, p.1 ;4 ;8 ;9 ;10)

Funding to various organisations working with IDPs (2004)

- Government of Germany grants EUR 500,000 to ICRC which will benefit about 160,000 IDPs
- The European Commission allocates EUR 8 million to Somalia in 2004 and allocated about EUR 20 million since 2000
- Government of Japan granted over US\$1 million to the project implemented by UNICEF Humanitarian Programming for Internally Displaced and Unsettled Populations in Somalia (Aug 03)

"The Federal Foreign Office is providing EUR 500,000 from the humanitarian aid budget for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to be used to maintain healthcare services in Somalia. In a joint project with the Somali Red Crescent, the ICRC is running five hospitals in Mogadishu and central and southern Somalia as well as 24 first-aid centres and five cholera treatment centres. The ICRC will use the German contribution to finance medication and expendables for three months as well as training for local medical staff. The money will also help to provide some 160,000 internally displaced persons with aid including plastic sheeting, blankets and water canisters." (GOG, 25 March 2004)

"They will help pay for better access to healthcare and nutrition programmes, improve food and water supplies and sanitation systems and facilitate the return and resettlement of displaced people.

[...]

ECHO's priority for Somalia in 2004 is to address the core emergency humanitarian needs that persist as a result of the ongoing civil conflict, and which are compounded by climatic extremes such as drought and flooding. Access to basic health care services, clean water, sanitation and education is extremely limited with some 30% of the population of Somalia without access to any health services. The infant mortality rate is estimated at 132 per 1,000 live births. Malaria, acute respiratory infections and diarrhoea account for more than half of all mortalities in children under 5 years of age. Chronic instability has resulted in the break down of water supply systems, especially in central and southern Somalia. Only about 20% of the population have access to safe drinking water.

[...]

An estimated 500,000 people are expected to benefit from these activities over the next fifteen months. ECHO has provided more than €20 million to Somalia since 2000." (EC, 19 March 2004)

"1. On August 22 (Fri), the Government of Japan and the United Nations (UN) decided to extend assistance of a total of 1,104,860 US dollars through the Trust Fund for Human Security to the project "Humanitarian Programming for Internally Displaced and Unsettled Populations in Somalia" to be implemented by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF).

2. The purpose of this project is to address the impacts of conflict and natural disasters in Somalia and respond to the needs of internally displaced and unsettled populations. Activities include provision of emergency vaccinations to affected children, dissemination of health information on cholera and malaria, distribution of insecticide-impregnated mosquito nets, provision of nutritional support to malnourished children in affected areas, and provision of increased access to potable water.

3. This project is expected to improve the health of internally displaced and unsettled populations and to reduce child and maternal disease and mortality among them." (GOJ, 22 August 2003)

First ever meeting with Somaliland authorities and international donors (Sept 2003)

- Discussion focused on the needs of 600,000 people displaced in Somaliland
- UN Resident Representative in Somalia said funding trends were slowly increasing

"Ministers from Somaliland have held unprecedented talks with international donors and the United Nations. Foreign Minister Edna Adan Ismail described the meeting, held on Wednesday, as a breakthrough

for the self-declared republic, which is seeking international recognition. "It gives us status and it gives us political importance that we have never been accorded before," she told IRIN at the end of the talks.

Officials from Ethiopia and Djibouti also attended the day-long talks, which focused primarily on the 600,000 displaced people in Somaliland. Other participants included the UN refugee agency (UNHCR), the World Food Programme (WFP) and UNICEF, the World Bank and embassy officials from the US, Britain, Canada, the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, Japan and Finland.

[...]

Maxwell Gaylard, head of the UN Development Programme (UNDP) Resident Representative for Somalia, who initiated the discussions, said the trend for donor support was slowly increasing. "It is the first time that we have brought together, or been able to bring together, the authorities of Somaliland directly with the international donor community," he said." (IRIN, 19 September 2003)

Gaps

Critical protection and sectoral gaps identified by the OCHA Internal Displacement Unit (April 2004)

- In the south and central areas of Somalia IDPs' access to the most basic services is often non-existent mainly due to lack of resources allocated by donors particularly for development activities
- Access to basic education for IDPs is most likely close to nil especially in the south/central Somalia where such services are privately run
- Major gaps in IDP assistance require urgent attention in particular in the fields of HIV/AIDS, psychosocial support, camp management and human rights
- IDPs and minority groups outside their clan area seriously lack protection and as a consequence are denied access to services, subject to forced relocations and forced labour
- Implementation of a UNCT Protection Working Group to monitor the implementation of a protection framework has been limited due to lack of capacity in the field
- UNCT proposed the creation of a Protection Coordinator under the RC/HCs' office
- Somaliland authorities issued an edict whereby it will deport all 'foreigners' who are not of Somaliland origin such as IDPs and minorities
- UNDP/UNHCR Returning Refugee and Internal Displacement Programme (RRIDP) to improve IDPs' food security and livelihood risks to be terminated due to lack of funding

"Protection of IDPs, as well as minority groups, remains a major gap in all three regions of Somalia. In Somali society, protection is the responsibility of the clan and is a process that generally works well. IDPs and other minority groups, being outside their clan areas, have no such benefactors. Consequently they are subject to exploitation (both sexual and economic), denied access to services, subject to forced relocation and forced labour, restricted in their movements, and otherwise discriminated against.

A thematic working group, that included NGOs, has prepared a protection framework document. It calls for the establishment of a UNCT Protection Technical Working Group that will monitor the implementation of the framework. The framework has the broad acceptance of the UNCT but its implementation has been limited due to lack of capacity in the field. Moreover, while OCHA has led this process until recently, OCHA has neither the capacity at present, especially in the field, nor the mandate to drive this process further. UNIFEM has been tasked with coordination of protection, but is questionable whether it too has the necessary capacity or technical experience. The OHCHR, which could play a leadership role in this

regard, has been unable to field a human rights officer to the UNCT for eighteen months despite the resources for such a post being available for one donor. Consequently, the UNCT has proposed that a post of Protection Coordinator be created under the RC/HCs office to take on full responsibility for the implementation of the UNCT protection framework. Two donors have expressed some interest in possibly supporting such a post. Special effort must, therefore, be made to follow-up with donors on resourcing this important post.

Implementing an effective protection strategy will also require close collaboration with the authorities in Somaliland and Puntland. In the latter case, there appears to be some interest on the part of the Government in addressing this issue. In Somaliland, the protection issue has been exacerbated by that Government's edict that it will deport all 'foreigners' – IDPs and other minorities that are not of Somaliland origin. This situation needs to be monitored closely and adds urgency to OCHA's deployment of the Hargeisa post. One option for the HC is to follow-up on recommendations of the Hargeisa IDP Workshop of 2002 that recommended a series of Guiding Principles training courses for local authorities, leading in the case of Somaliland and Puntland authorities to the adoption of official IDP policies. With the establishment of NRC in Hargeisa, OCHA should draw on the agency for support in such training.

In the south/central region, the problem is even more acute as there are as yet no legitimate authorities with which to engage. However, preparations for such engagement with the new Government, should it materialize, should be started now. In the meantime, awareness raising of the rights of IDPs and minority **groups and of the responsibilities of the local 'authorities' should be undertaken through civil society** institutions and through the use of IRIN radio broadcasts on the Guiding Principles.

[...]

WFP no longer provides any blanket feeding, albeit targeted assistance such as school feeding and support to refugee returnees is undertaken. This means that the HVCs do at least have some fingerhold on livelihood opportunities. However, given the abject squalor of the camps, they are living well below acceptable living conditions. Targeted livelihood enhancement programming is therefore essential. It needs to be elevated as the fifth component of the UNCT's strategy for the provision of basic services – vocational training, however basic, and access to income generating opportunities. Unless the issue of livelihoods is addressed concomitantly with that of the provision of basic services, the latter will never become sustainable and projects will either fall into disrepair or require long-term injection of external resources which few, if any donors are willing to support.

The foundations of this type of intervention has been laid by the joint UNDP/UNHCR Returning Refugee and Internal Displacement Programme (RRIDP). However, to date, this important initiative has received only scant funding from donors and is at risk of being terminated as a result. Donors expressed some concern on the effectiveness of the implementation of the programme as well as the degree of collaboration between the two implementing agencies. These allegations need to be reviewed and urgently addressed if found to be right." (OCHA IDP Unit, 16 April 2004)

Information gaps in Somalia prove deleterious to humanitarian programming and advocacy (2003)

- OCHA and SACB information efforts have not been fully implemented due to absence of staff

"The OCHA network is starting to improve the quality and quantity of information coming out of the field that is feeding into the aid community through the SACB structures and to UN Headquarters level through regular weekly and monthly updates, together with reports to the Security Council and General Assembly. The UN has continued to support public awareness and media activities, but the absence of a dedicated staff person has meant that these activities have not been fully implemented. OCHA is actively working with the International NGO community to establish ways in which the network can best benefit the wider aid community in Somalia." (UN, 3 June 2003, p.5)

"Amidst increasing concern over the deplorable conditions of IDPs and minorities – who comprise nearly half of an estimated chronically vulnerable 750,000 Somalis – the year also saw innovative attempts to better define vulnerability in the Somali context. At the request of the UNCT, *A UN Report on Internally Displaced Persons in Somalia* was published in July 2002, which provided a first comprehensive contextual analysis of internal displacement. As part of this process, a draft *Operational Framework for Vulnerable Communities in Somalia* has been developed as the basis for further discussion among the UNCT, with the ultimate aim of developing a countrywide strategy for addressing vulnerability. Using a community-based approach, it seeks to: 1) set objectives and modalities for supporting dedicated national actors in the implementation of both short- and long-term interventions designed to address the needs of the most acutely vulnerable communities, and 2) in doing so, to challenge conventional programme planning methods by encouraging organisations to assess needs in a more holistic manner, as opposed to strategising strictly within the confines of their mandate." (UN, November 2002, p.3)

Lack of clear mandate and coordination to assist IDPs (2002)

- There is no clarity as to whom should provide IDPs with assistance in Somaliland
- Assistance to IDPs has been on ad hoc basis
- IDPs complained of diversion of relief supplies by local authorities in Hargeisa

"International aid agencies lack coordination when dealing with long-term assistance for internally displaced and returnee populations in the self-declared republic of Somaliland, northwestern Somalia, says a report from the United Nations Coordination Unit/Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNCU/OCHA).

"The primary reason is the problem associated with which agency has, or should have, a mandate to assist these communities," said the joint report. Efforts to form a joint committee to sort out this issue had also not materialised, it added.

As a result, the "little assistance" delivered to the region to date had been on an ad hoc basis. This meant that the prospect of as many as 80,000 returnees to Somaliland arriving over the next two years was raising "grave concerns" with regard to increased social and economic pressures on both local authorities and resident populations.

UNCU/OCHA recommended that any further assistance for internally displaced persons (IDPs), particularly those in Dima camp in the Somaliland capital, Hargeysa, should be conducted with the consultation of the IDPs themselves, as complaints regarding the diversion of relief supplies by local authorities had been lodged. It was also necessary to establish a system of monitoring and evaluating the delivery of any relief supplies." (IRIN 15 August 2002)

Policy and recommendations

Recommendations from the OCHA Unit on Internal Displacement (April 2004)

- Deploy remaining international humanitarian officers to central Somalia and strengthen links to the Wartorn Societies Project to strengthen coordination
- That the UNCT strengthen efforts to provide basic education, basic services, and livelihood enhancement programmes to IDPs and highly vulnerable communities

- Reassess who should carry out the coordination of the UNCT's protection activities as UNIFEM lacks capacity
- Appoint a Protection Coordinator within the UNCT
- Strengthen advocacy for donor funding particularly in long-term provisions in order to break the cycle of relief interventions for IDPs

"The mission makes the following recommendations to the HC, the UNCT and to OCHA:

- That the deployment of the remaining international humanitarian officers to the central region be given the highest priority by OCHA in order to effectively strengthen the level of field coordination and the monitoring of the humanitarian environment;
- That OCHA strengthens its level of coordination with local NGOs and civil society through closer links with the Wartorn Societies Project's (WSP);
- That the UNCT increase its efforts in promoting access to basic education among HVC's, as well as capacity building among adults for income generation;
- That the UNCT's strategy of providing the four basic services to all HVCs is strengthened and that the provision of livelihoods enhancement programming is added as the fifth 'service' in order to increase the sustainability of the other four;
- That the coordination of the UNCT's protection activities be reassessed as UNIFEM lacks the capacity to lead this process;
- **That the Protection Coordinator position within the UNCT is be filled as quickly as possible and priority be placed on the search for donor resources for this post;**
- That a project proposal is developed in order to implement the programming proposed by the Kismayo Livelihood Study in Puntland;
- That a 4Rs workshop be organized jointly by UNDP and UNHCR drawing on the experienced gained in other countries that have passed through transition;
- That the advocacy on behalf of the UNCT for resources be strengthened at HQ and capital levels; and
- That the donor community be continually reminded that longer-term provisions of funding in Somalia are needed to break the unending cycle of relief interventions for Somalia's HVCs." (OCHA IDP Unit, 16 April 2004)

Recommendations of the independent expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia (2003)

- At the request of the Ministry of Justice of Somaliland, the expert recommended to establish an office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Hargeisa
- **The Expert recommends to set up a committee of experts to investigate past human rights violations and crimes against humanity**
- The expert encouraged continued multi-agency activities to meet IDPs' short-term needs and to find long-term solutions for their integration
- The expert recommended the international community to assist local authorities and civil society in fulfilling their roles for the protection and promotion of human rights

"The Minister of Justice, in his meeting with the mission, expressed the desire for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to be represented in "Somaliland". He also said that it would be useful to have specialist human rights training to raise awareness in the region.

[...]

The expert noted that a law for the establishment of an independent national human rights commission had been drafted, and commended the participatory process involved in its preparation. The "President" expressed his approval and indicated his future support for it when it was submitted for approval. The establishment of the commission had been suggested by the expert during earlier missions.

[...]

(c) Calls on the Secretary-General and the Security Council to establish a committee of independent experts to examine allegations of past massive human rights violations and crimes against humanity committed in Somalia, and to report on options for how these might be addressed;

[...]

(f) Encourages continued comprehensive multi-agency efforts to cater for both the short-term needs of IDPs as well as longer-term solutions to the problem of integration, including the provision of social services to cater for their humane absorption into society;

(g) Calls upon all Somali local authorities to pay serious attention to the protection of children and to coordinate with UNICEF and all other international NGOs to achieve the goal of a better life for the children of Somalia;

(h) Recommends that the international community and local authorities render every assistance to civil society in fulfilling its role with respect to the protection and promotion of human rights in Somalia;

(i) Calls upon all Somali local authorities to provide full protection and support for international humanitarian aid personnel operating in Somalia;

(j) With respect specifically to activity of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the expert recommends the establishment of an office based in Hargeisa, "Somaliland", having close operational links with trained partner umbrella women's organizations in "Somaliland", "Puntland", Kismayo and Mogadishu. The OHCHR international representative would coordinate his/her work with the activities being undertaken under the UNDP ROLS project and undertake the documenting of human rights violations and activities. Human rights advocacy would also be included in the project mandate as an indispensable element for building a human rights culture. He also advises collaboration with civil society groups taking part in the Somali National Reconciliation Conference, with a view to ensuring that they are effectively represented at the meeting." (UNCHR, 30 November 2003, paras.58, 63, 101)

UNCU recommendations for IDPs in Somaliland and Puntland (2002)

- Legal frameworks for land-ownership for IDPs must be established
- Local governments to develop clear IDP policy
- Conduct delivery of humanitarian assistance and services with full consultation and participation of IDPs to avoid diversions and answer appropriate needs
- Urban planning to integrate 30,000 IDPs in Bosasso needed
- Human rights should be monitored in IDP settlements

Somaliland:

"The relocation and resettlement of IDPs granting security of tenure in cooperation with the local municipality should be a matter of urgent discussion between international agencies and governmental authorities.

The local government and municipal authorities should be encouraged to outline a clear policy statement with respect to their policy vis-a-vis IDPs in Somaliland. This should include clear guidelines with respect to the social and legal status of IDPs of southern origin.

There is lack of coordination among international agencies in terms of long-term assistance to IDP and Returnee populations. The primary reason is the problem associated with which agency has, or should have, a mandate to assist these communities. Efforts among international agencies to convene a joint committee have not materialized. As a result the little assistance delivered so far has been conducted on ad-hoc basis.

The prospect of as many as 80,000 returnees arriving to northwest Somalia over the next 2 years raised grave concerns about the increasing economic and social burden to local municipal authorities and resident populations.

In light of the fact that IDPs, particularly those in Dima Camp, have complained that intended relief supplies are regularly diverted by local authorities, any further assistance from international agencies should be conducted with the consultation of the IDPs themselves.

In addition, the international agencies need to establish a mechanism of monitoring and evaluating the delivery of assistance.

A short-term food for work program for IDPs in Dima camp should be introduced to rebuild roads in Hargeisa that were destroyed by the 1999 floods. This would generate employment and improve the nutritional and health problems which are particularly acute among the Ajjuran of Dima Camp." (UNCU 30 July 2002, p.12)

Bosasso:

"There is a vital need for the implementation of an urban planning program for Bosasso town which would incorporate the wide range of planning problems of the estimated 30,000 IDPs in and around Bosasso.

There must be a clear and official recognition of the problem by the Puntland State. This must be stated in official policy by both municipal and central authorities. At present central authorities and local authorities are not in agreement in terms of the future of Bosasso's IDPs. Government officials would like most IDPs to be eventually repatriated to south and central Somalia, while the Mayor of Bosasso is keen to find a permanent solution within the context of the Bosasso municipality.

As an important pre-requisite for future investment and project assistance for the IDPs on the part of governmental and international agencies, is a legal framework for land-ownership and the legal status of the IDPs must be established.

To avoid raising expectations and avoid political and social problems, any project or service delivered to the IDP camps should be done so with the full consultation and participation of the elders of the respective communities.

An independent agency or local NGO with the full knowledge and cooperation of the Municipal and State authorities should monitor the abuse of human rights in the IDP camps which range from sexual assault and rape to homicide. The UN Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR)—Somalia should take the lead in this endeavor in cooperation with well-trained local NGOs.

Finally, there is a vital need for coordination between international agencies and NGOs with respect to Bosasso's IDP population. As yet, coordination and information sharing between agencies has been dismally poor. Africa 70s intervention in terms of mapping the composition and outlining the priority needs of the IDPs has yet to be supported seriously by other international agencies. Agency staff have pointed out that this stems from conflicting mandates and responsibilities and a lack of interest on the part of local authorities. However, our own research found that key governmental staff are keen to design and implement humanitarian and long-term assistance to the IDPs. Local authorities have shown their good faith by setting aside public land for a pilot resettlement project." (UNCU, 30 July 2002, pp.21-2)

In order to read about UNCU's particular recommendations for Hargeisa, Buroa-Yirowe, and Awdal region please consult the source below.

Reference to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

Known references to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (Apr 2004)

- References to the Guiding Principles Reference to the Guiding Principles in the national legislation
- Other References to the Guiding Principles (in chronological order)
- Availability of the Guiding Principles in local languages
- Training on the Guiding Principles (in chronological order)

Reference to the Guiding Principles in the national legislation

None

Other references to the Guiding Principles

None

Availability of the Guiding Principles

The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement have been translated in Arabic in 1998

You can access the Arab version here:

http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/principles_arab.pdf

Training on the Guiding Principles

None

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AFP	Agence France Presse
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
DSA	Digil Salvation Army
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FEWS	Famine Early Warning System
FFT	Food-For-Training
FFW	Food-For-Work
FSAU	Food Security Assessment Unit
HIV/AIDS	Human Immuno-deficiency Virus (AIDS)
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICS	International Committee for Somali
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGAD	Inter-governmental Authority on Development
MRR&P	Ministry of Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
MT	Metric Tonne
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OAU	Organization of Africa Unity
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
RRA	Rahanwein Resistance Army
SACB	Somalia Aid Coordination Body
SPM	Somali Patriotic Movement
SSNM	Southern Somali National Movement
UMCOR	United Methodist Committee on Relief
UN	United Nations
UNCHS	United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat)
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNCU	United Nations Coordination Unit
UNDP EUE	United Nations Development Programme - Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia
UNESCO	United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNITAF	United Task Force
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPOS	United Nations Political Office for Somalia
UNV	United Nations Volunteers
USAID	United States Agency for International Agency
VAW	Violence Against Women
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

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